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ABSTRACT 
Due to an absence of extensive sophisticated political tracts and an assumption that the 
Islamic Movement (IM) in Palestine' is violent, existing scholarship has largely ignored 
the IM's political theory. Mirroring general Western discourse, it has tended to 
categorize Islamists2 as anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic, dismissing instances of 
Islamist adoption of internal elections and cooperation with ideological `others' as 
Machiavellian. Analysis of Western discourse reveals correlations between perspective, 
methodology and conclusions. Building on this, I have adopted a perspective which 
acknowledges the possibility of multiple, in particular non-secular, paths to the ideals 
enshrined in (among others) Western democracy, and seeks to create a hermeneutical 
dialectic between different perspectives: Islamist versus non-Islamist narratives, Islamist 
theory versus comparable Western constructs, ideals versus praxis. Focussing on the 
Gaza Strip and domestic Palestinian politics, and drawing primarily on interviews, I 
have analysed the IM's understanding of ideal governance, political process and the 
body politic. 
Following this approach, I have found that, like Locke, the IM in the Gaza Strip views 
legitimate authority as contractarian within a divine framework. Political authority 
resides in election. Echoing Buchanan and Tullock, weighted majority rule is regarded 
as optimal, unanimity as the ideal. Multiple `right' interpretations of truth are 
acknowledged to exist. Dissent is deemed essential to truth, harmony and consensus to 
maintaining political community. The ideal constitution, predetermined only qua 
principles, is to be created through community-wide consultations. Mirroring Giovanni 
Sartori's observation that, while value consensus is not imperative for a political 
community to function, procedural consensus is essential, the IM welcomes procedural 
compromise with other-thinkers but refuses to compromise on its core values, aware 
that multiple value systems can coexist under procedural consensus. Trends are 
emerging which argue for equal rights for Christians and communists to public office on 
the basis of contractarian and rights-based theories. Like Hegel, the IM defines freedom 
as voluntarily and self-consciously willing the universal/divine - thus rendering coerced 
freedom meaningless - and sees the state as educator and embodiment of the universal. 
Significantly, however, and unlike Hegel, it insists on the social contract as the basis for 
state legitimacy. 
The above findings show that democratic-like, pluralistic expressions of Islamism exist, 
where present research denied they did. Perspective and method seem to have prevented 
scholars from perceiving these expressions. Conversely, problematisation of the 
`secular prejudice' and of Western presumptions about Islamism, incorporation of the 
Islamist perspective, and the creation of a hermeneutical dialectic between Western and 
Islamist political thinking, appears to enable a more objective analysis of existing data, 
leading to the discernment of a relatively coherent, democratic-like Islamist theory. 
1 Comprising the resistance movement Hamas, its student wing, the political off-shoot Hizb al-Khalas and 
affiliated Islamic charities. 
2 Those advocating a society and state based on Islamic principles. 
... 
be patient towards all that is unsolved in your heart... 
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PART I 
APPROACHING ISLAMISM 
,! 
L' . 
^ý 
r'ý^, ! 
CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEMATIQUE: 
ISLAMISTS, DEMOCRACY AND WESTERN CONSTRUCTS 
OF ISLAMISM 
The paradigm' still largely dominant among Western2 scholars of what has variously 
been called `Islamic fundamentalism', `radical Islam' or `political Islam', but which I 
will refer to as 'Islamism', ' is problematic. Its depiction of Islamism (the ideology 
advocating the creation of a society and state based on Islamic principles) as a violent, 
anti-pluralistic and anti-democratic monolith -a depiction based on the view that 
Islamists habitually engage in violence against ideological `others', denounce Western- 
style democracy, and insist on the absolute sovereignty of God - fails to explain, beyond 
dismissing them as insincere, such non-violent, pluralistic and democratic-like instances 
as Islamists conducting elections to select their leaders, cooperating with ideological 
1 `Paradigm' is here used to denote a set of loosely shared constructs, however arrived at. The discursive 
field producing these constructs is not monolithic. 
2 Those operating within a Western social science framework, regardless of geographical origin or 
domicile. 
3 The term `fundamentalism' is problematic because of its Christian origins, its relative inappropriateness 
to Islam (which is by definition fundamentalist), its inappropriateness to Islamism (which is not necessarily 
slavishly traditional) and its derogative connotations (see John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 
pp7-8; Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State, ppix-x, 1-3,32-34; Abdel Salam Sidahmed & 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds), Islamic Fundamentalism, pp2-5; Dale Eickelman & James Piscatori, Muslim 
Politics, pp68-69). 'Radical Islam' has derogative connotations and lacks descriptive precision. `Political 
Islam' would be appropriate but for the fact that it does not highlight the social focus of this entity as 
`political' carries connotations of 'that which concerns the state' (cf. D. D. Raphael, Problems of Political 
Philosophy). `Islamism' best characterises this phenomenon as an ideology based on Islam, with both social 
and political applications. 
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`others' and advocating contractarian theories of government which grant non-Muslims 
near-equal political rights to Muslims. The proliferation of data conflicting with this 
dominant paradigm calls for a paradigm shift, ' or at least a different way of thinking 
about Islamism. A growing number of scholars, encouraged by the debate caused by, 
among others, Edward Said's Orientalism (1978) and the rise in popularity of post- 
modernist critiques of metanarratives and modernity, ' has begun to challenge the 
existing model and to try to account for these `conflicting' data. 
This thesis is conceived as part of this revisionist trend. At its most immediate level, it 
queries whether all forms of Islamism are truly, and inherently, authoritarian, intolerant 
and violent. At a second level, it explores to what extent they indeed differ from 
Western democratic notions, and whether one can find a basis for evaluating them as a 
Westerner while neither positing Western notions as normative, nor rendering the 
evaluation meaningless by resorting to total relativism. This research is situated within 
the wider debate, reignited by the global rise of what is generally called `religious 
fundamentalism', on the role of religion in politics, on the extent of the universality of 
values and systems (including the human rights debate), and on the nature of the new 
world order (and whether the future will be a `clash of civilizations' or the adoption of 
capitalist democracy as the pinnacle of history). At a methodological level, it is an 
exploration of how to reduce the ideological and cultural distortion in a Western study 
of Islamism so as to be able to incorporate the widest variety of relevant evidence, even 
if this problematises assumptions regarding Islamism or beliefs concerning progress, 
modernity, secularism and democracy. It thus touches on the question of whether one 
4 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientifrc Revolutions. 
5 This is not to claim that these scholars are post-modernist, only that post-modernism helped to create a 
more pluralistic climate in which non-Western cultures could be studied with less meta-narrative baggage. 
See also Armando Salvatore, Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity, p145. 
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can stay true to one's analytical framework while delivering research in which the 
studied subjects can still recognise themselves. ' 
The focus of this thesis is the political theory and praxis of the Islamic Movement (IM) 
in the Gaza Strip -a loose network affiliated to the international Muslim 
Brotherhood, 
comprising Hamas, ' the student movement al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah, the political party 
Hizb al-Khalas, and Islamic charities such as al-Mujamma` al-Islami, and al-Jam'iyyah 
al-Shabbat al-Muslimat. 8 Through this focus, I will test the validity of the proposed call 
for a paradigm shift, and experiment with different ways of thinking about Islamism. I 
have chosen to limit myself to a specific movement in a limited area to be able to root 
my observations sufficiently in the particular and avoid making unsupported sweeping 
generalisations (see further for significance of this approach). 
The IM is of particular interest vis ä vis the debate concerning the nature of Islamist 
political theory and Islamism's relationship with democracy. Palestine is a vibrant 
meeting place between `Islamic' and `Western' ideas, with its proximity to Israel, its 
large Diaspora in both `Islamic' and `Western' cultures, and its people's high level of 
education. Eighty years of de facto occupation and the glimpse of an independent future 
offered by the recent Peace Process, have made Palestinians acutely aware of their 
unique chance to reshape their political system, rendering Palestinian Islamist notions of 
an Islamic state particularly compelling. Gaza is the main seat of both the embryonic 
Palestinian proto-state institutions, and of the political wing of the IM (as distinct from 
the `military' wing which is highly decentralised, independent and operates mostly from 
John Voll, `Foreword' in Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pxix. 
7 Acronym for Harakah al-Muqawwamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement), meaning `zeal'. 
8 For reasons of time and space, this thesis will not focus on al-Jam`iyyah al-Islamiyyah or any other of the 
Islamic charities affiliated to the IM, on the assumption that the charities studied, being the flagship charities 
of the male and female sections of the IM respectively, will be reasonably representative of the IM's overall 
charitable culture. For reasons of space and simplicity, this thesis will also not focus on other Islamic groups 
such as Islamic Jihad, Hizb al-Tahrir or al-Salafiyyun. 
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the West Bank) .9 
As such, the Gazan IM is specifically interesting to study. To 
understand - beyond such ideologised and totalistic notions as 
`democratic' or `anti- 
democratic' - how it thinks, what it values, and how this 
is translated into praxis, is 
significant for the wider study of Islamism, particularly as the IM has a high profile 
among Islamists due to its operating in what Islamists worldwide regard as one of the 
most visible struggles against Western hegemony in the shape of Israel. It is equally 
important with regard to the continuing peace negotiations. 
I will limit myself to the political, defined loosely as that which concerns the 
organisation of power. This broad definition has the advantage of rising above such 
definitional dichotomies as state versus non-state, 10 high versus low politics, public 
versus private, religion versus politics, coercion versus negotiated persuasion, or 
symbols versus structures. " Organisation of power is found in both state and non-state 
structures, both the public and the private - an example being the hijaib (headscarf), a 
private decision with very public consequences. Organisation involves structures as 
well as rules. Consequently, it has both physical and conceptual aspects. This study 
will focus on both, on the grounds that praxis, as action or structure, is a manifestation 
of the values underpinning the practitioner's ideals. 
Within the political, I will concentrate on the domestic, that which concerns the 
organisation of power within what the IM regards as its habitat. This thesis will not 
discuss the IM's relationship with Israel, Arab states or the West, nor its views on the 
Palestinian people, the land or the role of terror-instilling tactics in warfare. While each 
9 Cf. Ahmad Rashad, Hamas, p38; Sara Roy, `Beyond Hamas', Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Review 2(1), pp30-3 1; Roger Gaess, `Interview with Mousa Abu Marzook', Middle East Policy V(2), pp 115- 
116; personal interviews with Ismail Abu Shannab IV, Ghazi Hammad II, `Muhammad', `Ashraf , `Ahmad'. 
10 Cf. Raphael. 
11 Cf. also discussion in Eickelman & Piscatori, pp3-21; David Held, `A Discipline of Politics? ' in A. 
Leftwich (ed), What is Politics?, p144 ("a phenomenon found in and between all groups, institutions (formal 
and informal) and societies, cutting across public and private life"). 
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of these questions is important and one could argue that they cannot be separated from 
the IM's domestic politics, particularly as a significant part of the IM's raison d'etre is 
its rejection of the current Peace Process and its insistence on armed resistance, both in 
the name of nationalism, I will not discuss these issues because of considerations of 
space. In Part II, which focuses on intra-Palestinian political violence, I will justify in 
more detail why I have chosen to exclude political violence against Israel from this 
study, particularly as the IM - and Hamas in particular - is often defined in the public 
mind in terms of its use of terrorist tactics against Israel. " 
Throughout I will use the word `discourse' to mean a self-consciously constructed set of 
utterances, which taken together constitute a conceptual approach. Examples are 
Western `discourse' on Islamism and Islamist political discourse. I will reserve the term 
`narrative' to refer to a less self-consciously constructed, less theoretical set of 
utterances, pertaining generally to events. 
Any attempt at finding new ways of thinking about Islamism must be defined in relation 
to existing Western discourse on Islamism. Moreover, if a paradigm shift is to be 
realised, it must be clarified as to what blinds scholars who have sustained the dominant 
paradigm, to the discrepancies between model and evidence, so as to maximise one's 
own responsiveness to available evidence. This and the next chapter will focus on these 
issues. 
Developments in both natural and social sciences13 have led to the acknowledgement 
that observations are influenced by the observer's conceptual framework and the process 
12 By `terrorist' I mean violence perpetrated indiscriminately against a population (without regard for age, 
gender or civilian/military status) to instill terror. By the same token, some of Israel's actions could be 
described as `terrorist'. 
13 Cf. Theory of Relativity, Quantum Mechanics; psychoanalysis, ideology-critique, Gadamerian 
hermeneutics. 
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of measuring itself. `Reality', or that which exists `objectively' outside the `subjective' 
mind of the observer, is thus understood to be unknowable directly but only through the 
distortions of mind and measuring. Social `reality', moreover, has been acknowledged 
to be fundamentally polysemous because of the meaningfulness of human action, 
resulting in similar actions carrying different meanings and rendering conclusions 
extremely vulnerable to perspective and method. 14 Conceptual perspective, 
methodology and conclusions are thus clearly linked. 
Against these developments, `objectivity' in its traditional sense of reaching conclusions 
independent of subjective perspective, is no longer achievable - leading some to adopt 
ontological relativism or subjectivism, and to deny the existence of an independent 
`reality' altogether. Yet, even from aperspectivist and fallibilistic15 perspective it is 
possible to uphold the existence of an independent reality, even if not directly known, 
and maintain what is known of reality as the yardstick by which the validity of theories 
is judged. Objectivity, then, ceases, with Brian Fay, to be "a property of the results of an 
inquiry" and becomes "a property of the process of inquiry itse f'. 16 An inquiry is 
objective in this sense if 
its procedures and ... judgments ... be responsive to the evidence as best it can be 
determined, and ... to other possible interpretations of this evidence.... [It] must require 
its practitioners to seek out facts which appear relevant to the case, to follow the lead of 
these facts even if it goes against accepted preconditions ..., to put their explanations up 
14 Cf. Gilbert Ryle's famous description of the different meanings behind the contracting of an eye-lid - from meaningless twitch, to conspirational wink and parody of conspirational wink; quoted in Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures, pp6-7. 
15 Scientific conclusions are dependent on the observer's perspective; knowledge about the world is never 
certain or final. Terminology borrowed from Brian Fay, Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science, pp208, 
72. 
16 Fay, pp212-213,216-217. Fay's conclusions closely follow Richard Bernstein's in Beyond Objectivism 
and Relativism. 
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against other explanations to show that theirs are superior, and to be willing to revise or 
abandon their conclusions ... 
Objectivity thus becomes "a social process of ongoing criticism", of problematising 
assumptions, method and constructs, and compelling oneself to continually evaluate the 
impact of one's perspective and methodology on one's conclusions. This, however, 
should not degenerate into "a form of biography in which social theorists reveal a great 
deal about themselves but almost nothing about those they are studying". " 
To establish which perspectives and methodological strategies increase responsiveness 
to the available evidence, I will subject the existing genre of Western discourse on 
Islamism to the process of evaluation just described, in an attempt to discern the 
influence of perspective and method on conclusions. Others have analysed existing 
discourse and observed, to varying degrees, correlations between perspective, method 
and conclusion. Said argues that the essentialist mindset of Western scholars of the 
Orient, which defined the Orient as the antithesis of the Occident, eternally different, 
essentially inferior, and frightening, encouraged the adoption of a methodology which 
privileged "abstractions ... 
based on texts representing a `classical' Oriental civilization" 
to "direct evidence from modem Oriental realities". " John Esposito and John Voll list 
the unproblematised adoption of a secularist perspective as one of the chief factors 
leading scholars to misunderstand the nature of Islamist movements. Armando 
Salvatore, Bobby Sayyid and C. A. O van Nieuwenhuijze likewise point to the obscuring 
17 Cf. also Fred Halliday's criticism of both Said and the Orientalists (see further), that both focus "more on 
discourse than on the analysis of reality" ("Orientalism' and its Critics', British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 20(2), p162). 
18 Said, cf ppl-28,300-302. 
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effect of the Eurocentricity of perspectives rooted in modernisation and development 
theories. 19 
Besides these studies concerned with determining the overall perspectival flaws 
underlying Western research, others have catalogued the different approaches and 
conclusions within the Western genre. Shireen Hunter divides scholars between neo- 
Orientalists and neo-Third-Worldists, according to whether they attribute Eastern 
behaviour "to certain cultural traits and peculiarities of Islam", or follow the Third- 
Woridist tradition of the 1960s-1970s which saw "the root causes of the West's 
problems with the Third World countries ... in the 
West's imperial and colonial past". 
Ghassan Salame similarly divides the field into culturalists and non-culturalists, 
depending on whether they "think that a specific culture and/or religion could in itself be 
an obstacle to experimentation with democracy" 2° 
Neither of these types of studies has focussed explicitly and extensively on 
methodology, the impact perspective has thereon, or the influence method has on 
conclusions? ' Moreover, the cataloguers' focus on cataloguing has tended to weaken 
their effort at problematising, while the problematisers' focus on problematising has 
generally prevented them from highlighting those areas of Western research which were 
relatively successful in `objectively' conveying `reality'. The latter, consequently, can 
(inadvertently) resort to essentialisation of the field. Said best exemplifies this. By 
refusing to distinguish between different types of Western discourse, he blanketly 
19 Esposito, Threat; Voll, `Foreword'; Salvatore, Islam; Bobby Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear; C. A. O van 
Nieuwenhuijze, `On the Prospects of Intercultural Studies and International Education' in van Nieuwenhuijze, 
Paradise Lost. 
20 Shireen Hunter, 'The Rise of Islamist Movements and the Western Response: Clash of Civilizations or 
Clash of Interests' in Laura Guazzone (ed), The Islamist Dilemma, pp320-321; Ghassan Salam6, 
`Introduction: Where are the Democrats? ' in Ghassan Salamd (ed), Democracy without Democrats?, p3. 
21 Cf. Said's (undeveloped) assertion that only a critical methodological self-consciousness will suffice to 
free scholars of Orientalism's hold (pp326-327). 
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condemns all such as essentialist, and, consequently, implies that cross-cultural research 
is inherently "corrupt" for its being intertwined in existing power structures. 2 Not all 
Western research is essentialist, nor is all cross-cultural research "corrupt" - distorted 
though it may be. Without multiple categories, Said is unable to acknowledge this, or 
discern which research is better than others, and why. 23 
To be able to draw up an analytical framework which can sustain a new way of studying 
Islamism, the two approaches must be combined to arrive at a clearer understanding of 
which combination of perspective and methodology maximises `objectivity'. Salvatore 
and van Nieuwenhuijze both proffer problematising categorisations, Salvatore from a 
genealogical perspective, charting the development of Western research on Islamism 
against historical events. As I am concerned with the state of contemporary research, 
and employ a more ahistorical conception of perspective and method, 24 Salvatore's 
classification is only tangentially relevant. Van Nieuwenhuijze has problematised four 
of the main academic disciplines concerned with the Middle East. Because each has 
evolved along different perspectival and methodological lines, van Nieuwenhuijze's 
analysis offers the beginnings of the type of analysis I propose. However, because he 
categorises by discipline, rather than individual text, he is in danger of essentialising the 
fields. 
On the basis of my own research, I propose a three-way categorisation based on 
perspective: those who treat Islamism as the immutable `other', Islam as its defining 
22 Cf. Said's contention that all representations are misrepresentations because embedded in the "culture, 
institutions, and political ambience of the representer" (pp272-273). See also critiques of Said: Sadik al- 
`Azm, `Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse', Khamsin 8; Halliday, "Orientalism". 
23 Said only hints that "there is scholarship that is not corrupt" at the end of his book and fails to analyse it 
(pp326-327). Weaknesses notwithstanding, however, Orientalism has been one of the inspirations for this 
thesis. 
24 Though I am aware of the historicity of research and its methods, my contemporaneous focus conflates 
the historical axis, rendering it less relevant than other variables. 
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essence (essentialists); those who approach Islamism from the position that Western 
modernity, and secular democracy in particular, is the norm (modernists); and those who 
allow for the possibility of plural trajectories to the ideals enshrined in `democracy', and 
thus approach Islamism as a possibly legitimate alternative (pluralists)25 Said's 
`Orientalists', Salvatore's first circle, Hunter's `neo-Orientalists' and Salame's 
`culturalists' overlap with my definition of essentialists (though there are qualitative 
differences between Orientalists and neo-Orientalists, and `my' essentialists are 
primarily neo-Orientalist) 26 Salvatore's second and third circle correspond to my 
definition of modernists while his fourth circle, Salame's `non-culturalists' and Hunter's 
`neo-Third-Worldists' incorporate both my categories of modernists and pluralists. 7 It 
is important, however, to differentiate between modernist and pluralist because the 
former's conclusions closely resemble those of the essentialists, despite significant 
ontological and methodological differences. Moreover, as the modernist framework 
appears to be deeply ingrained in parts of Western social science - whether a minimalist 
or maximalist definition of modernity is employed" - it must be located and 
circumscribed in order to be problematised. 
My analysis is based on a sample of twelve texts on the general phenomenon of 
Islamism (country-specific analyses have been excluded for the purpose of simplicity 
25 To distinguish my definition of essentialist, etc., from others, I will italicise mine. 
26 Unlike neo-Orientalism, which is more reductionist, traditional Orientalism displayed, despite its 
dichotomising between self and other, a meticulous "historical-philological respect for the facts" (Van 
Nieuwenhuijze, p341). 
27 Salvatore's 4' comes closest to my definition of pluralists. However, his circle does not problematise 
modernity to the same extent as my pluralists do, leading us to a different interpretation of the same text 
(Chapters 2&6 from Zubaida - see footnote 72). 
28 Cf. Habermas's minimalist conception of modernity as an unfinished project (Die Moderne - Ein 
unvollendetes Projekt, 1992; paraphrased in Salvatore, p172). 
WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF ISLAMISM 12 
and comparability) 29 My choice to start with an analysis of general discussions of 
Islamism is partly aimed at locating my research within the larger arena of general 
Western research on Islamism, and, by extension, Western research on non-Western 
phenomena. A second, methodological reason is that Palestinian Islamism is relatively 
little studied in the West. Its field of scholars is consequently less diverse than the field 
of scholars studying Islamism in general. For creating an analytical framework with 
which to discern correlations between construct, perspective and method, a wider field 
will yield more generally applicable results. 
My sample has been selected on the basis of influentiality, in the sense of being quoted 
by other texts in the genre, or on the basis of providing clear examples of a particular 
category's characteristics? ' Because of the extent of the genre and the small size of the 
sample, the selection is subjective. However, the extent of its representativeness is 
indicated by the fact that the trends it exemplifies are equally found in other general 
texts on Islamism3' and in the texts on Palestinian Islamism to be reviewed in Chapter 
29 Essentialist texts: Samuel Huntington (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (Chapters 3-5,9-10,12; only sections on Islam included); Martin Kramer (1993b), `Islam vs. 
Democracy', Commentary 95(1); Kramer(1993c), `Islam & the West (including Manhattan)', Commentary 
96(4); Judith Miller (1993), `The Challenge of Radical Islam', Foreign Affairs 72(2); Amir Taheri (1987), 
Holy Terror (Chapters 1&13). Modernist texts: Guazzone (1995), `Islamism and Islamists in the 
Contemporary Arab World' in Guazzone; Jean Leca (1994), `Democratization in the Arab World' in Salam6 
(Leca also displays some pluralist aspects); John Waterbury (1994), `Democracy Without Democrats? ' in 
Salamd; Bassam Tibi (1988), The Crisis of Modern Islam (Chapter 1& Conclusion). Pluralist texts: Esposito 
(1992), Threat (Chapter 6); Francois Burgat (1993), The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Chapter: `God or 
the People? Islamists between Theocratic Violence and Democracy'); Zubaida (1989), Islam (Chapters 2&6). 
30 Essentialist: Huntington (book or preceding article, 1993) quoted in e. g. Sayyid, Eickelman & Piscatori, 
Halliday (1996), Guazzone, Salam6; Kramer (1993a) in Eickelman & Piscatori, Guazzone, Miller, 
Dalacoura; Miller in Eickelman & Piscatori, Guazzone; Taheri (included primarily for typicality of 
essentialism) in Ranstorp. Modernist: Guazzone in Dalacoura; Leca & Waterbury (references to Salamd) in 
Eickelman & Piscatori, Sayyid; Tibi in Halliday (1996), Roy (1995), Sayyid, Salvatore. Pluralist : Burgat in 
Roy (1995), Dalacoura, Jensen; Esposito in Roy, Eickelman & Piscatori, Sidahmed & Ehteshami, Huntington 
(1996), Ranstorp, Sayyid, Dalacoura; Zubaida in Ayubi, Halliday (1996), Salvatore, Sayyid, Dalacoura. 
31 Cf. Bernard Lewis, `The Roots of Muslim Rage', The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990 (essentialist); 
Fred Halliday, Islam & the Myth of Confrontation (modernist veering towards pluralist); Olivier Roy, The 
Failure of Political Islam (pluralist with hints of modernism); Eickelman & Piscatori, Muslim Politics 
(pluralist). 
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2.32 Classification is based on the conceptual perspective expressed in the text. 33 An 
author could thus theoretically be classified in two different categories. However, since 
most texts written by the same author tend to display the same perspective, I will, for 
convenience's sake, typify the authors by the category of their text. 
1.1 WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF ISLAMISM 
All three fields touch on the interconnected themes of political violence, pluralism and 
democracy. Each field has its own set of characteristic constructs, despite minor 
variations and a considerable overlap between essentialists and modernists. Essentialist 
texts tend to depict Islamists as inherently violent, " anti-pluralistic35 and anti- 
democratic. 36 Islamism is treated as a monolith, unchangeable and without significant 
internal distinctions. 31 Instances of democratic-like38 behaviour are dismissed as 
Machiavellian dissimulation aimed at gaining power via the "unpatrolled route" of 
elections, for the purpose of imposing an (authoritarian) Islamic state once in power. 39 
Islamism's alleged propensity to violence and incapability of dealing with pluralism are 
32 Most `Palestinian' modernist texts display some essentialist methodological patterns. Though this may 
indicate a different sub-category among the modernists, it does not fundamentally alter the analytical 
framework suggested by this chapter. 
33 One cannot rely on authors' self-declarations. Both Miller (p45) and Taheri (pl), for instance, denounce 
essentialism while engaging in it. 
34 Cf. Huntington, pp254-265 (Islam's "bloody borders"); Taheri, p217 (Muslims' "traditional penchant for 
violence'); Kramer, p36 (emphasising violence, ridiculing charitable institutions). 
35 Cf. Taheri, p191; Miller, pp45,51. 
36 Cf. Huntington, pl 14 (Islamist movements versus 'democratic movements'); Miller, p45; Kramer, pp38, 
41. 
37 Despite protestations (cf. Miller, p45) the picture presented ignores diversity. 
38 `Democratic-like' is used to indicate awareness of democracy's cultural specific roots without sacrificing 
the potentially universal validity of democratic values. 
39 Kramer, p37; Miller, pp47,52. 
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attributed to both Islam's essence and origins, and Islamism's refusal to separate 
religion and politics. 40 Little attention is given to the structural and cultural context 
which has given rise to this violence. Islam/Islamism is posited as the antithesis of the 
West, which is portrayed as essentially rational, pluralistic and democratic. Though 
some within this field hint at the desirability of bridging these differences, " their 
recourse to `essences' gives the two entities of West and Islam(ism) an immutable 
quality, leaving the impression that for differences to be bridged, Islamism must 
exchange its essence for a Western one. 42 
Modernist texts likewise tend to portray Islamists as violent, anti-pluralistic and anti- 
democratic, but qualifiedly so. The violent impulse is partly attributed to the violent 
context of state repression Islamists find themselves in, 43 while anti-pluralistic, anti- 
democratic attitudes are seen as indices of the lack of economic and conceptual 
development in the direction of a Western-type modernity 44 Though Islamism, and 
particularly its anti-secularity, is posited as an anti-thetical `other', it is not depicted as 
the eternal `other', nor necessarily as a monolith 45 With the right type of 
industrialisation, the extension of democratic-like institutions, and the internalisation of 
democratic-like value systems, Islamism could become democratic-like. Yet because 
modernists insist this can only occur with the secularisation of Islamism, they in effect 
demand that Islamism be stripped of one of its core positions, that religion is inseparable 
from politics. Modernists explicitly allow for change - on their terms. Though echoing 
40 Cf. Huntington, pp254-265; Taheri, pp220-221. 
41 Cf. Huntington, pp320-321. 
42 Cf. also comments on 1s` circle in Salvatore, pp 117-125. 
43 Cf. Guazzone, pp2l, 27; Waterbury, p32. 
44 Tibi, pp30,127-148; Waterbury, pp23-33; Guazzone, pp6-7,9-10,20. 
45 Cf. Guazzone, pp 12-16. Tibi, Waterbury do not make significant distinctions, Leca only hints at one (p55). 
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the essentialist stance, theirs is more flexible. Modernity being seen as a state of mind 
and a product of structures, both of which are not deemed culturally specific, Islamism 
could keep some of its `essence' while adopting the key characteristics which make for 
modernity. 46 
Pluralist texts refuse to treat Islamism as a monolith and the Western model as an 
unproblematic universal norm. Consequently, they refrain from blanketly characterising 
Islamists as either violent, anti-pluralistic or anti-democratic. They list incidents of 
violence4' - within their structural and cultural context - alongside incidents of 
pluralistic behaviour 48 They chronicle Islamist statements attacking democracy as an 
alien notion alongside statements defending democracy as Islamic 49 They warn that 
unless Islamists change their core constructs concerning citizenship and political 
equality - at present favouring Muslims over non-Muslims - Islamist states will be 
discriminatory and ideologically repressive 50 Yet they balance such warnings by 
criticising Western illiberal praxis towards those challenging the ideological basis of 
Western states, " questioning the extent of the West's secularisation, or even the 
universal desirability of the concept of democracy 52 Fundamentally, pluralists are more 
willing to problematise both their preconceptions of Islamism and the Western political 
46 Cf. also comments on 2"d and 3'd circles in Salvatore, pp125-129,171-178 (especially Halpern: 
modernised Islam would be so "changed" as to no longer be "Islam"; p 127). 
47 Cf. Burgat, p115; Esposito, pp180,208. 
48 Burgat, pp132-135; Esposito, ppl88-189; Leca, pp54-60 (modernist with pluralist leanings). 
49 Cf. Burgat, ppl24-131; Esposito, pp186-189. Zubaida responds by pointing out `Western' aspects of 
Islamist thinking (pp59-60,173-174). 
50 Cf. Burgat, ppl22-135; Esposito, pp187-189. 
51 Cf. Burgat, p131; Esposito, p177. 
52 Burgat, pp129-130; Leca, p75 (whether democracy is "everywhere and always ... the best and only way to `solve problems"'). Zubaida is less explicit, yet critiques modernisation theories (p123). 
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constructs they employ to understand Islamism. Significantly, they refuse to foreclose 
the possibility of an Islamic form of (non-secular) democracy. 53 
The modernist-essentialist emphasis on violence was partly triggered by the radical 
violence of the first contemporary Islamist groups coming to the West's notice from the 
end of the 1970s onwards. Before then, it was commonly believed that Islam was on its 
inevitable path to marginalisation in the face of modernity 54 When `Islam' burst into 
Western consciousness again, the audacity of the violence both obscured the (continued) 
existence of a non-violent Islamism and `confirmed' the secularist prejudice that religio- 
politics leads to violence. " Counter pointers were drowned out. Tibi and Taheri, 
writing during the 1980s, can be partly exonerated for not looking beyond violence 
(though by the time Taheri wrote, Egyptian Muslim Brothers had run for election and 
condemned violence). " With the proliferation of Islamist democratic-like actions 
during the late 1980s and 1990s, none of the others have this excuse. 
1.2 CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
With a view to the level of problematisation allowed by a text, two conceptual 
commitments stand out specifically: the author's attitude towards the universality of the 
Western historical trajectory, and the extent to which the author indulges in 
dichotomisation. I will discuss each in turn. 
53 Esposito, p187 (on Islamic democracy); Leca, p75. 
54 Cf. J. Harris Procter (ed), Islam and International Relations, pvii; quoted in Daniel Pipes, In the Path of 
God. - Islam and Political Power, p8. 
55 Cf. Esposito: "The assumption that the mixing of religion and politics necessarily and inevitably leads to 
fanaticism and extremism has been a major factor in our concluding that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible" (p208). 
56 Abdel Aziz Ramadan, `Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt' in Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby (eds), 
Fundamentalisms and the State, pp 173-178. 
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Attitudes towards the Western Model 
A chief difference between essentialists and modernists on the one hand, and pluralists 
on the other, is their respective attitudes towards the Western historical trajectory. To 
the former, the West's ideational and structural development (which most appear to 
equate with `modernity')" is the model for the rest of the world. " Emphases differ, 
with some attributing more importance to the adoption of Western values and ideas, in 
particular pluralism, human rights and secular democracy 59 Others emphasise the 
importance of structural development, in particular industrialisation, the growth of trade 
and the middle classes. 60 For the non-West to adopt the Western model, it must, 
according to both, shed some of its characteristics, such as the sacralising of politics. To 
both, modernity is a quality which is external to the non-Western world - to be imported 
to replace indigenous constructs and structures. 61 Essentialists, however, are less 
optimistic about the non-West's capability to internalise modernity, particularly its 
ideational side, on the grounds that this is part of the West's essence, and that changing 
one's essence is nigh impossible. 62 
57 Positions are ambiguous. E. g. Huntington denies it does, yet by robbing modernity of its ideational 
content, placing this under the category 'Western' (pp68-78,92-93,320-321; also n47), he redefines 
`Westernization' to mean what others call `modernization' (cf. discussion in Sayyid, pp84-126). Salvatore 
observes that modernists are often caught between the conflicting notions of universal progress and Islam as 
an eternally closed system, the latter adopted wholesale from the Orientalists (pp126-127). 
58 This assumption informs statements in cf. Miller, pp45,54; Huntington, pp69-72,114; Taheri, pp14-17; 
Guazzone, pp6-7,9-10; Waterbury, pp24,33. Sayyid argues that conflation of the terms modernity and West is 
one of the reasons for Western miscomprehension of Islamism, as the latter is both modem and anti-Western 
(pp84,126). 
59 Cf. Miller, Taheri, Guazzone 
60 Cf. Waterbury (emphasises ideational aspects too); Tibi. 
61 Cf. Guazzone, pp6-7; Huntington, pp100-101,320-321; Tibi, p22; Waterbury, p33; 
62 Cf. Huntington's concern that, despite global (material) modernisation, "a [global] moral reversion [will] 
occur as Western power declines" (pp68-78,320-321). 
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This approach results in Islamism being treated as lacking normative value, measurable 
only by the `norm' of (Western) modernity. Modernist texts tend to employ theoretical 
models derived from Western(ising) experiences to determine whether Islamism is 
democratic, or at least democratising 63 Essentialists tend to employ a more emotive 
approach, simply concluding from the fact that certain Western values, practices or 
institutions are absent, that Islamism is `other', enemy and inferior 64 In both cases, 
understanding of Islamism is distorted because little effort is made to understand it from 
within its own framework. As Esposito rightly observes, 
[m]odern, post-Enlightenment secular ... categories of thought 
distort our understanding 
... The modern notion of religion as a system of personal belief makes an Islam that 
is 
comprehensive ... with religion integral to politics and society, "abnormal" ... 
irrational, 
extremist, threatening (p198). 
One result is that the religious element is exaggerated. Huntington thus attributes the 
non-integration of Chinese Buddhists into predominantly Muslim Asian countries solely 
to Islam (p264), ignoring other factors such as the wealth differential between Chinese 
and non-Chinese, the strength of the state, the extent of collusion between Chinese and 
state elites, or the extent of tribal influences on that country's political culture. 
Because of their emphasis on religion, and the connotation the merging of religion and 
politics has in Western history with violence and intolerance, essentialists and 
modernists are prone to view Islamism as violent and anti-pluralistic 65 They are 
likewise prohibited from an in-depth exploration of the potential of an Islamic form of 
63 Cf. Guazzone, pp9-10; Waterbury, pp24,35,40-41. 
64 Cf. Kramer, p38; Miller, p54. 
65 Cf. Taheri: "Every attempt at turning Islam into a doctrine of political power inevitably leads to 
terrorism" (pp220-221)" 
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democracy because their Western model posits that democracy presupposes 
secularisation. That this model is an ideologised version of the actual historical 
trajectory can be gleaned from the fact that democracy as a system of government does 
not dictate secularism. 66 
Pluralists, meanwhile, remain open to considering alternatives to Western models, 
" and 
actively criticise these models, sometimes in terms of their validity, 
" more often in 
terms of the West's failure to adhere to them. 69 However, they refrain from cultural 
relativism, for they hold certain values - such as respect for difference, freedom of 
speech, respect for basic human rights (with the proviso that definitions of what 
constitute these may vary) and leadership accountability to the led - to be universally 
applicable. 70 These beliefs are expressed searchingly, not triumphantly, because of the 
pluralists' keen awareness of their knowledge's cultural specificity. But they are still 
taken as tentative guidelines by which the other system's effectiveness in guaranteeing 
human dignity is measured. In this sense, they follow the line Sayyid suggests when 
critiquing Western discourse, to separate modernity from the Western trajectory, and 
distill a set of values and structures which make an entity modern regardless of cultural 
differences. " 
66 Earlier advocates of (liberal) democracy, such as John Locke, did not insist on secularisation in the sense 
of separating morality from religion (see Chapter 6). 
67 Cf. Burgat's observation that divine law is an acceptable legal basis (pp 130-132); Esposito's openness to 
Islamic forms of democracy (p187). 
68 Cf. Leca acknowledging democracy not always "best ... way to `solve problems"' and majority rule not 
morally sound (pp75,55179n6); Burgat's observing lack of secularism in much of West, querying practicality 
of secularism (pp129-130,132). 
69 Cf. Burgat on West's suppression of state-challenging ideologies (p131); Esposito on West's failure to 
acknowledge Western violence against Islam (p171). 
70 Cf. Halliday's solution to the problem of defining universals, confining the search for transcultural 
standards to issues "pertaining to the treatment and equality of human beings" (Myth, pp153-154). 
71 Enabling the possibility of plural types of actualised modernities (pp84-126). 
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Pluralists thus attempt to achieve a balance between universalism and relativism, by 
asserting their values while allowing `the other' to problematise them. 
72 Such an 
attitude is vital in cross-cultural research. For, as van Nieuwenhuijze has noted, to 
bridge the cultural chasm between observer and observed, the observer must adopt 
the readiness to identify one's own frame of reference with the intent to hold it in 
abeyance, during the effort to find one's way into the other frame of reference ... 
[O]ne 
[should thus] abstain, for example, from entering into a given situation with a set of 
preconceived questions to be administered to a ... sample ... singled out according 
to 
equally predetermined categorical criteria. 
This involves the transformation of the "subject-object relationship into a subject- 
subject relationship, intersubjectivity" - or what I call a dialectic between conceptual 
frameworks. 73 Precisely because the pluralist field is more willing to problematise both 
their perception of the other and the constructs of their own culture, it enables such a 
dialectic to occur and leads to a profounder understanding of Islamist positions. 
Pluralists are thus able to analyse Islamist ideas and actions without the presuppositions 
that haunt essentialists and modernists, and can discern more clearly areas of similarity 
between Western and Islamist models because they do not presuppose difference, 
despite differences in form. 
However, there is a danger in this approach. By wishing to avoid imposing a'Western' 
discursive structure on a `non-Western reality' (I use this terminology warily as the 
distinction between West and non-West is not as dichotomous as these terms suggest), 
72 Salvatore argues that Zubaida does not problematise modernity, but merely makes it inclusive towards 
Islamism (pp179-181). I contend that Zubaida does problematise modernity, by problematising key elements 
such as secularisation, and accepting the validity of a non-secular modernity (cf. pp172-181). Though he 
employs a modernist approach in e. g. using Western state models, he applies these models pluralistically by 
remaining open to alternatives. 
73 Van Nieuwenhuijze, pp329,341-342,354. 
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pluralists can end up losing sight of the correlation between factors, their hierarchy in 
terms of significance and the logic which links them. A structuralist modernist has a 
model which ranks structures above ideas. A pluralist may lose sight of the significance 
of specific data for lack of a hierarchical framework of values. This is reflected in the 
(relative) lack of definitional depth the pluralists of this sample display (see further). 
Alternatively, a pluralist may overemphasise the `non-Western' framework of values 
s/he studies, to compensate for his/her `Westernness', and end up romanticising the 
`other', without sufficient critical distance - though none in this sample appear to have 
done so. In the first instance, the pluralists' awareness of difference results in an 
overemphasis of sameness. In the second, it results in an overemphasis on difference. 
Attitudes towards Dichotomisation 
Though all three fields indulge in dichotomisation, the essentialist and modernist texts 
do so most distortingly. 74 Dichotomisation is central to the process of defining. With it 
one is able to differentiate. Yet, following Derrida, 75 dichotomisation also distorts the 
object described by suppressing both internal differences in the categories used, and 
cross-over elements between the categories. In the process of categorisation, language 
imposes an artificial structure on `reality', informed largely by its internal logic and the 
conceptual perspective inspiring the categorisation. What falls outside this structure, is 
suppressed - by, for example, projecting cross-over elements found in the privileged 
component of a dichotomy onto the unprivileged element. Consider the pair modernity- 
tradition. Informed by a modernist mindset, the term tradition comes to include all that 
the modernist despises. `Modems' are thus defined as, for instance, rational while 
74 Both Said (pp53-54,58-59) and Sayyid (p 107) hint at this problem, 
75 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology; `Difffrance' in Margins of Philosophy; Writing and Difference; H. J. Silverman, Derrida and Deconstruction. 
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`traditionalists' are deemed irrational; yet in actuality both categories exhibit rational 
and irrational traits. The binary opposites, concludes Derrida, thus remain 
interconnected, even in definition, because the one is defined as `not-the-other'. 
Essentialists posit Islamism as the antithesis of democracy or the West, 76 while all that 
the West is not supposed to be (violent, irrational, regressive, religiously fanatical) 
becomes the focus of research on Islamism, thus exaggerating it beyond its actual 
importance. Essentialist dichotomisation is accompanied by essentialisation, " also 
central to definition by distilling an object's characteristics to an indispensable set of 
qualities without which an object would not be itself. 78 Yet, an essentialist text reduces 
this set to a few privileged essences, treats them as fixed and immutable, and generalises 
from an essence found in one instance to other similar manifestations, regardless of 
temporal or geographical disparity. Thus, an eclectic mixture of manifestations of 
different Islams is posited as a monolithic essence termed `Islam' which defines Islamist 
actions. Historical, economical and social contexts are relegated to the background. 
Huntington, for example, roots the present tensions between the West and Islamism in 
fourteen centuries of opposing `natures'. The possibility of `the West' and `Islam' 
having a relationship constituted of more than one facet (not all oppositionary) with 
different phases (not all antagonistic), or of Islam not being inherently militaristic 
because its founder led an army, is not even hinted at. 79 
76 Cf. Huntington, p114 (`Islamist' versus `democratic'); Miller, pp45,54. 
77 Said makes similar criticism (pp230-234,300-305). 
78 According to The Oxford Reference Dictionary, `essential' is "necessary; indispensable"; `essence' is 
"all that makes a thing what it is; an indispensable quality or element". For discussion of argument that 
essentialising lies at foundations of institutionalisation of modern social science, see Salvatore, Ch. 4. 
79 Huntington, pp209-210,263. Almost similar argument in Miller, p47; Taheri, pp200,220-221; Kramer, 
p35. Even taken on its own terms, this argument is problematic as it does not take ethnic essence into account. 
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The combination of dichotomisation and essentialisation renders essentialist analysis 
highly emotive. Huntington thus sees the "contest between Islam and the West" as 
between two different versions of what is right and what is wrong and, as a 
consequence, who is right and who is wrong (p212). 
"`Unless we hate what we are not"', quotes Huntington, "`we cannot love what we are"' 
(p20). In this way an unbridgeable chasm is created between the `self and the `other' - 
the `other' judged by the values of the `self but posited eternally outside that 'self. 
Modernists too overindulge in dichotomisation. Though they tend to use existing 
dichotomies within their Western-based models, rather than positing Islamism against 
democracy or the West, the terms they employ still position Islamism as the antithesis of 
modernity. Because of the universal nature of these dichotomies modernists generally 
avoid cultural essentialisation. But by applying them rigidly they foreclose 
problematisation. Guazzone describes Islamism as "authoritarian" and "right-wing", 
and in the process suppresses democratic-like aspects, despite carefully distinguishing 
between different forms of Islamism, and even discussing a democratic-like Islamist 
election statement (ppl2-16,18-19). Leca, who displays both modernist and pluralist 
features, compares Islamists to `populists', as opposed to `constitutionalists', and so is 
unable to acknowledge those Islamists who are deeply concerned about 
constitutionalism (pp54-60). 8° 
Rigid dichotomisation appears to be one of the chief reasons modernists and 
essentialists fail to fully understand the complexity and diversity of Islamism - resulting 
in a selective, decontextualising, generalising methodology (see further), which 
80 Cf. Salvatore's comment that modernists consolidated traditional-vs-modem dichotomy (p127). 
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suppresses, or downplays, Islamist instances of democratic-like behaviour. While a 
certain amount is unavoidable, a less distorting way of dichotomising is needed. 
One way of better understanding `reality' is, returning to Derrida (or at least, my 
understanding of him), neutralising the either/or approach of the binary oppositions with 
a both/and perspective which suspends the oppositions. " Such an approach consists of 
analysing phenomena from both angles of a dichotomy, viewing Islamism as, for 
example, characterised by being both democratic and undemocratic, both religious and 
non-religious, allowing each term to elicit features which its opposite suppresses. It 
calls for a flexible approach to definition - dichotomising to highlight differences, yet 
allowing for the existence of cross-categories. It also calls for problematising existing 
dichotomies and acknowledging their cultural and temporal specificity. 
This is particularly relevant to the religion-politics dichotomy if exaggerating or 
downplaying the religious element is to be avoided. Talal Asad's critique of Clifford 
Geertz's influential approach to religion, for instance, questions the universal 
applicability of his secular, compartmentalised concept of religion, embedded in the 
modern Western attitude towards religion as a personal belief, separated from reality, 
from its structures and from `real' knowledge. 82 There is no such thing as "an 
independent religious domain", counters Asad: 
Religious symbols ... cannot be understood independently 
from their historical relations 
with non-religious symbols or of their articulations in and of social life. 
81 I refrain from proposing Derridean deconstruction as it is too time-consuming for the scope of this thesis. 
82 Cf. Esposito's critique of secular prejudices. 
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To appreciate the interplay between religion and politics in an Islamic context, one's 
Western concept of religion must be problematised by "unpacking the comprehensive 
concept ... into heterogenous elements according to 
its historical character", and using 
these elements analytically without delimiting where they should or should not be 
found. 83 
Though none of the pluralist texts have explicitly adopted such a Derridean approach, 
their qualified use of categories points to it. By judging Islamism through tentatively 
positing `universal' values while simultaneously rendering these open to 
problematisation, the texts create a temporary space in which their subject can be both 
approaching and distancing themselves from Western values, both democratic and non- 
democratic, both religious and political. The nature of research is to push towards 
closure of the opening created by problematisation, and the pluralists indeed close this 
space. But by delaying closure, and investigating alternative understandings of 
Islamism, they limit the distorting effect of dichotomisation, enabling the reader to 
glimpse Islamism's complexity and diversity. Thus, rather than categorising Islamism 
as democratic or undemocratic, pluralists portray both democratic and undemocratic 
aspects of Islamism, the tensions between the two and, finally, which aspect they deem 
stronger. 84 As with their insistence not to treat Western constructs as the norm, the 
pluralists' reluctance to dichotomise can result in a loss of valuational hierarchy, a 
blurring of the distinction between significance and triviality, and in a loss of overall 
theoretical rigour (though this is precisely what helps them be open to understanding the 
different in the other). 
83 Talal Asad, `Religion as an Anthropological Category' in Asad, Genealogies of Religion, pp53-54. See 
also Derrida criticising Michel Foucault's study of madness (Madness and Civilization) for not arguing from 
an intellectual position prior to the dichotomous separation of madness from reason (B. Flynn, `Derrida and 
Foucault: madness and writing' in Silverman, Derrida, p203; Jacques Derrida, `Cogito and the History of 
Madness' in Derrida, Writing and Difference; D. Judovitz, `Derrida and Descartes: Economizing Thought' in 
Silverman, p49). 
S4 Esposito, pp209-212; Zubaida, pp172-179. Burgat remains more ambiguous about their relative 
strengths. 
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1.3 METHODOLOGICAL PATTERNS 
I will discuss each field's methodological patterns. Methodology is informed by 
perspective. Over-dichotomisation encourages conflation, generalisation, selectivity and 
decontextualisation, while prohibiting in-depth analysis. Positing the Western model as 
universal encourages generalisation, selectivity, decontextualisation and shallow 
definition of non-Western concepts. The following must be read with the previous in 
mind. 
Attitudes towards Conflation and Generalisation$S 
Conflating different groups, instances and time spans into one monolithic whole is 
chiefly an essentialist characteristic - in line with the aims of reductionist 
essentialisation. In this vein, Taheri groups together phenomena as diverse as the 
Egyptian Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, Khomeini's Shi'i Iranian regime, and the 11`h 
century movement of the `Assassins' as expressions of `Holy Terror', while Kramer 
explicitly condemns those endeavouring to distinguish between `moderates' and 
`extremists' in the case of the bombing of New York's World Trade Centre. 86 In 
Kramer's case, conflation leads him to ignore that the prime suspect in the bombing had 
led one of the more violent of Egypt's Islamist groups, which the largest Egyptian 
Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has repeatedly condemned for their 
violence. " Kramer's insistence on conflating has prevented him from sifting 
85 Cf. also Said, pp37-38. 
86 Taheri, pp220-221; Kramer, `West', p33. 
87 Ramadan, pp161,167-173; Taheri, pp49,213. 
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accommodationist from confrontationist and thus finding a basis for constructive 
dialogue. 
Some modernists likewise indulge in conflation, " which is somewhat surprising as they 
tend to employ rigorous theoretical models which shield against crude conflation. A 
clue can be found in Guazzone who, despite distinguishing elaborately between 
literalists and pragmatists, radicals and moderates, noting the divergence in Islamist 
positions on women, and hinting at a similar divergence in Islamist positions on 
democracy, concludes that all Islamists promote authoritarianism 89 The rigour 
theoretical models inspire is overridden, it seems, by the power of the modernist 
perspective - particularly the `secularist prejudice' which holds that failure to separate 
religion from politics leads to authoritarianism. Such preconceptions prohibit 
discernment, and appear to explain why otherwise methodical scholars fail to discern 
differences in the case of Islamism. 
The pluralists' lack of conceptual rigidity makes them more attentive to diversity. They 
thus report both violent-intolerant and pluralistic-democratic instances of Islamist 
behaviour, and discuss both democratic-like and anti-democratic statements, 
differentiating between the different manifestations, rather than conflating them into a 
monolithic whole. 90 Consequently, one is able to appreciate the complex diversity of 
Islamism, and distinguish different, not necessarily converging, trends. 
Attitudes towards generalisation are similar to those regarding conflation. While 
essentialists often make sweeping generalisations, unsupported by evidence in the text, 
pluralists generally refrain from this, while modernists indulge only in generalising 
88 Cf. Waterbury, Leca. 
89 Guazzone, pp14-15,18-20. Waterbury, Tibi and Leca fail to make any rigorous distinction. 
90 Esposito, pp189,202,206-207; Burgat, pp109-129; Zubaida, pp157-158,173. 
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theories. General pluralist conclusions tend to be rooted in particular instances. " In 
sharp contrast stand such essentialist generalisations as Taheri's who concludes from 
one nitric acid attack on an unveiled Lebanese girl not only that Islamism is against 
women's rights, but also that "Radical Islam has declared war on the infidels" - without 
providing conclusive evidence for these latter statements and ignoring counter-evidence 
(pp11-13). 
Modernists, rather than making sweeping generalisations, tend to meticulously root their 
observations in social science theories. However, this attitude predisposes them to 
generalising, explaining the particular through general theories, rather than drawing 
general conclusions from the particular. Consequently, they occasionally miss 
important data because their models fail to alert them to these particular details. 
Modernist thus tend to ignore signs of evolution towards a more pluralistic, democratic- 
like attitude among some Islamists because their secularist prejudice prevents them from 
sufficiently acknowledging these signs. 
Attitudes towards Selectivity and Decontextualisation 
Science is about sifting; selecting is therefore inevitable. At issue here is the way 
important, and readily accessible, evidence is ignored. Essentialists display the most 
conspicuous disregard for evidence which contradicts their thesis, creating a value 
hierarchy which devalues contradictory data, while overvaluing consistent evidence. 
This seems to be a logical outcome of the reductionist essentialising approach since this 
is an attempt to reduce complexity. It is also linked to the `secular prejudice' equally 
found among modernists. The attitude, that expects fanaticism, irrationality and 
91 Esposito's discussion of Rushdie affair (pp190-193); Zubaida's differentiation between different 
forms/uses of Islam (pp152-156). Same applies to treatment of West, cf. Burgat's discussion of West's 
secularity (ppl29-130); Zubaida's distinguishing different European trajectories (p129). 
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violence in so-called `fundamentalist' movements, 92 lulls scholars into readily believing 
corroborating data. 
Manifestations of suppressed characteristics, if discussed at all, are generally dismissed 
as disingenuous dissimulation. In this vein, violent incidents are overemphasised while 
electoral and charitable actions are ignored or ridiculed. 93 The same occurs in the few 
(cursory) essentialist discussions of Islamist theory. Kramer, discussing the Sudanese 
Islamist leader, Hasan al-Turabi, highlights only Turabi's fears regarding the 
factionalising influence of the multi-party system, and the corruption-inducing nature of 
electoral campaigns, to conclude that for Turabi, elections are "to be discarded after 
successful one-time use" (p38). No mention is made of Turabi's contractarianism 
9a (which necessitates regular elections) or his advocacy of popular referenda. 
Selectivity is equally applied to sources used. Apart from the occasional (and mostly 
decontextualised) Islamist quote, essentialist texts rely primarily on non-Islamist sources 
- Western observers, (Westernised) local elites and (Western-inspired) human rights 
organisations. " This approach drowns the indigenous voice with Western(ised) 
representations, 96 preventing Islamists from presenting their `defence', and forecloses a 
real encounter between `Western' and `Islamist' discourses. It is exacerbated by the 
92 Cf. Esposito's observation that "[for those who subscribe to a liberal secular ... tradition, any intrusion 
of religion in politics is often viewed as potentially dangerous ... This perception 
is intensified when our 
knowledge of religious groups is limited to those who represent a radical minority" (pp202-203). 
93 Cf. Kramer, pp36-37; Miller, pp45-52. 
94 Kramer, p38; Turabi, `The Islamic State' in John Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, pp243-248 
(Kramer quotes from same article). 
95 Beyond quoting election slogan and manifesto (dismissed as Machiavellian), Miller only cites Western 
academics (pp48,43-44). Huntington, likewise, quotes primarily Westerners or Western-educated Muslims 
(e. g. Chapters 4.3,5.2,9.2,10). 
96 Cf. Said's criticism of Orientalism (p21). 
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absence of personal interviews97 - thus overemphasising the role of Islamic tradition 
because, following Salame, "it is more familiar and in many ways more accessible to us 
than the actual evolution of Muslim societies" (pp4-5). 
Modernists are similarly selective discussing Islamist characteristics. Waterbury and 
Tibi fail to mention the existence of democratic-like Islamist statements or actions 
altogether, while Guazzone only mentions one such instance in passing, without 
seriously engaging it. Modernists are likewise selective in the sources they use, drawing 
little on Islamists directly, 98 instead discussing (Western) modernisation theories at 
length, leaving no space for in-depth engagement with Islamist thinking, or indeed for 
considering evidence which falls outside the scope of these models. This, again, 
appears to be the logical outcome of the modernist perspective which is readily 
sidetracked by its interest in applying models, from trying to understand its object from 
within the object's own framework. Modernists are far less selective when discussing 
opposing Western theories. 99 
Pluralists include the widest variety of evidence. They include both pro- and anti- 
democracy statements, Western(ised) and Islamist sources. "' Burgat in particular, 
Esposito to a lesser extent, partially counters Said's concern about the suppression of the 
indigenous voice by including lengthy Islamist quotes. Pluralists are also non-selective 
in being ready to apply ethical standards to Islamists and the West alike. The pluralist 
perspective is the least encumbered by theoretical structures and rigid expectations. It is 
accordingly more willing to include conflicting evidence and problematise. As 
97 My criticism is based on the texts, not the authors. Miller, for instance, interviewed Turabi and 
Hizballah's Fadlallah for another article (1994), `Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed 
Fadlallah', Foreign Affairs 73(6). 
98 Tibi is the exception, drawing on Muslim, even occasionally Islamist, sources (cf. Qaradawi; pp27-28). 
99 Cf. Waterbury, p34; Tibi, pp22-31. 
100 Zubaida's Chapter 6 is the exception. 
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mentioned above, the pluralist readiness to problematise can lead to a loss of value 
hierarchy. The pluralists of this sample guard themselves against this by tentatively 
positing certain values (pluralism, human rights) as universal, and judging both 
Westerners and Islamists by them. However, it is less clear by what standard they judge 
the relative significance of violent versus pluralistic, democratic-like actions. This is 
problematic as one of the most prominent disagreements between pluralists and the 
other two concerns the place of violence in Islamist thinking and practice. 
Decontextualisation, another form of selectivity, is practised in a similar way. 
Essentialists are the worst offenders, pluralists the best contextual isers. 10' Modernists 
find themselves in between, contextualising where their models demand it, practising 
decontextualisation primarily insofar as their models are specific to a culture which is 
not their subject's culture. An illustration of decontextualisation is the essentialist 
depiction of violence as inherent, rather than circumstantial. Taheri thus makes no 
acknowledgement of the acid attack he describes on an unveiled girl happening amidst a 
civil war, amidst a struggle with political opponents probably employing similar tactics. 
Instead, it is portrayed as an unprovoked, unique, typical Islamist event - preventing the 
reader from understanding motive and context, widening the chasm between reader and 
Islamist. The pluralists, conversely, situate Islamist violence within its cultural and 
structural context. Burgat thus argues that it is both "a defence against the preventative 
repression of states" and heavily influenced by the social universe of the perpetrators, 
rather than by their being Islamists per se. 102 
101 Interestingly, Kramer's country-specific texts on Lebanese Islamism display a greater respect for 
contextualisation than his general overviews. Focussing on a limited subject area thus appears to inspire the 
kind of contextual discipline found among the pluralists. Cf. Kramer, `Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad' in 
Marty & Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms. 
102 Burgat, pp113-118. 
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For essentialists, decontextualisation appears to be central to the activity of 
essentialisation. Only by stripping an activity of context is it possible to arrive at an 
essence which will manifest itself regardless. Modernists have a similar approach, for to 
arrive at a universally applicable theoretical model, trends must be stripped of context. 
Context is only deemed helpful when the theory has explicitly incorporated it. 
Pluralists, on the other hand, are forced to study context because they are not armed 
with universal meta-theories, and must utilise whatever information their subject yields, 
including context. Moreover, they tend to be interested in the `other' as `other', rather 
than as 'not-the-self'. 
Attitudes towards Definition and Analysis 
Essentialist texts are generally weak on definition, and consequently, on analysis. 
Taheri illustrates this by never succinctly defining the term `Holy Terror'. Even 
Huntington, though otherwise the most rigorous among the essentialists, displays a 
similar weakness in his use of the epithet `anti-democratic' (pp92-93,98-101). It is 
clear that those described are anti-Western, anti-secular, non-Western movements 
calling for the re-adoption of indigenous, generally religious, values. But Huntington 
fails to discuss what specific aspects of democracy these movements repudiate, and with 
which they agree. Lack of definition prevents one from engaging in any depth with 
these movements' thinking. 
Though modernists define their Western concepts and theories with some care, they 
display a laxity towards the definition of Islamist concepts. Waterbury takes great care 
to explain Western democratisation models, yet fails to define or elaborate on Islamist 
concepts. Guazzone, while including some Arabic-Islamic concepts in her text, fails to 
elaborate on these and the theory in which they are embedded. Detailed definition of 
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Western models provides profound insights into Islamism. Weak definition of Islamist 
concepts, however, renders them one-sided. Leca's analysis of `Islamist democrats' 
through the prism of `populism' and `constitutionalism' thus falls short of its potential 
(pp54-60). Had he sufficiently engaged with Islamist thinking, he would have realised 
his categorisation of Islamists as populists is reductionist, and explored how Islamist 
constitutionalism compares to Western constitutionalism. 
Pluralists, though failing to reach the modernists' level of definitional precision with 
regard to Western theories, generally define both Western and Islamist concepts 
sufficiently adequately to grapple with differences and similarities. Burgat (followed 
closely by Zubaida) is the most thorough, defining Western and Islamist concepts to a 
similar depth, and allowing each to shed light on the other. 103 Burgat's deconstructing 
Islamist attitudes towards Islamic law in components that closely resemble Western 
secular attitudes to law is one example (pp129-132). Predictably, the level of analysis 
rises with the level of definition. Moreover, definition and its concomitant level of 
analysis impose a value hierarchy by which the subject can be evaluated, thus countering 
the pluralist temptation to blur the distinction between significant and trivial. 
Differences between the fields can again be explained with recourse to the different 
perspectives. Essentialists are primarily interested in the `other' as `not-the-self . 
Consequently, they have little to gain by meticulously defining the `other'. 
Furthermore, detailed definition is likely to highlight inconsistencies in their carefully 
balanced set of essences. Modernists are so immersed in modernist theories, that they 
have little time for properly defining Islamist concepts. Their primary aim seems to be 
to apply these theories to the case of the Islamists - not necessarily to understand the 
Islamists as they understand themselves (which helps to complement an `external' 
103 Cf. Zubaida's treatment of Iranian Constitution (pp172-179). Zubaida, however, elaborates more on 
Western than on Islamist theories/concepts. 
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understanding based on modernist theories). Pluralists, finally, are both interested in 
the `other' as `other', and are forced to define the `other' because they are armed with 
only a minimum of theory. Their lack of theory enables them to see their subject more 
clearly. Pluralist definitions tend therefore to be informed rather by the information the 
subject yields than by the dictates of a preconceived theory (although no one is free from 
the bias of preconceptions). The problematisation of established understanding, 
moreover, further forces pluralists to probe and elaborate. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
The above analysis has detailed the influence of conceptual perspectives and 
methodological strategies on conclusions. It has shown how the essentialist and 
modernist perspectives inhibit seeing the `other' as `other', by imposing either a 
reductionist framework which decontextualises and generalises to arrive at immutable 
essences, or modernist theories based on premises which fail to sufficiently take into 
account local particularities. It has also shown that a pluralist perspective is a powerful 
instrument for shielding one from over-generalising, decontextualising and ignoring or 
downplaying conflicting evidence, because it encourages the willingness to problematise 
one's own conceptual framework, and one's understanding of the `other'. 
A temptation for the pluralists is to overemphasise the particular, without relating it to 
the general. This is exacerbated by the lack of an overarching theoretical framework 
and the concomitant eclecticism and lack of value hierarchies. Though these attitudes 
are simultaneously the source of their strength, it may be advantageous to borrow from 
modernist methodology its theoretical depth, coherence and rigour (applied with a 
sufficiently pluralist alertness to cultural specificity and over-dichotomisation), and 
WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF ISLAMISM 35 
from essentialist methodology its awareness of difference1°4 (balanced with a pluralist 
willingness to problematise the difference and seek sameness). 
Though adopting a pluralist approach, I will use Western political theory to illuminate 
Islamist thinking, by positing the former, not as normative, but as a comparable set of 
constructs to create a hermeneutical dialectic which throws light by offering a 
perspectival shift - mirroring Waterbury's application of Dankwart Rustow's theory of 
democratisation, though the latter fails to maintain a sufficiently pluralist perspective 
(pp34-37). This way, I will be forced to define both to sufficient depth to allow a 
dialectic of equals to take place. This by itself will impose a discursive value hierarchy. 
But comparison with a Western political model with which I, as a Westerner trained in 
Western political science, am deeply familiar, will further force me to search for value 
hierarchies in Islamist thinking, in order to be able to establish difference or sameness 
(as a pluralist, I will strife to remain open to either). Though there is a danger that this 
method will impose a Western discursive hierarchy on Islamist political theory, the 
benefits of an increased definitional rigour, a more coherent theoretical framework, and 
an improved value hierarchy appear to outweigh this danger - particularly as I am well 
aware thereof and intent on minimising it. 
Concerning the issue of violence, I will take particular care to contextualise it, both 
ideationally and structurally; to incorporate Islamist explanations of incidents; and to 
question the veracity of non-Islamist sources which overly deny any own involvement in 
violence and blame all brutality on the IM. 
104 Cf. van Nieuwenhuijze, p340. 
CHAPTER 2 
WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF PALESTINIAN ISLAMISM 
Having developed an analytical framework with which to chart correlations between 
conceptual commitments, methodological approaches and conclusions constructed, I 
will now apply this to Western discourse on Palestinian Islamism. I will focus primarily 
on `influential' texts (see p12). Of texts published too recently or distributed too locally 
to have been in a position to be quoted regularly, I will include those providing 
sufficiently original information to be judged potentially influential. Books and 
(publicly available) occasional papers focussing on the IM are thus automatically 
included in this survey' (though two of these have in addition been regularly quoted)? 
Of those articles and chapters concentrating on the IM and dealing with its overall 
' Ahmad Rashad (1993), Ziad Abu-Amr (1994), Hisham Ahmad (1994), Beverley Milton-Edwards (1996), 
Andrea Nüsse (1998). Meir Litvak (1996) will not be included because of its exclusive focus on nationalism, 
which falls outside the scope of this thesis. Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela (2000) was published too late to be 
included. For details, see `Bibliography' or footnotes 7&8. 
2 Those quoted four times or more: Abu-Amr in Ahmad, Jensen, Litvak, Milton-Edwards (1996), Nüsse 
(1998), Roy (1995), Sayigh, Usher (1995a&b) (Arabic original of Abu-Amr's book quoted in Milton-Edwards 
(1996), Nüsse (1993&1998), Rashad, Shadid); Ahmad in Budeiri, Klein, Litvak, Nüsse (1998), Sayigh. 
Milton-Edwards, quoted in Jensen, Nüsse (1998), Rashad (reference to original doctoral thesis), was only 
published in 1996, Nüsse (not quoted, though 1993 article quoted in Klein, Rashad) in 1998. Rashad, quoted 
in Roy (1995), Nüsse (1998), was published in 1993 but appears not to be widely available (Durham Library 
could not purchase it). 
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ideology, development and organisation. ' five have been quoted regularly! Four more 
will be included for their original information. ' Articles dealing with but one aspect of 
the IM, with aspects of `foreign policy', or those discussing the IM tangentially only, 
will be excluded. 6 
Of the fourteen texts analysed, ten reflect a modernist perspective, ' four a pluralist one. ' 
Some modernist texts veer towards essentialism, ' others towards the pluralists. 10 One 
3 Cf. Mohammed Shadid (1988); Emile Sahliyeh (1988); Lisa Taraki (1989a&1989b); Ze'ev Schiff & Ehud 
Ya'ari (1990); Jean-Francois Legrain (1990); Rema Hammami (1990); Muhammed Jaradat (1992); Isiah Jad 
& Rema Hammami (1992); Michel Jubran & Laura Drake (1993); Ziad Abu-Amr (1993&1995); Sara Roy 
(1995); Graham Usher (1995a&1995b); lyad Barghouti (1995&1996); Maria Holt (1997); Michael Jensen 
(1998). 
4 Those quoted four times or more: Shadid in Abu-Amr (1994), Ahmad, Holt, Israeli, Jubran, Nüsse 
(1993&1998), Rashad, Roy (1995), (Yezid) Sayigh; Legrain (1990) in Litvak, Rashad, Roy (1995), Strum, 
Usher (1995b); Schiff/Ya'ari in Abu-Amr (1993&1994), Hammami, Jubran, Legrain (1991), Milton-Edwards 
(1996), Mishal, Nüsse (1993 & 1998), Sayigh, Usher (1995b); Hammami in Augustin, Litvak, Milton- 
Edwards (1996), Tamari, Usher (1992&1995a&1995b); Abu-Amr (1993) in Ahmad, Milton-Edwards (1996), 
Nüsse (1998), Rashad, Roy (1995). 
5 Roy (1995), Usher (1995a), Holt (1997), Jensen (1998). Usher's book (1995b) contains roughly the same 
material on the IM as his article (on which I will focus). 
6 Limited or `foreign policy' focus: cf. Raphael Israeli (1990); Jean-Francois Legrain (1991); Beverley 
Milton-Edwards (1992); Andrea Nüsse (1993); `Ali Jarbawi & Roger Heacock (1993); Shaul Mishal & 
Reuben Aharoni (1994); Ali al-Jarbawi (1994); Suha Taji-Farouki (1994). Tangential focus: cf. Ann Lesch 
& Mark Tessler (1987); Mohammed Shadid & Rick Seltzer (1988); Kitty Warnock (1990); Philippa Strum 
(1992); Graham Usher (1992); Salim Tamari (1992); Rita Giacaman & Penny Johnson (1994); Amal Kawar 
(1996); Harold Cubert (1997); Yezid Sayigh (1997). 
7 Shadid (1988), `The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza', Third World Quarterly 
10(2); Legrain (1990), 'The Islamic Movement and the Intifada' in Jamal Nassar & Roger Heacock (eds), 
Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads; Schiff& Ya'ari (1990), Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising - Israel's 
Third Front; Hammami (1990), `Women, the Hijab and the Intifada', Middle East Report 20(3-4); Abu-Amr 
(1993), `Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies XXII(4); Abu-Amr 
(1994), Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad; Ahmad 
(1994), Hamas - From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian 
Society; Usher (1995), `What kind of nation? The rise of Hamas in the occupied territories', Race & Class 
37(2); Milton-Edwards (1996), Islamic Politics in Palestine; Nüsse (1998), Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of 
Hautas. 
8 Rashad (1993), Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue; Roy (1995), `Beyond Hamas: Islamic 
Activism in the Gaza Strip', Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 2(1); Holt (1997), `Palestinian 
Women and the Contemporary Islamist Movement', Encounters 3(1); Jensen (1998), `Islamism and Civil 
Society in the Gaza Strip' in Ahmad Moussalli, Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths & Realities. 
9 Cf. Shadid. 
10 Cf. Legrain. 
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pluralist text strays into modernism while another comes close to modernism-in-reverse 
by privileging Islamism. " Nevertheless, all texts are sufficiently rooted in one 
perspective to be classified thus. Intriguingly, while the texts displaying a pluralist 
perspective have also adopted a pluralist methodology, all modernist texts exhibit 
certain methodological characteristics found among the essentialists of the general 
sample. However, because these texts' conceptual perspective is modernist, and those 
methodological approaches which are essentialist in character appear to have 
(paradoxically) been inspired by a modernist perspective, I have classed them as 
modernist. None of the texts have adopted a purely essentialist perspective - possibly 
because none of the authors come from a traditional Orientalist-philological 
background, while the fact that the majority is either Palestinian or appears to identify 
closely with the (secularist) Palestinians, further precludes the adoption of an 
essentialist dichotomisation. 12 
Brief Contextualisation of the IM 
Before embarking on an analysis of the fourteen texts, I will briefly discuss the IM's 
historical, ideological and organisational development. The Egyptian Brotherhood, 
founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, began establishing branches in Palestine in 1946, 
including one in Gaza. 13 During the early 1950s, this branch was amongst the most 
active local parties, organising charitable services for the refugees of the 1948 Israeli 
war of independence, orchestrating demonstrations against Nasser's policy of 
containment towards resistance activities, and providing military training for the 
11 Roy and Rashad respectively. 
12 Even Israelis Schiff & Ya'ari write sympathetically about the Palestinian struggle. There are some 
essentialists among the larger canon, cf. R. Israeli. 
13 Cf. Milton-Edwards, p40. 
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resistance through its contacts with Brotherhood officers in the Egyptian army14 When, 
in 1954, Nasser clamped down on the Egyptian Brotherhood, after one of its members 
tried to assassinate him (apparently without authorisation) in revenge for his 
imprisoning the Brotherhood leadership, " the Gazan Brotherhood suffered the same 
fate. Many were imprisoned, others took refuge in the Gulf. The movement kept 
operating, albeit on a much reduced level, until 1958, after which it was effectively 
silenced. 16 Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, following the 1967 war, freed the 
Brotherhood of Nasser's grip, thus ironically allowing it to regroup. 
In 1973, Shaykh Ahmad Yassin, a school teacher, and, among others, Ibrahim Yazuri, a 
pharmacist, established a charitable and educational organisation, al-Mujamma' al- 
Islami, followed in 1976 by the founding of al-Jam'iyyah al-Islamiyyah by Ahmad Bahr, 
an älim, and, among others, Ismail Abu Shannab, a civil engineer. Many of those 
involved in these charities, though not all, had Brotherhood connections. In 1981, 
women associated with the IM's charities founded, in conjunction with IM leaders, the 
Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat al-Muslimat (Society of Young Muslim Women). 
These charities, providing anything from healthcare to courses in accounting to football 
clubs, roughly adhered to the principles elaborated by al-Banna and the early Egyptian 
Brotherhood, emphasising Islamic education and social justice. Incorporating the logic 
espoused by later Islamist writers such as the Indian-Pakistani Abul A'la Mawdudi and 
the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, they sought to lay the basis for an Islamic state by first 
gradually re-Islamising society, thus creating a generation of people who would be 
14 Milton-Edwards, pp38-53; Hart, pp75-76,97-105; Sayigh, pp60-65; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp6-9. 
15 Cf. Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, pp 105-162. 
16 Cf. Milton-Edwards, pp46-55. 
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`pure' enough to create an Islamic state. " Meanwhile, and particularly following the 
Iranian revolution in 1978-1979, the IM's ideological message had found resonance 
with those sections of the burgeoning student population18 who did not identify with the 
PLO's more secular elements. These students generally called themselves al-Kutlah al- 
Islamiyyah (Islamic Bloc) in electoral contests. Though they had close links with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its charities, they seem to have had a certain amount of 
autonomy. 
Until the Intifada broke out in 1987, the Brotherhood refrained from resistance 
activities, instead criticising, and even fighting, those who did resort to armed 
resistance, on the grounds that the Palestinians were (at the time) no match for the 
Israeli army, and that the best form of `resistance' was to fortify the Palestinian nation 
through Islamic education, in preparation for an eventual battle for liberation. When the 
Intifada erupted, the Brotherhood leadership chose to join the resistance, partly because 
it believed the time and the mood to be right, partly because it feared it would lose all 
popular support if it did not (PLO supporters had already repeatedly accused the 
Brothers of collaboration with the Israelis for actively opposing their policy of 
resistance, while younger Brotherhood supporters could no longer be contained and 
might well have left the movement to join the PLO). 19 
To safeguard their social and charitable network in case the Intifada failed, the 
leadership established a separate organisation, dedicated entirely to resistance, al- 
Harakah al-Muqawwamah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Resistance Movement), acronym 
17 See Mawdudi, The Process of Islamic Revolution; Qutb, Milestones, pp37-77. 
18 The 1970s saw the establishment of numerous universities, including al-Najah (Nablus), Bir Zeit (near 
Ramallah) and the Islamic University (Gaza). 
19 This paragraph is based on Milton-Edwards, Usher and interviews with IM leaders Ahmad Yassin, `Abd 
al-Fattah Dukhan, and Ismail Abu Shannab. 
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HaMaS, 20 meaning `zeal'. Most of the Brothers seemed to have joined Harnas (with the 
exception of those who still held that Islamisation was more urgent than resistance), but 
many more joined who had not been full-fledged Brotherhood members, and thus lacked 
the ideological formation the former had had. 2' 
Though much of Hamas's energy was spent on fighting the Intifada and maintaining its 
position vis ä vis the other Palestinian factions, and though the Brotherhood's 
transformation into a resistance movement led to the inclusion of less ideologically 
formed members, the IM's ideological development did not stagnate. Some members 
brought back fresh insights from their studies abroad, be they from Sudan and Hasan al- 
Turabi's Islamic Front'22 from Russia'-3 or from the United States. 24 Interaction with the 
Lebanese Hizballah and other foreign visitors provided a fertile climate for new ways of 
thinking among the 415 Islamist expellees who had been evacuated to Marj al-Zuhur in 
Lebanon in 1992.25 The proliferation of satellite television, and particularly the ready 
availability of such critical Arabic-language channels as Al-Jazirah, also revolutionised 
the IM's access to trends in world thinking. Consequently, one can find traces of the 
ideas of a wide variety of thinkers in the IM's discourse, ranging from Marx and Darwin 
to Islamists Rashid al-Ghannouchi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. 
20 The 's' being the first consonant of'Islami'. 
21 Cf. interviews with IM leaders Abu Shannab, Mahmud Zahhar, and former cadre leader `Muhammad'. 
22 Cf. Ghazi Hammad, `Iyad', 'Kamal' (though not an IM member, as an Islamist staff member at the IUG 
he would certainly have had influence on his colleagues). 
23 E. g. Yahya Musa studied in Russia during the 1980s. 
24 Among others, Ismail Abu Shannab and Mahmud Zahhar studied in the United States during the 1980s. 
25 Among them were Hamas leaders'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Dukhan and Abu'Aymara 
Taha, as well as Kutlah leader'Ayman Taha, who became President of the IUG's Student Council in 1998. 
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In institutional terms, the Gazan branch of the IM can be depicted as follows: 26 
Muslim Brotherhood 
Charities Mosques Islamic AI-Kutiah 
University al-Isiamiyyah 
(Students) 
Hamas 
AI-Mu)amma' AI-Jam'iyyah AI-Jam'iyyah 
al-Islams al-Islamiyyah al-Shabbat 
al-Musiimat 
(Mixed) (Mixed) (Women) 
AI-Risalah 
(Newspaper) 
Lines in this diagram do not necessarily indicate organisational or hierarchical links 27 
In some cases, the connection is limited to an overlap in personnel. This is particularly 
so in the case of the mosques and the Islamic University which, though receiving 
financial assistance through the IM and having many IM affiliates among their staff, are 
not necessarily wholly controlled by the IM. Many of the Islamic University's lecturers 
and staff, for example, are affiliated to the IM. Yet, at the same time, a good number of 
Deans, Department Heads and Board Members are unaffiliated or even PLO 
supporters. 28 Similarly, the relationship between the mosques and the IM is not always 
straightforward, and, though much of what is said from the pulpit does reflect views 
present within the IM (bearing in mind that the IM is not monolithic), one cannot simply 
take a mosque's message as authorised by the IM's leadership. The IM's control over 
26 This diagram does not include the institutional network in the West Bank, nor the institutional links 
between the Gazan and West Bank networks, and the Hamas leadership abroad, notably in Jordan. 
27 See also Jensen, pp200-205. 
Qassam Hizb 
Brigades al-Khalas 
('Military' (Political Party) 
Operations) 
28 Cf. interviews with Deans Nabil Abu Ali, Muhammad Nairab and Atallah Abu Sibah. 
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the mosques, moreover, has diminished significantly since the newly-established 
Palestinian Authority wrested control away from it in the mid-i 990s. 29 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how large the IM in Gaza is. In terms of Hamas, 
opinion polls regularly set popular support at 10-15%, 30 though more in-depth surveys 
give a figure closer to 20-30%. 3 ' Given the proliferation and high popularity of Islamic 
charities affiliated with the IM, and given the strength of electoral support in the 
universities and various professional unions over the years, 32 the latter figure appears 
more accurate. Opinion polls, moreover, are likely to be affected by the reluctance of 
IM supporters to disclose their political affiliation to strangers through the answers they 
give 33 
In terms of actual membership, it is even harder to establish facts. Hamas and the 
Qassam Brigades being underground organisations, it is not publicly known how many 
members they have. Nor have I been able to ascertain how many of the 70-80% of the 
Islamic University's student population who annually vote for the Kutlah are Kutlah 
members (though a rough estimate would be around 15-25% of the 7,500-strong student 
body). Staff statistics of the various charities affiliated with the IM tell equally little. 
Staff are complemented by a fluid body of volunteers, and neither all staff nor all 
volunteers are IM supporters, let alone members. As for Hizb al-Khalas, spokesperson 
29 In the early 1990s, the Brotherhood and Hamas were thought to control some 40% of the Gaza Strip's 
mosques (Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p16). 
30 Cf. Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre's Public Opinion Polls, Nos. 1-20. 
31 Cf. Theodor Hanf & Bernard Sabella, A Date with Democracy, p70. 
32 In the past decade, pro-Hamas student parties across the territories have regularly gained the majority or 
a significant minority of student votes. The same can be said of a number of different professional unions 
(e. g. the Engineers' and Medical Unions in Gaza, the Chamber of Commerce in Ramallah). 
33 A number of Islamist interviewees underlined this argument as the reason for the discrepancy between 
opinion poll results and their own reading of Islamist support (which they, optimistically, tend to put around 
40% or higher). 
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Salah Badawil claimed that, in 1998, Khalas, active only in the Gaza Strip, had 5,000 
members but many more supporters - as manifested by the large turn-out (40,0000 
according to Badawil though I've been unable to confirm this figure) to a rally on the 
future of Jerusalem. 34 
Each of the various organisations that make up the IM has a well-defined internal 
hierarchy. Hizb al-Khalas, al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah and the various charities have 
legally registered lines of authority, with executive councils, boards of administrators (in 
the case of the charities) or general assemblies (in the case of Khalas and the Kutlah), 
and these structures are replicated on a smaller scale at a district level, thus forming a 
pyramidical hierarchy. Hamas, though not legally registered, has a similar structure, 
with each geographical region forming its own general assembly, and delegating some 
of its members to a central assembly, out of which the executive leadership is chosen 35 
It is less clear how the different parts of the IM's network relate to each other 
hierarchically. The charities, the Islamic University and Hizb al-Khalas appear to 
operate independently from Hamas and the Brotherhood, although the overlap in 
personnel clearly makes for a certain level of cooperation and mutual support. Khalas's 
al-Risalah newspaper, for example, regularly defends Hamas, while Hamas leaders 
sometimes posit Khalas as a model `Islamic democratic' party36 The Kutlah, though 
theoretically independent, seems in practice to be in close cooperation with the Hamas 
leadership - which does, however, not preclude it from acting independently. Those 
mosques which are still close to Hamas (in terms of both a predominantly pro-Hamas 
congregation and pro-Hamas prayer leaders and preachers), appear to stand in much the 
34 Interview with Badawil. 
35 I did not analyse the Qassam Brigades as they are less directly related to the IM's domestic political 
vision, and, being `military' units, rather fall within the realm of international relations and war studies. See 
also pl 11. 
36 Cf. Ismail Abu Shannab, The Islamic Approach and the Subject of Democracy. 
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same relationship to the latter as the Kutlah: functional independence coupled to close 
cooperation. 37 
As for the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, it is difficult to say 
anything conclusively? ' From what I have heard, though, it seems that the two 
organisations have more or less merged, effectively forming three sub-groups: one 
consisting of those Brothers who are uncomfortable with the direction Hamas has taken 
(who may well have turned their backs on the new Hamas-Brotherhood organisation and 
sought refuge in the charities and mosques), one consisting of those Hamas 
activists/supporters whose ideological commitment is considered too shallow for 
positions of ideological authority, and one consisting of those Brothers-turned-Hamas- 
activists and those Hamas-activists-turned-Brothers whose ideological commitment is 
beyond doubt. From now on, I will thus use the term Hamas to refer to both these 
organisations. 
Though the Qassam Brigades did not form part of my research, as they only indirectly 
relate to the IM's domestic political vision, concerned as they are with warfare against 
Israel (see p111 for a justification for this exclusion), it is worthwhile mentioning that 
their organisational link with Hamas in Gaza appears to be increasingly tenuous. Most 
operations are prepared in the West Bank while much of the finances seems to come 
through the Hamas office in Jordan. Over the past half decade, the leadership in Gaza 
and that in Amman have repeatedly clashed over fundamental policy issues, such as 
whether or not to participate in the Palestinian elections of 1996 and to what extent 
37 Jensen paints a similar picture of loose institutional linkage between the various parts of the IM. 
38 Some of my interviewees insisted the Brotherhood had ceased to exist as an organisation (only to remain 
as a way of life); others insisted that to be in a position of leadership in Harnas, one must have become a 
Brother; yet others were shocked that their colleagues had mentioned the existence of the Brotherhood, saying 
that they thought its existence was secret (which has intensified my belief that the middle group spoke most 
truthfully). 
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suicide operations were still justified towards the end of the 1990s. 39 The Gazan 
leadership has displayed ever more discomfort over the suicide operations, and, while 
they still tend to publicly support them, they appear to be searching for alternatives. 
One indication that it had lost control over the various semi-independent cells which 
make up the Brigades is the appeal Mahmud Zahhar, one of its spokesmen, made at a 
life press conference to those responsible for the spate of suicide bombings following 
the assassination of Yahya Ayyash in 1996, to stop the campaign. Mishal and Sela, 
drawing on Israeli security records, similarly describe numerous violent incidents which 
did not appear to have been authorised by the IM's political leadership. " 
The socio-economic profile of the IM's members and supporters, as far as this is known, 
is varied - though very few of the country's elite appear to be among its ranks. It 
attracts students, professionals and merchants, it attracts supporters from both refugee 
camps and city areas, from among the poor as well as the middle-classes, from among 
the labourers as well as the highly educated. Interestingly, though it has a number of 
supporters among the `religious intelligentsia', and though its more conservative 
members are often allied to the religious establishment on issues such as women's rights 
(see Chapter 7), there appear to be few religious functionaries or scholars among the 
IM's highest echelons. As for geographical distribution, both the charitable network and 
the political movement have branches in all the Strip's major towns and refugee camps. 
In either case, however, the centre of power appears to be in Gaza City. 
As for its place in the larger political arena, the political branches of the IM (Hamas, 
Khalas and the Kutlah) operate independently from both the PLO and the other Islamist 
groups, most significantly Islamic Jihad as the other groups have either withered, viz. 
Hizb al-Tahrir, or are politically quietist, viz. al-Salafiyyun. The IM does not recognise 
39 See also Chapter 7. 
40 Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp49-82. 
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the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians, as it does not believe 
that the PLO represents the entire Palestinian people. It particularly disagrees with the 
latter's approach to the Peace Process, with its style of leadership and with what it 
believes to be its secular stance (see p55 for discussion of problematicity of labelling the 
PLO secular). 41 
The IM's non-acceptance of the PLO as the sole representative is partly ideology-based 
(specifically so in the case of the leftist PLO parties, such as the Popular and Democratic 
Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine, the PFLP and the DFLP), partly a matter of rivalry 
(particularly in the case of Fatah) 42 In a similar vein, its relationship with Islamic Jihad 
is complicated by both ideological differences and rivalry, as both covet the same 
constituency. In both cases, relationships are further complicated by the fact that the IM 
believes Fatah and Islamic Jihad to be derivative of the Brotherhood. Islamic Jihad was 
founded in the early 1980s by Muslim Brothers who disagreed with the IM's refusal to 
join the resistance, while many of Fatah's founders had had close ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood of the 1950s (see p56). However, rivalry and ideological differences 
notwithstanding, the IM does enter into alliances when political pragmatism dictates 
thiS. 43 
41 Cf. Hamas's Mithaq; Abu Shannab, The Islamic Approach; Khalas Conference Papers 1-3; Rashad; 
Usher; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism. 
42 Hamas has made no secret of its desire to equal or outdo Fatah in influence. Moreover, since a 
significant number of Fatah supporters veer towards Islamism in outlook, the constituencies of Fatah and the 
IM overlap. Paradoxically, rivalry also exists between Hamas and the leftist PFLP and DFLP over those who 
reject the current Peace Process and criticise the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority. 
43 Cf. the alliance of all small opposition parties at al-Azhar University against Fatah, demanding a change 
in the university's electoral rules (Spring 1998). See also the numerous jointly signed communiques in 
Khalas's Special Information File concerning the Communiquds of Hizb al-Khalas. 
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2.1 WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF PALESTINIAN ISLAMISM 
Following the general sample, the modernist texts portray the IM as violent, 44 anti- 
pluralistic45 and anti-democratic. 46 Yet, unlike their general counterparts, they tend to 
accredit these attributes more to the IM being Islamist than to its context (such as violent 
political climate or lack of structural development needed to underpin democratisation). 
This position not only resembles that of the general essentialists, it is also directly 
related to the adoption of essentialist methodological characteristics (see further). It 
seems to be rooted in the modernists' almost unquestioning acceptance of the PLO as 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and thus of its hegemonic 
aspirations. This acceptance appears itself to be informed by a host of interconnected 
reasons inspired by modernist-related positions - ranging from affinity with the secular, 
`progressive' outlook of the PLO's Left, or the assumption that the PLO is the most 
likely force for modernity in Palestine, to the conviction that to question the PLO's 
legitimacy is to undermine the Palestinian cause, as the majority of Palestinians are 
believed to accept the PLO as their representative. Conversely, and a further indication 
that a modernist perspective underlies this bias towards the PLO, the IM is seen as 
incapable of dealing adequately with the demands of modernity 47 
Acceptance of the PLO's hegemonic aspirations seems to underlie the modernist texts' 
ready adoption of the PLO's version of events, leading them to conclude, for instance, 
that the IM is the chief perpetrator of violence in the clashes between it and the PLO, 
44 Cf. Shadid, pp679-680; Milton-Edwards, pp106-116,132-138. Exceptions: Ahmad, Nüsse. 
45 Cf. Abu-Amr, `Hamas', p18; Shadid, pp677-680; Ahmad, pp56-57. 
46 Cf. Usher, p78; Ahmad, pp56-57; Abu-Amr, `Haman', p18 (Haman condemns democracy as Western, 
preferable to dictatorship until "establishment of Islamic rule"). 
47 Cf. Usher, p78; Milton-Edwards, pp197-198. Implied by cf. Shadid, Abu-Amr. Nüsse diverges 
somewhat. 
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without questioning the latter's role in these events 48 Shadid even goes so far as to 
claim that "the majority [of the nationalists] insist on withdrawing and avoiding 
violence" rather than "fight[ing] the violence of the Brotherhood" -a claim which even 
a cursory investigation of the most notorious clashes calls into question. 9 Once it is 
accepted that the IM is the chief perpetrator, it is impossible to attribute outbursts of 
violence to context alone (as the general modernists would have done) because such an 
explanation would implicate both the IM and the PLO, as they operate within the same 
context. A non-contextual explanation must thus be found, and `Islamist nature' comes 
readily to hand - especially as many of the more vocal PLO leaders portray themselves 
as secular and progressive, while tending to depict the IM as overly Islamic and 
backward 5° Not only does this explanation fit the Western prejudice that traditional 
Islam has a penchant for violence (which even Westernised Arab Muslims seem to have 
been influenced by), 5' it also suits the modernist position that mixing politics and 
religion leads to violence. 
Similarly, acceptance of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians 
seems to have led the modernist texts to see the IM as derivative (caused solely by the 
PLO's failures, and the PLO's traditional enemies, Israel and Jordan; see further) and 
48 Cf. Shadid, pp679-680; Milton-Edwards, pp106-116,132-138; Schiff & Ya'ari, pp225-227; Abu-Amr, 
Fundamentalism, pp43-46 (though Abu-Amr tries to render a balanced account by including statements from 
both sides, he overemphasises Islamist violence without counterbalancing it with a discussion of PLO 
violence); Usher, pp68-69 (singling Hamas out for "internecine `collaborator' killings" where all parties were 
involved); Hammami, pp24-28 (allegations of violent imposition of headscarf on PLO activists; see Chapter 
5). Nüsse ignores inter-Palestinian violence as it is outside the focus of her research. 
49 Cf. 1982 clashes at Nablus' al-Najah University and 1983 clashes at the Islamic University of Gaza. For 
discussion of Gaza events, see Chapter 4. Regarding al-Najah, the student leader of Fatah at the time of the 
clashes acknowledged that the violence was partly triggered by Fatah's refusal to recognise the victory of the 
Islamists in the Student Council elections, while both neutral and Islamist eye witnesses insisted this refusal 
was expressed in a violently enforced disruption of university life, and that, after the clashes, PLO supporters 
visited the houses of Islamist students to rough them up (see Chapter 4, footnote 68). 
so Cf. personal interviews with Freh Abu-Middin (Minister of Justice); Top MOPIC Official. 
51 Cf. Shadid, Abu-Amr. 
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anti-nationalistic. " As such, the IM's rise to power is characterised as illegitimate, the 
IM depicted as a usurper of the PLO's rightful role. " Hamas's calling for separate 
strikes during the Intifada is painted as proof of its betrayal of the Palestinian cause, " 
while its championing of Islamic dress is condemned as undermining Palestinian culture 
in order to weaken national unity (despite the fact that those primarily adopting Islamic 
ss dress are women who would otherwise often wear Western clothes). 
Like the general sample, the modernists allow for the possibility that the IM may change 
- but on their terms. In this vein, Hamas is urged by Abu-Amr to adopt "acceptable 
positions" on pluralism and democracy and to embrace secularism 56 Usher likewise 
singles out "Hamas's rejection of secularism" as one of the three principal threats to the 
Palestinians' fight against Zionism (p78). Unless Hamas "absorb Western liberal 
traditions and rearticulate them", insists Milton-Edwards, it will not survive in the 
"Palestinian political climate" (p209). 
The pluralist texts, in contrast, do not stress the IM's alleged violent and intolerant 
attitude, " rather concentrating on its charitable institutions, the way these provide 
services to anyone regardless of ideology or creed, and even at times include Christians 
52 Shadid, pp674-676; Abu-Amr, `Haman', pp7-8,17-18; Usher, pp66,69,78; Milton-Edwards, pp109- 
110. 
53 Cf depiction of struggle for Islamic University; Chapter 4. 
54 Schiff& Ya'ari, pp235-236; Jubran, pp9-10. 
55 Cf. Shadid, p671. Hammami infers the same, though less explicitly so (p25). 
56 Abu-Amr, `llamas', p18; Fundamentalism, pp131-132 (insisting that Hamas joins the "secular" PLO on 
the PLO's conditions). 
57 Rashad mentions Hamas-PLO violence in passing (ppii, 31-32), as well as its efforts to curb it (ppl, 30- 
34,40-42). Roy dichotomises somewhat facilely between Hamas (radical, violent) and Islamic-based social 
services (moderate, constructive). Holt only makes oblique reference to clashes between Islamists and 
`nationalists' (pp64-65). Jensen mentions Islamist violence only in connection with Israeli and Palestinian 
Authority attempts to gain Western support by painting a strong Islamist opposition (pp204-205). 
WESTERN CONSTRUCTS OF PALESTINIAN ISLAMISM 51 
in their executive boards. 58 Typically, they do not treat the IM as monolithic, instead 
highlighting internal debates, and conflicting motives in `consumers' of IM charities 59 
As these texts are more sociologically than politically oriented, they tend not to discuss 
issues of democracy directly 6° When they do, they faintly echo the modernist approach 
by observing that the IM has no clear democratic position; yet they do so without 
insisting that it cannot develop such a position while keeping its non-secularist 
principles. b' Holt alone explicitly questions the universal applicability of Western 
(secularist) solutions (pp73-74). At the same time, none of the other texts dogmatically 
insists on Western solutions, instead allowing for alternatives. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES 
Following the issues raised in the previous chapter, I will discuss the attitudes of the 
modernists and pluralists of this sample to the question of the universal applicability of 
the Western historical trajectory and the extent to which they indulge in 
dichotomisation. 
Attitudes towards the Western Model 
The modernist texts posit the Western historical trajectory as the universal model. This 
position can be gleaned from the way the PLO is treated as the harbinger of modernity, 
58 Cf. Roy, ppl7-30 (p22 re Christian partner in charity); Jensen, p210 (describing sample of consumers of 
Islamist-run computer course); Rashad, pp8-9,13. 
59 Cf. Holt, pp69-73; Roy, pp9,17-30; Jensen, pp197-198,207-215; Rashad, ppl 1-12. 
60 Rashad is the exception, concentrating on politics; yet, he too only indirectly addresses issues of 
democracy (cf. discussion of Hamas's involvement in elections, pp15-16). 
61 Cf. Roy, pp26-27. 
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the IM as an obstacle which, on the basis of its "primitive and prohibitive interpretation 
of Islam" cannot begin to meet the exigencies of modernity, instead leading Palestine to 
a medieval-style autocracy, without democracy and respect for human rights - unless it 
adopts secularism and Western liberal traditions. 62 Such conclusions appear to be 
rooted in the conviction that Palestinian society is inevitably progressing towards a 
secular, democratic modernity and that anything detracting it from its course is a 
temporary anomaly 63 Consequently, the rise in the IM's popularity is explained as 
primarily a function of the PLO's failures, of King Hussein's strategic favours and 
initial covert Israeli support towards the IM (both as strategies to undermine the PLO) 64 
These factors played a part. Israeli lenience did help the IM - though it also had its 
share of forced closures and imprisonments 65 Good relations with the King similarly 
helped. But it is, at best, simplistic to credit its growth entirely to external factors. 
Rather, such explanations seem to be motivated by a reluctance to admit that the IM 
might have grown also by the force of its ideology and praxis (given its reputation for 
financial integrity and social responsibility) - an admission which might contradict the 
assumption that the Palestinians are secular-minded. 
62 Cf. Usher, p78. Milton-Edwards, Ahmad and Abu-Amr hint at the same (cf. Abu-Amr, 
Fundamentalism, ppl28-130), though Milton-Edwards is the least identified with the PLO. Schiff & Ya'ari 
imply it by referring to the IM's cultural programme as a "return to the ways of the ancients" (p226); cf. also 
Shadid, pp670-674; Hammami, p25 ("reactionary"). Again, Nüsse is the exception. Legrain remains neutral. 
63 Cf. Abu-Amr: "Palestinian society has a strong secular tradition" (Fundamentalism, ppI28-132); Shadid 
hinting education and urbanisation will result in secularisation (pp662-664; for more explicit expression of 
Shadid's attitude towards education and secularisation, see Shadid & Seltzer, `Political Attitudes of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip', Middle East Journal 42(1), pp24-25). 
64 Cf. Shadid, pp674-676; Abu-Amr, `Hamas', pp7-8,17-18; Fundamentalism, p131; Usher, pp66-69 
(Hamas a "barometer of discontent"), 78; Milton-Edwards, pp8,109-110. 
65 The Israelis shut down al-Mujamma` and its offshoots a number of times, refused it a permit for much of 
the 1970s, and imprisoned its leader Ahmad Yassin and various others during the 1970s and 1980s (cf. 
personal interviews with Yassin III; Ibrahim Yazuri, Director of al-Mujamma`; Muhammad Shamma`, Deputy 
Director). 
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The assumption that "Palestinian society has a strong secular tradition", which underlies 
the call for Hamas to adopt secularism, " is in need of problematisation. A survey 
conducted by Shadid and Seltzer (sic) in the mid-1980s demonstrates that some 60% of 
respondents favoured a state based, in some way, on Islam, against 11% favouring an 
explicitly secular state 67 My survey at Gaza's pro-Fatah al-Azhar University indicates 
that over 80% of Fatah supporters and nearly 60% of (leftist) PFLP supporters champion 
an Islamic or mixed Islamic-secular state. 68 Likewise, a majority of Palestinians still 
appear to view Islamic law as the legitimate source for any future legal framework 69 
Moreover, though regular opinion polls set popular support for overtly Islamist 
organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad at 10-15%, 7° more in-depth surveys set it 
at 20-30%. " 
Models for marrying religion and politics are myriad in recent Palestinian history. Some 
of the most influential political figures during the British Mandate period (1920-1947) 
were religious leaders, just as some of the main political institutions were religious. 72 
66 Cf. Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp128-132. 
67 28.1 % favoured a "state based on Islamic Law", 31.3% a "state based on Arab nationalism and Islam", 
22.5% a "Democratic-Palestinian" state, 11.1 %a "Democratic-secular" state (Shadid & Seltzer, p24). 
68 Of 398 Azhar students who stated they nationally supported Fatah, 53% said they hoped to see an 
Islamic state in Palestine, 28.4% a mixed Islamic-secular state (this term, familiar to students, indicates that 
Islam should have some official role in state structures). Of the 14 who put their trust in the (leftist) PFLP, the 
figures are 57.1%, 7.1%, 21.4%! Overall, 74.5% of 526 Azhar students answering the question `To what 
extent should religion have influence over politics? ' replied 70% or over (35% stating 100%). 
69 Cf at the final convention in April 1998 of the Gazan branch of the Model Parliament - Women and 
Legislation, an umbrella organisation of Palestinian institutions concerned with women's rights with close 
links to the Palestinian Left, only a few participants advocated abolishing Islamic law as the basis for law in 
Palestine. 
70 Cf. Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre's Public Opinion Polls, Nos. 1-20. 
71 Cf. Theodor Hanf & Bernard Sabella, A Date with Democracy, p70. 
72 Opposition to the British was led by Hajj Amin al-Hussayni, Mufti of Jerusalem, and the Supreme 
Muslim Council (cf. Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism, pp 17-18; 
Michael Dumper, Islam and Israel - Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State, pp 18-24). 
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Much of the political language of the 1920s drew on religious images, 73 while most of 
the major clashes between Palestinians and Zionists occurred around religious feasts or 
symbols. 74 One of the first guerilla groups to fight the British and trigger the Arab 
Revolt (1936-1939), was led by a religious cleric, Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, whose 
ideas were sufficiently close to the Muslim Brotherhood to have been adopted by Hamas 
as one of their military-ideological icons. 75 
During the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, when Gaza's population was tripled by the 
influx of refugees from what is now Israel 7' and Palestinians felt betrayed by the Arab 
leaders and officers leading the offensive for their lack of commitment to Palestine, " the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers were among the few providing volunteer units, while the 
Palestinian Brotherhood branches, established by visiting Egyptian Brothers in 1946, 
were the most prominent, and effective, in providing assistance to the refugees 
afterwards and in organising guerilla attacks against Israel! ' Having come under 
Egyptian rule after the 1948 war, the Gazan Brotherhood, initially one of the largest 
movements, was gradually suppressed in Nasser's general clampdown on the 
Brotherhood from 1954 onwards. 79 In the Jordanian-ruled West Bank, the Brothers 
73 Cf. reminding Muslims worldwide of the religious nature of the struggle for Jerusalem, and condemning 
land sales to Jews arguing that land was sacred, carrying the corpses of "friends of the prophet and the early 
[Muslim] warriors"; Johnson, pp22-23,24. See also Dumper, p21(n135). 
74 Cf. 1920-1921 clashes around feast ofNabi Musa, 1928-1929 clashes around rival claims to Wailing 
Wall. 
75 Cf. Johnson, pp38-47; Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, p136; Milton- 
Edwards, ppl 1-23. 
76 Cf. Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development, p 15. 
77 Alan Hart, Arafat, pp77-80. 
78 Gazan Brotherhood branch primarily engaged in resistance, not so West Bank branches. Cf. Milton- 
Edwards, pp38-53; Hart, pp75-76,97-105; Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp60-65; 
Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp6-9. 
79 In 1954, membership was over a thousand, with Abu-Amr describing it as "one of the largest 
organizations" in Gaza. Cf. Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp7-10; Milton-Edwards, pp46-55. For Egyptian 
events, see Mitchell, pp105-162. 
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were the only political party allowed to operate freely, almost without interruption, until 
the Israelis occupied the West Bank in 1967.8° 
Even during the supposedly secular decades of the 1960s and 1970s, when first 
Nasserism, then Palestinian nationalism were at their uncontested height, religion was 
never far from politics, as Nasser's and Arafat's regular (rhetorical) references to Islam 
suggest. The 1970s actually saw an increase in general religious fervour. In 1978 alone, 
three Islamic Shari'ah colleges were established, " while between 1967 and 1987 the 
number of mosques doubled in the West Bank, and tripled in Gaza. S2 A 1982 survey of 
Muslim students revealed that all respondents observed Islamic practices strictly, while 
78% of the women said they chose to wear the hijäb (headscarf) without family 
pressure. 83 Though the IM played a role in this process, it was but one among many 
factors, as exemplified by the fact that many of those establishing the Islamic colleges in 
1978 had no affiliation with the Brotherhood. 84 In short, proposing to practise an 
Islamicly inspired form of politics is not an anomaly to Palestinian society. 
The claim that the PLO is secular, which likewise undergirds the modernist call for 
Hamas to adopt secularism, " is equally problematic. The PLO is an umbrella 
organisation containing different Palestinian resistance movements. Though a number 
of the smaller movements, such as the leftist Popular and Democratic Fronts for the 
8° Cf. Lawrence Tal, `Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan', Survival 37(3), pp140-141; Milton- 
Edwards, pp55-64; Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949- 
1967, Ch. 4. 
81 Hebron, Gaza and Jerusalem; cf. Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership, p144. 
82 Gaza: from 200 to 600 mosques; West Bank: 400 to 750 (Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p15). 
83 Sahliyeh, pp143-144. 
84 See Chapter 4 regarding Islamic University of Gaza. For discussion of other factors fuelling religiosity, 
cf. Jensen, pp203-204; Milton-Edwards, pp4-9. 
85 Cf. Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp128-132. 
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Liberation of Palestine (PFLP and DFLP, founded in 1967 and 1969 respectively), are 
explicitly secular, the largest and most powerful group, Arafat's Fatah, is ambiguous 
about secularism. In the late 1960s, when Fatah formulated its state vision, it pointedly 
refrained from calling it secular, instead defining it as: "A democratic, progressive, non- 
sectarian state in which Jews, Christians and Muslims would live together in peace and 
enjoy the same rights". " Arafat underlined that "[w]e did not issue the slogan calling 
for the establishment of a secular state ... this 
is a distortion of the expression of 
democracy we proclaim". Rather, Arafat continued, "[w]e do not debate the structure of 
the new state in detail because what we need now is the greatest possible national 
cohesion". 87 This intentional ambiguity enabled Fatah to absorb adherents from widely 
differing ideologies. However, if the results of my 1998 survey at Gaza's al-Azhar 
University are representative of a general trend in Fatah, a majority of Fatah supporters 
prefer Islamicly oriented ideologies over secular ones. 88 
Within Fatah, models of religio-politics abound. A number of its founders had close 
links with the Muslim Brothers, ranging from membership and enrolment in the latter's 
military training programmes, to electoral alliances and mounting attacks on Israel under 
their umbrella, before founding Fatah in 1957.89 Though involvement with the Brothers 
may have been motivated by the fact that the Brothers were, at the time, one of the few 
movements actively agitating for the liberation of Palestine, the close cooperation also 
indicates a certain amount of affinity in purpose and worldview. That this affinity went 
deeper than mere temporal opportunism seems to be suggested by the fact that in the late 
1960s a number of Brothers joined the PLO's guerilla forces in Jordan, first as Islamic 
86 Conclusion of third Fatah Congress, quoted in Alain Gresh, The PLO, p32. 
87 Interview cited by Middle East Report 1969-1970, p335; quoted in Gresh, p50. 
88 See footnote 68. 
89 Cf. Arafat, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Khaled al-Hassan, all members of 
Fatah's Central Committee (see Hart, pp75-76,100-101,84-88,146; Sayigh, pp294,884,890). 
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Fatah, then acquiring the name of Qawa'id (Kata'ib) al-Shuyukh, the shaykhs' bases 
(batallions), and that Brothers continued to enlist with Fatah into the 1980s. 9° 
To say that the Palestinians are a secularly-oriented people and that only a secularly- 
oriented organisation such as the PLO can legitimately represent them, is thus false on 
two counts, since neither the Palestinians as a whole nor the PLO are wholly secular. 
Moreover, by labelling the PLO secular, and the IM anti-secular, the modernist texts fall 
into the trap of dichotomisation, foreclosing the possibility of cross-over elements (see 
further). 
Positing the West as model precludes the modernists, as in the general sample, from an 
in-depth engagement with Islamist concepts. Because it is assumed that Islamism will 
eventually give way to secularism, its political ideas are not taken sufficiently seriously 
to be thoroughly analysed. The conviction that the IM is naturally violent further erodes 
interest in the IM's democratic-like proclamations. Issues concerning democracy are 
mentioned only in passing, admonishing the IM to adopt them, but without any serious 
analysis of which aspects of democracy the IM embraces and which it rejects. Only 
Nüsse, and to a lesser extent Legrain, 9' engage to some depth with Islamist concepts. 
Nüsse consciously chooses to study the IM's publications in, paradoxically, an 
Orientalist manner: 
Orientalist criticism seems to have led, unfortunately, to a neglect of the study of texts. 
But if the writings are not mistaken for reality and the research is not guided by the 
wish to provide any ahistorical proof of some "essence of Islam"... then this 
90 Sayigh, p226. Personal interview with Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shannab (I1). Abu-Amr suggests that 
the 1960s cooperation was due more to the PLO's refusal (partly under pressure from Egyptian President 
Nasser) to allow the Brothers to organise themselves militarily than to affinity (Fundamentalism, p41). 
Nevertheless, there must have been sufficient affinity for both sides to agree to this public arrangement. 
91 Legrain, too, places great emphasis on the study of Harnas communiqu6s. See also Legrain & Chenard, 
Les voix du soulevement palestinien (collection of Intifada communiques). 
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"Orientalist" type of work can be an important supplement, ... a solid basis for any 
more contextual research. 92 
Though this path leads Nüsse to take Islamist concepts seriously, her modernist 
preconceptions prevent her from engaging in a two-way dialectic because they prevent 
her from exploring Islamist concepts from within. Examples are her discussion of the 
IM's adoption of the term `democracy' (see `Dichotomisation') and its attitude towards 
Christians (see `Definition'). 
Unlike modernists, pluralists are more willing to problematise the Western model and 
do not presume a priori that Islam or Islamism per se is incompatible with modernity or 
democracy. Holt illustrates this when she states, concluding a discussion of the IM's 
attitude towards women, that "Islam does not preclude democracy any more than a state 
based on Islamic law precludes women's rights" (p74). Holt refrains from relativism by 
maintaining democracy as her standard of evaluation. Her pluralism lies in her 
acknowledging that democracy may take different forms. In a similar vein, Roy 
observes that: 
The key question in Gaza, as elsewhere in the Arab world, is not whether Arab society 
will be religious or secular, but whether people will eat, develop, and progress. In all 
these respects, Islamic institutions have a critical role to play, especially now (p34). 
Islamism, in the eyes of these authors, is not necessarily an anomaly nor does it have to 
adopt secular or liberal attitudes to be valid. The rise of Islamist influence is thus not 
exclusively explained in terms of the failure of secularism or the PLO, or on account of 
being a pawn in the hands of Israelis or Jordanians. Similarly, no particular value 
judgement is expressed about the increase in religious fervour in Palestine because there 
92 Nüsse, p3. See also Chapter 1, footnote 26, 
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is no need to explain it away as an aberration. Such an approach enables Jensen, for 
instance, to acknowledge without alarmism or condemnation that "[t]he main 
contenders for defining the political landscape of tomorrow, apart from the present-day 
rulers, is the Islamist opposition" (p197). 
Concomitant with this attitude is greater openness to each movement's benefits and 
which one should legitimately represent the Palestinians. The pluralists do not interpret 
IM actions as anti-nationalistic, or as an unforgivable threat to the PLO. Resultantly, 
they do not depict an absolutist-like dichotomy between PLO and IM, or between IM 
and secular modernity. Roy agrees with the others that "Islamic institutions have a 
critical role to play" and is considerably scathing in her critique of Arafat and his PNA 93 
Moreover, "[t]he West", she insists, "in demonizing Hamas, and by extension, all parts 
of the Islamic movement in Gaza, is committing a potentially fatal error". Rather, it 
should differentiate between radical and moderate Islamists and support the moderate 
wing for the vital role it plays in stabilising the economy and moderating the effects of 
occupation, such as alienation and dislocation (p33). Without such dichotomies, the 
pluralists are able to abandon any fixation with violence, and display a certain amount 
of sympathy and respect for the Islamist contribution to society. Following Roy, 
A particular strength of Islamic institutions ... comes 
from the clarity and consistency of 
their message. Arafat's message is fluctuating and contradictory, and hardly relevant to 
the difficulties of everyday life; the Islamic message is clear, unchanging, and 
attainable: a moral and ordered life can be created and sustained through Islam. The 
importance of this fact should not be underestimated in a social and economic order as 
fractured as Gaza's (p25). 
93 Roy, pp28,34; 13-17. 
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Rashad goes furthest in this respect, at times almost completely identifying himself with 
the IM. An illustration is his description of the negotiations about Hamas joining the 
PLO, particularly when compared to some modernist descriptions. In Rashad's version, 
Hamas was the willing partner, while Arafat's refusal to accept its legitimate conditions 
scuppered the deal. "Despite the tensions", Rashad contends, "the Islamists continued 
to hold meetings with PLO officials in an attempt to ... avoid 
inter-Palestinian conflict". 
Hamas's condition of demanding 40% of the seats on the PLO's governing body is 
described as reasonable, reflecting an estimation of popular support in the territories. 
Modernists such as Abu-Amr, on the other hand, insist that Hamas "refused to work 
with the PLO because of irreconcilable ideological and political differences". In this 
view, the discussions were initiated by the PLO, while Hamas's "precondition that it be 
given 40 to 50 percent of the seats in the Palestine National Council", was unacceptable 
because it would enable Hamas to "take over the PLO from within", and was thus 
clearly intended "to make it extremely difficult for the PLO to accept them" 94 Both 
views probably carry some truth. But Rashad's over-identification with the IM, like 
Abu-Amr's over-identification with the PLO, calls into question whether he has been 
able to remain sufficiently critical. 
Finally, in contrast to the modernists, the pluralists do not tend to assume that 
Palestinian society is secular. The exception is Roy who insists on the factually dubious 
assumption (see above) that Palestinians do not want a religious but a "secular national 
state" (p28). 
94 Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp131-132. 
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a backward-looking religious movement whose main enemies are Western culture and 
Western political systems", and highlighting those Islamist arguments which have 
adopted Western reasoning, ends up warning that "[t]he fixed principles of traditional 
Islamic thought could be eroded by the absorption of too many "alien" concepts, 
increasing the inner contradictions of the Islamists' ideology" (ppl, 180). Western 
notions are thus depicted almost as poison to the Islamic framework, rendering hybrid 
Islamic-Western thinking practically inconceivable. 
An interesting example is Nüsse's suggestion that the Islamists' adoption of the terms 
`democracy' and `will of the people' is tactical, rather than principled, adopted in the 
expectation that free elections will give them power. Nüsse bases this conclusion on the 
observation that as recently as the 1950s the Egyptian Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid 
Qutb condemned the idea of popular sovereignty as antithetical to Islam, in which God 
alone has sovereign power, and on the "absence of discussion" within the movement 
surrounding "this major innovation" of adopting the concepts of `democracy' and 
`popular will' (pp76-77). 
Adoption of these terms may well have a tactical component. But what if they are 
adopted to determine power-sharing internally? Islamist standards are indeed at present 
incompatible with Western values (divine versus popular sovereignty being one 
example). But what of those notions that do overlap? Before Qutb, the influential 
Indian Islamist thinker Abul Ala Mawdudi had already developed his theory of 
"theodemocracy" which justified elections and political representation on the basis of 
God having given humanity viceregal sovereignty, leading to a theory closely 
resembling Western contractarianism (see Chapter 6). Contemporary Islamist thinkers 
such as the Tunisian Rashid al-Ghannouchi and the Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi, have 
further developed these ideas. The IM, acknowledging its debt to these men, has been 
influenced by these ideas. And moreover, it has taken inspiration from democratic 
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praxis as observed in Israel, and, to a lesser extent, other Western democracies. While 
clues to these developments may not have been obvious in the 1990-1992 publications 
of the British-based, Hamas-affiliated magazine Filastin al-Muslima (Nüsse's main 
source of information), as the Intifada was still raging at that time, those clues that were 
present are likely to have been obscured by Nüsse's dichotomising attitude which sets 
Islamist and Western thought apart. 
Because of the absence of a rigorous theoretical framework (see `Definition') in the 
fashion of the general modernist sample, the dichotomisation in these modernist texts 
borders at times on essentialisation, with opposites being defined in a reductionist 
manner. One manifestation of such essentialisation is the way in which the IM's actions 
are characterised as determined by Islam, while the PLO's actions are characterised as 
determined by secularism. Attitudes to Christians tend to be discussed in this way. The 
IM's reliance on Islam is blamed for preventing it from seeing Christians as fully equal 
citizens (despite some tentative indications to the contrary). " The PLO's secularist 
position is regarded as enabling it to wholly integrate Christians (despite a tendency in 
Fatah, bitterly fought by some Christians, to alot political quotas to Christians on a 
sectarian basis). 98 This elevation of Islam to the primary factor determining the IM's 
nature is equally evident in the way some modernist texts highlight the IM's use of 
mosques, ignoring Fatah's similar recourse to them (see `Decontextualisation'). In a 
similar vein, essentialist dichotomisation is practised in the way the IM's actions are 
characterised as bad, while the PLO's actions are portrayed as justified, or at least 
excusable. A case in point is the way the IM's attempts to gain influence in Palestine's 
universities are depicted as Machiavellian and anti-nationalistic, as opposed to the 
97 Cf. Nüsse, pp101-103. 
98 Cf. Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp128-129; Jerusalem Times, 01.12.1995 (Jessica Berry, `Controversy 
over Christian Quota'; Hanna Samara, `Christians in the Election Law'). 
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`legitimate' attempts by Fatah to create or maintain a hegemonic position (see Chapter 
4). 
Such essentialising is encouraged by Palestinian popular culture which, like most, veers 
towards essentialism, and influences rumours, the views of some politicians, and the 
news coverage of some newspapers. Rumours are one of the main carriers of this 
essentialism, because they naturally encourage reductionism. Reductionist symbols, 
such as wearing a beard, become indubitable signifiers of a larger phenomenon, such as 
being a Hamas member. Vague suspicions based on flimsy information rapidly become 
unshakeable facts in the telling. Gazan society is particularly rife with rumours - thanks 
to the isolation Israel's `collective incarceration' imposes on the Gaza Strip (over half 
the population has never been allowed by the Israeli authorities to leave the Strip) and to 
years of occupation which have broken down more official channels of communication 
and bred a secretive environment. `Facts', particularly concerning political events, thus 
often have dubious foundations in rumour. Yet, encouraged by the cultural tendency in 
Gaza not to admit to not knowing something for sure, such ambiguous conclusions are 
passed on with great conviction, leaving the next person in the chain of rumour no 
reason to not believe the statement. I was assured on numerous occasions that particular 
people were Hamas members, especially if they preached, had a beard, or were 
connected to a mosque - only to find out later that they were from Fatah or the religious 
establishment. 
In contrast, the pluralist texts tend to be more willing to neutralise dichotomisation and 
essentialisation by problematising labels and embracing contradictory data. Jensen, for 
example, lists the different reasons his interviewees quote for joining their sports club, 
despite a certain amount of internal contradiction. The same person is thus quoted as 
saying he joined the club "mainly for religious reasons", while later acknowledging he 
plays there because it was "close to my home". Rather than dismissing the religious 
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reasons as insincere, the result of indoctrination, or elevating them to the essence of 
these men's life, Jensen takes both reasons seriously, refusing to reduce life's 
complexity 99 The weakness in this approach is a loss of value hierarchy, leaving it 
unspecified which motivation weighs more heavily. 
Holt, likewise, juxtaposes the view many Palestinian women hold that "[b]y wearing 
Islamic dress, they are protected from unwelcome male attention and may, therefore, 
move more freely in the public arena", and that the Islamist movement has encouraged 
them to fight for their Islamicly-approved rights, with the observation that the Islamist 
movement has failed to sufficiently challenge the patriarchal nature of Palestinian 
society, and eradicate women-degrading practices. "' The two sets of statements stand 
in tension to each other, yet Holt refrains from, in the words of Salvatore, settling into a 
solution and thus precluding "new paths of problematization". 101 She is thus able to 
reveal a side of Islamist women's narrative that is generally not found in modernist 
discourse because, on the surface, it contradicts the perception of Islamism as a force 
against women's rights -a perception not shared by Islamist women. "' However, here, 
too, the danger is to abstain from according relative weight to each of these arguments. 
The pluralists tend to refuse to juxtapose Western and Islamist notions as incompatible, 
a position which enables them to engage more fully with Islamist discourse (see 
`Definition'). Despite this, the West remains a normative reference point. Jensen, for 
instance, defines moderate, with Moussalli, as "open to dialogue, compromise and more 
importantly, to universal rights, freedom, pluralism and civil society", versus `radical', 
or "resistant to dialogue and cooperation with the Arab regimes and the West in 
99 Jensen, pp208-210,215-216. 
100 Holt, pp69; 71,65; 72-74. 
101 Salvatore, pxvi. 
102 Cf. also Roy, pp22-23. 
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general" (p 197). 103 Moderate and radical are defined with respect to the West and its 
understanding of universally applicable values (though no particular model is posited, as 
with the modernists). Moreover, there is an underlying assumption that, through 
dialogue, the `moderate' Islamists will eventually accept those Western values held to 
be universally applicable. That this acceptance is expected to be more on Western than 
Islamist terms is suggested by the fact that, though all texts criticise the way Westerners 
view Islamism, none are explicitly (self-)critical of the West, and the supposed 
universality of its values. Holt displays an implicit understanding of the need for such 
(self-)criticism by observing that what Westerners see as `universal', Islamists tend to 
define as `Western' and thus not directly applicable to them (p73). Beyond this, there is 
little critical reflection on Western values and praxis, comparable to that found among 
the pluralists of the general sample. 
The pluralists likewise refrain from dichotomising between a secular, (potentially) 
progressive PLO, and an Islamist, regressive IM. This is partly because three of the four 
texts focus more on sociological than political issues, concentrating on clients of the 
IM's institutions and ideas rather than its leaders' contentions with the PLO. Where the 
texts do discuss PLO-IM relations, they do so without excessive labelling, judging both 
by equal standards, allowing actions to speak for themselves. 104 Resultantly, pluralists 
are less fixated with the religious and violent aspects of the IM, looking behind the 
sometimes fiery rhetoric for meaning1 ' and placing religious explanations within their 
context. 1°6 While this perspective provides new insights, it fails to sufficiently answer 
103 Quote from Moussalli, `Modem Islamic Fundamentalist Discourse on Civil Society: Pluralism and 
Democracy' in A. Richard Norton (ed), Civil Society in the Middle East, pp88-116. 
104 Cf. Roy, p34; Holt, p74. Rashad tends to be more critical of the PLO than of Hamas. 
los Cf. Rashad, pp8-9,11-12. 
106 Cf. Jensen, pp203,207-209. 
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modernist allegations that the IM is violent because the issue of political violence is 
largely ignored, thus undermining these texts' revisionist goals. 
Another result of this perspective is that Islamist charitable institutions are taken 
seriously - not as cynical fronts for luring society into Islamism, a perspective popular 
among modernists. "' With the pluralists, this thesis assumes that charity praxis is one 
manifestation of the core ideals of the ideology behind it. If charities are opportunistic 
fronts, the testimonies from charity staff would hardly be convincing. Roy challenges 
the notion that the Islamic charities are mere Machiavellian "vehicles of propaganda and 
recruitment" (p23). 1°8 Doubtless, such institutions serve as vehicles for the 
dissemination of ideas and as advertisements for their sponsor movement. But perhaps 
because she regards Islamism as a genuine force, a legitimate part of modernity (rather 
than an impostor), she does not ignore that the charities were founded to meet society's 
needs. Countering the claim that the charities recruit terrorists, Roy argues 
it is extremely unlikely that the Qassem Brigades [Hamas's highly independent military 
wing] use social-service institutions for recruitment, since militants are few, highly 
decentralized, secretive, and traditionally recruit from within (i. e., relatives from the 
clans of existing members). [... ] The Islamic social movement in Gaza long preceded its 
political counterpart and will, in all likelihood, long outlive it. [... ] Its doctrine is one of 
service ... [It is ] oriented towards life not death (pp30-32). 
Jensen observes that the members of the Islamic football club he interviewed did not 
receive any "schooling or indoctrination" to "embrace an Islamist orientation", and that, 
besides playing at the club, none of the interviewees "participated in other organized 
Islamic activities" (p214). This is not to say religio-political reasons did not play a part 
107 Cf. Shadid, pp666-667; Abu-Amr, `llamas', pp8,14; Schiff/Ya'ari, pp224-226. 
108 For modernist expressions of the `front' view, cf. Shadid, pp665-667; Abu-Amr, `Hamas', pp8,14; 
Legrain, `A Defining Moment', p72; Milton-Edwards, p105. 
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in the players' choice of club too. Unlike many Fatah-affiliated clubs, this club could 
not provide extra perks, such as "better training facilities ..., 
better job opportunities or 
better housing conditions". Had such practical considerations been their main 
motivation, all interviewees acknowledged, they would have joined a Fatah-affiliated 
club (p210). Combining these two observations, the club can hardly be characterised as 
a front. Rather, it appears to offer a particular service - creating the opportunity to play 
football in an atmosphere of religious brotherhood. 
2.3 METHODOLOGICAL PATTERNS 
Attitudes towards Conflation and Generalisation 
The modernist texts tend to conflate internal differences within the IM. The starkest 
example is in Schiff and Ya'ari who treat the Salafiyyun as part of the IM (pp226-227), 
even though the Salafiyyun are institutionally unconnected to the Brotherhood and their 
ideologies differ markedly (see footnote 30, p 151 of this thesis). Some, like Usher 
(pp72-77) and Legrain (pp 181-182), acknowledge the existence of internal debates 
within the IM. Others, like Ahmad, even quote democratic-like Islamist statements 
(p69). But, like the general sample, they end by denouncing Islamists monolithically as 
anti-democratic. Ahmad's `evidence' that Hamas seeks a cleritocracy is a nebulous 
passage from Hamas's Charter asserting that Hamas "judges all its actions according to 
Islam" (p56). It appears that the assumption that Islamists cannot be democratic because 
they are not secular is too strong to allow for alternative readings, or for 
problematisation of presumptions - even if evidence appears to contradict them. It is 
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further encouraged by the suspicion that much of Islamist theoretical discourse is 
opportunistic, 109 and by the dichotomising between IM and modernity. 
Unlike the general sample, these modernists display a greater tendency to generalise 
from particular incidents, in a manner reminiscent. of the general essentialists. Shadid, 
for example, depicts the 1982 clashes at al-Najah University as typical of the IM's 
behaviour (pp679-680). 1° In fact, they were unique in Najah's history, though smaller 
skirmishes did happen more regularly. Major clashes at other Palestinian universities 
were equally few and far between. One of the chief reasons for this discrepancy 
between the general modernist sample and this sample is the absence of theoretical 
models in the latter, since models encourage the meticulous rooting of generalisations in 
the particular. I have already discussed one reason for the absence of such models (see 
p49). Another may be a difference in approach. Where the general modernists 
generally display a developmentalist attitude with its heavy reliance on developmental 
theories, in this sample they appear more inclined towards historical narrative. Their 
modernism thus resides more in outlook than in methodological approach. 
Pluralists conflate less, and are less prone to generalising from the particular. Roy 
maintains a clear conceptual distinction between `military', `political' and `social' 
Islam, and refrains from generalising from actions done or attitudes held by one of these 
to the whole, or treating Islamism as a monolith. Though she reiterates, without 
qualification, the modernist view that Hamas members "spent a great deal of time 
during the early years of the Intifada trying to impose Islamic moral codes on a less than 
receptive population", Roy does not infuse her descriptions of Islamic charities with a 
109 Cf. Shadid, pp665-667; Abu-Amr: Hamas's Islamic doctrine "lends itself to more than one 
interpretation to justify shifts in attitudes" (Fundamentalism, p133). 
1 10 Cf. also acid attack described by Milton-Edwards (pp113-114). 
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similar moralistic, authoritarian flavour, instead praising "the clarity and consistency of 
their message", and the topicality of their charitable work (pp9,17-30). "' 
One of the reasons for this lack of generalisation lies in the pluralists taking a more 
anthropological approach. Describing his approach, Jensen quotes Norton observing 
"Scholarship on the Islamists has ... 
been overly textual, too inclined to report words of 
the ideologues..., and insufficiently sociological, in terms of failing to look at the 
motives of those who lend their support to the Islamist movement" (p199). 
112 
Such an approach starts self-consciously from the particular, daring only tentatively to 
generalise. In the words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz: 
The bulk of what I have eventually seen (or thought I have seen) in the broad sweep of 
social history I have seen ... 
first in the narrow confines of ... peasant villages. [... ] Like 
all scientific propositions, anthropological interpretations must be tested ... either by 
confining oneself to one's chosen stage and letting others make of one's descriptions 
what they will (in which case the generalization of them is likely to be even more ... 
uncontrolled), or one can take up ... the task of demonstrating that ... 
less minutely 
focused problems can be made to yield to the same kinds of analysis practiced on the 
narrow scene. [... ] ... without 
[this kind of approach] we are prey, on the one hand, to 
the pallid mindlessness of radical relativism and, on the other, to the shabby tyranny of 
historical determinism. 113 
III Jensen likewise stresses non-heterogeneity of Islamist institutions (pp197-198). Roy bases her views of 
Harnas on, among others, Abu-Amr, Legrain, Rashad, Shadid. 
112 Quote from Augustus Richard Norton, Political Reform in the Middle East, paper presented at "State, 
Individual and Civil Society in the Middle East", Magleds, Denmark, 13-14.11.1995, p8. 
113 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, ppvi-viii. 
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Jensen, an anthropologist by training, starts from the particular of an Islamist football 
club. Holt and Roy likewise focus on particular case studies or testimonies from 
`consumers' of Islamic charities. Rashad does not and, interestingly, also generalises 
more, without sufficient support of evidence. "' Rooting macro-observations in the 
micro-level seems to help prevent sweeping generalisations. "' 
Attitudes towards Selectivity and Decontextualisation 
The modernist texts are somewhat selective in their choice of topic, source and 
evidence. They tend to focus on violence and intolerance, structural organisation, or 
tactical decisions regarding the Peace Process or the Intifada. Where ideas are 
addressed, they are generally discussed with reference only to Hamas's Charter, and 
topics are confined to Islam, nationalism, resistance/jihad and the Jews. With the partial 
exception of Nüsse, all texts avoid an in-depth discussion of the IM's attitude towards 
democracy, or any of its constituent themes, such as governance, the political process or 
the body politic. 
Most modernist texts tend to include some Islamist quotes - Ahmad, Milton-Edwards 
and Nüsse being the most generous - but the bulk of these stem from written 
publications and published interviews. Personal interviews with IM members are few. 
Five texts list none, the remaining ones generally include a limited number only, and 
then mostly with the leadership. Those personally interviewed in the ensemble of texts 
(incorporating only the parts concerning the IM from the most relevant chapters from 
1 14 Cf. Rashad's sweeping characterisation of "Arafat loyalists" as out to "discredit the Islamists" and 
obliterate them while depicting Hamas as "careful to avoid an inter-Palestinian conflict" (pp40-41); or his 
sweeping condemnation of the attitudes of "European states and America" towards the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict (p43). Both statements contain elements of truth, but are facile in their broadness. 
1 15 See also remark on Kramer (Chapter 1, footnote 101). 
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Milton-Edwards and Abu-Amr)i6 include nine leaders from Gaza, the West Bank and 
Jordan, and only a few ordinary members/supporters (whose views are rarely asked 
concerning political issues). At the same time, modernist texts draw readily on the IM's 
political rivals. In Milton-Edwards' chapter on the second decade of the occupation, 
none of the 43 footnotes concerning the IM refer to a personal interview with a 
Palestinian IM member or even to IM publications, while 16 refer to personal interviews 
with nationalist, leftist and non-partisan Palestinians, and five site the pro-Fatah al-Fajr 
newspaper (pp232-235). "' Her chapter on IM ideology is less imbalanced, with 8 of the 
50 footnotes referring to personal interviews with IM leaders, 18 to Hamas's Covenant 
or leaflets. However, the 8 interview references refer to only three different interviews - 
a small sample indeed. 
Few modernists discuss the credibility of their sources. Legrain is the exception when 
he notes how a number of `Harnas' communiques distributed during the Intifada were 
produced by the Israelis to sow discord, and how "'the attempted burning of the Gaza 
blood bank (a PLO stronghold)" in the name of Hamas was likewise an Israeli 
provocation. 18 None of the texts acknowledge the fact that many of the Palestinian 
sources used are predisposed towards the PLO's point of view. `Official' Palestinian 
pronouncements on events tend to come from PLO ranks. The majority of Palestinian 
newspapers for the past 30 years have been in the hands of pro-PLO editors. "' Scholars 
naturally rely on them as they are the most readily accessible - but do not sufficiently 
reflect on the source's credibility. The same can be said of scholars' reliance on each 
1 16 Chapters 4&6,2&3 respectively. 
117 There are two references to personal interviews with prominent Jordanian Muslim Brothers; however, 
this does not make up for the lack of interviews with Palestinian Brothers. 
118 Legrain, p183. 
119 Cf. A/-Fajr which both Milton-Edwards and Abu-Amr quote from. See p98. 
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other's works. Shadid, being one of the first texts to focus on the IM, is oft quoted. Yet 
no one questions his quite clearly pro-PLO, modernist perspective. 
The combination of essentialist methodology and a modernist perspective leads the 
modernists to over-emphasise, decontextualise, at times even essentialise, the violent 
and religious aspects of the IM. Schiff and Ya'ari, for instance, stress that Hamas 
activists are using mosques to store weapons and conceal fugitives (p222). Yet they fail 
to highlight that Fatah and even the Marxist PFLP similarly used mosques . 
120 They 
depict the Israeli debate about whether or not to clamp down on Hamas as being chiefly 
about how to arrest "clerical figures" and curb the institutions of the waqf (religious 
endowments) without inviting "charges of violating the Palestinians' freedom of 
worship" (p237) - thus painting a picture of a batallion of imams waging war on Israel. 
In fact, the majority of Hamas's leadership are professionals, `clerical' only in the way, 
following Islamic custom, they take their share in preaching, "' while Fatah likewise 
uses mosque sermons to spread its message. 
In sharp contrast to the general sample, acts of violence are often decontextualised. 
Milton-Edwards elaborates on a nitric acid attack by Islamist activists on a PFLP student 
leader, "' but fails to situate the attack in the ongoing struggle for political influence over 
Gaza's Islamic University in which both sides engaged in atrocities amidst an 
increasingly violent occupation (see Chapter 4). 123 
120 Cf. personal interview with Intifada Cell H. The issue here is not whether Hamas used mosques more 
than Fatah, but that mosque-use is singled out as an aspect of Hamas's praxis. 
121 See Chapters 6.3 & 7.4. 
122 Milton-Edwards, pp113-114. 
123 Cf. also Usher's discussion of Hamas's involvement in collaborator killing, without mentioning that all 
factions were involved, and situating the atrocities against the Intifada's climate of all-out war and the danger 
collaborators posed (p69). See also Chapter 8.2.5. 
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The pluralists are generally careful to contextualise - largely because, as with the 
general sample, they are forced to by the relative absence of metanarratives in their 
approach, and by their reliance on a more anthropological approach, which encourages 
close observation or even participant observation. 124 Roy, for instance, contextualises 
the violence displayed by suicide bombings, observing this is largely a result of the 
"economic decline and social fracture" Gaza has experienced over decades of what Roy 
terms `de-development' (p14))25 Holt similarly places her discussion of Islamism and 
women's rights in its local context, indicating in particular that Western-inspired 
solutions might not work (pp7l-73). 
Likewise, the pluralist texts tend to include a wider variety of evidence than the 
modernists do, discussing both violent and charitable, tolerant and intolerant aspects. 
Only Rashad focuses primarily on the political, and then largely in relation to practical 
(as opposed to conceptual) issues such as relations with Israel and the PNA. Yet in all 
texts pointers can be found towards the possible emergence of a democratic-like 
Islamism. The pluralist temptation is to lose a sense of value hierarchy. Roy guards 
herself best against this (perhaps as a result of her modernist inclinations), squarely 
evaluating the violent relative to the charitable. The others are less successful. 
Pluralists are also less selective in their sources, more willing to seek out Islamists 
personally, so that they can present their own version. Though only 3 of Jensen's 45 
footnotes refer to personal interviews with IM members, 8 of the 20 pages are wholly 
dedicated to the views of 4 members of an Islamist football club, with 16 direct quotes 
124 Cf. Roy lived in the Gaza Strip during the Intifada, Jensen lived there and worked with Islamists, Holt 
worked with women's organisations from Jerusalem. Subsequent to writing his article, Jensen spent six more 
months in Gaza, enrolling in an English course at the Islamic University and joining an Islamist football club. 
125 See also Roy, The Gaza Strip. 
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and several paraphrases. 126 In Roy's case, though only 6 of the 70 footnotes refer to 
personal interviews with Islamists, she has based much of her conclusions regarding 
Islamic charities on an analysis of a sample of "five Islamic business establishments", 
and interviews with members of, and site visits to, four major and "several other smaller 
[Islamic] organizations". 127 Significantly, both Roy and Jensen have aimed their 
research at the IM's institutions and their `consumers' on the assumption that these can 
reveal a different, less overtly political, side of the IM. 
In contrast, the other two texts do not include references to personal interviews with IM 
members. Consequently, Rashad's text is weak on providing a window into the 
thinking of Hamas members - particularly poignant as he criticises Hamas's Mithaq for 
not containing any "real specifics on any issue" (p11). But Holt's text still shows a 
different approach than observed in the modernist texts, by including significant quotes 
from published interviews with the IM's `consumers', rather than focussing on public 
explanations of the leadership. 
Despite their greater inclusiveness of Islamist sources, the pluralist texts resemble the 
modernists in not reflecting sufficiently self-consciously on their sources' credibility, 
particularly when it concerns other texts belonging to the Western canon. Roy, for 
instance, has unquestioningly adopted the modernist perspective found in the majority of 
her source texts towards Hamas. 12' To reconcile the contradiction between this 
modernist reading of Hamas, and her own pluralist understanding of the Islamist 
charities (which she has observed directly, without a modernist interface), and to 
safeguard the purpose of her text to persuade the West to refrain from demonising all 
126 Jensen also interviewed five participants on an Islamic charity's computer course. See pp207-214,218- 
219 (n27, n31, n34). 
127 Roy, pp17,38 (n51, n54). 
128 Roy does question the credibility of Israeli and American views (cf. p11). 
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Islamists and support moderate Islamists, she is forced to dichotomise between a radical 
Hamas and moderate charities, to `save' the charities from `contamination' with the 
negative picture painted by the modernist texts of Hamas. However, as Jensen, Rashad 
and my research indicate, such dichotomisation is not meaningful as both are 
manifestations of Islamism, sharing personnel and a religio-political vision, and neither 
are sufficiently monolithic to be capturable under a `radical' or `moderate' label. "' 
Jensen discusses the problematicity of certain Western approaches to Islamism (pp199- 
200) but fails to extend this discussion to the Western canon on the IM. Rashad goes so 
far as to note that "Israeli military sources, Arafat loyalists, and some other nationalists" 
are likely to provide "prejudicial information" and warns that, in order to consolidate 
their own power base, "Arafat loyalists ... will attempt to 
discredit the Islamists as 
fanatics and question their loyalty to Palestinian unity". Yet, he too fails to scrutinise 
the modernist texts he draws on. However, he, like Jensen and Holt, does seem to 
implicitly filter the information contained in these texts by refraining from repeating 
what appears tainted by prejudice, such as exaggerated claims of Hamas's anti- 
nationalistic and violent attitude (pp34-39). 130 
Attitudes towards Definition and Analysis 
In sharp contrast to the modernists of the general sample, those of this sample lack the 
rigour of a theoretical framework, and consequently definitional depth. 131 A number of 
modernists self-consciously employ theoretical models to explain why Islamism has 
129 Many of the more moderate Hamas leaders are pillars of charitable institutions - the organisational links 
between the two wings remain, however, generally tenuous. 
130 Like Roy, Rashad questions the credibility of pro-Israeli US Congressmen and journalists. 
13 1 There are exceptions, though not in the primary sample. Sayigh, for instance, is a modernist who 
employs a rigorous definitional framework. 
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grown in influence over the past decades. In all texts, modernist models underlie the 
conclusions - but generally in an un-selfconscious manner. Most significantly, 
however, they default on defining terms such as `anti-democratic' or `ulama-'. This 
appears to be caused by these texts' inclination towards historical narrative, rather than 
theoretical, or developmentalist, analysis. 
As a result of their positing the West as model, adopting a dichotomous attitude, and 
regarding Islamist thinking as lacking in depth, "' the modernists do not sufficiently 
engage with Islamist thinking. Abu-Amr wrote in 1994 that "[i]ssues of democracy and 
pluralism have not so far been a matter of concern for the Islamic movement in the 
Occupied Territories". At the same time, he claimed that Hamas sought to prevent 
"political parties that do not take Islam as a frame of reference" from operating in an 
Islamic state, thus implying that `issues of democracy and pluralism' had already been 
dismissed)" Though the IM's Intifada publications did not reserve much space for 
theoretical discussions on democracy (largely because their focus was everyday 
activism, their audience uneducated people), numerous statements appeared which were 
reflections of an ongoing debate about the nature of right government, from comments 
on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to criticisms of the PLO's undemocratic nature. 134 To 
say that these issues had not been "of concern" is thus, at best, an excuse for not having 
probed the IM's thinking further - as even the existence of the above-mentioned anti- 
pluralistic stance indicates. That stance, moreover, is held by one faction only within 
the IM. 135 It is certainly not the only opinion - as many statements and the IM's actual 
132 Paradoxically, the modernist notion that the IM is opportunistic is held in conjunction with the 
contradictory notion that the IM's fundamental principles are fixed, stifling and puritanical (cf. Usher, p78; 
Abu-Amr, `Haman', p18; to lesser extent: Nüsse, p180; Milton-Edwards, pp165-166,198). 
133 Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p130. 
134 Cf. Legrain, Fundamentalism, p78; Ahmad, p69. 
135 Abu-Amr references his statement to Mahmud Zahhar, a Hamas spokesman whose views are not always 
considered by other leaders and the rank and file to be wholly representative of the movement's thinking. 
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participation in elected institutions appear to indicate. Even if it were, however, Abu- 
Amr should have tried to understand why it has been adopted and what values its 
adoption reveals. It is this kind of dialectic probing that is missing in the modernist 
texts. 136 
Among the modernists, Nüsse engages most fully with Islamist notions. Yet because 
she, has not problematised her modernist assumptions, she forecloses the possibility of a 
two-way dialectic interaction. Besides Nüsse's failing to probe the IM's understanding 
of the concept of `democracy' (see `Dichotomisation'), Nüsse's treatment of Hamas's 
attitude towards Christians in an Islamic state is illustrative (pp102-103). While 
correctly identifying some of the tensions that could result from the attempt to marry the 
concept of citizenship based on domicile to that based on ideological identification, she 
overlooks the evolution in the IM's understanding, assuming it still adheres to the 
classical Islamic concept of dhimmi (protected person) by which Christians would be 
protected but not fully-fledged citizens (see Chapter 8). 137 
The pluralist texts lack definitional rigour, particularly with regard to Islamist 
concepts. 138 Thus, despite their willingness to engage with Islamist thinking from within 
its own conceptual framework, "' their lack of definitional rigour prevents them from 
creating an in-depth dialectic between their Western conceptual framework and that of 
136 Cf. also Milton-Edwards' treatment of IM's reliance on "broad models based on the past" (p 198). 
137 Litvak takes a similar approach (pp18-19). 
138 Though, like the modernists, some employ (modernist) models to explain Islamism's rapid (re)growth, 
or define to some depth main terms such as `Islamist' or `moderate'. Cf. Jensen, pp203-204; Holt, pp65-69. 
139 Cf. Jensen unravelling the different motives compelling his interviewees to support Islamism (pp205- 
214); Holt attempting to move beyond modernist assumption that the IM is "reactionary, anti-intellectual and 
dismissive of women's rights", seeking to understand why the IM "is regarded by many Palestinian women as 
their best hope for liberation" (pp65,69-74). Curiously, Rashad who displays the most openly sympathetic 
approach to the IM, is also the pluralist engaging in the least depth with the IM's ideas, being content with 
observing that the Mithaq lacks "real specifics on any issue" without much further probing as to political and 
social ideas (p11). 
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their Islamist subjects. In this, they fail to match their general counterparts and the 
conceptual depth these latter attain. One reason for this discrepancy may be the more 
self-consciously anthropological approach of this sample (enhanced by their area focus), 
which can encourage an overemphasis on the local to the neglect of situating it within a 
more general social science framework. 14° 
140 See also quote from Geertz (p70). 
CHAPTER 3 
FOCI, METHOD AND SOURCES 
3.1 RESEARCH FOCI 
Much of Western discourse on Palestinian Islamism focusses on violent and intolerant 
behaviour and uses evidence thereof to support its argument that Islamists are unlikely 
democrats. This `evidence' tends to be distorted by decontextualisation, generalising 
conflation, too heavy a reliance on pro-PLO narratives, and, in a circular manner, the 
sheer weight of `evidence' of other violence. The emphasis on violence, moreover, 
discourages scholars from further exploring Islamist political theory, as the evidence of 
violence appears to make a mockery of any expression of democratic-like ideals. If, 
however, this evidence can be shown to be distorted, the study of Islamist political 
theory may be rendered meaningful again. A re-evaluation of allegations of violence is 
thus essential. 
Part II will focus on two violent episodes which have shaped the modernist reading of 
Palestinian Islamism as anti-pluralistic and anti-democratic. Using a pluralist 
methodology, I will re-examine available evidence. Both episodes - the struggle for the 
Islamic University (Chapter 4) and the `hijA (headscarf) campaign' (Chapter 5) - are 
generally interpreted as proof of the IM's intolerance towards other-thinkers, and its 
readiness to resort to violence. The struggle for the Islamic University is, allegedly, an 
illustration of political intolerance towards political rivals, the `b a-b campaign' an 
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example of socio-political intolerance. Both are portrayed as examples of the IM's 
strategy to undermine the PLO and establish a political counter-hegemony, proof of the 
IM's anti-nationalistic nature and its betrayal of Palestinianness. 
Part III will focus on the political theory of the IM in Gaza. The IM's principal ideal is 
the establishment of an Islamic state on the basis of Islamic law. For reasons of time 
and space, I will limit my focus to three key aspects of this proposed Islamic 
state: governance (Chapter 6), political process (Chapter 7), and body politic (Chapter 
8). In Chapter 6, I will focus on the IM's understanding of leadership and authority, 
looking specifically for contractual constructs, checks on malpractice, and private-public 
dichotomies. In Chapter 7,1 will examine decision-making in policy-design and 
legislation, evaluating the roles of rationality and revelation, expertise and 
representativeness, and studying how dissent and opposition are handled. Chapter 8 will 
analyse the IM's attitude towards the political role of Christians and communists in an 
Islamic state. 
The choice of these topics is inspired not only by their centrality to any theory of 
government but also by their being pivotal to challenging modernist claims that the IM 
is authoritarian and anti-pluralistic. The type of leadership advocated by, and practised 
in, a movement reveals a great deal about the extent to which that movement is 
authoritarian or democratic. The same is true of the kind of decision-making procedures 
being advocated (and practised) - in particular the way dissent is handled. An analysis 
of the IM's attitude towards Christians and communists - each of whom are generally 
considered by Western discourse to have a problematic relationship with Islamism - 
will help establish to what extent the IM is indeed anti-pluralistic towards the 
ideological `other'. 
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3.2 CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
Attitude towards Western Model 
Following a pluralist perspective, I have problematised the universality of the Western 
model, using it instead as a source for comparison with Islamist concepts, providing 
contrasting angles at similar problematics, thus enabling me to probe the latter in a 
dialectical `hermeneutical circle'. 1 Western concepts have been treated not as 
universally privileged but as comparable entities, with as much claim to `truth' as 
Islamist concepts, privileged only in the way they form the foundations of my 
conceptual framework, and provide me with a map with which to interpret other 
conceptual systems. To offset this latter privileging, I have immersed myself as much as 
possible in Islamist thinking, trying to engage with Islamists and Islamist concepts from 
within their own framework, delaying the `translation' of an Islamist term into a 
Western equivalent until the former has been sufficiently probed, remaining willing to 
further problematise such `translations' and drawing, where possible (and given the fact 
that my Arabic reading skills are limited), on Islamist theoretical texts as well as the two 
primary authoritative sources for Muslims, the Qur'an and the Sunnah (Traditions of the 
Prophet). 
At the same time, I have tried to refrain from establishing too sharp a dichotomy 
between `Western' and `Islamist', acknowledging the existence of innumerable cross- 
over elements. I have attempted to balance relativism with universalism, tentatively 
positing certain positions, such as respect for difference, antipathy to violence, 
leadership accountability, condemnation of corruption and dishonesty, as universally 
I This resembles what Hans-Georg Gadamer called a "fusion of horizons" where meaning is `created' 
through a dialectic between the original meaning of a term as meant by its user and the interpretation given to 
it by the observer; the horizons never fuse completely, tension remains between the two perspectives, and the 
interpretive process never ends (Truth and Method, cf. pp267-274). 
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applicable, while remaining open to their potential problematisation by cultural `others'. 
These positions, though intertwined in my conceptual framework with specific Western 
political models and value systems, are self-consciously posited as potentially 
independent of them (a value may be realised by different systems). 
The attitude I have adopted towards the Western model has allowed me to de-ideologise 
the issue of whether Palestine should adopt a Western style of modernity, and thus 
whether the Palestinians as a whole are a secular-minded people, whether the PLO is 
secular and a modernising force, and whether the IM is anti-secular and an obstacle to 
modernisation. My views on which party operates more effectively, which more 
accurately represents ordinary Palestinians, what type of development is best suited for 
Palestine, can similarly be acknowledged to have cultural specificity. Labels such as 
`secular' or `modern' can be problematised, and used descriptively rather than 
ideologically. Consequently, I do not have to treat the IM as an anomaly, or the PLO as 
an ideological `ally'. 
Attitude towards Dichotomisation 
I have avoided excessive dichotomisation by actively searching for cross-over elements 
from the antithesis of a phenomenon's label, riding contradictions without prematurely 
solving them, and challenging existing dichotomising labels. I have accordingly tried to 
search for non-violent, secular, pluralistic and democratic instances in the IM, 
juxtaposed them to violent, anti-secular, etc. instances, settling on a conclusion of the 
contradictions only when both sides of the opposite terms have been allowed to speak. 
Alternatively, I have compared those Islamist ideas which harbour seemingly 
contradictory inclinations (such as liberal and communitarian) to two representative sets 
of Western ideas revolving around these inclinations (for example Locke and Hegel), 
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and allowing each to bring out different aspects of the IM's thinking (acknowledging 
that neither is wholly defined by the one inclination). 
A particularly important dichotomy to neutralise is that between religion and politics. 
The secular prejudice appears to be one of the overriding factors operative in distorting 
Western understanding of Islamist thinking. I have treated the IM as a political 
movement with a religiously inspired outlook, in which both components are legitimate. 
I have avoided either overemphasising or ignoring the religious element, instead treating 
it as an integral part of the IM's ideology. 
3.3 METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 
Attitude towards Generalisation and Conflation 
Following the pluralists, I have tried to root my observations and conclusions in 
particular instances, wherever possible providing proof of incidents which back the 
generalisations I propose. I have taken care not to treat the IM, Islamism, or Western 
political theory as monoliths. A certain level of generalising is unavoidable. In the 
process of delineating factions within a movement (cf. Chapter 8), nuances within 
factions are suppressed, differences between factions exaggerated. Nevertheless, I have 
delineated factions to highlight the diversity within the IM. 
The IM is a non-monolithic, loosely-knit movement. Its conviction that the precise form 
of the ultimate Islamic state is to be left flexible until representatives of the people and 
experts have had a chance to discuss it in detail, precludes it from too dogmatic an 
adherence to one set of institutions (see Chapter 7). It is exacerbated by the 
circumstances in which the IM evolved, favouring secrecy, not open debate. It is also 
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influenced by regional differences, such as the marked increase in conservatism the 
further south one goes within the Gaza Strip. 
Attitude towards Selectivity and Decontextualisation 
One has to guard against being overly (or unwittingly) selective towards topics and 
sources. Within the political focus and limits of this thesis, I have included extremes 
ranging from violence to democratic behaviour, intolerance to pluralism. I have sought 
out Islamists and Islamist critics, insiders and outsiders, leaders and led, the politically 
calculating and the politically guileless. The first two pairs have been particularly 
important for analysing the involvement of the IM in violent incidents, and its attitude 
towards Christians and communists; the third and fourth for testing to what extent 
advocated political ideals are practised within the movement. 
The issue of selectivity is at the root of the problematic of truthful representation. The 
discourse of this thesis imposes a discursive order on `reality', distorting it. Said 
referred to the distortion of the indigenous voice. ' To minimise this, I have included 
significant verbatim quotes from the IM. I have relied heavily on personal interviews - 
where possible multiple interviews with the same person - to be able to understand IM 
members well enough to represent their thinking adequately truthfully. I have also tried 
to minimise the structure of the interview, so as to better allow the interviewee to 
express his/her logic. The indigenous voice, whether the IM's or its critics, is likewise a 
distortion of `reality'. Where the focus is on what the IM wishes one to think, this 
representation is the object of one's study; the fact that it is a representation is irrelevant. 
In all other cases, it is, and one has to attempt to neutralise its distorting impact by 
2 Said, p21. 
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critically analysing it, just as one should with one's own representations (further details 
in `Sources'). 
The discipline of contextualisation provides some guarantee against misrepresentation. 
I have taken particular care to contextualise incidents, participants and their narratives in 
the analysis of violent episodes. In the analysis of ideas, contextualisation is more 
problematic. I have contextualised the praxis which serves as a critical counterpoint to 
the ideas advocated by the IM. But ideas, particularly utopian ideas, try, by their nature, 
to escape contemporary context and create new discursive contexts. Moreover, there is 
no unidirectional link between context and idea - one context may inspire widely 
differing ideas in one person, let alone different persons. Where relevant, I have tried to 
set ideas within the context those expressing them inhabit. Where possible, I have 
provided the ideational context for ideas, sketching the Islamist, Islamic and other 
ideational sources from which they might, or were acknowledged to, have come. But 
this is speculative in the absence of positive acknowledgements or adequate tests for the 
veracity of such acknowledgements. 
Attitude towards Definition and Analysis 
Taking apluralist-cum-modernist approach, I have attempted to sufficiently probe both 
Western and Islamist concepts, allowing each to dialectically engage with the other in an 
ever deepening `hermeneutical circle'. I have tried to ensure that I understood the way 
Islamists were using their concepts from within their own conceptual framework by 
studying the (translated) works of Islamist thinkers they acknowledged to be influenced 
by, notably Abul Ala Mawdudi, Sayid Qutb, Hasan al-Turabi and Rashid al- 
Ghannouchi; by analysing the way they structured their answers to my questions; and by 
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In front of the court, the plurivocity common to texts and to actions is exhibited in the 
form of a conflict of interpretations, and the final interpretation appears as a verdict to 
which it is possible to make appeal. Like legal utterances, all interpretations in the 
field of literary criticism and in the social sciences may be challenged ... 
Only in the 
tribunal is there a moment where the procedures of appeal are exhausted. ... 
Neither in 
literary criticism, nor in the social sciences, is there such a last word. 
7 
In this spirit I have analysed the IM, letting Islamists, Islamist critics and Western 
concepts take on, variously, the role of prosecutor, defendant and witness, knowing that 
the `verdict' of this thesis is subject to further questioning. 
3.4 SOURCES, MEANING AND INTERPRETATION 
The subject of this thesis is ideas. As ideas are not directly observable, potential 
evidence is anything, discursive or non-discursive, which objectifies ideas. ' Discursive 
evidence, or `speech-acts', can be either written or oral, where the distinction is not in 
its having been transcribed (interview transcripts are here considered oral), but in the 
nature of its production (written expressions tend to be more carefully wrought because 
they can be endlessly rewritten) and its intended audience (a written expression is 
generally intended for a wider audience) 9 To illustrate this distinction, personal 
interviews have been `created' by the interaction between the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Consequently, transcripts of them contain, to the interviewer, more than 
Ricoeur, p215. 
8 This step is premised on the belief that agents generally act `rationally', in the sense that their actions are 
intended to achieve a particular goal; `rational' here does not imply a value judgement regarding whether the 
intention or action is `rational' by the observer's standards (cf. Fay, p104). This approach is not to be 
confused with Rational Choice Theory (cf. Bohman, New Philosophy, pp67-76,197ff; 18-30). 
9 The distinction is not rigid; improvised speeches at rallies are intended for a large audience, even partly 
created by the interaction between speaker and audience, while diaries are not intended for publication. 
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just the transcribed text, notably the interviewer's ideas and emotions during the 
interview, and observations of non-discursive signifiers emitted by the interviewee. 
This layer of information is absent from written evidence. I will thus treat these two 
categories separately. 
Non-discursive evidence (`action-events')10 is equally important, particularly because it 
conveys meaning differently from discursive evidence. The study of action-events can 
be modelled on the study of a text. According to Ricoeur, ' this analogue is justified by 
the fact that both speech-act and action-event have an inscribable `sense-content'. Just 
as writing fixes the `said', so action-events leave their mark, reflecting the intentionality 
and meaning of the agent. Like discourse, action-events have a locutionary and an 
illocutionary side. " Like text, the effects of action-events are detached from their 
author, addressed to anyone who can `read' them. This analogous situation enables one 
to study action-events using the same type of methodologies used to analyse texts. 
The inclusion of action-events and oral speech-acts as evidence counters Said's criticism 
that Orientalism, reflecting its origin as a study of ancient texts, focusses overly on 
written texts when studying contemporary events. 13 Since Islamist movements tend to 
be action-oriented rather than philosophical, and since the IM in particular has written 
nothing extensive about its concrete political ideals (partly because the political 
situation discourages free political expression, partly because the Peace Process and the 
relationship with Israel have overshadowed written deliberations over a future 
Palestinian state), a focus on written texts would, and has, resulted, in a distorted 
understanding of the IM, ignoring its two most important forms of expression - oral and 
10 I will reserve the term `action' to describe both speech-acts and action-events. 
II Ricoeur, ppt97-209. 
12 See also John Searle, Speech Acts. 
13 Cf. Said, p300. Also Norton quote (p70). 
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non-discursive. That little has been written does not imply that little has been thought 
- certainly in an oral culture like Gaza's. 
Evidence contained in speech-acts and action-events is multi-layered. At the 
locutionary level is what is said or done. At the illocutionary level lies what is said or 
done in saying or doing something. At the perlocutionary level is what is said or done 
by saying or doing something. " At the first two levels, both of which are intentional, 
signifiers of meaning range from content, apparent intention, and apparent audience, to 
inconsistencies, contradictions and omissions. Further signifiers are excessive emphasis 
and excessive dichotomising, indicating something being suppressed. The third level, 
which is not intentional but consequential, is only important insofar as it establishes a 
distinction between intentional (illocutionary) and unintentional (perlocutionary) 
consequences, where political opponents of the IM wish to equate the two and provide 
motives, usually sinister, for the perlocutionary as if it were illocutionary (particularly 
relevant for the study of violent incidents). 
Having established that non-discursive action-events can be `made' discursive through 
interpretation, the distinction important to this thesis is not between discursive and non- 
discursive but between theory and praxis, where praxis is seen as a manifestation of the 
values underpinning the theoretical ideals, at times more truthful than the expressed 
ideals. While the former is exclusively discursive, the latter is both discursive and non- 
discursive - as in the way a Hamas member talks to and treats a Christian. As praxis is 
used in contrast to theory, the discursive element is not important for its discursive 
content, only for the underlying values it conveys. Praxis can be a reflection of the 
practitioner's values, or it can be a front, hiding those values. Though impossible to 
conclusively establish whether praxis is genuine, one is generally able to hazard an 
14 See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. 
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educated guess. Praxis surrounding internal leadership elections is likely to reflect fairly 
truthfully the IM's understanding of the nature of leadership. The way IM charities treat 
Christian and communist clients is likewise likely to be representative of existing 
attitudes within the IM towards Christians and communists. 
Sources for establishing the type of praxis practised are accounts of practitioners, those 
being practised on, and third-party observers (see `Oral Speech-Acts'). A further 
possible source is participant observation. Hamas's underground status renders 
participant observation in anything but public rallies impossible. Participating in charity 
work or enrolling at a course at the Islamic University would have been a possibility. 
As I was primarily interested in canvassing the political views of a wide variety of 
leaders and members, and the observation of praxis was but part of my research, I 
decided merely to engage in a limited version of participant observation - in the form of 
living for nine months in Gaza City within a stone's throw of the Islamic University, 
attending public rallies and election contests, and participating in Gaza's social life, both 
in the city and in refugee camps. This approach - particularly the fact that my wife and I 
had voluntarily chosen to live and participate in Gaza, without weekly escaping to the 
comforts of Israel or Jerusalem, as many foreign residents of Gaza do - helped raise my 
level of insider knowledge and, inadvertently, the level of trust I received in my 
interviews. 
With Palestinian Islamists, where secretiveness has been instilled by thirty years of 
Israeli occupation, and half a dozen years of increasingly coercive self-rule, it is 
important to be able to probe beyond what the interviewee wishes one to hear. 15 
Moreover, since much of my research revolves around ideals which can be costly to 
is Cf. James C. Scott, Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. 
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admit not to be adhering to, it is crucial to probe beyond the consciously understood to 
the actual. 16 
To critically analyse apparent discursive meaning for hidden and latent meaning, " I 
have juxtaposed statements (the discursive content of speech-acts) from people 
belonging to either side of the set of binary opposites of Islamist versus critic, leader 
versus led, and politically calculating versus politically guileless. A second critical 
moment lies in the testing of IM statements against the observed praxis of IM 
institutions. Since IM praxis is perpetrated by a movement in opposition, with only 
limited power, and IM ideals revolve around a (utopian) Islamic state in which the IM's 
leaders hope to play a leading part, not all ideals can be tested in praxis. However, a 
number of them are equally applicable to the movement's present organisation - just as 
the way any political party runs its internal affairs reflects its vision of the nature of 
leadership at state level, particularly if it self-consciously views its praxis as an 
embodiment of its ideals (as the IM does). 
3.5 WRITTEN SPEECH-ACTS 
In the Gazan context, written material is of only limited value to an analysis of the IM's 
ideals. Israeli occupation, and at present the PNA's increasingly coercive stance, has 
nurtured a secretive political culture. It is difficult to assess whether a communique has 
been officially sanctioned by the leadership, whether it expresses a movement-wide 
16 Some of the methods of ideology critique are helpful here (cf. David Held, Introduction to Critical 
Theory). I have opted against using a full-scale ideology critique approach as its main focus is to critique the 
veracity of ideologies, not to use critical methods to uncover and map out the ideology in question. But the 
following is inspired by critical theory. 
17 Though hermeneutical and critical approaches have traditionally been critical of each other, they are not 
irreconcilable. Cf. Ricoeur's attempt at synthesis on which I have modelled mine ('Hermeneutics and the 
Critique of Ideology' in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics). 
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consensus, or even whether it is an Israeli attempt at sowing disunity. Gazan Islamists 
are also action-oriented and not given to lengthy written theorising, an attitude which 
has been reinforced by the need for secretiveness. 18 Finally, Gazan popular culture is 
predominantly oral -a characteristic which has been enhanced by its long experience of 
occupation. " I encountered few, apart from the intellectual elite, who read newspapers 
thoroughly, or who read for pleasure. Whenever I announced I wished to withdraw from 
social banter and read, I invariably received queries after my health. Gazans seem to 
gather and disseminate information orally, during endless social visits. A number of 
Hamas members confessed they had merely skimmed the books they were assigned to 
have read to pass their introductory `llamas courses', and had never fully read Hamas's 
Mithaq (constitution). 20 
Official Party Literature 
Official party literature comprises Hamas's 1988 Constitution (al-Mithaq), 
communiques distributed in the form of leaflets to convey the movement's position on a 
topical issue, and official press statements. The Mithaq, though officially written and 
sanctioned by the leadership at the time, has lost much of its relevance. It was written 
during and for the Intifada, addressing themes prominent then but no longer wholly 
relevant, in a general, theoretical rather than practical way. It was heavily influenced by 
the older guard which is beginning to be surpassed by a younger leadership with a 
different outlook. It was, moreover, written before some of the most important debates 
concerning practical political structures took place, in the wake of the Oslo Agreement. 
s Cf. Rashad's comment on Mithaq (p11). 
19 Cf. Scott: "Oral traditions, due simply to their means of transmission, offer a kind of seclusion, control, 
and even anonymity that make them ideal vehicles for cultural resistance" (pl60). See also footnote 35, p102 
of this thesis. 
20 Cf. Intifada Cell 11. 
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Indicative of its problematicity is that discussions have surfaced about rewriting it? ' 
Moreover, many of those I interviewed, including the leadership, never referred to it and 
a few admitted to never having read it 22 The tone of most interviews confirms the view 
that the Mithaq is outdated as a representation of Hamas' position, even though it has 
not been officially rewritten or repudiated. Its text, though, is still relevant as a 
historical document of the kind of positions prevalent among at least some of the 
leadership in 1988. 
Communiques are generally of equally little relevance. They are responses to particular 
events, addressed to the general populace, and as such, tend to be immediate, off-the- 
cuff responses of a populist nature. They are written in the style of public oratory in 
Gaza, which tends to transform moderate opinions into inflammatory rhetoric. Since 
such rhetorical utterances seldom become reality and seem to be intended largely for the 
purpose of impact and aesthetics, they cannot be taken too literally. This is corroborated 
by the fact that the audience tends to receive the oratory in a way totally 
incommensurate with the passion of the statement. 23 When an orator calls for the 
destruction of Israel the audience do not actually imagine this to be possible (this does 
not absolve the orator from the consequences of his/her rhetoric). What is conveyed, is 
the emotion of anger at having been evicted from one's place of birth, locked up in Gaza 
and frustrated in one's dreams by the state of Israel. The extremity of the situation" 
21 Cf. Rashad, pp 11-12; al-Hayat, quoted in Mideast Mirror, 07.04.1993, p25 (quoted in Abu-Amr, 
`llamas', p12; also quoted denial of existence of discussions by llamas leader `Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi in Saw! 
at-Haq iva al-Huriyya). 
22 Those who did were primarily of the older generation (Yassin, `Abd al-Fattah Dukhan). 
23 Cf the various Hamas rallies I attended in Gaza. 
24 In 1993, the population density in the Gaza Strip was 2,290 per km', compared to 210 for Israel and 
5,700 for Hong Kong (Roy, Gaza, pp175-181). Taking into account the Israeli settlements to which 
Palestinians are denied access (42% of the Strip in 1996, including security areas around them; A 
Comprehensive Survey of Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip, p99), the figure becomes 3,725. In the camps 
(in 1993,70% of Gazans were refugees or descendants thereof, over half still resided in camps; Roy, Gaza, 
p 15), the population density was 76,120 per km2, nearly ten times that of non-camp residents (7,910) and 700 
(continued... ) 
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renders it difficult to publicly express moderate opinions, even if they are held in 
private. Moreover, public passion is used as an outlet for privately held 
frustration. 
Consequently, a dualistic culture has emerged in which private and public statements 
often do not correspond, while both are held with equal conviction by the speaker. 
Z" 
Primarily used during the Intifada and at university campuses, the communiques serve 
as communication links between the various political movements and the general 
populace, informing them of strike days, urging them to keep courage, 
issuing 
guidelines of behaviour towards the Israelis. A number of these 
have been collected and 
translated, and where available, I have drawn on them. 26 At the time I was conducting 
my fieldwork (May 1997, December 1997-July 1998, March 1999), most communiques 
were authored by the student movement, the Kutlah al-Islamiyyah, since Hamas's 
actions were severely circumscribed by the PNA's policy towards it. Written from a 
largely local perspective, by youth for a youthful audience, the content tended to be 
either highly rhetorical or say little about long-term positions. I have thus hardly used 
them in this research. 
24 (... continued) 
that of Israeli settlers (110). In 1999, an estimated 1,113,000 Gazans (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
quoted in Palestine Business Report, V. 1) lived on some 60% of the Strip's 363 km 
Z, the rest taken up by some 
5000 settlers (Survey of Israeli Settlements, p102). In 1998,33% of Palestinian families "lived below the 
poverty line" (PCBS quoted in PBR, V. 4). In 1999, unemployment hovered between 15-17.5% (PCBS, PBR, 
V. 3), having been around 40% in 1996-1997 ('adjusted unemployment rate', UNSCO Report on Economic 
and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Spring 1998, ppii-iii). Gaza's water supplies are 
rapidly being depleted, water being reportedly intercepted by Israel before it flows into Gaza's aquifer, while 
five wells, installed by the Israeli government inside the Strip, tap water for Jewish use only (Roy, Gaza, 
p 165). At an economical level, Gaza has, according to Roy, been de-developed by Israel, starved of 
investments, infrastructural improvements and educational opportunities (Roy, Gaza, p117-319). At a 
psychological level, according to research by Iyad al-Sarraj, director of the Gaza Community Mental Health 
Programme, one in seven Gazan adults has been tortured, one in five has witnessed a violent death at the 
hands of Israeli soldiers (`Honeymoon..!! ', al-Quds, 18/03/1998). 
25 Cf. a Hamas supporter in the West Bank telling me, when alone, of a friendly encounter with an Israeli 
soldier in which he conveyed his wish for peaceful coexistence, yet arguing for a violent solution in the 
company of Hamas friends - in both instances seemingly genuine. 
26 Shaul Mishal & Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground; 
Legrain & Chenard. These collections cover roughly the first year of the Intifada. A collection of leaflets 
covering the entire Intifada is said to be available at Bir Zeit University. When I tried to access it, it was 
unavailable. 
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Oral public speeches have too much in common with the style of the Mithaq and the 
communiques to be classified differently. As they tend to be equally generalistic, 
populist and full of rhetoric, I have not used this source, although a thorough study of 
numerous speeches would probably yield interesting indirect insights into the IM's 
thinking. 
Press statements, like communiques, generally refer to immediate events, such as 
positions taken on the Peace Process. Though they are less plagued by rhetoric, their 
relevance to this thesis is as limited as that of the communiques. 
Conference Papers and Newspaper Articles 
Conference papers and (reflective) newspaper articles by IM leaders are a more useful 
source since they tend to be addressed to an intellectually sophisticated audience, and as 
such are less populist and more thoughtful than communiques. Not only do they convey 
the ideas of the movement's leaders, they also illustrate how the movement perceives 
itself, justifies itself and interprets the situation. Conference papers are somewhat rare 
because Gazan Islamists are generally unable to leave Gaza without being arrested by 
the Israeli authorities, and the number of conferences inside the Strip is limited. I have 
been able to retrieve four conference papers, one given to me by Hamas leader Ismail 
Abu Shannab, the other three by the public information office of Hizb al-Khalas. 
Before the Intifada, the IM had little access to the media, as most newspapers were 
controlled by the dominant PLO. I thus cannot draw on this source concerning the 
violent incidents of the 1980s to be discussed in Part II. A certain amount of material on 
political ideals has become available since the production of newspapers by the IM - al- 
Watan, and after closure by the PNA, al-Risalah, officially the organ of Hizb al-Khalas, 
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in practice written by both Hamas and Khalas members. Since back issues of al-Watan 
are hard to come by, and its material pre-dates the important internal debates following 
the Oslo Agreement, the PNA's arrival and the creation of the PLC which rendered 
questions concerning the type of future state more urgent, I have relied exclusively on 
the back issues provided by al-Risalah. 
Had I been able to read Arabic more fluently, I would have relied more on al-Risalah. 
Instead, I have asked translators to skim the issues for headlines relating to my research 
foci. This would have been a greater weakness in my research, were it not for Gaza's 
primarily oral culture, and the fact that the bulk of al-Risalah's content does not discuss 
long-term political ideals. Those articles I have drawn on, I have found to merely 
duplicate what I had already heard in interviews. Their primary function has thus been 
to confirm whether ideals expressed privately would be held sufficiently deeply to also 
be expressed publicly. 
Another source, popular among Western scholars of the IM, is the British-based 
magazine, Filastin al-Muslimah. Though edited and published in Britain, it is believed 
to faithfully reflect the IM's positions Z' Though this may well be correct, I have not 
actively included it among my sources, firstly, because its editors are on record as 
denying they are Hamas's mouthpiece, and second, because it has an extremely small 
circulation within the Gaza Strip. Because it hardly contributes to the debate in 
Palestine, and because the local leadership has no control over its contents, it seemed 
inappropriate to attribute its views to the IM's leadership. What I have included, comes 
from the work done by others, most notably Nüsse. 
27 E. g. during the Intifada it reprinted Hamas's communiques (Nüsse, pp4-5). 
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Local Media Coverage 
Since most of the Palestinian newspapers are pro-Fatah and part of the political 
establishment (which Hamas leaders generally are not), they are a useful source for 
establishing what the view of the establishment was on a particular event in which the 
IM was involved. Their reports must, however, be taken as partisan, unless proven 
otherwise. I have drawn on the English-language al-Fajr to portray a sample of the 
establishment's view of the violent incidents discussed in Part II. As the politically 
well-established Hanna Siniora was its editor during the 1980s, and it has been 
described as "the PLO's proxy voice", " its view can be regarded as indicative of the 
1980s establishment. Moreover, it has also been used by various modernists and has 
shaped their understanding of the IM. 
3.6 ORAL SPEECH-ACTS 
The oral speech-act of the interview has been the most extensively used source in this 
thesis. I have already elaborated on the oral nature of Gazan popular culture, and on the 
absence of written material on the IM's political theory - the reasons for choosing this 
form of evidence. Before discussing methodological issues surrounding the interview, I 
will briefly detail the other two forms of oral speech-act I have used, the survey and the 
informal conversation. Though strictly speaking written, the survey is essentially a 
standardised interview, and has thus been classed `oral'. It is useful where one has a 
rough notion of the various answers to one's question present in the IM, and is merely 
interested in how the answers are spread across it - granted one has a means of selecting 
a sufficiently representative and random sample. It is useless if one is interested in the 
28 Janet Wallach & John Wallach, Arafat, p321. 
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nature of the answers, or if one does not have a sufficient grasp on the types of answer 
which exist within the studied phenomenon. 
I have conducted two surveys during Student Council elections, one in December 1997 
at Gaza's Islamic University, the other in April 1998 at the neighbouring Al-Azhar 
University. I took a sample of 4.8% and 13.4% of the IUG's male and female student 
bodies respectively, 29 and roughly 10% of al-Azhar's male and female student bodies 3° 
Only those emerging from the voting booth were given a questionnaire, thus preventing 
irregularities. In both instances, the percentage of votes for each party recorded by my 
survey corresponded to well within a 5% margin of the official election results, 
indicating that the composition of my respondents is a relatively representative sample? ' 
Participants were told to answer the questionnaire on their own, and assured that their 
entries would be anonymous. Questions were formulated so as not to suggest a 
particular answer (copies of the questionnaires can be found in Appendix A). Answers 
were formulated to provide everyone with acceptable options. Judging by the response 
of those handing in their questionnaires, these formulations were much appreciated, and 
appear not to have forced respondents into answers other than their own. I was not able 
to prevent students from consulting or pressuring each other. 
Another possible source is the informal conversation. Its advantage is its informality. 
Though I have been able to have a few such conversations with IM members of the 
IUG's Student Council and with alumni who classified themselves as ex-Hamas 
29 Against 3081 female students registered in 1997-1998, I received 412 filled-in questionnaires; this figure 
was 224 for the 4628 male students (see http: //www. iugaza. edu). I aimed at 10% in both cases - 50% of the 
questionnaires distributed among the men were not returned. 
301 do not have the exact gender breakdown for 1997-1998. Judging by later figures, the ratio of men is 
55%-60% (see http: //www. alazhar-gaza. edu). In 1997-1998,5500 students were registered (of which only 
1811 voted; see A! Ayyam 19.04.1998). I surveyed 311 men (roughly 10% of male student body, 30% of 
voters), and 265 women (roughly 11% of female student body, 34% of voters). 
31 For al-Azhar, official results and my findings were: Kutlah al-Quds (Shabibah) 83% (82.6%), Kutlah al- lslamiyyah 6.5% (6.2%), Nizam al-Islami 1.0% (1.2%). 
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members, as an outsider to the movement I have not been able to have informal 
conversations with other members. I have, however, with other people, ranging from 
businessmen to high-ranking members of the PNA's Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation (MOPIC), the Palestinian equivalent of a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
Personal Interviews 
Personal interviews are particularly useful for this thesis as they provide some control 
over the direction of the conversation. One can engage at a complex level with the 
interviewee's thinking, and cross-check ambiguous statements. Face to face, one has 
the opportunity to obtain a measure of the character of the interviewee, enabling one to 
better judge whether a statement or alleged previous behaviour is in character. 32 Though 
this measure is unlikely to be conclusive, it is better than relying on previously 
published interviews. " Where possible, I aimed for multiple interviews to build trust 
and rapport, and gain some insight into the IM's `hidden transcript' 34 I concentrated on 
the IM's political and humanitarian wings which, though organisationally separate, 
share a considerable number of personnel, besides espousing the same ideology (see 
further). I did not interview any members of the IM's `military' branch. Not only is this 
32 Cf. Esposito's plea that researchers engage in "[d]irect observation, interaction, and study" in order to 
place what is written and said "within the context of what [the Islamists] actually do" (p204). 
33 Most published interviews are of little use to this thesis because they either focus on immediate events, 
such as a particular stage in the Peace Process, or are content with vague, general statements about the IM's 
political theory. 
34 See Scott. Cf. also Said's observation of the need for "determining friendships" between Orientalist and 
Oriental (p275). Multiple interviews (indicated in text with Roman numbers) - Hamas top leadership: Yassin 3x, Abu Shannab Sx, Zahhar 3x, Haniyyah 2x; Hamas middle leadership: Hammad 2x; Khalas leadership: 
Musa 4x; Hamas members: Intifada Cell 3x; IM Critics/Non-Partisan: `Abd al-Shaft 2x, Bakr 2x, Jarro' 2x, Qassim 2x, Sourani 2x, Shahadah 2x. 
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separate in both organisation and personnel, it is also less likely to be the seat of 
sophisticated political thinking. 
Important is whether a person's views are representative of the movement as a whole. 
As the IM is not monolithic, the criterion for establishing whether a person's views can 
be considered representative is not whether they are shared by all, but whether they fit 
the movement's overarching principles. Those views that appeared to contradict these 
principles have been viewed with suspicion; if they occurred in one interview only, they 
have been discarded as atypical. This has only been the case in one or two interviews 
with younger members whose general education had suffered from the Intifada and who 
seemed to have had little instruction in the ideals of the movement. 
My interview questions revolved around two sets of issues: general political theory and 
praxis, and accounts of specific violent episodes. Regarding the first, it is noteworthy 
that Islamist interviewees were generally not reluctant to express views they knew to be 
contrary to Western ideals. At the same time, many of their views were remarkably 
similar to Western ones. Rather than insisting on an absolute dichotomy between 
Western and Islamist, I have adopted the view that, unless proven otherwise by any of 
my critical analyses, what was expressed, was expressed genuinely. Because I tried to 
allow the interviews to shape my questions rather than arrive with a pre-fixed set of 
questions (in response to van Nieuwenhuijze's observation; see thesis p20); because I 
tried to minimise the structure of my interviews to offer interviewees as much freedom 
as possible to express their views within their own logical and conceptual framework (in 
response to Said's criticism; see p29); and because time was limited, I have not always 
been able to cross-check whether views expressed by the top leadership were held by all 
members, or even all the leadership. This does not apply to the more central positions I 
have discussed. Where I have not been able to cross-check, I have only portrayed 
-ý-- 
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particular views as general if they were clearly implied by related statements in the 
majority of interviews. 
Regarding accounts of specific violent episodes, the interview's purpose is to canvass 
memories. People's perception of history is, besides being subject to memory loss, 
constantly evolving. New experiences change one's perspective on a remembered 
event. Particularly influential, especially in Gaza's highly communal culture, is the 
collective memory of the group(s) to which the interviewee belongs which comes to 
overlay the original memories. These collective memories are often riddled with 
unfounded rumours which are heavily influenced by the teller's worldview 35 A sign 
that the collective rather than the personal memory is operative is when eye witnesses 
give bird's eye accounts rather than their personal, limited, experience. Unless there is 
proof the interviewees draw on their personal memory or on different collective 
memories, they are likely to have been influenced by the same shared collective 
memory, and thus the proliferation of one version adds little to the weight of evidence. 
Because the IM's reputation is at stake in the incidents in question - it is noteworthy in 
itself that the IM did not wish to be seen to be violent or intolerant - accounts were 
likely to be distorted. Evasions, contradictions, inconsistencies or forceful denials were 
thus particularly significant. I generally tried to let interviewees tell their version of 
events uninterrupted, without leading from me, so as to augment the value of their 
accounts as independent eye witness statements. If controversial details were glossed 
over, I informed the interviewees of allegations made by critics, offering them an 
opportunity to `defend' themselves (following Ricoeur's judicial analogy). When the 
point under discussion was insulting to the interviewees, I explained that, as a 
35 Cf. Scott: "Rumour thrives most ... 
in situations in which events of vital importance to people's interests 
are occurring and in which no reliable information - or only ambiguous information - is available. ... Life- threatening events such as war, epidemic, famine, and riots are thus among the most fertile social sites for the 
generation of rumors. [... ] [In the retelling, rumor takes on the] hopes, fears, and worldview of those who hear 
it and retell it" (ppl44-145). 
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researcher, I had to probe controversial issues, if only to record their negation of 
allegations. At the same time, I explained I could not take their word at face value but 
had, to safeguard my integrity as a researcher, to corroborate their version with accounts 
of critics. 
The majority of interviewees were inexperienced in interviews. Many, including some 
leaders such as Abu Shannab, 36 had never, or hardly ever, been interviewed before. 
Consequently, they were not used to the practice of spinning. A further factor 
facilitating interviews was that honesty and integrity are virtues held high by the IM - to 
which its reputation of incorruptibility testifies. Though the world has known many 
corrupt people professing incorruptibility, indicative of the extent to which these virtues 
are held dear is the way in which many IM members were openly self-critical. 
Illustrative of this attitude was the extent to which the members of a former Intifada cell 
I interviewed three times encouraged debate and self-criticism. Evasiveness or refusal 
to take responsibility for past wrongs was condemned and controversial details were 
acknowledged for honesty's sake even though their reluctance to do so was palpable. 
37 
Trust is indispensable if interviewees are to reveal anything beyond cliches. An obvious 
issue is confidentiality - particularly poignant in an environment where belonging to an 
Islamist group spells imprisonment. Those who insisted on anonymity, were granted it, 
their names have been changed, 38 and identity clues in their accounts have been omitted. 
I only recorded with consent and explained consent could be withdrawn at any moment 
during the interview. Beyond confidentiality, however, I felt it important to begin the 
interview by laying my cards on the table and so reciprocate the vulnerability I expected 
36 When I arrived in Gaza, Abu Shannab had only recently been released from a 7-year jail sentence. 
37 E. g. discussion of clashes with local Fatah branch when latter ignored Hamas strike called in protest 
against Madrid Peace Process. They openly recounted their and their party's involvement. But their reluctance 
and shame showed when one finally said: "we want to skip from this point" (Intifada Cell 1). 
38 Names between inverted commas are imaginary names to cover anonymous sources. 
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from my interviewees. In each interview - bar one when I forgot to do this, and paid the 
price in never really establishing a relationship of trust -I began by explaining the 
purpose of my research, by acknowledging the general arrogance of the West towards 
Islam, Islamism, and the Arab world, the existence of moral and political crises in the 
West, and the need to learn. By doing this, one invites criticism, and I certainly received 
that. But one also gains the right to criticise, thus enabling a dialogue to take place - 
rather than creating a confrontational atmosphere in which the interviewee is constantly 
on the defensive (as some Western interviewers seem to like to do). 
39 
Gaza being a small, encased society, rumours spread rapidly about the few foreigners 
who live inside the Strip. If a foreigner is seen to (socially) frequent only one section of 
Palestinian society, s/he easily loses trust with the others - particularly as levels of 
suspicion have been enhanced by the occupation. It is therefore imperative to have 
contacts with as many sections of society as possible - and certainly not just the 
Palestinian elite and the expatriot community. 
Interviews with Islamic Movement leaders 
The most readily recognisable leaders were those in official positions of legally 
registered institutions - Hizb al-Khalas, al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah, and the various 
affiliated charities. In the latter case, the link between the charity or the interviewee and 
the IM was not always straightforward. A few months before I moved to Gaza, the PNA 
closed A1-Jam`iyyah al-Salah al-Islamiyyah in Deir al-Balah among twenty other 
39 Cf. Daniel Pipes' interview, `Ahmad Yusuf: "Hamas Is a Charitable Organization"', Middle East 
Quarterly 5(1). Compare the responses with those in Gaess' more pluralist interviews with Abu Shannab and 
Abu Marzook. 
FOCI, METHOD AND SOURCES 105 
charities which Israel considered to have organisational links with Hamas 
4° Multiple 
sources have since confirmed it is not part of the IM, despite repeated attempts by the 
latter to absorb it. 4' There are two types of Islamic charity. One shares the IM's 
ideology and has some staff who politically support Hamas. Beyond that, they are not 
part of the IM. The other type - such as al-Mujamma' al-Islami, founded by Yassin and 
Yazuri, two of Hamas's founders, and its female equivalent al-Jam'iyyah al-Shabbat al- 
Muslimat, many of whose leaders were previously involved in the female branch of the 
student party al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah - is part of the informal network of the IM, even 
though it is organisationally independent and may have staff and Board members who 
do not support the IM. The latter type can be expected to reflect the IM's general 
political theory. In either case, though, I have only included those who personally 
confirmed their affiliation to the IM (for overview, see `Bibliography'). 
The leadership of Hamas is less easily identifiable because of the organisation's 
underground nature. Unfounded rumours make it difficult to rely on popular perception. 
To identify Hamas leaders, I asked Abu Shannab, a person imprisoned in 1989 for 
heading Hamas, and widely recognised as one of its current three most influential 
leaders, to name the ten most important leaders. 42 I asked the same question of the 
members of a Hamas cell formerly operative during the Intifada, " and amalgamated the 
two lists. 
Except for Dukhan, those I interviewed lived in Gaza City. The majority of those I did 
not interview lived in the middle or southern part of the Strip. This is significant, as the 
40 See Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Press Release, `Palestinian Civil Society Threatened by PNA 
Closure of Legitimate Charitable Institutions in Gaza', 28.09.1997. 
41 Personal interview with Ahmad Al-Kurd (Director); `Muhammad'; Jensen, pp201-202. 
42 Abu Shannab II. 
43 Intifada Cell II. 
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southern parts are generally more conservative than Gaza City. My findings thus 
primarily concern the Hamas of Gaza City - although Gaza City having the highest 
number of influential Hamas leaders, the largest constituency of followers, and the most 
influential Hamas-affiliated institutions (the headquarters of al-Mujamma', al-Jam'iyyah 
al-Islamiyya, al-Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat and, more indirectly affiliated, the Islamic 
University), this section of Hamas is also the most influential. 
The identity of Hamas's middle leaders tends to be clouded in secret. Unlike the top 
leaders, who are well-known and have the (dubious) protection of fame, they have 
something to lose if their identity is disclosed - more so than the rank and file who do 
not bear the same burden of leadership, and will thus be treated less harshly if 
imprisoned. Accordingly, middle leaders were almost impossible to identify. I have, 
however, been able to identify two middle leaders. 
Interviews with Islamic Movement Members/Supporters 
IM members are important sources for assessing leadership claims about internally 
applied ideals. Comparison between political theories as viewed from `above' and 
`below' is likewise instructive in establishing how much of the leadership's thinking is 
actually reflected in the members' views! ' Ordinary Hamas members are generally 
reluctant to confirm their membership. At the same time, Gazans are liberal in labelling 
others `Hamas' on the basis of such insubstantial evidence as hear-say, regular mosque 
attendance or wearing a type of beard popularly associated with Islamists 45 A number 
of students stated categorically that a certain mosque's imam was a confirmed Hamas 
as Cf. Norton's call for more sociologically oriented research which looks "at the motives of those who lend 
their support to the Islamist movement" (p70). 
as Interestingly, among the student population, many of the Islamists did not wear beards, while a number 
of Fatah members did. 
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member - even though the mosque in question was PNA-controlled and 
known to be a 
mouthpiece of PNA policy. Similarly, Milton-Edwards appears to have been told that a 
key player in the history of the Islamic University, Shaykh Muhammad Awwad, was a 
supporter of the Mujamma'46 - while Awwad in fact opposed the creation of the 
Mujamma`, advising the Israeli authorities against granting it a permit, and only enlisted 
its help to safeguard the Islamicity of the University 47 One can thus be sure neither of 
the veracity of the label bestowed on a person, nor of the person's self-chosen label. 
However, people were willing to disclose whether they had been members during the 
Intifada. The Intifada has long since finished, and people believe that, as Fatah and 
Hamas fought on the same side, the Fatah-led PNA will not imprison erstwhile Hamas 
members retrospectively. Those who had since become Khalas members were likewise 
relatively willing to disclose their membership as Khalas is an officially registered party. 
However, during my fieldwork the PNA adopted an increasingly harsh attitude towards 
Khalas members, treating them as if they were Hamas members. Consequently, Khalas 
members became more reluctant. 
To complement interviewees' own testimonies of their membership, I sought the advice 
of a network of trusted friends which I had formed during the first three months of 
fieldwork, whose insights had been found to be reliable. I had taken particular care that 
this network comprised friends from different political and social backgrounds, so as to 
increase the scope of their combined knowledge and neutralise any bias from their 
backgrounds. When approaching new people, I ran their names by this network. 
Similarly, I asked their advice on whom they thought I should see next. 
46 Milton-Edwards, p107. 
47 Yassin III. 
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I interviewed a number of members in target groups, sometimes assembled around a 
topic (women's issues), mostly assembled as a group of friends or colleagues. Besides 
being able to obtain multiple responses to similar questions, these target groups enabled 
me to observe how the members of the group reacted to each other, which provided 
clues as to how they understood, for instance, the nature of leadership and dissent (for 
overview see `Bibliography'). 
Interviews with Critics, Officials and Non-Partisan Observers 
IM opponents and outsiders are useful sources for establishing a critical account of IM 
behaviour during the violent episodes to be discussed in Part II, and IM praxis 
concerning the theoretical constructs discussed in Part III. Apart from ascertaining a 
person's party membership, non-partisanity, or official position, of particular importance 
is whether an interviewee's account is based on hearsay, or on personal participation or 
experience, and whether the interviewee was in a position of leadership, and thus had 
access to privileged information. The fact that some of the events under scrutiny 
happened 15-20 years ago made it difficult to find eye witnesses. 
Aware of the factionalism engendered by years of occupation, and the effect this has on 
the spin of interviewees' narratives, I actively searched for interviewees who were able 
to rise above partisan loyalty. Some interviewees proved their ability to do this by 
absolving the rival movement of some of the blame for an incident and accepting some 
for their own party. If this was the case, I have given their `testimony' special weight. 
In other cases, certain people were recommended for their impartiality. " A useful 
category of non-partisan sources was that of internationals working with Islamic 
48 This procedure holds similarly for IM leaders. I have given extra weight to Abu Shannab's testimonies as 
he is recognised, across Gaza's political spectrum, to be even-handed and trustworthy. 
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institutions. In this vein, I approached two international charities who regularly dealt 
with Islamic charities, as well as Michael Jensen and Norwegian researcher Turid 
Smith-Polfus (for overview, see `Bibliography'). 
The two Gazan human rights centres I visited each appear to have a preponderance of 
personnel with affiliations to one particular party - PFLP in the case of the Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), Fatah for the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law 
(GCRL). The PCHR appeared to be generally reliable, though at times its party 
affiliation showed 49 The GCRL's director and one particular Board Member (a PLC 
member for Fatah) displayed considerable bias towards Fatah, against Hamas. 
5° 
49 Its director, Sourani, gave a particularly partisan account of the burning of the Palestinian Red Crescent 
Society (see p168). 
so Cf. they blamed Hamas for 95% of the collaborator killings, without concrete proof. When pointed out 
that their affiliation with Fatah might prejudice them against Hamas, the director revised the figure to a `mere' 
67% (Shahadah I). 
PART II 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
AND 
THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN GAZA 
PREFATORY REMARKS 
Having outlined the problematic surrounding Western discourse on Islamism and its 
emphasis on Islamist violence, I will focus on two violent episodes which helped shape 
the Western modernist view that Palestinian Islamism is anti-democratic and anti- 
pluralistic: the struggle for the Islamic University in Gaza (Chapter 5) and the so-called 
`1? yäb campaign' (Chapter 6). As both are used to illustrate the IM's intolerance 
towards ideological and political others and its ready recourse to violence, a re-analysis 
of the veracity of the modernist interpretations of these episodes is imperative if a study 
of the IM's political ideals (Part III) is to be taken seriously - particularly if these ideals 
include concepts such as consultation and social contract. 
I have investigated two further violent episodes: the 1980 burning of the Palestinian Red 
Crescent Society (PRCS) in Gaza and the 1981-1982 clashes at Nablus' al-Najah 
University. Since conclusions drawn were similar and space is limited, I will only refer 
to them to underline the general applicability of my findings. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I have chosen to limit this thesis to a study of domestic 
politics. Consequently, I will not address Hamas's use of guerilla and terrorist tactics 
against Israels' Though a study of the latter is a welcome complement to the present 
study, there are two reasons in particular why I think it justified not to include these 
issues. Violence against an external enemy is qualitatively different from violence 
against an internal one, for the simple reason that the latter will always be restrained by 
the knowledge that one has to live, indefinitely and in close proximity, with the family 
51 By `terrorist' I mean violence perpetrated indiscriminately against a population, regardless of age, gender 
or civilian/military status, to instill terror. By the same token, some of Israel's actions can be described as `terrorist'. 
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of one's victims. However much there may be a linkage between a movement's attitude 
towards `foreigners' and its attitude towards fellow citizens, one cannot directly apply 
conclusions from the study of the former to the latter. Moreover, the former is more 
concerned with issues of war and international relations than with issues of governance, 
political process and body politic. 
Secondly, though the IM uses the term jihad (from the verb jahada, to strive) to mean 
both social and military striving, thus encouraging scholars to treat its (socio-)political 
and military aspects as one single whole, there is a clear institutional separation between 
the IM's political and military wings. There are also indications that the latter enjoys a 
large degree of independence from the former (see also p45). Mishal and Sela, drawing 
on Israeli security records, describe various violent attacks against Israeli citizens which 
did not appear to have been authorised by the IM's political leadership, and which, 
moreover, seemed to cause the latter considerable embarassment. 52 From my own 
research, it seems that much of the military efforts in the past half decade have been 
orchestrated either by the Hamas leadership in Amman, or by maverick individual cells 
within Hamas's military wing inside the occupied territories (and then often from the 
West Bank, rather than Gaza). Such attacks do therefore not necessarily reflect the 
political leadership's views in Gaza. 
Using apluralist methodology, I will re-examine available evidence, paying particular 
attention to the IM's narrative (largely ignored by the modernist canon), and juxtaposing 
this against the narrative of non-Islamists with first-hand knowledge of the incidents. 
An exhaustive analysis is not possible here. 
52 Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp49-82. 
CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY 
IN GAZA 
Those of the Western canon who describe the struggle for the IUG, generally portray it 
as illustrating the extent to which the IM, or the Mujamma` as it is often called after the 
IM's main charity, al-Mujamma' al-Islami, is violent and anti-pluralistic, and thus 
inherently undemocratic. Schiff and Ya'ari talk about "Yassin's ... take-over" of the 
IUG, of the IM "[p]urging the school of PLO partisans", and turning "the faculty and 
student body of 700 men into a reserve of disciplined "soldiers". "' Abu-Amr refers to 
"clashes" taking place "between 1982 and 1986"2 while Milton-Edwards describes how 
Leftists, liberals or progressives expressing a view that was in any respect contrary to 
that of the Mujama were dealt with severely. The story of one particular student, who 
was beaten, publicly ridiculed and ostracised illustrates the bitter lengths to which 
Mujama members were prepared to go to in order [to] ensure a compliant student 
population. [... ] 
... strenuous efforts were made to prevent [the nationalists] 
from organising their own 
political activities. The secular democratic forces in the university were not given the 
I Schiff & Ya'ari, p225. Jubran & Drake similarly describe this episode (p5) but since their version 
follows the above almost verbatim, I assume they have copied it, without recourse to independent new 
evidence. 
2 Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p45. 
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same freedom as the Mujama by either the pro-Islamic administration or the Israeli 
authorities. Nationalist students were often barred from the university. ... 
It was also 
common knowledge that the Mujama began to keep a cache of weapons such as axes 
and knives on campus to be used against secular democratic elements. 3 
Since the Mujamma"s opponents were mostly PLO activists, the struggle for the IUG is 
implicitly presented as proof of the Mujamma"s anti-nationalist credentials. The 
struggle between secularists and Islamists is portrayed as if the IUG was, by right, a 
secularist institution and that its Islamicity was an aberration. A secular institution, in 
this view, is all-embracing, an Islamic one exclusive (towards secularists and non- 
Muslims) -just as the PLO is portrayed as an all-embracing body, serving all 
Palestinians, while the Brotherhood is depicted as a narrow faction, interested only in 
expanding its own influence. 
4.1 THE 1983 INCIDENTS IN WESTERN DISCOURSE 
I will focus on the strike and clashes of 1983 as a paradigmatic example of the overall 
struggle and draw some general conclusions about the depiction of the IM's actions (and 
by inference, ideology) in Western discourse and the PLO narrative. Milton-Edwards 
describes the 1983 strike, saying: 
The doormen [Mujama members or supporters] soon developed a reputation for 
violence, with newspapers reporting in 1983 that they aided armed gangs who attacked 
striking teachers and students on the campus: `University gatekeepers and student 
3 Milton-Edwards, pp] 11-112. 
4 This juxtaposition is implied in e. g. Abu-Amr's statement: "The PLO supporters wanted the [IUG] to be a 
secular nationalist educational institution for all social, political, and religious groups of the Palestinian 
people. The Brotherhood wanted to maintain the university as an Islamic university" (Fundamentalism, p 43). 
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supporters of the Islamic bloc broke the strike line and injured fifteen striking students 
and teachers. ' 
Concerning the 1983 clashes, she writes: 
[... ] In 1983 attacks by Mujama supporters on students reached an unprecedented level 
when seventeen nationalists were badly beaten in clashes on the campus and ordered to 
halt their political activities. 5 
Abu-Amr refers only to the clashes: 
On June 4,1983, a violent clash took place between the Brotherhood and the 
nationalists on the campus of the university. More than two hundred students were 
injured in this clash. This incident coincided with another similarly violent clash at 
Birzeit University in which a number of students were injured. Both the PLO 
nationalists and the Brotherhood supporters accused one another of triggering the 
clashes and held one another responsible... 6 
The other Western texts under review do not detail these events, largely because most 
write about events after the creation of Hamas in 1987/88. Schiff and Ya'ari focus on a 
similar series of violent incidents at the IUG in 1986, ' while Shadid primarily highlights 
5 Milton-Edwards, pp110-111. The quote is from al-Fajr, 03.06.1983. The clash reference is based on an 
article in al-Fajr, 10.06.1983. 
6 Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p43. Note the difference in number of casualties between Milton-Edwards 
and Abu-Amr. 
T Cf. Schiff & Ya'ari: "The contest for al-Azhar [IUG] was practically a mini-civil war between the Islamic 
Congress [Mujamma`] and its adversaries of the left ... The violence peaked in April 1986 in a series of 
stabbings and acid attacks... " (p225). Again, since Jubran & Drake describe this episode in almost the same 
words (p5), I assume they have copied it, without recourse to independent evidence. 
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clashes in the West Bank, with only one reference to a clash at the IUG between the IM 
and Islamic Jihad in 1987.8 
4.2 THE 1983 INCIDENTS IN A PRO-PLO NARRATIVE 
Milton-Edwards has based her account on two articles from the pro-Fatah al-Fajr 
newspaper. Its approach well illustrates the nature of the PLO narrative. The first 
reports that 
tensions surrounding the two-week-old employees strike at the Islamic University in 
Gaza escalated sharply, May 31, after university gatekeepers and student supporters of 
the Islamic bloc broke the strike line and injured 15 striking students and teachers. 
The university's employees, it is explained, had created and elected a new employees' 
union on May 10, against the wishes of both the Administration (according to al-Fajr 
"drawn from members of the Strip-wide Islamic bloc") and the student's Islamic bloc. 
The Administration's refusal to recognise the union had led to the strike which, 
according to the newspaper, included 80 lecturers, 20 employees and several hundred 
students, 1° and centred on a dispute between the employees and the administration about 
the way salaries were determined. 
From the start, al-Fajr continued, the strikers' opponents played foul. Quoting a 
student, the article stated: 
8 Shadid, pp678-680. 
9 Al-Fajr, 03.06.1983. 
10 At the time, there were 121 teaching staff and 1514 male students at the IUG (the tensions appear to 
have occurred primarily in the male section); Educational Statistical Bulletin for the West Bank, Gaza Strip 
and Pre-1967 Occupied Palestine, No. 3 (1983), pp130,127. 
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"everyday from the morning to noon when the strikers go home, dozens of men, armed 
with clubs, chains, knives, and metal bars surround the campus, in an attempt to 
provoke the employees and students. " 
Moreover, 
a gang of 20 men, armed with clubs and chains first arrived on campus, the union 
source said shortly after the strike began. Then, students protected the teachers. The 
same gang turned up at the university again, May 23. Eyewitnesses say that with the 
aid of the gatekeepers they "pushed" two teachers ... to the ground, 
but were prevented 
from beating them by students who intervened. 
Describing the May 31 incident, 
the strike breakers used "sharp objects" against the teachers, injuring six. The attackers 
also caused extensive damage to physics and chemistry laboratories. 
The second article in al-Fajr describes the subsequent clashes: 
Anti-national Muslim fanatic students with outside supporters launched attacks, June 4, 
on students at Bir Zeit University, ... and the Islamic 
University of Gaza, injuring more 
than 70 students" and causing extensive property damage. [... ] 
Fights began at the Islamic University at around 8: 00 am when groups belonging to 
the Islamic bloc in Gaza infiltrated through the forest area and onto the campus. A car 
full of Muslim Brothers was driven tank-like into the cafeteria ... 
They then ... attacked 
other students with rods, clubs, shovels and knives. The campus and surrounding 
streets were transformed into a battle ground with hundreds of students participating. 
Note that though al-Fajr put the number of injured at 70, Abu-Amr cites the 200 injured claimed in a 
student leaflet (Leaflet No. 3 of the Central Leadership of the United Palestinian National Front, Gaza, 
08.06.1983). Since Abu-Amr quotes extensively from al-Fajr, it is intriguing that he chose to use a number 
which is more likely to have been inflated. 
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]A mobile medical unit belonging to the Islamic Institute accompanied the attackers 
At Bir Zeit, three hours after the fighting in Gaza had quietened, two busloads of 
Islamic bloc supporters arrived from Gaza ... Eye-witnesses estimated 100 young men 
and women tried to enter the old campus..., claiming they wanted to march on campus 
on the occasion of the 16`h anniversary of the start of the occupation. The doorkeeper 
and students tried to stop them entering but were beaten and pushed aside. [... ] 
[... ] [S]cores of local students climbed onto roofs and sent down a shower of stones, 
forcing the group to disperse. ... the rest 
fled back to the mosque and started chanting 
slogans against "infidels", "communists" [... ] 
The organised Islamic students involved in the clashes at both universities are known 
in the occupied territories as Akhwan Muslimin [Muslim Brothers] ... The Akhwan 
have taken an increasingly active political role, frankly anti-nationalist, in recent years 
leading Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to consider them collaborators with the 
Israeli authorities. 12 
4.3 CONTEXT AND PLAYER ANALYSIS 
Western and al-Fajr descriptions are both misleading by omission. As well as being 
about wages and recognition, the strike was a protest against the recent appointment as 
President of the IUG of Muhammad Saqr, a Muslim Brother from Jordan, and, to the 
strikers, the embodiment of the university's Islamic direction. The conflict, moreover, 
as well as being between `nationalists' and Islamists, was between local PLO activists 
and Arafat and the PLO leadership abroad, who publicly supported the IUG's Islamic 
nature and had sanctioned, " some say even decreed, " Saqr's appointment. It goes 
'2 Al-Fajr, 10.06.1983. 
13 Salah al-Saqa (then IUG Board member), Nabil Abu 'Ali (former Dean of Students, currently Dean of 
Scientific Research), Ismail Haniyyah II (1980s Kutlah leader, presently Head of Academic Affairs Office), 
(continued... ) 
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wholly unmentioned that, on the day of the clashes, the strikers were reinforced by 
busloads of PLO supporters from the universities of Bir Zeit, Najah and Bethlehem, " 
and that they marched en masse on the university when the clashes erupted. 16 Nor is it 
mentioned that the strikers themselves were reportedly aggressive to staff members 
opposing their policy, and that the strike culminated in a storming of the President's 
office to undo Saqr's appointment. Finally, nowhere are we given a glimpse of the 
Islamist narrative. 
Background Analysis 
Far from having been a secular university which had been hijacked by the Islamists - as 
implied by Milton-Edwards's contention that there were "disputes over the segregation 
of the sexes in the university, over the basic curriculum" and that "[a]ny expression of a 
secularist viewpoint... was stifled and the university became more `Islamic' than ever"" 
- the IUG had been envisaged as an Islamicly inclined university from the start. Though 
proposals to establish a secular university, championed by leftists such as Haydar `Abd 
al-Shafi, director of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, had been circulating among 
13 (... continued) 
Zakariyyah Thalmas (1980s Shabibah leader) all stated this was the decision of the Committee of Founders in 
Jordan, which included both PLO members and Muslim Brothers. 
14 Ahmad Shawwa (then IUG Board Member). 
)5 Ismail Abu Shannab (I), Haniyyah (I&II), Atallah Abu Sibah (then Kutlah leader, now Dean of Student 
Affairs) and Abu `Ali mentioned that student activists were brought in from the West Bank, most notably Bit 
Zeit; Ahmad Yassin (spiritual leader of Harnas) estimated the total number of PLO activists at 400 (Yassin 
III), Yahya Musa (1980s Kutlah leader) set the number of visitors at 300 (Musa 111); non-Islamists confirmed 
buses had come from the West Bank - Thalmas mentioned students from the West Bank in general, Isam 
Yunis (then Jabhah al-`Aural al-Tulabiyyah, PFLP student wing, activist; currently at Palestinian Centre for 
Human Rights, PCHR) mentioned Bit Zeit, `Ziad' & `Husam' (then Jabhah activists) Bethlehem, Yunis al- 
Jarro` (lawyer with PFLP affiliation, Board Member of PRCS) Bit Zeit and Bethlehem (Jarro' I). 
16 Cf. PFLP: `Adli Yazuri (1980s Jabhah leader), Jarro' 1, Yunis, `Ziad' & 'Husam'. Fatah: Thalmas. IM: 
Yassin III, Abu Shannab I, Haniyyah I&II, Musa III. 
17 Milton-Edwards, p110. 
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secularist intellectuals, " these had floundered because of a lack of access to suitable 
land to build a university on. '9 Another group, centred around Shaykh Muhammad 
Awwad, President of the Board of the already existing al-Azhar College (a secondary 
school affiliated to Cairo's al-Azhar University), called for the establishment of an 
Islamicly oriented university, with an initial focus on religion, law and Arabic. As this 
group had access to a large tract of unused land around al-Azhar College and an existing 
educational institution, and as, due to its Islamic emphasis, it was attractive to the Fatah 
leaders in exile (who were engaged in a power struggle with the Palestinian Left)2° and 
the administrators of large funds in the Gulf States, their plan succeeded. 
On November 6,1978, while the secularists were still debating, the latter group founded 
the Islamic University with the approval of Arafat, and with the help of Arab funds, 
channelled largely through Fatah? ' While the idea of establishing a secular university 
with an emphasis on the sciences kept circulating among the Left until the establishment 
of al-Azhar University in 1991, the secularist leaders I interviewed insisted they 
wholeheartedly accepted the establishment of the Islamic University, after having been 
196 Abd al-Shaft II, Jarro' I&II. 
19 Cf. Sayid Bakr I&II (then Vice President of the IUG Board), Saqa, Ahmad Shawwa & Hilmeh Hammad 
(then IUG Board Members). See also Milton-Edwards, The Rise of the Islamic Movement in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip since 1967 (PhD), p 174-175. 
20 Towards the end of the 1970s, the Left was engaged in an. offensive to gain overall control of the 
Palestinian struggle, and outflank Fatah. In 1979, the various leftist groups had gained the backing of the 
USSR, the Soviet-bloc countries, Syria and Libya, while the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end 
to imperialism in Indochina and Africa had boosted their general morale. Over the following half decade, 
Arafat tended to cooperate with the Islamists (cf. Sayigh, p486-487; Abu-Amr, p47-49). In 1979, Fatah's Abu 
Jihad launched a concerted push in the territories for influence and control (Sayigh, p479-481). 
21 Sayigh claims that Abu Jihad secured the funds as well as the academic accreditation for this university 
from al-Azhar in Cairo (p480); Sayid Bakr, Vice President of the IUG's Board at the time, claims that Arafat 
cleared the funds himself, after meeting with Bakr (whom Arafat knew from his student days in Cairo), 
Awwad and other Board members in Beirut (Bakr I). Awwad maintains that he himself raised the funds from 
the Gulf. 
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assured that it would not discriminate against Christians and would expand to include 
scientific studies. 2 
The IUG's initial subjects were religiously oriented - u$ül al-din (religious studies), 
Shari ah/gänzrn (law), and Arabic (for the purpose of Qur'änic studies). " The local 
Board of Founding Trustees was made up of members of the Gazan elite with traditional 
religious leanings, 24 while the Committee of Founders in Jordan which was established 
with the approval of Arafat and Abu Jihad to raise funds internationally, attracted a 
number of both non-Islamist religious personalities - such as the late Shaykh `Abdul 
Hamid Sayigh, erstwhile speaker of the PNC - and Muslim Brothers, who had a 
particular commitment to education and a good rapport with the rich Gulf states (where 
funds were most readily found after the economic boom following the 1973 oil crisis). " 
That the Gazan founders of the IUG indeed envisaged an Islamicly oriented university is 
clear from documents of the late 1970s, which stated that the IUG aims to educate "a 
good generation of youth, able enough to propagate the Islamic da'wah [call] and to 
22 `Abd al-Shafi II, Bakr 1, Saqa, Hammad. Jar o` (I&II) confirmed this synopsis. 
23 Awwad, Abu Sibah, Muhammad Nairab (former faculty Dean). According to the Five-Year Plan for the 
Establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza (Muharram 1399/1979), the plan was to expand these first 
three colleges with colleges for economics and the sciences in 1979, agriculture in 1980, engineering in 1981 
and medicine in 1982 (p3). 
24 Awwad; Sulayman al-Astal, Mayor of Khan Yunis; prominent businessmen Ahmad Hassan al-Shawwa, 
Raghib Murtaja, Sulayman as-Shanti and Tawfiq Yazji. lt was soon extended to include the General Director 
of Education, Muhammad al-Jiddi, two leading doctors from al-Shiffa` Hospital, Dr Sayid Bakr and Dr Ghalib 
Dhimmu, Dr Yusuf al-Hindi, Merhat Ghazi Amassi, engineer Salah as-Saqa, Hilmeh Hammad, and Hamid 
Jaradi. Sources: Awwad, Abu Sibah, Bakr I, `Resolutions of the meeting of the executive committee on 
28.09.1979' (Private Document). 
25 Beside Sayigh, it included Islamicly oriented Palestinian National Council members Dr `Abdallah Abu- 
`Azza, `Abd al-Rahman Hurani and Dr Salim Amin al-Agha, as well as Muslim Brothers Khayri al-Agha, a 
rich Palestinian who had worked with universities in Saudi Arabia, and Ishaq al-Farhan, a Palestinian living in 
Jordan. Dr Salim al-Agha also had Brotherhood connections as, by the time Hamas had been created, he was 
considered to be reflecting Hamas's views in the PNC (sources: Saqa, Hammad, Abu `Ali; Abu-Amr, 
Fundamentalism, p145(n85)). Awwad, Bakr 1, Saqa, Jarro' I confirmed that the lUG had been established in 
cooperation with, and with considerable financial help from, Arafat and the PLO (see also Sayigh, pp480, 
629). Shawwa & Hammad, Abu `Ali, Haniyyah 11 confirmed that the Committee was made up of different 
political persuasions. 
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preserve its precious Islamic heritage", to raise people sufficiently qualified to "resist the 
waves of moral disintegration and atheism with the weapons of education and faith", 
and to assist "religious and scientific research which would serve the Islamic creed and 
the language of the Qur'än". For, 
In the midst of our adversarial conditions nothing could help us except the faithful 
`a7im [scholar] in addition to the faithful medical doctor, engineer and writer. Thus 
[has come] the idea of establishing a university with faith as its crown, and thus it is 
that this institution has come to hold the name `the Islamic University'. 26 
Similarly, they stipulate that "female students will have their own departments 
belonging to them". 27 In short, the fact that much of the curriculum was Islamicly- 
orientated and that women and men were taught in separate sections was the vision of 
the original founders in 1978 (and a reflection of Gazan culture, it seems)" - not that of 
the Mujamma` which, then, was still battling with the Israeli authorities for a permit 
(against which the IUG's Awwad had been advising the Israeli authorities), 29 and which 
did not gain influence in the IUG until the early 1980s. 3° 
26 Five-Year Plan for the Establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza, ppl-2. 
27 Five-Year Plan, p3. 
28 Abu Sibah. I have no conclusive evidence on Gazan culture in 1978. But presently, this is the view of 
women studying at the IUG (IUG's Women Section). 
29 According to Yassin (III), Awwad had told him that, as Head of the High Court of Appeal, he had 
counselled the Israeli authorities against granting the Mujamma` a permit, on the grounds that religious 
education, which the Mujamma' aimed to give, should be kept in the hands of the religious authorities. 
Muhammad Shamma' (Deputy Director of al-Mujamma') and Raji Sourani (PCHR) confirmed that Awwad 
had opposed the Mujamma`. 
30 Nairab (secularist by persuasion) set the beginning of the IM's attempts to gain influence at around 
March 1983. Musa (II) confirmed that "[t]he Islamic Movement did not actually have power in the Islamic 
University until 1982 or 1983". 
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By 1983, tensions had increased over the nature and direction of the IUG. A majority of 
the staff appears to have been secularly oriented at the time, 31 while the doormen were 
pro-Islamist 32 The Administration, mirroring the Gazan Board and the Jordanian 
Committee, seems to have been Islamicly inclined 33 While a majority of the student 
body was pro-Islamist (not surprisingly given the IUG's curriculum), " it included a 
significant number of highly motivated, and well organised, secularist PLO activists. 
Some of these had received their `training' in prison 35 A high proportion were 
supporters of the PFLP's student wing, Jabhah al-'Amal al-Tulabiyyah. 36 
In 1983, the Committee, the Board and Arafat decided to appoint Muhammad Saqr, a 
Muslim Brother from Jordan with a Harvard doctorate, as President. The outgoing 
`President' had been acting President only, as he had not been sufficiently qualified. At 
the time, sufficiently qualified academics were rare in Gaza 37 According to Dean Abu 
Sibah, this had led to the `importing' of 32 lecturers with doctorates from Jordan, 38 
31 Judging by the outcome of the elections for the Employees' Union. This is confirmed by Abu Sibah, 
Musa IV, Thalmas, Jarro', `Ziad' & `Husam'. Nairab observed the majority of staff were interested in 
education, not factionalism. 
32 Musa II&III, Jarro', `Ziad' & `Husam'. See also Milton-Edwards, pl 10. 
33 Jarro', Thalmas, `Ziad' & `Husam'. See also al-Fajr, 03.06.1983. Abu `Ali said the Administration was 
appointed by the Committee in Jordan, with the approval of both Abu Jihad (PLO) and the Muslim Brothers. 
34 Even then, al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah won student elections decisively. Cf. Saqa, Shawwa & Hammad, 
Musa III, `Ziad' & `Husam'; Milton-Edwards, p112. 
35 Cf. Sayigh, p478; Sahliyeh, pp115-136; Hillel Frisch, `The Palestinian Movement in the Occupied 
Territories: The Middle Command', Middle Eastern Studies 29(2), pp258-262. 
36 'Ziad' & `Husam', Jarro' I, Thalmas, Yunis. This is partly due to the fact that, unlike Fatah, which had 
concentrated its efforts largely outside the territories, and the IM, which had been preoccupied rebuilding 
itself, the PFLP had had a high profile in Gaza in the first years after the 1967 war (cf. Sayigh, p210), 
resulting in a high profile among the prison population. 
37 The first Dean of Shari ah only had a Bachelor's degree (Abu Sibah). In its first year, the lUG had one 
lecturer with a Doctorate, five with a Master's, six with a Bachelor's (Statistical Bulletin for the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, Vol. 1). 
38 Abu Sibah. According to the Statistical Bulletin for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Vols. 1-3) and the 
Educational Statistical Bulletin for the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Pre-1967 Occupied Palestine (Nos. 2-3), 
there was an increase of 22 staff with Doctorates, 17 with Masters, 27 with Bachelors between 1979/80 and 
(continued... ) 
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which had given rise to the pay differential between local and foreign lecturers that had 
a part in triggering the strike. Some PLO activists contended that the 30, and Saqr, were 
brought in to boost the number of Islamicly inclined staff and so secure the IUG's 
Islamic nature 39 Given the Islamic emphasis of the Committee in Jordan and the 
conservative nature of the Board in Gaza, it is quite likely that a number of these 
lecturers had links with the Jordanian Brotherhood 4° This may well have intensified the 
tensions between the secularist and Islamicly inclined camps at the IUG. Equally, the 
IUG genuinely needed qualified personnel to boost the quality of its teaching. 
These tensions were complicated by strains between the PLO's international leadership 
and local activists. After his defeat in Beirut in 1982 and the launch of the Reagan Plan 
(proposing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation), Arafat had begun exploring more 
intensely whether Jordan could represent the Palestinians in US-sponsored talks with the 
Israelis. A number of PLO factions, including the PFLP and many Fatah activists in the 
territories, were vehemently opposed to such negotiations. " Rumour had it, moreover, 
that the King was meddling in Gazan affairs through the IUG, in the same way as he 
was alleged to be using the awgäf in the West Bank to increase his power at the cost of 
the PLO 42 Since the IM was believed to be pro-Hussein (just as its sister organisation 
38 (... continued) 
1980/81, an increase of, depending on the source, either 4 (SBWBGS; no qualificational details) or nothing 
(ESBWBGS) in 1981182, and an increase of 4 with Doctorates, 9 with Masters, 19 with Bachelors in 1982/83. 
It is thus seems that Abu Sibah was referring to 1980/81. 
39 Cf. Thalmas. Haniyyah (II) recounted articles denouncing the Jordanian lecturers in Fatah underground 
publications - according to him with the aim of depleting the IUG of expertise. 
40 I have not been able to establish this conclusively. 
41 The Spring 1983 rebellion by Fatah leaders in Lebanon was partly triggered by Arafat's cooperation with 
Hussein, and his willingness to explore the Reagan Plan (cf. Hart, p461). 
42 Thalmas. Regarding West Bank, cf. Shadid, p675. 
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the Jordanian Muslim Brothers were considered to be close to the King)43 and Saqr was 
a Jordanian Muslim Brother, the internal PLO tensions were readily projected onto the 
struggle with the IM 44 As a consequence of Arafat's rapprochement with King Hussein 
and his deteriorating relationship with Syria, following Syria's role in helping to oust 
him from Lebanon, the IM had come closer to Arafat 45 Furthermore, local activists 
resented the fact that Arafat and Abu Jihad cooperated with the Muslim Brothers, and 
with politically conservative individuals such as Awwad46 -a policy partly inspired by 
Arafat's struggle with the PLO's Left47 - because they saw Arafat's cooperative attitude 
strengthening the local Brotherhood and undermining their own efforts at gaining 
control over local institutions for the PLO, in line with Abu Jihad's strategy. 8 
The PFLP activists among the students, in conjunction with the secularists among the 
staff, appear to have been determined to undo Saqr's appointment and reinstate the 
outgoing acting President, Riad al-Agha 49 Though having initially agreed to it, Agha 
was unwilling to accept his demotion, and while, by some accounts, not ideologically 
43 Cf. Lawrence Tal's reference to "their informal pact with the state" ('Dealing with Radical Islam: The 
Case of Jordan', Survival 37(3), p146). See also Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the 
Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967, Chapter 4. 
44 Abu Sibah recounted that heated discussions took place as a result of the Palestinian-Jordanian 
agreement, and that, given that Gazans were "Easterners, whose blood is hot" it took little to ignite an 
explosion. 
45 Cf. Barghouti, `The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories' in Guazzone, p147. 
46 Cf. Thalmas, Jarro' I. 
47 Cf. Sayigh, p558ff. Also, as discussed in Chapter 3, a significant section of the Fatah leadership had had 
close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1950s. Not surprisingly, Arafat did not seem to 
ideologically object to the idea of an Islamic University. According to Abu Sibah, he is said to have remarked 
at its inception that if the Vatican has a Christian University, why should Gaza not have an Islamic University. 
However, despite Islamic elements among Gazan Fatah supporters, the Shabibah at the time seem to have 
been pushed into a wholly secularist position by their alliance with the Left and the fact that the Islamists were 
identified with the notion of an Islamic University. Arafat may also have played a double game, officially 
supporting the Islamists to gain their international support, unofficially encouraging local Fatah supporters to 
weaken the Islamist hold over the IUG. 
48 See footnote 20. 
49 Yazuri, Nairab. According to Haniyyah II, the strikers distributed leaflets likening Saqr derogatively to a 
General and calling for his dismissal. 
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wed to either camp, he was ready to throw his lot in with the secularists if they kept him 
in office5° - with some Islamists claiming he was deliberately appointing secularists to 
the IUG's Administrations' As none of my interviewees stressed the issue of salaries or 
the Administration's refusal to recognise the employees' union, it seems that, however 
pertinent those issues might have been at the time, the real issue was the future direction 
of the IUG and the Presidency of Sagr. 52 
There was a fundamental difference in opinion between the PLO and the IM regarding 
the priority of resistance. While the PLO believed in resistance over education on the 
grounds that without freedom education meant nothing, the IM (then) believed in 
education over resistance on the grounds that the resistance forces were no match for the 
Israeli army, whereas education would prepare the population for the eventual battle for 
liberation. " The Islamists appear to have been backed in condemning activities that 
could lead to suspension of education by the non-aligned academically-minded staff and 
the (non-IM) Board members. 54 Their position was indirectly supported by the 
argument of the Palestinian branch of the Jordanian Communist Party who had from 
1974 eschewed military action on the grounds that "90% of the clandestine members of 
50 While he is said to have cultivated a relationship with Yassin for pragmatic reasons (Hilmeh Hammad, 
Musa 111), most of my interviewees agreed he favoured PLO supporters in appointments (Bakr II, Nairab, 
Musa III, `Ziad' & `Husam') or at least favoured the PLO in general (Saqa, Haniyyah II). 1 did not have the 
chance to interview Agha myself. 
51 According to Musa (II), "Riad al-Agha ... was implanting secularists and communists as much as 
he 
could with what seemed to be a pre-planned strategy to control the overall direction of the university". 
52 Haniyyah II, Abu Sibah, Jarro' 1, Yazuri, `Ziad' & `Husam', Nairab. Haniyyah (II) insisted that the 1983 
events could not have been about the employees' union, as, according to him, the first employees' elections 
were held in 1984. Abu `Ali held that employee elections had occurred since 1978, while Musa III recounted 
that employee elections had taken place, but illegally so, which was why the Islamists had refused to 
participate. These discrepancies may be the result of a problem of definition - i. e. Abu `Ali may be talking 
about electing employee representatives, Haniyyah about elections for an officially recognised union (in which 
case, it is possible that, not having been recognised by the IUG in 1983, a union was finally established in 
1984). Without access to the IUG's archives, it is impossible to conclude the issue decisively. 
53 Even during the Intifada, Hamas kept urging teachers to teach and students to study, if need be privately 
(cf. frequency of these calls in leaflets; see Chapter 7, footnote 86). Nairab, `Ziad' & `Husam' confirmed this 
was the IM's attitude during the 1980s. 
54 Nairab, Abu `Ali. 
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the guerilla groups were arrested even before carrying out military attacks" 
SS The 
Brotherhood, unlike the PLO, had experienced repression to the point of near-extinction, 
both under Nasser and under the brief spell of Israeli rule in 1956 
56 They therefore 
feared premature resistance. Whatever the merits of each side's argument, both believed 
the other to be betraying the national cause. 
The 1983 Strike 
The incident which triggered the first Fajr article, the breaking of the strike line and the 
injuring of "15 striking students and teachers" by the "university gatekeepers and 
student supporters of the Islamic bloc", appears to have coincided with the strikers' 
attempt to occupy the President's office 57 Four interviewees recounted that the incident 
ended in a minor clash between Agha's pro-PLO supporters and Saqr's Islamist 
supporters, 58 with Musa, one of the Kutlah leaders, detailing that the university's 
doormen, whose job it was to protect the university, were involved. Though only Musa 
dated the incident with any precision to "a couple of days before the bringing in of the 
buses [June 4]", all linked the incident to Agha's dismissal. Since al-Fajr's description 
of "university gatekeepers and student supporters" fits the description of those 
defending the President's office and Musa's memory places the office incident around 
May 31, it seems that the violence ending the strike, described in al-Fajr (though denied 
55 Sayigh paraphrasing Bashir Barghuti's position (p477). 
56 Cf. Milton-Edwards, p46-55. 
57 Saqa, Nairab, Haniyyah II, Musa III, Abu Sibah. Saqa likened Agha's pro-PLO supporters to a 
bodyguard. Abu `Ali denied that violence happened surrounding the dismissal of Agha. Since he has a stake 
in portraying the IUG's history as harmonious, I am more inclined to believe the first four. Yazuri, finally, 
insisted the PLO supporters had been too weak a force to occupy the President's office. 
58 Saqa, Nairab, Musa, Abu Sibah. Abu Sibah insisted the conflict was between Agha supporters and Agha 
detractors, not necessarily along PLO-Islamist lines. As Dean, he is likely to wish to tone down factional 
conflicts. 
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by Haniyyah), 9 was a response to the invasion of the President's office - and not merely 
an unprovoked reaction to a peaceful strike. 
There are other reports that the strikers were not entirely peaceful, that they intimidated 
staff members opposing the strike. The strike happened towards the end of the 
academic year, exams pending. Some lecturers wished not to disrupt the exams for 
educational reasons. Others believed the strike was political in nature, aimed at 
weakening the IUG so that an eventual take-over by the PLO would become easiei° - 
just as the strikers interpreted a refusal to strike as a betrayal of the `national' cause, and 
a declaration of support for the Islamists. According to Haniyyah, 
[the strikers] even threatened some of the University professors who wished to continue 
with the exams, regardless of the strike ... many of them were seriously hurt. Nabil 
Abu `Ali was one of the professors who was threatened .. 
61 
Abu `Ali in fact denied he was threatened. 62 But his denial may be motivated by the 
present political situation in which some of those who helped to orchestrate the strike 
head two of the most notorious security forces and by his stake in portraying the history 
of the IUG as harmonious. Equally, Haniyyah might be exaggerating. Shabibah and 
Jabhah leaders denied that the strikers engaged in violence, and insisted that their bid for 
control of the TUG was "not by fighting but by democratic ways" 63 The Jabhah leader, 
59 Haniyyah denies that violence was used against the strikers. But, as in the case of the PLO supporters 
denying violence, it seems more likely than not that some form of intimidation was used, given the violent and 
antagonistic climate engendered by political rivalries and occupation. 
60 Cf. Haniyyah I&II. 
61 Haniyyah II. Musa (IV) also recounted the strikers were violent. 
62 Abu `Ali. 
63 Thalmas. Cf. also Yazuri. Thalmas could not give any further details as he was in prison during the 
clashes. He dated the clashes to June 1984 but since all other sources give 1983 and fail to mention any 
significant clashes in 1984,1 am treating this inconsistency as due to `memory confusion'. 
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`Adli Yazuri, claimed that the PLO supporters could not engage in violence as they were 
banned from the university compound during the strike. According to him, the 
subsequent clashes were actually caused by the strikers trying to force entry into the 
university, having missed the exams and been failed by the Administration 64 His 
account is contradicted by that of two former Jabhah student activists who, while 
insisting they did not engage in violence ("we were weaker than them; if we had been 
stronger, we would have probably started the violence, because we were not nice"), 
described a sit-in on campus65 - echoing al-Fajr's reference to a two-week strike on 
campus. 
Within the larger context of a struggle for power between the various movements, and a 
violent political climate caused by occupation and the Palestinian response thereto, 
directed at both Israelis and fellow Palestinians (who were safer substitutes for the outlet 
of anger the occupation caused)" -a case in point is al-Fajr's report that on June 1 
"unidentified assailants hurled a hand grenade at the home of ... Dr Mohammed Saqr, 
shattering windows, but causing no injuries"" - it seems more likely than not that the 
64 Yazuri. 
65 `Ziad' & `Husam'. 
66 Israeli forces tended to respond harshly to discourage further resistance - e. g. displacement of over 
15,000 refugees from Gaza's refugee camps in 1970-1971 in response to resistance activities (Lesch, pp4l-45; 
Roy, p 105); town quarter demolitions in response to killing of Israeli soldiers or settlers (cf. G. Aronson, 
Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada, pp199-200; Dick Doughty & Mohammed El Aydi, Gaza: Legacy of 
Occupation, pp58-64); the military order to break the bones of those caught throwing stones (Sahliyeh, pp8l- 
84; Aronson, pp214-221). During the 1980s, the Israeli army initiated a series of `Iron Fist' policies which 
meant a radicalisation of the punishment of resistance activities (Sahliyeh, pp8I-84; Adam Keller, Terrible 
Days, p121). With the Intifada, both the Israeli response to Palestinian violence and intra-Palestinian violence 
intensified, cf. the increase in the number and atrocious nature of collaborator killings (cf. Yizhar Be'er & 
Saleh 'Abdel-Jawad, Collaborators in the Occupied Territories). Another outlet for occupation-inspired 
frustration were assassination attempts on political dissenters. In 1967, Hamdi al-Taji al-Farouki's house was 
shelled for (prematurely) advocating a two-state solution while, between 1967 and 1973, the Mayors of 
Hebron and Gaza were attacked for similar reasons (Issa Shuaibi, `The Development of Palestinian Entity- 
Consciousness, Part (I', Journal of Palestine Studies 1X(1), pp60,63). Hashim al-Khaznadar from Gaza was 
killed in 1979 for supporting Egyptian proposals for Palestinian autonomy (Harold Cubert, The PFLP's 
Changing Role in the Middle East, p141). 
67 Al-Fajr, 03.10.1983. Following the attack, the IUG, according to al-Fajr, took out front page ads calling 
the incident "part of a "low conspiracy" aimed at crippling the "progress of the university"". Even if the 
(continued... ) 
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strikers would have engaged in some form of intimidation, just as the doormen and 
Islamist students are likely to have done. Too many different sources refer to a strike on 
campus and to some sort of violence. This reading is (tentatively) supported by the fact 
that a year earlier, in a similar type of stand-off, PLO activists at Nablus's Najah 
University violently imposed a strike on the university in protest against the Islamists 
winning the student elections, harassing those who wished to continue with classes -a 
strike which equally culminated in a violent battle for the university, and was similarly 
reported in the pro-PLO press as chiefly the fault of the Islamists 68 
Going back to al-Fajr's references to an "off-campus gang" and "dozens of men, armed 
with clubs, chains, knives and metal bars" harassing the strikers, it is unclear whether 
they were sanctioned by the Islamist leadership - and, indeed, how much damage they 
did. For, despite the reference to chains and knives, the article does not actually 
mention any worse crime than trying to provoke the strikers and pushing some lecturers 
to the ground. If this `gang' was sanctioned by the leadership - Haniyyah insists no 
violence was used against the strikers69 - its existence seems to have been motivated by 
the violent climate of occupation and resistance which had inspired the various PLO 
movements to establish, by all accounts ruthless, strike squads. As no reports of such 
67 (... continued) 
incident was unconnected to the strikers, its occurrence was one more factor creating a violent climate. 
Intriguingly, the al-Fajr report on the clashes insinuates this attack was perpetrated by the IM. 
68 Cf. Al-Fajr, 15-21.01.1982,22-28.01.1982,19-25.02.1982. According to my interviews with 'Abd al- 
Rahman Turk (1982 Shabibah leader), Nasr Sha'r (1982 Kutlah leader), anonymous 1982 Kutlah leader, 
Yusuf'Abd al-Haq (PFLP-affiliated lecturer), Islamist Najah alumnus and a non-aligned Najah alumnus, the 
activists disrupted university life for 40 days, using loudspeakers in the central court, throwing parties, 
physically pulling lecturers and students from their classrooms, sneering at Islamist students, in some cases 
pulling off hija3s. Some are said to have stormed into a Board of Trustees meeting, jumping on the table and 
shouting derogatory slogans at the President, Hikmat Masri. Others rounded on a (student) relative of Masri 
and beat him into hospital. Though the Islamists were certainly engaged in violence during the battle, and are 
said to have scared a leftist lecturer into jumping from a second-floor window (he survived and still teaches at 
Najah), I have heard no reports of Islamist violence during the strike (though this may well have happened). 
69 Haniyyah I. 
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gangs have been made since the coming of the PNA, 70 its existence in the 1980s cannot 
be taken to `prove' an essentially violent bend in the IM's leadership. Also, given the 
proliferation of such squads among all Palestinian movements during the occupation, 
one can hardly single out the IM for having one. Moreover, just as al-Fajr seems to 
have glossed over the more aggressive aspects of the strikers, it is possible that similar 
armed groups were involved on the strikers' side. 
Another option would be that this strike force was organised by some of the more 
violently inclined among the Brothers, but not sanctioned by the entire leadership. In 
this case one has to ask why the leadership did nothing to stop them. One possible 
answer is that they turned a blind eye because they welcomed the results. 
A third option is that this strike force was connected to the Israeli collaborator network. 
Though I hesitate to proffer this option without further proof, it cannot simply be 
discarded. As I will discuss later, it seems that collaborators spread inflammatory 
leaflets on campus to antagonise the rival movements, just as they did during the 
Intifada. Furthermore, it is well documented that by 1988 Israeli undercover units, 
disguised as Palestinians, were operating in the territories, in the words of Israeli human 
rights organisation B'Tselem, "for all intents and purposes as liquidation squads". " 
Likewise, it is known that armed Palestinian collaborators arrested Palestinian activists 
during the Intifada. 72 Collaborators were also found to attack bare-headed (leftist) 
women activists during the Intifada, while posing as Hamas supporters (see Chapter 5), 
while one leader of a more notorious Brotherhood strike force (involved in beating up 
70 `Khalid' IV, PFLP Supporter II. 
71 Na'ama Yashuvi (B'Tselem), Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories, p8. Though 
the military has repeatedly denied the existence of such units, and B'Tselem has granted that perhaps "there is 
no official policy that permits such killing", the latter's extensive research has led it to conclude that "in 
practice the phenomenon exists". 
72 Cf. photos at IUG photo exhibition in memory of 50" anniversary of 1948 war, May 1998. 
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PFLP leaders in 1986) was later found to have been a collaborator. 73 It is thus not 
unthinkable that collaborators operated a strike force, ostensibly in the name of the 
Brotherhood, but actually intended to cause havoc - though this still implicates the 
Brotherhood leadership if it was aware of this force (as it presumably was, though I have 
no confirmation of this besides al-Fajr). 
The 1983 Clashes 
Turning now to the clashes, I have already alluded to the fact, ignored by al-Fajr, that 
some 300 PLO supporters had been bussed in from the West Bank. Though the former 
PLO activists I interviewed acknowledged that these buses did indeed arrive, they 
generally insisted their purpose was peaceful. Some Jabhah activists maintained that the 
visit was a coincidence. The students, they insisted, had come for a commemoration of 
the first anniversary of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and that it was usual for 
students to participate from all over Palestine (mirroring al-Fajr's description of the 
Gazan Islamists arriving at Bir Zeit for the 16`h anniversary of the start of the 
occupation). " This explanation begs several questions. Why would a commemoration 
be scheduled for 8.00 am, more or less forcing the visitors to arrive on the eve of the 
event - staying over in Beit Hanun, according to the Islamist narrative? 75 Why come all 
the way from the West Bank instead of joining in their own universities' 
commemorations? 76 Why did the Fajr article not mention the planned demonstration in 
73 Walid Hamdiyyah is presently in prison on suspicion of collaboration. He was also allegedly involved in 
turning in Hamas Intifada leader `Emad `Aql. Cf. Jarro' 1, Yazuri, Thalmas. 
74 Yunis; `Ziad' & `Husam'. 
75 Abu Shannab 1, Haniyyah I. 
76 Since Yassin (III) insisted that the Kutlah had a permit to demonstrate in Bir Zeit, it is conceivable that 
pro-PLO students wished to demonstrate unencumbered elsewhere. The choice of lUG where the PLO was a 
minority, suggests however that a confrontation was sought. 
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Gaza and the existence of placards among the PLO supporters - as it did regarding the 
Islamist demonstrators at Bir Zeit? " 
That more than a demonstration was intended was hinted at by Thalmas, who said: 
One of the ways of defending ourselves was sometimes to collect people from 
everywhere, ... to give the 
impression that we are very strong people. 
But, he added, though he was in prison at the time, 
I am sure that no one even threw a stone towards anyone from the Islamic movement. 78 
Yazuri equally resolutely denied that his followers were engaged in violence. Yazuri's 
account of events is that the Administration had retaliated against their support for the 
employees' strike by failing them for their missed exams and suspending them; and that, 
subsequently, the pro-PLO students had assembled in front of the IUG to force entry in 
order to be able to continue their studies and sit the exams they had missed. But, Yazuri 
insists, because they had not expected "thousands" of Islamist supporters, "hidden inside 
the classrooms with big sticks, chains and knives and in the area surrounding the 
university", the pro-PLO students had come unarmed and were, consequently, severely 
beaten by the Islamists. Yazuri was taken to hospital unconscious, his ribs broken. 79 
There is an unresolved contradiction here. For, if the intention was to show force 
- something both Yazuri and Thalmas acknowledge - why, given the previous tense 
77 A! -Fajr quotes the Bir Zeit Student Council's report that "unfamiliar people [were] leaving the mosque 
carrying placards bearing slogans condemning the PLO". 
78 Thalmas. 
79 Yazuri. His wife confirmed this. 
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weeks, would the PLO supporters have come unarmed? Another Jabhah activist, Isam 
Yunis, originally from Gaza and one of the Bir Zeit students in Gaza at the time of the 
fights, recounted that there was a coalition of different political movements against the 
Mujamma' planning to challenge the latter's bid for hegemony (again, an implicit 
recognition of the potentially violent nature of the visit): 
The National Movement [PLO], even Islamic Jihad, ... was asking for action 
[against 
the Mujamma']. The Mujamma' saw the IUG as their kingdom and they refused any 
power-sharing. 8° 
Kutlah leader Haniyyah similarly mentioned that "there was an agreement in 1983 
between all the different student blocs ... to stage a coup 
d'etat against ... Muhammad 
Saqr" and that, just prior to the clashes, a meeting had taken place in Jabalyah Camp 
with "all the leaders of the different political blocs, Fatah, the PFLP, including `Abd al- 
'Aziz `Odeh who is a leader of Islamic Jihad" with the purpose "to plan to take over the 
University on [the coming] Saturday". " 
Given the general violent climate, the fact that there was a pre-planned coalition against 
the Mujamma', that there had been a clash in the President's office a few days prior, that 
bus-loads had arrived from the West Bank and that PLO supporters there are known to 
have engaged in violence prior to these clashes as at al-Najah University, an unarmed 
challenge to the IM seems unlikely. One PFLP representative, Yunis al-Jarro', a well- 
respected lawyer capable of rising above political partisanship, agreed that the bringing 
in of students from the West Bank probably indicated a physical challenge was intended 
80 Yunis. 
81 Haniyyah II. 
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with the purpose of establishing a PLO hegemony at the IUG 82 This reading is further 
corroborated by the fact that, according to Haniyyah, not only were the `demonstrators' 
armed, " but 
One of the people who was considered to be an Islamic Jihad activist at the time, Hijaz 
Burbar, had given a Friday sermon at the Khatibah mosque [down the road from the 
IUG] saying, literally, that all hospitals and ambulances should be ready tomorrow - 
84 which was to be Black Saturday - to take the injured from the Islamic University ... 
The Islamist narrative indeed paints a picture of an armed attack by PLO supporters to 
take control of the university. " In Abu Shannab's words, 
The Islamic University announced that it wanted to bring in a new professor to be the 
President 
... [T]he 
Fatah people and the communist parties said [to each other]: we 
reject this professor and plan to attack ..., remove this person, and control the 
university. This plan was decided in Bir Zeit University. And from Bir Zeit came 
students, from Fatah and the communist parties. They gathered at Beit Hanun [north of 
Gaza City], that night, and the Mujamma` party noticed ... people coming 
from outside 
were gathering in Beit Hanun to attack the university. So what do you expect their 
reaction will be? To defend the university. So they urged their supporters to gather 
around the university, to defend it against any attack - if it comes. In the morning, 
those who had planned the attack, came directly to the university, expecting everything 
to be open ... because they did not know that the Mujamma' had noticed their 
movement. So all of a sudden clashes erupted. In any clash, you use whatever you 
82 Jarro' 1. 
83 Cf. also Yassin III, Abu Shannab 111, Sami Abu Dhughri (1980s Kutlah activist, President IUG Student 
Council 1997). 
84 Haniyyah It. AI-Fajr similarly uses its reference to the presence of the Islamic institute's "mobile 
medical unit" to imply that the Islamists' attack was pre-meditated. 
85 Yassin III, Abu Shannab I, Haniyyah I&II, Musa III, Abu Dhughri. 
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have. We didn't have guns, and thank God we didn't have guns at that time. So with 
stones, sticks, whatever they could find as hand tools, they defended. ... From that 
moment, they [Fatah and the communists] began to say: they attacked us, they did this 
and that. Yes, we did. It's not shameful to do so because you are coming to attack the 
university. So we defended the university. 
86 
Comparing, it is interesting that the Islamists have no compunction in acknowledging 
that they used violence `defensively', while references to PLO violence, even defensive, 
were entirely absent from the PLO narrative, even after my prompting them on this 
issue. Similarly interesting is that the Islamists readily took responsibility for wishing to 
defend the IUG and its Islamicity, while most of the PLO supporters refrained from 
acknowledging that there might have been an underlying intention to take control over 
the university and make it secular. 87 
Whoever initiated the violence, and whether or not the PLO supporters were armed, it 
seems clear from the above accounts that the Islamists truly believed the university to be 
under attack. Though possible theirs is a fabricated narrative to justify violence, it is too 
detailed, and too plausible, to be simply dismissed. Given the rumours spread by 
Awwad in 1980 concerning a communist bid to take over the IUG; 88 given the infamous 
January 1982 clashes in Najah University following an Islamist electoral victory; given 
finally the storming of the President's office in the recent strike, the grenade which had 
exploded in Saqr's house, and the rumour that hundreds of PLO supporters had been 
bussed in from the West Bank, it is not surprising that the Islamists believed the 
university to be threatened. From their point of view, the PLO strike had been 
illegitimate, and deliberately aimed at weakening the university. Not only were they 
86 Abu Shannab H. 
87 Only Jarro' did. Yunis merely acknowledged that there was an intention to challenge the Mujamma"s 
hegemony which he portrayed as illegitimate. 
88 See p168. 
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protesting an appointment made by the appropriate authorities that had (initially) been 
accepted by Agha, they had also disrupted the exam period and organised `illegitimate' 
employee elections. 
Both sides possessed an ideational framework which could readily justify violence 
against the other. In each narrative, the other was a collaborating force, betraying the 
Palestinian cause -a view fuelled by the heated debate regarding the merits of 
resistance. 89 Moreover, for some 15 years people had not had recourse to a trusted 
guarantor of the rule of law. Instead, they were daily confronted with a humiliating 
occupation force, the frustration of which experience could easily spill over into intra- 
Palestinian relations. They had grown used to taking the law into their own hands. 
Given the rivalry between a PLO with hegemonic ambitions and a nascent Islamist 
movement which refused to accept the PLO's representativeness, the PLO challenge, 
whether armed or not, readily provoked a violent response. In Musa's words, 
These dynamics were happening in an environment that could be characterised as a 
society without an ability to communicate, lacking democratic behaviour, in addition to 
occupation ... and a Palestine Liberation 
Organisation that was trying to marginalise the 
establishment of any new Islamic organisation. ... 
[Then you have] the [Islamic] 
movement which started to feel that it had the right, more than others, to express itself 
because it was the one with... righteousness. To be self-critical ..., both the Islamic and 
the secular mentality were backward. Both had a mentality that depended on the logic 
of power [and conflict], not debate 90 
89 Cf al-Fajr's description of the IM as collaborators in its report on the clashes. Former Jabhah activists 
`Ziad' & `Husam' recounted Islamists telling them in prison that they had been told the Jabhah were 
collaborators; see p327. 
90 Musa H. 
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In this climate, and in the absence of legitimate arbitration structures, the clashes 
seemed relatively inevitable - particularly if it is taken into account that it is more than 
likely that collaborators were involved in exacerbating the tensions. Abu `Ali, then 
Dean of Student Affairs, recounted that much of his time was spent reconciling the 
opposing factions after inflammatory leaflets had been distributed, in his opinion by 
collaborators. " According to Abu `Ali, 
The occupation was playing on contradictions [between the two parties] ... [A] small 
group of agents [published] a leaflet on this or that. ... 
[S]itting in my office ... one 
[of 
the two parties] would say: there was a leaflet against us. The other would say: we 
didn't sign it. This happened on many occasions. They praised me as a reconciler; I 
didn't reconcile, I only clarified that neither was responsible for the conflict. 92 
During the clashes, moreover, Israeli soldiers surrounding the university are said to have 
sent escaping students back into the fighting, " while some interviewees insisted they 
had seen senior members of the Israeli Administration in Gaza hand out weapons 94 
Whether or not these accounts are correct, the Israeli army was indeed present and did 
not stop the fighting. 
One thing the Islamist narrative does not sufficiently address is the accusation of PLO 
activists that an underlying reason for the clashes was the Islamists' suppression of 
91 This was similarly one of the Israeli military's tactics during the Intifada (cf. Legrain & Chenard; 
Shahadah I&II for the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law). 
92 Abu Sibah similarly singled out inflammatory leaflets. Abu Shannab (I), after discussions with PFLP 
leaders in prison, had come to the conclusion that in most major clashes between the PFLP and the Islamists 
someone who later had become suspected, or `convicted' by the Intifada's activist `courts', of collaboration 
had been central to the action at the time, inciting activists against each other, spreading exaggerated and false 
rumours. 
93 'Ziad' & `Husam'. Abu Sibah said merely that the Israeli army had surrounded the IUG and did not 
interfere. 
94 Abu `Ali mentioned Dalian (Interior Office), Yazuri singled out Abu Sabri (Gaza Governor). 
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opposition. " Though some Islamist interviewees openly regretted the violent clashes of 
the 1980s, 96 they denied that they suppressed opposition. As Chapter 7 details, it must 
be granted that, regardless of the complaints, there are sufficiently numerous accounts of 
PLO activities at the IUG to conclude that they were able to operate to some degree. 
However, given that, by their own admission, the Kutlah activists felt that the PLO was 
unwilling to tolerate an independent political newcomer such as the Islamists, that they 
resisted the PLO's bid for hegemony, and that they believed they were some sort of 
righteous vanguard, it is likely within the violent, lawless context of the 1980s that the 
IUG's Kutlah reacted forcefully, at times violently, to those activities of PLO activists 
which it interpreted as having underlying hegemonic ambitions - particularly resistance 
activities which threatened the IUG with closure. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
I hope to have shown that the case the Islamists make regarding the clashes - that they 
were planned by the PLO to take control of the university - is not implausible 
(regardless of whether it is true), and that, given that and the structural and ideational 
framework of the 1980s, the occurrence of these incidents does not prove the IM to be 
violent by nature. Neither side acted `democratically' during the clashes, both engaged 
in violence, and both appear to have been used to engage in violence (Schiff and 
Ya'ari's singling out the Islamists for turning the IUG "into a reserve of disciplined 
"soldiers"" is thus somewhat misleading). The evidence is inconclusive regarding who 
initiated it. However, it seems to have been contextually inspired, rather than an 
inescapable result of the core beliefs each party held. Moreover, despite the pain 
95 See also Chapter 7. 
96 Haniyyah II, Musa H. Abu Shannab (1) inferred this. 
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inflicted, the extent of the violence was, particularly against the backdrop of occupation, 
relatively limited, with no fatalities and, if al-Fajr is correct, only 70 injured (out of, by 
all accounts, between 600-900 people fighting). Given its contextual nature and its 
limited extent, given also that the Kutlah's leaders express regret at the violence of the 
1980s and that both the ideational and structural frameworks have changed, resulting in 
a more cooperative climate, improved cross-party communication and the beginnings of 
a rule of law, 97 the 1983 clashes cannot be said to be representative of the IM's present 
political culture. All they say is that under certain circumstances the IM did, and so 
could again, resort to violence. 
Contrary to assumptions in PLO and Western discourse, the Islamists were continuing 
the tradition of the University's founders while the PLO supporters were attempting to 
change this direction. Whether the secular or Islamist vision was more suitable to 
Gaza's culture is debatable. But claiming that the IM had imposed Islam on an 
otherwise secularly inclined university is rewriting history. Such rewriting appears to be 
part of the dichotomisation process that both PLO and Western authors are tempted to 
engage in, justifying secularist actions against Islamists by depicting the latter as 
usurpers and outsiders. 
Al-Fajr thus ignores violence on the part of the Gazan PLO activists; highlights the 
arrival of Islamist buses in Bir Zeit while suppressing the arrival of PLO buses in Gaza; 
justifies PLO activists throwing stones at the Islamist demonstrators in Bir Zeit as 
defending the fatherland, while condemning violence by Islamist activists in Gaza (who 
equally believed they were defending their university), and depicting it as "anti- 
nationalist" and indicative of collaboration "with the Israeli authorities". In the 
97 See Chapter 8 regarding improved leftist-Islamist relations. While legislation, the judiciary and the police 
forces in the Gaza Strip are now in Palestinian hands, enjoying more legitimacy than the occupation forces, 
there are still instances of lawlessness (cf. the recent spate of intimidatory attacks by members of the security 
forces on members of the Legislature and even Ministers; Khaled Abu Toameh, `State of Chaos? ', Jerusalem 
Report, 22.05.2000, pp36-37). 
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dichotomisation, the intentions of the other are inflated to totalitarian proportions, 
leading the United Students National Committee to call on students to "defend their 
university so that it will remain an independent Palestinian institution" (as if the 
Islamists were a foreign state invading Gaza). " Milton-Edwards and Abu-Amr likewise 
portray the occasional eruptions of violence as if the 1980s were one prolonged violent 
battle - although major `battles' at the IUG only occurred in 1983 and 1986. 
The same dichotomisation process is at work in the depiction of the conflict, by both al- 
Fajr and Milton-Edwards and Abu-Amr, as one between "nationalists" and 
"Brotherhood/Mujama supporters" - despite the fact that significant numbers of the 
`nationalists' were Islamicly inclined (though the 1983 conflict and the alliance between 
Fatah and the PFLP had pushed them into the secularist camp), 99 while the 
"Brotherhood supporters" supported the decision of the leadership of the `nationalists' 
(Arafat) to appoint Saqr. 
The same process of dichotomisation and distortion seems to have been operative in 
Western descriptions of the 1981-1982 clashes at al-Najah University. "' PLO agression 
prior and after the clashes goes unreported. The Islamists are depicted as anti-nationalist 
and anti-democratic. Yet, by admission of the 1982 Shabibah leader and other non- 
partisan eye-witnesses, the initial tensions were caused by the pro-PLO forces refusing 
to accept the landslide victory of the Islamists in the Student Council elections, and 
staging a 40-day strike, completely, at times violently, disrupting university life. "' 
98 A! -Fajr, 10.06.1983. Rumours of close IM-Jordanian cooperation may have informed this statement. 
99 E. g. Abu Sibah's insistence that Fatah and Mujamma` supporters could be found on either side of the 
conflict regarding Agha. 
too Milton-Edwards, pp]33-135; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p45; Shadid, pp679-680. See also al-Fajr, 
15-21.01.1982,22-28.01.1982,19-25.02.1982. 
101 See footnote 68. 
CHAPTER 5 
SOCIO-POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 
THE `HIJAB CAMPAIGN' IN GAZA 
The hijäb (headscarf)' has many different meanings, social, political as well as religious. 
For some women, it is an assertion of peasant roots, for others a statement of identity. 
During the Intifada it became a statement of nationalism, and of respect for the martyrs. 
For many, it is simply an expression of faith, of their obedience to the Qur'änic verse 
"Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw 
their veils around them [when abroad]" (33: 59)2 and the (non-verbal) Hadith which has 
the Prophet indicating to his daughter Fatima to cover herself when in public 3 Some, 
though not many in Gaza, hold these religious injunctions to have been temporary 
commands only, relevant to the context of their day, but not a religious imperative 4 
Others see the hijab as a means to buttress male authority, subdue women, and usher in 
a male-dominated Islamic state. The by 9b is thus more than a scarf, or the personal 
choice of a woman to wear it, revolving as it does around issues of freedom, tolerance 
and competing value systems. This chapter will analyse allegations that Hamas 
orchestrated a campaign to intimidate women into wearing the hab. If true, they 
1 Some in Gaza used `hijah' to mean the full face cover. I use it to mean the hair-scarf usually intended in 
Western discourse. 
21 use the Penguin translation because it better conveys the meaning of veiling. 
3 Cf. `Khalid' I. 
4 Cf. Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite. 
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suggest that Hamas has authoritarian tendencies which disrespect personal choice. If 
not, these allegations will reveal something about the way Hamas actions and motives 
are distorted in Western discourse. 
5.1 THE `IJÄB CAMPAIGN' IN WESTERN DISCOURSE 
Numerous Western texts refer to a campaign to impose the hy9b. One article in 
particular, by Rema Hammami, ' has become the basis of claims in other texts, for its 
being the most comprehensive and authoritative. ' I will concentrate on this article. 
The gist of Hammami's article is summarised in the following quote: 
[T]he intifada has been the context for a vicious campaign in Gaza to impose the hab 
(headscarf) on all women. The campaign included the threat and use of violence and 
developed into a comprehensive social offensive. Social acquiescence, political 
inaction, family pressure and a concurrent ideological transformation created a 
situation in which only a few committed women in Gaza, one year into the Intifada, 
continued not to wear a headscarf. These women were affiliated with the three leftist 
factions and, although acting individually, were all asserting within the context of the 
intifada the fundamental linkeage between gender liberation and the possibility of a 
Hammami, `Women, the Hijab and the Intifada', Middle East Report 20(3-4), pp24-28 
6 Cf. Milton-Edwards, pI85(n4) (due to print mistake, n5); Usher, p67; Salim Tamari, 'Left in Limbo', 
Middle East Report 22(6), p17(n7); Ebba Augustin, `Developments in the Palestinian Women's Movement 
during the Intifada' in Augustin, Palestinian Women, p37(n64); Strum, Philippa, The Women are Marching, 
p217 (reference to Hammami, `Women's Political Participation in the Intifada: A Critical Overview' in 
Women's Studies Committee, The Intifada and Some Women's Social Issues, 14.12.1990, p80). Most other 
texts referring to the `campaign' without reference to Hammami are generalistic and without much detail (cf. 
Sayigh, p630; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, p 19; Schiff & Ya'ari, p226), except for Amal Kawar who 
discusses it in some depth as it relates to the leftist women's movement (Daughters of Palestine, pp 114-123). 
Others refer to similar `campaigns' to forcefully impose the h ßäb or a sexual code (i. e. gender-segregated 
weddings), prior to the Intifada (Shadid, p674; Milton-Edwards, pp 111,116). 
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progressive and democratic future. Their struggle, then, was not against the hijab itself 
but about what the intifada would lead to (p24). 
While never squarely putting the blame on Hamas, Hammami clearly implies Hamas 
orchestrated the campaign by prefacing her discussion of the incidents with a detailed 
description of the growth of the Mujamma' Islami (p25), and by ending with a postscript 
detailing various related incidents for which Hamas activists are blamed (p28). None of 
the five specific hab incidents she describes are directly attributed to Hamas. She even 
acknowledges that "multiple forces worked simultaneously (though not necessarily 
jointly)" to impose the hijäb (p26), including religious elements in Fatah, and 
collaborators working for the occupation forces to sow discord (p28). Yet by explicitly 
linking the hjjab to the creation of an Islamic state and "a reactionary ideology about 
women's role in society" (p25), by accusing the secular forces of deliberate inaction for 
not wishing to alienate the "religious groups" (p28), 7 and by concluding that the 
"`intifada hijab' was not about modesty, respect, nationalism or the imperatives of 
activism but about the power of religious groups to impose themselves" (p26), 
Hammami leaves no doubt as to whom she blames for the campaign. Other texts who 
quote her, corroborate this reading by representing her article as unequivocally holding 
Hamas responsible for the `hijab campaign' - though this conclusion may also be partly 
informed by these scholars' own perspectival prejudices. ' 
Hammami's article raises important issues regarding gender relations, the role of 
women in a future Palestinian society and present contradictions between personal 
freedom and religious culture. But her argument is undermined by her conflating 
7 That Hammami principally referred to Hamas is clear from her explanatory footnote, referring to the 
coalition between "Fatah and the Islamic groups" (of which Hamas was the largest) in the 1981 Najah and 
Hebron student elections (p71n7). 
8 Cf. Milton-Edwards: "Hamas has promoted the imposition of the hab on women in Gaza" (p 185). Usher: 
... in Gaza ... women were forced to wear the headscarf' (p67). In neither case is others' involvement 
mentioned. 
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evidence, inflating Hamas's role in the events, and reducing the hif b to an oppressive 
instrument in a "reactionary" campaign towards an Islamic state, with no 
acknowledgement of the possibility that not all perceive the hif b as oppressive or as a 
path to an Islamic state. She fails to establish whether the "h jab campaign" was in fact 
a planned campaign or a series of incidents brought on by a general atmosphere. ' and to 
sufficiently analyse the perpetrators. She also ignores the Hamas narrative concerning 
both hija-b and bulb campaign. 
5.2 CONTEXT ANALYSIS 
Hammami attributes the rapid growth of the Mujamma' during the 1970s and 1980s to 
the increasing `migration' of Palestinian day-workers to Israel, with its alienating effects 
of increased drug and alcohol abuse and feeling compromised by working for the 
occupier. The Mujamma', she contends, offered not only a fortifying moral code but 
also "the possibility of participating in a political community that claims to confront the 
occupation [ideologically] without ... exposing 
its members to danger [by abstaining 
from direct resistance] - as in the nationalist factions. " There is no reference to the 
general process of Islamisation which had been taking place in the territories from the 
late 1970s onwards, when the Mujamma' was still only a minor player (see Chapter 2.2). 
This omission enables Hammami to portray Palestine as a nation on its way to a 
"progressive and democratic future", and `blame' the massive turn to, and support for, 
the hUäb primarily on the Mujan ma`. 
Besides religious significance, the h. Uää has a number of `secular' meanings. As 
Hammami correctly observes, for women from the refugee camps, it could be an 
9 For this reason, I put `hab campaign' between inverted commas. 
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expression of loyalty to one's family's original village. For others, it was a statement of 
authenticity against the impact of Westernisation. " In a publication produced by the 
women's Kutlah al-Islamiyyah in 1998, girls are thus told that 
The European coloniser said: "The situation of the Orient won't be straightened unless 
the veil is removed from the woman's face and covers the Qur'än". 1 1 
The Intifada added further dimensions. The hijali thus also became an expression of 
solidarity with the martyrs, and of Palestinian-ness (particularly as a distanciation from 
Israeli secular culture). It similarly became thought of as a protection against Israeli 
soldiers and against being targeted as a collaborator. The bU b had non-ideological 
meanings too. For some, it was a means to gain anonymity and evade the stares of the 
public arena; " for others, to avoid confrontation by conforming to society's pressures. 
Hammami fails to mention that many women chose the / jäb of their own volition - 
sometimes against their husband's will13 - and that, to many, thehijäb is not "an 
instrument of oppression, a direct disciplining of women's bodies for political ends" 
(p25), but an instrument of pride and control. 14 Maria Holt observes in this vein 
By wearing Islamic dress, [women] are protected from unwelcome male attention and 
may, therefore, move more freely in the public arena. is 
10 Cf. Islamist Women: "For a Muslim activist, being uncovered is being part of the colonising process that 
the West is engaged in". 
11 Kutlah al-Islamiyyah, The Way to Survive, p9. 
12 Cf. Deir al-Balah Camp Resident. 
13 Cf. Deir al-Balah Camp Resident, member of Gazan (secular) elite. Various other informal discussions. 
to This was the sentiment of my fourteen female Islamist interviewees and those I informally spoke with at 
the IUG (IUG's Women Section). 
15 Holt, p69. 
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One could counter that men should learn to curb their "unwelcome attention". But in 
Gaza's cultural context it is understandable that women choose to don the hijäb to be 
able to operate more freely. Moreover, a number of Islamist women told me that the 
hijäb and the IM had encouraged them to go out and claim their place in the universities 
and the workforce. " From this perspective, the proliferation of the h, ijäb is not 
necessarily a sinister plot for totalitarian control. 
Many women with no links with Islamism appear to wear the hijäb for religious, but 
non-Islamist reasons - rendering the equation between wearing thehijäb and the 
imminent creation of an Islamic state rather speculative. " During the Intifada this trend 
was strengthened by the intense climate of mourning, which rendered bare-headedness, 
with its associations with Westernisation, feminism and, to some, frivolity, highly 
tasteless. Hammami acknowledges this but fails to convey the impact of this climate on 
the attire of women, far beyond the impact any one movement could have had, tapping 
into religio-cultural roots much older than the advent of Hamas or Islamism. 
The trend towards the hijäb was strengthened by the belief that it would protect one 
from soldiers and collaborators. Hammami rightly condemns this notion as false 
- hyäbed women were not spared by soldiers or collaborator-hunters. Yet she is wrong 
in dismissing it so lightly as a motive. In my interviews, it was one of the most quoted 
reasons for wearing the hijäb during the Intifada. Rumours were rife, fuelled by books, 
16 Discussions with students in the IUG's women's section; `Iman', Head of Mujamma` Women's Training 
Centre; Women's Kutlah 1, Women's Kutla 2. 
17 Judging by the high percentage of hyäbed women one observes in Gaza (roughly 75%), five years after 
the end of the Intifada (and its lawless climate enabling intimidation), and the, compared to this number, 
relatively low percentage of Hamas supporters (somewhere between 10-30%; p43,53), a high percentage of 
hrjäbed women must be non-Islamist. Of the 575 Azhar students (69.4% of which support Fatah) who 
answered my survey question whether all women in their family wore the hija3,45% said they did, 25.2% that 
some of them did, 25% that none of them did. Of the 572 who answered whether they believed women should 
wear the hijab, 22.4% responded they should at all times, 56.8% they should only outside the house, 15.9% 
that they should never wear it (in comparison, for the 631 IUG students answering the first question, the 
figures are 75%, 15.2% and 7%; for the second question, 39.8%, 53.7% and 2.1 %). 
THE `HIJÄB CAMPAIGN' 148 
leaflets and (alleged) confessions by interrogated collaborators, " that the Israelis 
recruited collaborators by luring them into sexual encounters with other collaborators, 
and subsequently using compromising photographs to blackmail them. A PFLP 
document distributed and read widely during the 1980s detailed the different methods, 
collectively known as isgä( (literally: toppling) by which Israelis allegedly compromised 
Palestinians. " It was believed that bare-headed women would make more likely targets 
for isgät, their presence and beauty being considered more noticeable. This notion was 
reinforced by rumours of the sexual activities of Gaza-based Western NGO personnel 
and by the promiscuous characters in popular television soaps like "The Bold and the 
Beautiful". Both helped bare-headedness become equated with sexual promiscuity. 2° 
If the possibility is taken into account that a majority of hij9 wearers voluntarily chose 
to wear it, a reading which is vindicated by the fact that the majority of Gazan women 
still wear the hijäb five years after the end of the Intifada and its lawless climate, the 
incidents Hammami recounts, however deplorable, can no longer be seen as expressions 
of a totalitarian strategy by one group to impose its views on society, particularly as that 
group does not command the loyalty of more than between 15-30% (depending on the 
political affiliation of one's source) of the population. Indeed, it seems to be precisely 
Hammami's ignoring the general increase in religiosity and the perceived benefits of the 
hijab among much of the population, that allows Hammami to blame Hamas as an 
oppressing force. 
18 E. g. the book The Victim Confesses about the "alleged exploits" of a collaborator; a list, obtained after 
interrogation of suspected collaborators in Nablus prison, "of more than one hundred young men and women 
from the West Bank who were also involved in isqat [moral corruption] ... which 
later turned out to be false" 
(Be'er & Saleh, Collaborators, pp40-41). 
19 A number of Hamas members told me of having read this document, and insisted that tsgä 1 had been 
widespread; cf. Intifada Cell II, `Nasr', `Khalid' II. Israeli Human Rights Centre B'Tselem found that, though 
fear of isgäl was widespread, no conclusive evidence existed that isgff was practised extensively (Be'er & 
Saleh, pp39-42). 
20 1 heard many such rumours about the behaviour of Western expatriates at the UN's Beach Club in Gaza. 
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Finally, two aspects to the hab which indicate that many of the hijIb incidents may not 
have been wholly about religion, are only marginally highlighted by Hammami. First, 
there is a class angle. " Bare-headedness was more frequent among the educated and the 
Westernised, both of which groups tended to have a high percentage of the (upper) 
middle classes. With the lower classes feeling they bore the brunt of the Intifada's 
casualties, while believing that the upper classes were not suffering to the same extent, 22 
the byab issue seems to have been one of the means by which the lower classes tried to 
force the elite to express solidarity with them and their suffering. The disruption of 
ostentatious sea-side weddings during the Intifada by the less well-off from 
neighbouring Shati' (Beach) Camp, 23 and the raid by, in Hammami's words, "lumpen 
elements" (p26) on the well-off, middle class Ahmad Shawqi school in Gaza City are 
but two illustrations. 
Second, the hYa-b also became a symbol of the struggle between leftists and Islamists. 
The right of female PFLP activists not to wear the h jäb on campus appears to have been 
one of the foci in which the 1986 tensions at the IUG expressed themselves 24 Though 
there were non-aligned women who did not wear the l ijäb, bare-headedness seemed 
(among students) to have become an expression of loyalty to the Left. The reverse 
notion appears to underlie Hammami's portrayal of the hijäb as commitment to an 
Islamic state. Factional tensions between secularist and Islamist groups, fuelled in the 
21 Hammami hints at this by listing those "not wearing any form of headcovering" as "mainly educated, 
urban and petit bourgeois women" (p25). 
22 A telling joke still circulating in 1998 had it that activist youths from the rich Rimal area threw 
chocolates at the Israelis during the Intifada, instead of stones. However, it is not true that the richer families 
did not suffer; I have come across a number of casualties among the teenagers of upper middle class families. 
23 While these disruptions are often associated with Hamas (Shadid, p674; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, 
p19; Milton-Edwards, p116), particularly as the camp closest to where Gaza City's rich used to celebrate their 
weddings, has a strong Hamas presence, it is dubious whether Hamas was behind these disruptions. Both 
Marwa Qassim (former PFLP student activist, now director of the Gazan branch of the Palestinian Model 
Parliament - Women and Legislation) and Turid Smith-Polfus (Norwegian researcher) ascribed these 
disruptions primarily to class-tensions (Qassim I, Smith-Polfus). 
24 Qassim I; Yahya Musa III (former Kutlah activist). 
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first years of the Intifada by the struggle for influence over and ownership of the 
Intifada, thus may have played a role if the perpetrators in hija-b incidents were people of 
student age (rather than the lawless youths who appear to have been largely responsible 
for the incidents)" - particularly as bare-headed women would, during the Intifada, have 
readily been identified as leftist activists since they alone would ideologically object to 
wearing the /i j/ 7b. 26 Moreover, as for this latter reason most of the hug incidents 
concern leftist activists, the notion of a `b yb campaign' is consequently most 
pronounced in the leftist's historical narrative. " 
5.3 PLAYER ANALYSIS 
Given the observation above that Hamas's influence is exaggerated by Hammami, it is 
important to establish which other groups in Gaza would favour the hab. This is 
particularly so as in Gazan narratives the distinction between Hamas and other groups or 
individuals with religious connotations is often blurred. In interviews and informal 
talks, I often found my interlocutor using the terms `Hamas' and `Mujamma" loosely to 
describe people believed to be religious and conservative on the basis of their 
appearance (beards, jalabas), their opposition to leftists, or simply rumour. In this vein, 
the term `Mujamma" was used generically to mean `mutadayyin' (religious people) 
rather than the institution itself. " Some secularists and leftists used it as an insult. In a 
25 See `Player Analysis'. 
26 I have not found concrete evidence of such encounters, beyond shouting matches between activists. 
27 Many of the Islamicly oriented and non-partisan interviewees were unaware of the extent of h. ßäb 
incidents. 
28 Cf. when discussing the burning of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (which Western discourse 
blames on the Mujamma`, but seems to have been the responsibility of Fatah), some secularists who stated 
they believed the Mujamma` leadership to have been innocent, simultaneously described the crowd that 
stormed the PRCS as "from the Mujamma"' (cf. Salah al-Saqa, secularist IUG Board Member and close friend 
of Haydar `Abd al-Shaft, Director of the PRCS). 
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rumour-ridden society such as Gaza's (p64) such misnomers spread fast and quickly 
gain a factuality they do not deserve. 
Potential Players 
There are roughly four, sometimes overlapping, organised groups in Gaza who 
supported the by b: the religious establishment, represented in the awgäf and the official 
religious leadership; the religiously inclined wing of Fatah; religio-political parties such 
as Hamas and Islamic Jihad; and the ultra-conservative movements such as the 
Salafiyyun of which the charity al-Qur'an wa'l-Sunnah in Khan Yunis is an example. 
Most members of these different groups advocate the wearing of the hifäb as a religious 
command. 
There are indications that some of them were involved in imposing the hijäb. Schiff and 
Ya'ari mention "the crusade of the Salafiun groups in Khan Yunis" against "movie- 
theaters,... cafes selling alcoholic drinks,... Western-style music, jewelry, and other 
non-traditional pursuits". While Schiff and Ya'ari do not specify the hyäb, it is 
improbable these groups would abstain from enforcing the hijäb if they had no 
compunction in "beating up people who ate with their left hand". 29 I have no further 
proof the Salafiyyun were indeed engaged in such violence. But, whether or not they 
were, Schiff and Ya'ari describe this alleged "crusade" tellingly conflatingly as "the 
most prominent example" of "harassment from members of the Brotherhood", even 
though the Salafiyyun are institutionally unconnected to the Brotherhood and their 
ideologies differ. 30 Secondly, the Palestinian educational authorities, over which both 
29 Schiff & Ya'ari, pp226-227. 
30 The (Salafiyyite) Qur'an wa'I-Sunnah in Khan Yunis denounced elections and legislation as un-Islamic, 
and proposed a Caliphate in which an unelected Caliph would nominate a non-legislating, advisory Parliament 
(continued... ) 
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Fatah and the religious authorities wield influence, ordered schools at the beginning of 
the Intifada to institute the hijaä as school uniform. " Thirdly, even the nominally 
secular al-Azhar University in Gaza which is controlled by Fatah, orders its female 
students, to this day, to wear the hijab on campus. 32 
While there is a clear difference between the latter two examples and the alleged 
Salafiyyite "crusade", it is clear that both Fatah and the religious authorities have been 
Hammami does indeed mention that Fatah is believed involved in imposing the hi 
to have produced graffiti encouraging Islamic dress (p28), and that "religious youths" 
(p25) were responsible for one incident, just as she puts the blame for another on 
"lumpen elements ... used 
by the military authorities as agents provocateurs" (p26) and 
acknowledges that "young boys (between 8 and 12)" (p26) were also involved. But all 
these are portrayed as marginal players, more or less piping to the tunes of Hamas. 
As hinted at in Hammami's reference to "lumpen elements" and "young boys", beyond 
the organised groups, there was the general population. The general climate favoured 
the wearing of the h, ijäb, especially during the Intifada. That this climate had been 
fostered by Hamas through sermons and leaflets is beyond doubt. The hijäb, as part of 
the general themes of fortitude, steadfastness and religiosity as weapons in the struggle 
against the Israelis, seems to have been popular in sermons given by Hamas supporters 
during the early years of the Intifada (as well as before and after)? ' But, not only did 
members of the other groups appear to have done likewise, but preaching a religious 
30 ( continued) 
(Qur'an wa'l-Sunnah). See Chapters 6&7 for IM's position. 
31 PFLP activist of Women's Affairs Centre (WAC), during interview with Islamist Women. The incident 
at the Shawqi school (Hammami, pp25-26) seems to have been connected to this order and the failure to 
impose it on the more affluent, urban schools. 
32 Discussions with Azhar students, including female Shabibah leader. 
33 Cf. Islamist Women, `Ahmad', `Ashraf, `Khalid' II (non-partisan, Islamicly-inclined). 
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point of view is also not the same as imposing that view violently. No one interviewed, 
regardless of political persuasion, had heard their preachers advocate violence to spread 
the hijäb. While, conversely, none remembered their preacher specifically condemning 
the violence, this may be partly explained by the fact that these hijäb incidents seem to 
have been relatively marginal in the consciousness of many Gazans. 3a 
Given the general climate, anybody could have participated in the intimidations. In this 
way, members of the general public who were also Hamas members, may well have 
been involved in incidents. One junior member admitted that he had spat on the ground 
to display his disapproval of an un-h ijaäed woman, though he recoiled from the idea of 
being accused of throwing eggs or stones. 5 If a Hamas member was involved as a 
general member of the public, this cannot be taken as proof of Hamas orchestrating a 
`campaign'. 
Underlining the impact of the general climate, two (female) leftist interviewees 
observed that even male leftist activists had pressured female activists to wear the 
b jäb. 36 They explained this behaviour as an expression of both prudence, wishing not 
to alienate the religiously inclined forces (including those among Fatah) and protect 
`their' women, and cultural conditioning, blinding them to the wider issues involved. 
Numerous interviewees agreed that the prime culprits in imposing the hyaä were 
youngsters. 7 According to Hammami, 
34 See footnote 27. 
35 'Ahmad'. 
36 Qassim I; Leftist WAC Activist. 
37 Cf. Shadia Sarraj-Matar, Director Gaza Community Mental Health Programme - Women's Empowerment Project; Islamist Women; Leftist WAC activist; Islamist WAC activist; Raji Sourani I (Director 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights); Intifada Cell II; 'Ashraf; 'Narr'. 
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young boys (between 8 and 12) who were empowered by the intifada joined the 
campaign. If there were no soldiers to throw stones at, women without headscarves 
made good targets. Politically unaffiliated shabab [activist youths] who felt left out 
found harassing these women a safe way to express nationalist sentiment (p26). 
In my own experience, the only time I felt somewhat threatened in Gaza was when 
confronted with a dozen small kids in a refugee camp who were idling their time away 
practising sling shooting and I was a handy `substitute Israeli'. The idea that Israelis 
were the enemy, like the Intifada notion that bare-headed women were collaborators, 
would have been picked up from adult conversation. But these boys' actions cannot be 
blamed on any one movement. 
Nevertheless, some interviewees implied, echoing Hammami, that these Intifada youths 
were Hamas's proxy force, Hamas itself being too astute to be seen engaging in 
intimidation. " That this notion is far-fetched is underlined, not only by the observation 
made in the previous paragraph, but also by the statement of one Islamicly oriented 
woman that many of these boys did not even regularly frequent the mosques through 
which Ham as spread its message. 39 The underhand `proxy force' idea does not fit with 
the attitude Hamas members generally displayed of publicly owning up to their 
ideological positions, regardless of whether others approved. 40 Moreover, if Hamas 
wanted to show its muscle, it could, and did, do this more effectively, and less 
39 Cf. Sarraj-Matar, Leftist WAC Activist. Sourani blamed Hamas for purposefully indoctrinating, rather 
than orchestrating, the youth. The notion that Hamas was using the hijab to show its muscle is more explicitly 
expressed in Kawar's Daughters than by Hammami. 
39 Islamist Women. 
40 Based on my observation of Hamas members and the reputation they enjoy among Gazans (including 
non-Islamists). 
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controversially, by calling for strike days (their success being a measure of each 
movement's political influence). " 
Player Conflation in Hammami's Article 
In Gaza's rumour-ridden society incidents with religious overtones are readily blamed 
on Hamas, without concrete proof. Particularly concerning such ideologically charged 
and difficult to research acts as hijäb incidents, it is all too easy, when one is 
ideologically motivated, as Hammami is, not to sufficiently deconstruct the evidence 
when it confirms one's expectation that Hamas is behind it all. I will highlight a few 
examples. 
In one of the incidents implicitly ascribed to Hamas by linkage to the notion that 
wearing the hijab prepares the way for an Islamic state, the perpetrators are, in the 
victim's words, "boys from the [bourgeois] Rimal neighborhood [in Gaza City]" (p26). 
Rimal is one of the areas in which Hamas had, and has, the smallest of followings. " It 
is relatively rich, incorporates most of the international organisations, and houses a high 
number of secularist oriented families. Because of Hamas's lack of following in Rimal, 
it is highly unlikely (though of course not impossible) that these boys were Hamas 
supporters. That a woman was harassed by Rimali boys appears to be more an 
indication of the extent to which Gaza was permeated with hijab frenzy, than proof of 
Hamas's involvement in orchestrating intimidation. 
41 Cf. Legrain, p183-185; Rashad, p27-28; Usher, p68. 
42 During my stay in Gaza, I lived in Rimal and knew many Rimalis. Rimalis, Hamas leaders and activists, 
non-partisan interviewees and the Director of the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law confirmed that Hamas had 
little influence in Rimal. 
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In another incident two activist women were accused by shabäb [activist youths] of 
insufficiently covering their hair (pp26-27). When the women responded defiantly, the 
shabäb told the surrounding crowd that the women were collaborators, after which the 
crowd hounded them into a shop from where they were eventually allowed to leave 
when it was established they were not collaborators. Two points I made earlier are 
corroborated by this incident: bare-headedness and collaboration were clearly both 
topical and intertwined in the popular mind, not just in Hamas's narrative. 
Hammami mentions that PLO activists eventually `tried' the offending shabäb, but not 
that, according to one of the victims, the ring leader who, at the time, was believed to be 
a Hamas member, was shortly after executed by Harnas for collaboration with the 
Israelis 43 While the verdict may have been wrong, the fact that the man was executed 
by Hamas does at least indicate that the movement did not think highly of him. His 
actions can thus not be taken as representative of the Hamas leadership's plans. As for 
his fellow shabäb, it is unclear from the article whether they were confirmed to be 
Hamas. If they were, one must take into account that they did so in the violent climate 
of the Intifada, believing the h/b to be vital to the national struggle, and that the attack 
might have had political overtones, as these women were known leftist activists. 
Hammami may not have known that the leader was later executed 44 She did, however, 
know of the possibility of collaborator involvement since two leaflets she mentions 
warn of Israeli meddling through collaborators (pp26,27) and she briefly discusses the 
argument that collaborators were responsible. Revealing of the mindset of Hammami, 
and of most of those who quote her, is that no one explicitly draws the conclusion that 
the possibility of collaborator involvement in the `bijab campaign' seriously undermines 
43 Qassim I. 
44 Given that the article appeared a year after the incident happened in the Middle East Report (which 
operates a relatively short process of reviewing copy), it is likely this knowledge had been available, 
particularly as Hammami seems to have personally known the victim (Qassim). 
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allegations against Hamas. Another text also discusses that PFLP activists found 
perpetrators in a specific hija-b incident in Hebron to be collaborators, rather than Hamas 
activists as expected. 45 Yet, this text also fails to draw any serious conclusions and 
continues to treat Hamas as the orchestrator of a bUlb campaign ab 
The two incidents Hammami explicitly blames on Hamas (p28) are not part of the `hijäb 
campaign' but are apparently intended to prove Hamas's disregard of women's rights. 
One concerns Hamas activists pronouncing from a village mosque "that women should 
not be allowed to go out without a male member of the family". Scepticism is called for 
when a call from a mosque, and a village mosque at that, is equated with official Hamas 
policy. In fact, the statement contradicts the positions of both male and female IM 
members on the political position of women in an Islamic state, the majority of which 
stated that women would be entitled to be elected to the legislature and become 
Ministers of State in an Islamic state, as long as the Head of State is a male 47 It also 
contradicts the views of Islamist women regarding male Islamist attitudes (see further). 
Hammami fails to explore this discourse, instead condemning it wholesale as 
"reactionary". On its own, this statement is insufficient to prove, as Hammami appears 
to wish to do, that Hamas champions restricting women's freedom of movement at all 
times. 
45 The likely veracity of this conclusion lies in the fact that the interrogators were from the PFLP. 
46 Kawar, p 117. Having related the Hebron incident, Kawar continues: "The PLO leadership in the 
diaspora did not publicly take issue with Hamas's enforcement of the veil in the Gaza Strip". 
47 Against thirty-two interviewees championing this view (including the majority of the leadership), six 
held women should not be part of government while three claimed ignorance, referring the matter to the 
ulamä . The IM's general supporters (as opposed to active members) seem somewhat more `reactionary', in 
Hammami's terms. Thus, 67.1% of the 632 IUG students answering my survey question `Should women have 
equal opportunities in the professional sector? " responded `No', against 29.6% saying `Yes' (these figures 
were 67% and 29.1% for Hamas supporters, 64.2% and 35.8% for Fatah supporters). These figures seem, 
however, more a reflection of the general conservative climate in Gaza than of the IM's doctrines. 
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The other incident concerns Hamas activists "storm[ing] a women's committee 
production project" in Rafah. One of the leftist women present confirmed she thought 
the invaders were Hamas supporters 48 Leaving aside that this witness does not live in 
Rafah and consequently is likely to have come to her conclusion based on hearsay rather 
than positive knowledge, 49 it must be noted that this incident, if Hamas supporters were 
indeed involved, could similarly have been motivated by political rivalry rather than by 
women's issues per se. 
Further conflation is found in Hammami's linking acts of intimidation to slogans written 
on the wall. This argument is problematic on two levels. Authenticating slogans is 
difficult, even more so than authenticating leaflets since fabricated leaflets generally 
elicit counter-leaflets denying authorship 5° Signed or unsigned, anybody could have 
written them - authorised Hamas members, ill-informed sympathisers acting on their 
own, Palestinians hostile to Hamas or collaborators. Furthermore, though the 
proliferation of pro-ljijhb slogans no doubt contributed to creating a climate in which 
women felt pressured, daubing slogans does not prove one's involvement in 
orchestrating violent intimidation. The view that women should wear the byäb is a 
legitimate one, as long as it is not forcefully imposed. 
5.4 HAMAS' S NARRATIVE 
The first reaction of most Islamist interviewees, male and female, to the notion that 
Hamas might have imposed the h, fb violently was incredulity. In `Ashraf's words: 
48 Qassim I. 
49 Leaving open the possibility that, given the distortions of rumour, the invaders were identified with 
Hamas without acting on orders from the Hamas leadership. 
50 Cf. Legrain & Chenard; Shahadah I&II. 
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[Do you think] the leaders of Hamas [did this]? The members of Hamas? Of course 
not. For me, I was a member of Hamas, I've never done something like this ... and 
I 
will never do it. 
`Iman', the head (mas'ülah) of one of the Mujamma"s Women's Training Centres, and 
a member of al-Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat al-Muslimat, commented: 
The idea has been conveyed wrongly. I don't think a member [of Hamas or the 
Mujamma`] would attack women violently. He would talk and try to persuade them but 
not by force. Proof of this is that the Intifada is over, yet most women are still wearing 
the i fab. There could have been some things said to women displaying themselves in 
a lavish way, admonishing them to be more harmonious with the pain society was going 
through, and to show more respect for the martyrs ... 
But I never heard of any 
harassment [by Islamists]. If there were any attacks, they could have been wrongly 
labelled as Islamic whereas in truth they would have been done by collaborators. 
Muhammad Shamma', Deputy Director of the Mujamma`, condemned the harassments, 
saying 
it is not our way, violence and coercion is not a way to change; discussion, on the 
contrary, and objective opinions are the way to change. 
Ahmad Yassin similarly denied that Harnas was responsible. As to what to do if an 
individual member had engaged in violent intimidation, he replied: 
this person should be guided not to behave in such an inappropriate way in the future 
and be made to understand that this does not comply with the rules of Islam and that 
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Islam does not call for any ... individual to take the law by his own hand.... this will 
bring huge corruption in the society as a whole. 51 
Members of a Hamas activist cell which had operated during the Intifada in one of the 
refugee camps - the kind of shabäb that could have engaged in violent intimidation - 
said in response to the accusations levelled at Hamas by Hammami: 
Member 2: "These things used to happen a lot. Little children would do it but they 
weren't told by anyone to do it. When we used to see young children throw 
stones, we used to stop them. " 
Member 3: "Once two girls were walking without hyäb and some boys threw stones. 
Then one Hamas person hit their legs with a stick in order to stop the boys. [... ] 
Hassan Hudaybi [the second Supreme Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers] 
said: "we are `callers' to the faith, not judges of others". "SZ 
`Muhammad', a former Hamas cadre leader who has since left Hamas disillusioned, and 
whose testimony on this matter is thus all the more trustworthy, observed that 
apart from maybe one or two [incidents] in [my camp], none from the Hamas branch of 
[my camp] did like this, for there was a hard restriction from the leadership - `don't do 
like this'. Throwing eggs is not our method. 
All of my Islamist interviewees firmly believed that the Qur'an commands Muslim 
women to wear the hijab, as a symbol of their commitment to Islam and the modesty it 
51 Yassin II. 
52 Intifada Cell 11 (the credibility of these statements lies in the fact that these interviewees, who I saw on 
four occasions, proved to be honest and forthright on other issues, including issues which they thought to be 
unacceptable to the West). 
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preaches, and, in Yassin's words, as "a means of avoiding corruption and mischief... for 
us [men] and for women as wells53. Abu Shannab likewise explained: 
Islam says women have to cover their body, if they are to work in society without 
giving a bad impression. Look how the West is using women. Look at advertising.... 
Psychologically, they are using the body of the woman. God knows that the body of 
the woman is kind of inciting and this incitement should be kept within limits. ... you 
have to marry [to enjoy such incitement]. Beyond that, society does not need more 
incitement.... If, for example, a very nice woman wearing new fashion clothes walks in 
front of some boys, they will stare at her and they might concentrate on the beauty of 
her body. What psychological effects might this have on this guy, if he's not married? 
He will think of sex. But how can he get it, if he is not married? So he is [frustrated]. 
To keep society from this kind of incitement, the woman should protect her body from 
being open to the public - [with] any kind of dress [... ] Yes, it is a restriction, but it is 
... a restriction 
from God [... ] [I]f I am asking her to cover, ... I am asking her just to 
obey God 54 
This quote suggests Hamas leaders do not acknowledge the ambiguity of the Qur'änic 
verses regarding the h. ßäb which has spurned debates elsewhere in the Muslim world. " 
They seem, however, to be reflecting the Gaza's general atmosphere, as expressed, for 
example, by some women from secularly oriented families who told me that though they 
did not wear the hijäb, they believed it to be a religious command 56 However, its 
insistence on the finality of its interpretation regarding the üjäb cannot be taken as proof 
that it is against women's empowerment, or unwilling to enter a dialogue on the role of 
women in society and politics. In fact, though it posits detailed views on this matter and 
53 Yassin II. 
54 Abu Shannab IV. Yassin, Musa, Zahhar expressed similar views. 
55 Cf. Mernissi. 
56 Discussion with women from a secular family. 
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though not all are willing to enter dialogue, some IM leaders did engage in dialogue 
with the leftist Model Parliament on women's rights (see Chapter 7.4.3). 
Hamas leader Mahmud Zahhar links the high incidence of divorce, sexual promiscuity 
and teenage pregnancies in the West to a lack of moral discipline which includes the 
way women dress 57 This view is widely shared by Gazans, well beyond Hamas 
circles. " Devout Gazan Muslims view whether or not to wear the by ab as 
both a 
personal and a communal issue. At a personal level, it is about obeying 
God and 
gaining favour with Him. At a communal level, it is about preventing societal 
corruption and chaos. Given Hamas's emphasis on balancing the rights of the 
individual and the needs of the community (p 199), it would have been conceivable that 
Hamas would sanction some form of enforced imposition of the Ihija-b, for the sake of 
communal welfare. Instead, most of my interviewees categorically rejected the path of 
forced imposition. Not only, they argued, did the Qur'än forbid imposing religion, " but 
it would also be pointless since religion is concerned with what is in the heart. If 
someone was pressured into wearing the hijäb without believing in its religious 
meaning, it would mean nothing to God (see also Chapter 6). 
The IM may demand of its members to wear the by b. 6° Similarly, it wholeheartedly 
supports the imposition of the blab as a uniform on the IUG campus. But regarding 
society in general, it professes to believe in free choice. According to Shamma', "it is 
not anyone's business to force ... any woman to wear the 
/f äb". Another member, 
director of a charity, emphasised: "Islamic civilisation doesn't go with hitting and 
forcing people". Women, Zahhar insisted, "are not obliged to cover their ... 
faces or 
57 Zahhar H. 
58 Cf. `Khalid' I and other informal conversations. 
59 Cf. "Let there be no compulsion in religion" (2: 256). 
60 Yassin II. 
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their hands. If they are willing, this is a private thing. But nobody is obliging them to 
do that. "6' In the view of a female Kutlah supporter, "the hijäb is about personal 
freedom". " 
Hamas's Praxis Narrative 
It has been difficult to establish to what extent the IM practised its ideals. Apart from 
the statements of the Intifada cell and the former cadre leader, quoted above, that they 
had opposed the campaign, and the observations of many that none of their preachers 
advocated violence, I have not been able to find any concrete evidence that Hamas 
actively opposed the harassments - beyond Hammami's own reference, in passing and 
downplayed, that Hamas issued a leaflet disassociating itself from the attack on the 
bareheaded girls at the Ahmad Shawgi school (p26), and Risalah journalist and Khalas 
member Salah al-Na`ami's comment that "as I remember, [prominent people in Hamas] 
condemned the violent acts against women". 
Circumstantial evidence can be found, however, in the fact that the IM has a large 
number of women supporters, many of whom joined because they believe it accords 
women more respect than its secular counterparts. Leaders of the women's Kutlah 
insisted that 
women in other student movements have not as many rights as we have - we are 
independent [from our male counterparts], can have our own opinions. Sometimes, in 
the Shabibah and Islamic Jihad, the women take their decisions from the male section. 
61 Zahhar II. 
62 Islamist Women. 
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But we take our decisions for ourselves, without having to check it with the male 
section 63 
Though this may be biassed, it is significant for being given as a reason for joining al- 
Kutlah. As mentioned earlier, numerous Islamist and Muslim young women said the IM 
had encouraged them to, and persuaded their families to let them, go to university and 
develop themselves64 - contradicting the view raised 
by Hammami's article that the IM 
tries to keep women underdeveloped. Though all of them wear the Ihijäb, they are far 
from submissive. In the words of one female Kutlah leader 
if they [the male members of the IM] do not support us, we will support ourselves, for 
we are stronger. But I think they do their best. 
Or, following another, 
As a female, I can take my right on my own - no need for an advocate. I will change 
bs things myself for Islam gives me rights. 
While critics may argue that it is these women's Islamic upbringing, rather than its 
record on women's issues, that attracts them to Islamism, and that their upbringing 
prevents them from perceiving their `true' interests (in the tradition of `false 
consciousness' theories), the above quotes indicate that the IM is attractive to some 
highly motivated and ambitious women. In the words of the head of the Mujamma"s 
Women's Training Centre, 
63 Women's Kutlah 1. Cf. also 'Iman', IUG's Women's Section. 
64 See footnote 16. 
65 Women's Kutlah 1. 
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If I had been harassed or pressured in the wrong way, I would not be working for the 
Mujamma`. 66 
In recent times, moreover, the IM's al-Risalah newspaper raised the sensitive issue of 
honour killings and spoke out against it. Though some of the secularist and leftist 
women's organisations in Gaza have organised workshops and spoken out against it 
publicly for some time, they, by their own admission, find it hard to do so as they lack 
the `Islamic legitimacy' that the IM carries in the eyes of the population, and are thus 
vulnerable to the criticism that they are introducing Western values. " 
Leaving aside issues of `false consciousness', it seems unlikely that a movement which 
is attractive to the above ambitious women, and sufficiently concerned to publicly 
condemn honour killings, degrades women by violently forcing them to wear the hijäb. 
One would expect the attitude informing violent intimidation to spill over into the work 
environment and deter women from working for the Mujamma'. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Having analysed the context, the potential players, the influence of unfounded rumours 
on the popular understanding of the episode, and Hamas's own understanding of the 
Ij äb and the `hijab campaign', it has become clear that the argument that Hamas 
orchestrated the campaign, or indeed that there was a campaign at all, is rather 
speculative. I have not been able to find concrete evidence that Hamas did orchestrate a 
campaign, nor have Hammami or Hamas's Gazan leftist critics offered anything wholly 
66 'Iman'. 
67 Cf. Sarraj-Matar, Qassim I&II. Qassim said: "No one has the courage to confront [honour killings], not 
even the left-wing". 
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conclusive. I have pointed out that it is unlikely that Hamas used youths as a `proxy 
force'. I have also argued how each of the incidents Hammami details is inconclusive or 
negative in terms of proving Hamas to be behind them. Given that a number of 
interviewees appeared to have been wholly unaware of the existence of a campaign, a 
likely scenario is that no centrally orchestrated campaign took place, and that leftist 
activists interpreted the separate attacks levelled at them by lawless youths responding 
to a general climate and collaborator-led incidents as a full-blown campaign. When 
I 
put to a target group of Islamist women which included one PFLP activist, the notion 
that the `byaib campaign' might be explained as the spinning out of control of religious 
and ideological ideas spread by a variety of movements, taken up and exaggerated by the 
Intifada's youth, high on the power the Intifada had given them, they all agreed. 
68 
The Islamist narrative is that Hamas was not responsible and that violent intimidation is 
condemnable. While sceptics might argue that this is a cover up, I am inclined to take it 
seriously because on other issues Hamas members readily owned up to acts or ideals 
they believe in - even when they knew these would alienate a 
Western interviewer 69 
The fact that no Hamas member has taken responsibility for the `hyäb campaign' seems 
to indicate, at best, that Hamas was not responsible, at worst, that Hamas is ashamed of 
this aspect of its past. The fact that youths, `lumpen elements' and collaborators all 
seem to have played a confirmed part, and that, according to the leftist activist who was 
harassed by shabäb and hounded by a crowd, "[i]t is not typically Hamas [to engage in 
violence against women]", " seems to indicate that Hamas was not directly responsible 
68 Islamist Women. 
69 Cf. Yassin's acknowledging his belief (not shared by many other IM leaders) that Christians should have 
no part in the legislative body of an Islamic state (Chapter 8.1), the insistence of most Hamas leaders that 
women should not be allowed to become President, and the acknowledgement by all, whether or not they 
agreed with the policy, that Hamas was responsible for killing suspected collaborators, and that mistakes were 
made in this process (Chapter 8.2.5). 
70 Qassim I. The fact she was a victim of the `h yaö campaign', and had been involved in the 1985-1986 
clashes between leftists and Islamists at the IUG, increases the weight of this statement. 
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for the violence - although it certainly helped to create an atmosphere which put 
pressure on women to wear the hijäb. 
That the incidents are called a `campaign' and that Hamas is blamed for orchestrating it, 
is an example of the Derridean nature of the Palestinian secularist narrative Hammami's 
article reflects. In this narrative, Hamas is the repository of Palestinian society's more 
religious aspects, particularly those considered inimical to `progress' and `democracy' - 
enabling the narrators to evade the reality of their society's continuing religiosity and the 
aversion many feel towards the type of `progressive' society the narrators champion. If 
Hamas is the chief culprit for the increase in religiosity, all that is needed, from this 
perspective, to herald in a "progressive and democratic future" is to marginalise (or 
indeed eliminate) Hamas. 
To be able to successfully project religiosity onto one movement, the secularist narrative 
must exaggerate the influence of Hamas, attribute totalitarian aspirations to it, and create 
a clear distance between it and the `real' Palestinian psyche. Rumours categorising any 
behaviour with `religious' overtones as `Hamas' fuel this process, as the momentum of 
the narrative encourages its narrators to accept these rumours without much analysis. 
To exaggerate Hamas's influence, the hijab incidents are elevated into a strategically 
planned campaign, the involvement of other groups portrayed as secondary to Hamas's. 
To separate it from the rest of Palestine, the hijab is linked to an Islamic state (which the 
secularists cannot believe is the aspiration of many Palestinians), the benefits many 
Palestinian women perceive in wearing the hijäb are ignored (thus portraying Hamas as 
incongruous), and Hamas's national credentials are undermined (by emphasising the 
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alleged difference in national heroism between Hamas and the PLO, " and the un- 
Palestinianness of the Shari ah dress popular among Islamists). 72 
Again, the 1 ijab episode is not unique in being misreported in Western discourse. The 
burning of the (leftist-led) Palestinian Red Crescent Society in 1980 by a mob is 
similarly blamed on the IM. 73 Yet a closer inspection reveals that, though Islamist 
students were part of the mob, and a well-known IM student leader (Hijaz al-Burbar) 
was seen leading it, the actual mastermind behind the burning appears, in the opinion of 
those closest to the Red Crescent leadership, to have been Fatah, while Shaykh Awwad, 
the President of the IUG's Board (and not, as Milton-Edwards has it, a Mujamma` 
supporter; see p122), helped to create a climate of antagonism between Islamicly 
inclined and leftist Gazans, which the mob organisers exploited. ' 
Burbar, the student leader, was expelled from the IM, partly because of his part in the 
burning. 75 The IM students appear to have planned only to demonstrate on the IUG 
71 Cf. confronting occupation without "exposing its members to danger- as in the nationalist factions" 
(p25). 
72"... plain, tailored overcoats, known as Shari 'a dress, which have no real precedents in indigenous 
Palestinian dress" (Hammami, p25). Another example is Shadid's criticism of Shari ah dress as replacing "the 
beautifully embroidered native Palestinian dress which also meets Islamic standards ... a Palestinian national folklore symbol" (Shadid, p671). While I likewise lament the decline of the Palestinian dress, Shadid's 
criticism does not take into account other considerations, such as the influence price difference (cf. personal 
interview with lyad Barghouti) and the different dresses' connotations (Palestinian dress seems to connote the 
countryside, Shari ah dress urbanisation) may have on a woman's dress choice. Moreover, the leftist factions' 
preference for Western dress in everyday life seems to equally promote the decline of Palestinian dress. 
73 Milton-Edwards, pp106-108; Abu-Amr, Fundamentalism, pp45,49 (Abu-Amr blames the IM for two 
mob attacks on the PRCS, 07.01.1980 and 21.01.1982; the second incident, however, according to al-Fajr 
29.01-04.02.1982 and 05-11.02.1982, involved "unidentified persons" breaking in on the night of 26.01.1982, 
while Islamists were among the volunteers helping to clean up); Sayigh, p483. 
74 Those non-Islamists who blamed Fatah requested anonymity. Their first-hand knowledge of the incident 
and their secularist/leftist loyalties rendered their accounts trustworthy as they had no ulterior incentive to 
counter the popular argument that the IM was responsible. Because of the anonymity request, I will not 
disclose any non-Islamist names - though all were victims and in positions of leadership. Concerning the 
Islamists, I interviewed Yassin (then Director al-Mujamma`), Abu Shannab, Ibrahim Yazuri (then Deputy 
Director al-Mujamma`), Shamma`, Muhammad Muslih (Managing Director al-Mujamma`). 
75 For sources, see previous footnote. 
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campus, with some insisting that when the demonstration turned ugly they tried to 
prevent the violence. The mob itself seems to have been largely made up of, what 
Hammami calls, `lumpen elements', called up by Awwad having spread the rumour 
through the mosques that `the communists' were going to take over the IUG. Attacks 
on restaurants selling liquor on the way to the PRCS, for which the IM is also blamed, 
thus seem to have been more the fruit of mob rule and class antagonism (restaurants 
selling alcohol in Gaza are invariably for the rich), rather than IM strategy. 
As with the `hijäb campaign', the cause for misrepresentation of the events appears to be 
a mixture of prejudice (Islamists are deemed violent and anti-communist), strategic 
manipulation of the facts (Fatah needed a smokescreen to hide its involvement), and 
over-reliance on the PLO narrative and local rumour (see the discussion on the generic 
use of the term `Mujamma", even by those believing the IM to have been innocent; 
p150). 
PART III 
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIC 
MOVEMENT IN GAZA 
PREFATORY REMARKS 
Following the conclusions of Part II, violence does not appear to be as central to the 
IM's political culture as assumed by the modernists. Theoretical positions taken by the 
IM on issues such as personal freedom, rule of law and elections can thus be taken 
sufficiently seriously to warrant analysis - particularly if `tested' against praxis and the 
narratives of those affected thereby. 
Chapter 2 has shown that the sampled modernist texts do not seriously engage with 
Islamist discourse. Instead, on the basis of the type of distorted `evidence' discussed in 
Part II and a few random IM statements, they declare the IM anti-pluralistic and anti- 
democratic - with claims varying from statements that the IM advocates a cleritocracy' 
to charges that it dismisses the term `democracy' as "a Western concept with no place in 
Muslim society", acceptable only temporarily because it is to be "preferred to 
dictatorship as more hospitable to the flourishing of Islam". 2 Some highlight the 
existence of internal debates? Others acknowledge that Hamas is seen by "most 
Palestinians ... as representing the aspirations of many Palestinians"! Nüsse alone 
tentatively surmises that the IM supports free elections as an expression of the "will of 
the people" - but concludes that it views this "will" as monolithic, prohibiting any 
possibility of dissent. ' 
Ahmad, p56. 
2 Abu-Amr, `Harnas', p18. 
3 Cf. Usher, pp72-77. 
4 Milton-Edwards, pp183. 
5 Nüsse, p78. 
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The pluralist texts are more optimistic about the IM's democratic potential, emphasising 
the IM's heterogeneity and championing of `people's causes'. Yet, they do not directly 
discuss issues of democracy, beyond broadly stating that "Islam does not preclude 
democracy any more than a state based on Islamic law precludes women's rights". 6 
Moving beyond imprecise labels such as `(anti-)democratic', ' and refusing to take 
rhetoric that democracy is an un-Islamic concept at face value - rhetoric little used by 
the IM, despite Abu-Amr highlighting one such expression' - the next three chapters 
will concentrate on the IM's understanding of an Islamic state's governance, its political 
process and the nature of its body politic. 
Because of the paucity of written material (see Chapters 2&3), I have drawn primarily 
on personal interviews with leaders, led, insiders and outsiders. Regarding sophisticated 
theory sources tend to be leaders only. ' Where texts by Islamist theorists who have been 
identified by IM members as sources of authority, state a point more clearly than the 
interviewees, I have drawn on these. 
6 Holt, p74. 
Such terms are too totalistic, implying full compliance or total rejection while ignoring the proliferation of 
widely differing types of democracies, and too ideologised to be of descriptive/analytical use. Cf. also 
Giovanni Sartori's observation that the term `democracy' has "undergone verbal stretching and has become 
the loosest label of its kind" ('Democracy', International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 4(1968), p112); 
also Bhikhu Parekh, `The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy' and Alan Ware, `Liberal Democracy: 
One Form or Many?, both in David Held (ed), Prospects for Democracy. 
8 Rather, it highlights the similarity between its system and democracy, though stressing that the former 
limits the popular will to its `proper' boundaries, as revealed in Qur'än and Sunnah (Abu Shannab I, Haniyyah 
1, Ghazi Hammad I, Muhammad Muslih, Intifada Cell I&II, Hamas Supporters Gaza; Musa II, Salah Badawil, 
Yusrah Hamdan, Salah al-Na'ami). See also p231ff. 
9 The rank and file's understanding of Islamist theory is at times basic, partly because their education was 
interrupted by the Intifada, partly because the underground nature of Hamas has inhibited open discussion and 
the proper induction of members. IM leaders are acutely aware of this problem (cf. Abu Shannab V; Musa 
IV). 
CHAPTER 6 
GOVERNANCE: 
BETWEEN CONTRACT AND DIVINE LAW 
A key aspect of governance is what constitutes legitimate political authority. Equally 
important is the nature of the limits of such authority, and thus, the amount of freedom it 
leaves the governed. The answer to these questions determines largely the extent to 
which the political theory in question is authoritarian. This chapter will detail the IM's 
understanding of authority and freedom. 
6.1 STRUCTURE AND ENDS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
The IM's understanding of authority is rooted in its view of humanity's purpose. 
Following Yassin, 
God has created the human being and has provided him with a brain, increasing his 
value above that of other creatures, ... so that he can be viceregent of God on earth. 
God has made the human being a waqil [authorised agent] who does the work for God - 
just as a merchant makes someone his trustee over his business in a different country. ' 
I Yassin I. Though only Yassin, Hamas Supporters Gaza and an article in al-Risalah (12.02.1998, p16) on 
Egyptian Islamist Fahmi Huwaydi (whose thinking on this issue closely resembles the IM's) mention the term 
viceregent explicitly, all interviewees implied it in their thinking. 
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The viceregency notion has two fundamental consequences. First, it delimits human 
power and determines the end and scope of authority. As viceregent, one's chief 
purpose is to fulfill God's will. Because the IM believes this to be laid down in the 
Qur'än and Sunnah, at a literal level this means the protection of Islam (thus introducing 
the potential for tension with non-Muslims and those with a different understanding of 
Islam; Chapter 8). The IM interprets this task as establishing, and maintaining, freedom, 
justice, and equality - the three primary principles underpinning an Islamic state (which, 
because they are shared by many non-Islamic ideologies, offer a potential justification 
for cooperation with non-Muslims; Chapter 8). Z Of these, freedom is the most 
fundamental, with justice and equality serving to preserve freedom? In Yassin's words: 
The human being is born free ... [R]evelation and religion 
have come to preserve this 
freedom and to protect [him] against the enslavement of human-made systems. When a 
human being becomes a Muslim, he protects his freedom by subjugating himself only 
to God... 
Second, though observance of divine boundaries is the minimal requirement to 
legitimise the wielding of viceregal authority in God's eyes, it is not sufficient. Since all 
human beings are viceregents and have equal status as free agents of God, only if 
authority is voluntarily granted to a ruler, on the condition that it be returned to the ruled 
if the ruler infringes the former's rights, do those who have transferred their viceregal 
2 Abu Shannab I&II&III, Dukhan, Shamma`, Hammad I, Intifada Cell I, Harnas Supporters Gaza, `Nasr'; 
Ahmad Bahr, Musa 11, Hamdan, al-Na`ami, Khalas Conference Paper 3; Ayman Taha, Sami Abu Dhughri. 
Those stipulating the triplet shiirä (consultation), justice and equality seemed to infer freedom, as shürä is 
frequently equated with freedom of expression (Chapter 7). See also El-Awa's list of Islamic state principles 
(On the Political System of the Islamic State, p85). 
3 Though PNA oppression and the continuing Israeli occupation of Palestinian land clearly influence the 
IM's emphasis on freedom, and a reversal of these circumstances may result in a lessening of its commitment 
thereto, freedom has long been pivotal in Islamism (cf. Mitchell, pp224-227; Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, 
pp30-44; Milestones, pp 109-110; Ghannouchi, The Right to Nationality Status ofNon-Muslim Citizens in a 
Muslim Nation, pp39-40). 
4 Yassin I. 
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prerogative remain `free'. To prevent consent being forcefully elicited or arbitrarily 
withdrawn, authority must be circumscribed by a contract between ruler and ruled 
5 
This line of argument owes much to Mawdudi who argued on the basis of ýyah 24: 55, 
"Allah has promised those of you who believe and do good works to grant them 
viceregency in the land... ", ' that all believers are God's viceregents who, for 
administrative purposes, can "delegate their caliphate (viceregency)" to a ruler, making 
him "answerable to God on the one hand and on the other to his fellow `caliphs"'. ' 
Mawdudi supports his interpretation by ahädith such as "everyone of you is a ruler" and 
"no one is superior to another except in point of faith and piety". As the first of these 
ahädith continues "and everyone is answerable for his subjects", indicating that the 
Prophet was addressing his chiefs, not the people, Mawdudi's interpretation is not 
incontestable. Significantly, some in the IM have broadened the definition of "those of 
you who believe and do good works" to include Christians and, in some instances, 
communists (Chapter 8). 
To the IM, authority is dually circumscribed, by a contract between God and the ruler as 
viceregent, and by one between ruler and ruled, a transfer of power which the founder of 
5 Yassin II, Abu Shannab I&II&III, Shamma`, Zahhar 11, Haniyyah 1, Hammad I&II, Muslih, `Muhammad', 
`Ibrahim', Intifada Cell 111, Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Iyad', `Narr', `Ashraf, Special Communique 
(10.11.1988), Communique 49 (27.10.1989); Board Members Shabbat, `Iman'; Bahr, Badawil, Musa 
I&l1&IV, Harridan, Na'ami, al-Risalah 12.02.1998: 10 (Musa), Khalas Political Programme (pp24-25), Khalas 
Conference Papers 2&3; Masri, Taha, Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf, Women's Kutlah 1, half of Women's Kutlah 2. 
Cf. Qutb: authority comes from "the will of the governed" (Maarakat al-Islam wa-al Rasmaliyyah, pp73-74; 
quoted in Yvonne Haddad, `Sayyid Qutb' in John Esposito (ed), Voices of Resurgent Islam, p92); 
Ghannouchi: "Political power belongs to the community (ummah)" ('The Participation of Islamists in a Non- 
Islamic Government', p55); Turabi: "save for the express provision of the shariah, the consensus (Uma) of the 
community is paramount" (`The Islamic State' in Esposito, Voices, p243). 
6I use Khurshid Ahmad's translation (Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, p29) rather than Yusuf Ali's 
because Ahmad's better expresses the notion of being granted viceregency implied by the Qur'änic term 
iastakhliifannahum. 
Ibid., pp29-32. See also äyah 2: 30: 1 will create a khalý]ah on earth". 
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the Egyptian Brothers described as a `social contract' ('aqd ijtimä `1). 8 I will discuss 
each in turn. 
Social Contract 
The institutions embodying this contract are the office of Head of State, a Cabinet, a 
legislative body, generally called the Majlis al-Shi (council of consultation), ' and a 
judiciary, with a military and a police force to underwrite their authority. A majority of 
interviewees advocated elections to guarantee the contractarian nature of authority. " 
Elections, some argued, enable ordinary people to stand or elect their preferred 
representative, creating a body which represents the nation, in composition as well as 
consensually. In this vein, Abu Shannab insisted the Majlfs should 
come from and be elected by the base of the nation ... 
[so that] this Parliament can be 
considered as representative of the whole nation" 
Elections, others asserted, ensure that the transfer of viceregal power is temporary - that 
ultimate power remains with the community of viceregents. Elections guarantee "the 
8 Hasan al-Banna; quoted in Mitchell, p247. Cf. Qutb, Justice, p93. 
9 Also ahl al-shürä. Some took majlis al-shrmä to mean the Cabinet (Leader Kutlah-Azhar), others 
reserved it for the historical shürä councils (Abu Dhughri). 
10 See footnote 5. Three differed, against 39 for. One of Women's Kutlah 2 and Leader Kutlah-Azhar 
argued that ordinary people were insufficiently knowledgeable to elect, suggesting instead elections be held 
among the educated elite (one of Women's Kutlah 2 remained silent; `Ahmad' initially supported elections, 
then advocated elite rule, finally returned to his initial position). Among leaders, only Dukhan did not 
explicitly endorse the mechanism of elections, simply saying that the Majlis be made up of the heads of 
parties, institutions and tribes, and elect the Head of State. 
11 Abu Shannab III. Also Haniyyah 1, Shamma`, Musa II. 
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freedom to choose, ... the right of every 
individual to say their opinion", and enable 
people "to watch over the performance of their representatives". 12 
Underlining the centrality of contract to the IM's theory, Yassin stated that in case of 
serious abuse of power 
the ummah (the people) has the right to remove this Head of State from power, to revolt 
against him, even if this means war or fighting. This means that the ruler in Islam must 
act within certain boundaries, and if he trespasses, it should be his end [as a leader]. 13 
Elections are the preferred option. But the notion that power rests with the people is so 
important that some are prepared to sanction revolt14 - thus unequivocally breaking with 
the tradition epitomised by medieval jurist Ghazali (d. 1111) warning that "[t]he tyranny 
of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year's tyranny exerted by 
the subjects against each other", which has been taken by many essentialists to 
characterise Islam as a politically submissive religion. 15 
To prevent power from corrupting those who exercise it - to be "expected", according to 
Yassin - the IM advocates a separation of powers. 16 The executive, legislative and 
judiciary powers each have a duty to guarantee that the others honour their contractual 
12 Taha, Musa II. Also Abu Shannab V, Badawil. Cf. Mitchell (pp246-247) quoting early Egyptian 
Brothers: "'the nation alone is the source of power; bowing to its will is a religious obligation"' ('Awda) and 
"[t]he ruler has no legal existence ... except as `he reflects the spirit of the society and 
is in harmony with its 
goals"' (Ghazali). 
13 Yassin II. Also Abu Shannab 111, Musa IV, Abu Dhughri. 
14 All saw armed revolt as the last resort. Abu Shannab III and Abu Dhughri condemned Sudan's military 
coup as un-Islamic, but said it could be justified if proven to result in replacing an authoritarian dictatorship 
with a free and just regime. 
15 Ghazali quote and examples of essentialist position in Yahya Sadowski, `The New Orientalism and the 
Democracy Debate', Middle East Report 23(4), p16. 
16 Cf. Yassin II, Abu Shannab III&IV, Musa II, Khalas Political Programme (pp24-25), Khalas Conference 
Paper 2. 
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duties towards God and the people. If the Majlis finds the Head of State overstepping 
either his popular mandate or the state's constitutional principles (derived from Islam by 
consensus of the Majlis), and the latter "refuses to listen", then, following Yassin, "the 
Shikä Council has the right to impeach". " In this respect, the proposed Islamist system 
is similar, according to Abu Shannab, to the American Presidential one where a 
Constitution defines the boundaries outside of which a President risks impeachment by 
the legislative bodies. " 
Essentialists generally deem the advice of the early shlir councils to have been non- 
binding and therefore hold that Islamists cannot conceive of a system in which the 
advice of the people's representatives is binding. " In fact, a number of IM leaders 
asserted they believed the early councils' advice to have been binding and obligatory, 
and drew from this the principle that the Head of State and the Majlis are accountable to 
each other and the electorate. 20 
Ultimate legislative power lies with the Majlis al-Shin-ä. Following Yassin, 
the Majlis al-Shun has the decision-making power because it is the highest level that 
makes the laws. ... no other 
body has the right to contradict their Utihäd (independent 
interpretation). 1 
17 Cf. the early Egyptian Brethren's belief that the Majlis embodies the "real power in the state" and 
"commands the obedience of both ruler and ruled" (Mitchell paraphrasing the Brothers, p248). 
18 Abu Shannab III. 
19 Cf. Kramer: "... the dominant interpretation of Islam has historically sanctioned authoritarian rule [... ] 
The ideal of Islamic government most often evoked by the fundamentalists harks back to the notion of a just 
commander, ruling in consultation with experts in the law. " (`Democracy', p38). 
20 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Musa II, Shamma`, Muslih. 
21 Yassin II. 
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There is some ambiguity, however, about the role of the Head of State. Though most 
see it as executive, only participating in legislation through the Majlis, some still see it 
primarily as that of the successor (Khalfah) to the Prophet Muhammad. In this vein, 
Yassin once referred to the Head of State as the mujtahid mutlaq, the supreme 
interpreter of law, and insisted that 
On certain important issues, the Head of State, or Khalrah, should decide, after 
consulting with the people of AN al-Shi7r . 
For, 
... 
[being the mujtahid mutlaq], when 
this Khal ffah decides on a certain issue ... 
he should not be following the others, he 
should search for the best option after listening to others. After all, he is the decision- 
maker. The same applies to a professor, who is knowledgeable on a certain matter; he 
cannot listen to others who tell him that the matter is not like that. 22 
Yassin addressing the Head of State as mujtahid mutlaq and comparing him to a 
professor suggests that, besides being the supreme executive, the Head of State is also 
the supreme legislator, authorised to overrule the Majlis' legislative decisions - 
undermining the notion of separation of powers, and that which sees shikä as binding. 
Yassin's use of mujtahid mutlaq is somewhat confusing as, technically, one earns the 
position of mujtahid mutlaq through ability and erudition, not elections. It is a 
jurisprudential term and implies an extremely high degree of erudition, authorising one 
to make binding legal interpretations independent of any other authority. In the context 
of a relatively small population like Palestine's, not every generation may produce 
someone with that level of wisdom and erudition. Such a person may, moreover, not be 
the most effective Head of State. 
An explanation for this confusion may be that Yassin is here referring to a utopian ideal, 
moulded on the model of the Prophet - an ideal which may still be cherished by 
22 Yassin I. 
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Islamists, but has, despite having been advocated as realistic by earlier Islamists, " been 
increasingly tempered with the pragmatic recognition that leaders of such stature are not 
all that common, and that, consequently, inadequacy and even corruption must, in 
Yassin's own words, "be expected" in leaders and provided for by separating the various 
powers and making shür binding. That this ideal is not considered suitably pragmatic 
by the IM can be gleaned from the fact that none of the other leaders referred to the 
Head of State as mujtahid mutlaq. Only a few painted leaders in a future Islamic state as 
not needing institutional checks since their Islamicity was believed sufficient? ' 
Generally, interviewees, including Yassin, emphasised the need for a separation of 
powers. Whether, once the present `corrupt' (non-Islamic) leadership is eclipsed by a 
`truly' Islamic leadership, this utopian ideal will re-surface and influence the way the IM 
envisages an Islamic state be run, is impossible to say. However, judging by the IM's 
present pragmatism, and the lessons it is drawing from the less than perfect `Islamic' 
regimes in Sudan and Iran, 25 it is unlikely that the IM will lose its pragmatic view of the 
corrupting influence of power and the limitations of human leadership in the foreseeable 
future. 
The judiciary - about which opinions are divided as to whether they should be appointed 
or elected26 - is envisaged as sufficiently independent to be able to impeach members of 
the executive and legislative bodies. The notion that rulers are not above the law is 
fundamental to the IM's political theory, embodying the principle that all are God's 
23 Cf. the early Mawdudi (Theory, pp34-37). Later, he rejected it (Principles, pp29-33). 
24 Dukhan, Zahhar. Hints of this view were also found in Women's Kutlah 2 and Leader Kutlah-Azhar. 
25 For IM critiques, see p188 and Chapter 7, footnotes 56&77. 
26 According to JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 6 (May 1995), 54.4% of Islamists (nation-wide) hold 
judges should be elected, 23.6% that they be appointed by Parliament, 12.6% by the President. I did not 
discuss this issue with interviewees. 
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viceregents, equally accountable, regardless of worldly status? ' While it remains 
questionable whether an explicit institutional separation of powers existed in Islam's 
early days, the IM's advocacy thereof is justified through historical reference. In Musa's 
words, 
Looking 
.... 
[at] the issue of the separation of powers, ... you wouldn't 
find any other 
system as distinct as the Islamic one, where throughout history the judicial power was 
always above the ruler. People living in the Islamic State could thus take even the ruler 
himself to court who would stand on an equal basis with any humble member of society 
and would be judged equally. 28 
Divine Contract 
The contract between God and the ruler as viceregent stipulates that the ruler scrutinises 
himself in the light of what is known of God's law. Although distinguishing between 
'ibadat (that which concerns a Muslim's relationship with God) and mu amalat (that 
which concerns all other aspects of life) and bringing only the latter under the 
jurisdiction of the state (see p193), the IM expects rulers to be personally pious and 
upright, if only to ensure financial integrity and professional honesty (see `Praxis 
Analysis'). Following Yassin, 
[T]he fear of God [is another `security valve', ensuring that a leader remain incorrupt]. 
A pious leader should understand that he will be held accountable to God and that, if he 
27 Cf. Yassin 11, Abu Shannab IV, Haniyyah II, Musa II, Khalas Conference Papers 2&3. 
28 Musa II. Cf. Mawdudi, Principles, p28. 
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deviates from the just and right path, his destiny will be hell-fire. That fate should be 
rejected by any sane person. 9 
This has three implications, noted Abu Shannab: 
First, you devote yourself to your cause for the sake of God. This means that you don't 
want any reward from anybody. Second, you know that God is watching you, so you 
have to be straight. Third, you are wishing for a reward from God, so you expend 
maximum effort in order that God can reward you heavily. 30 
The importance of the contract between leaders and God is twofold. First, it 
admonishes them to set an example to society by internalising the ethics and ideals of 
the Islamic state and by practising them meticulously. Only if leaders are seen to do 
this, argues Head of Hizb al-Khalas Ahmad Bahr, can one expect criminals to come 
forward "to ask for justice to be applied to them", as they reportedly did at the time of 
the Prophet. 31 Second, it weakens a leader's dependency on the electorate by rooting 
half his authority in following God's rule, enabling him to lead from conscience as well 
as follow the electorate's will. 32 This freedom, however, remains circumscribed both by 
the leader's contract with the electorate, and by the rules offiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) 
which are to ensure that personal interpretation of God's word conforms to an 
`objective' standard. 33 
29 Yassin II. 
30 Abu Shannab IV. 
31 Cf. also Zahhar's (III) view that the Islamic command of zakah (alms tax) should be internalised to the 
point that all citizens feel themselves to be ministers of finance. 
32 Cf. Yassin I, Hammad II. 
33 Cf. Yassin II, Abu Shannab IV, Musa II. 
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6.2 BETWEEN CONTRACT AND DIVINE LAW: THE ISLAMIC 
MOVEMENT AND LOCKE 
In the IM's contractarianism, political authority has two sources: the observance of 
divine boundaries and the consent of the ruled. To explore the relationship between 
these two sources, I will juxtapose the IM's contractarianism with that of John Locke, 
one of the chief exponents of Western contract theory, who similarly roots political 
authority in both natural and consensual right. Not unlike the IM, Locke believes that 
"God hath given the World to Men in common" (§11.26: 1) and that, accordingly, human 
beings are equal and, ab initio, accountable to God only. Similarly, he holds that 
humanity's intended state of being is the "State of perfect Freedom ... [and] also of 
Equality" (§II. 4.3-7), and that for this to be realised God's law, the Law of Nature, must 
be upheld. Without "Political Government", Locke continues, this law would be 
powerless as there would be no "Power to Execute that Law [of Nature]" (§II. 4-7, 
§II. 123-131) 34 Without a civil law (encoded by humans, as distinct from natural law) 
and a sovereign state to enforce it, the "Enjoyment" of liberty would be "very uncertain, 
and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others" (§11.123: 7-8). In other words, "where 
there is no Law there is no freedom" (§II. 57: 19). 
However, where there is law (and a state to enforce it), there is not necessarily freedom. 
Only if the individual is "under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by 
consent" (§II. 22: 4-6), is the "Liberty of Man, in Society" vouchsafed. "Voluntary 
Agreement", concludes Locke, "gives ... 
Political Power to Governours for the Benefit 
of their Subjects" (§11.173: 6-7). Correspondingly, if the people "find the Legislative act 
contrary to the trust reposed in them", the Legislative's power becomes "forfeited, and 
... devolve[s] 
into the hands of those that gave it", giving the latter the right "to remove 
34 References in text to John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (indicating treatise, paragraph, line). 
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or alter the Legislative". "Supream Power" thus always remains "in the People" 
(§II. 149: 6-12). 
Mirroring the IM's logic, Locke argues that an ordered political structure is necessary to 
implement God's principles on earth, and that it must be based on a contract if 
individual freedom and equality is to be preserved. Like the IM, Locke suggests two 
sources for political authority, one divine and one contractual. Echoing modernist and 
essentialist criticisms' of Islamism, some scholars argue that Locke's commitment to 
contractarianism is weak and that, as an "exponent of the sovereignty of natural law", he 
solves the potential tension between the two by wholly subordinating consent to natural 
law. 35 The key to understanding the paradox of Locke and the IM lies in Patrick Riley's 
observation that 
the social contract, for Locke, is necessitated by natural law's inability to be literally 
"sovereign" on earth ... 
Natural law and contractarianism, far from being simply 
antithetical in Locke, necessarily involve each other, at least given human imperfection 
and corruption. 36 
To understand Locke's attempt at an "equilibrium between the naturally and the 
consensually right", 37 and in turn shed light on the IM's theory, one must examine 
Locke's definition of the law of nature as "the ordering of the divine wills3B - the divine 
order of right and wrong39 within which humanity must operate to be in harmony with 
35 Ernest Barker, The Social Contract, pxviii; quoted in Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy, p64. 
36 Riley, p69. Locke placed less emphasis on consent in his later works. 
37 Riley, p72. 
38 Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, p110; quoted (and `translated') by Johnson, Locke, p26. Cf. also A. 
John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights, p105. 
39 Cf. Locke, Essay, 11.21.50; quoted in Simmons, p33. 
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God's purpose. This law is not `natural' in the sense of reflecting human nature as 
observed, but `natural' as divinely ordained - thus introducing a distinction between a 
`fallen' human nature, controlled by desire and leading to "misery and slavery"; and a 
`redeemed' nature, controlled by reason, leading to "infinite perfection and happiness", 
which is the "end" of freedom as God designed it ao 
Locke's `natural law' is in fact the `divine law'. Though at times he equates natural law 
with reason (cf. §11.6: 7), Locke denies the rationalist position that natural law equals 
reason: 
reason does not so much establish ... this 
law of nature as search for ... 
it as decreed by 
a superior power ... 
Nor is reason the author of that law, but the interpreter. ... Nor 
indeed can reason give us laws when it is only a capacity of the mind and a part of us 
[and not of the supreme legislator, i. e. God]. 41 
The confusion arises because Locke uses the term `natural law' to refer to both the 
original `divine law', and that part of `divine law' which has become known through 
reason - as opposed to `positive law' which is `divine law' disclosed through 
revelation. 42 
In Locke's scheme, natural law is insufficient to command political obligation, lacking a 
political mechanism to administer and enforce it. It also lacks specificity. It is posited 
40 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I1.21: 38-50; quoted in James Tully, `Locke on 
Liberty' in Z. Pelczynski & J. Gray (eds), Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, pp69-70. 
41 Locke, Law, pl 10; quoted in Johnson, p23. I am here following the interpretation given by Riley (pp83- 
91), Johnson (pp23-45) and Simmons (pp14-67) that Locke sees reason as a tool to discover natural law, not 
its origin (which is the will of God). 
42 Locke, Two Tracts on Government, p222; quoted in Simmons, p17(n7). 
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in general principles, only partially understood, " too vague for most mortals to consider 
it relevant to their particular case. For the transformation from general to particular, the 
mechanism of consent is needed. Consent transforms both the general principle of 
rulership into the specific authority of a particular ruler (§I. 81: 24-27), and the general 
natural law into a specific civil law while preserving the freedom and equality of the 
community's members. Without "Sanction from that Legislative, which the publick has 
chosen and appointed", Locke insists, no "Edict ... by what Power soever backed, [can] 
have the force and obligation of a Law" (§II. 134: 11-16). In Riley's-words, consent is 
the mechanism needed to make natural law "sovereign" on earth. 
Consent, however, does not have the authority to contradict natural law. "[T]he 
Municipal Laws of Countries", Locke argues, "are only so far right, as they are founded 
on the Law of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted" (§11.12: 16-19). 
Consent, notes Riley, thus "operates within a context [of natural law]". " 
Locke's balancing natural/divine and consensual right parallels that of the IM. The IM 
similarly distinguishes between Sharl ah as a divine system of laws, and the actual law 
derived from revelation through figh (some interviewees confusingly used the term 
Shari `ah to describe both). 45 The Qur'an and the Sunnah, though believed to contain all 
knowledge needed to implement the divine system on earth, are held to provide general 
43 Through divine revelation, reason and the study of nature and human society (Simmons, pp18-21). 
44 Riley, p72. 
45 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab III&V, Shamma', Zahhar II, Hammad II, Muslih, Hamas Supporters Gaza, 
`Ashraf, , `Narr'; Musa II, Na'ami; Masri, Abu Dhughri, Women's Kutlah 1. The notion that Islamism 
parallels natural law tradition is not new; cf. Malcolm Kerr on `Abduh (Islamic Reform, pp 103-144). 
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principles only 46 Using reason, analogy and the study of nature and human society, ' 
these principles need to be transformed into a legal system. As the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah are relatively more detailed regarding practical matters than Locke's source of 
revelation, the Bible, the IM tends more towards prescriptiveness than Locke, who 
refrains from defining the precise content of natural law beyond stating that the details 
must be "suited to the interest and welfare" of each particular society 48 Regarding 
specifically constitutional matters, the generality of the Qur'an and the multiplicity of 
examples in the Sunnah have led the IM to adopt a similarly flexible approach to 
Locke's, arguing that the fact that God did not reveal one specific political system, is a 
revelation in itself, enabling people to adopt systems along God's general guidelines 
which are best suited to their particular situation 49 Like Locke, it proposes the 
mechanism of consent (through an elected legislative) to transform these general 
principles into a particular constitutional code, 5° while insisting that consent operates 
within the context of the Shari äh. 
It differs from Locke in the fact that the Qur'an contains the elements of a penal code, 
the hudüd. Thus, it is stipulated that a thief's hand be cut off, and an adulterer be 
flogged a hundred times. " Since it is revealed in specificity, the IM aims to inscribe it 
46 Despite containing references to specific incidents, the Sunnah is held to illustrate general principles, not 
demand literal imitation (see Chapter 7). The main exception are the Qur'än's h, udrid (see further), believed to 
provide legal specifics. 
47 What'Abduh called Sunnah Allah (traditions of God or God's 'laws') governing human success (Kerr, 
pp121-122,129-13). On importance of reason to complement revelation: Yassin I, Abu Shannab 1II&IV, 
Zahhar II, Shamma`, Hammad, 'Ibrahim'; `Iman'; Musa II, al-Risalah 04.06.1998: 5 (Hammad); Masri. 
48 Locke, Toleration, p183; quoted in Simmons, p106. 
49 Musa II. Also Abu Shannab III&V, Zahhar II. See also Chapter 7. 
50 Cf. Yassin II, Abu Shannab I&III, Zahhar III, Hammad II, `Nasr'; Badawil. As this position underpins 
the championing of elections, all in footnote 10 also imply this. The argument that Muslims should adopt 
situation-specific civil codes (previous footnote) is similarly based on a distinction between the actual legal 
code and divine law. 
51 Ayä15: 41-42; 24: 1-10. 
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into law without alteration - seemingly ruling out any role for consent. But even here 
the IM remains committed to some form of contractarian acceptance. For, recognising 
the potential for dissent on the grounds that these laws might seem draconian to a 
modem public, it insists that these laws can only be enforced if they have been agreed 
upon by the elected Majlis, after a long campaign of education in which the population 
has learned to understand why these laws are right, and what their implications are, and 
after eliminating the social inequalities which encourage crime. Consent, here, does not 
mean a licence to alter the h, udüd. It is merely a mechanism to make them acceptable, 
and thus willed by the people, rather than being imposed on them. 
In this vein, Hammad criticised Sudan's Nimeiri for implementing the hudüd in the 
1980s without first educating the Sudanese and ensuring that there was no need to 
steal. " Shamma' used the same arguments to condemn Saudi Arabia's experiments 
with the Sharlah. 53 "Islam doesn't want somebody's hand to be cut", Hammad argued, 
citing the non-implementation of these laws in Islam's early days when people were still 
learning. It may "take three years, six years, ten years" to educate people into accepting 
these laws, and, importantly, to "prepar[e] an alternative" (see also Chapter 7). 
Regarding al-hudrld, unlike issues which have been left unspecified or ambiguous and 
thus need consent to invest them with (legal) sovereignty on earth, divine law is 
sovereign over consent. But it cannot wholly do without it. 
The similarity with Locke also highlights what the IM does not believe. If, for instance, 
the IM held, as Kramer argues for Islamism in general, that the Shari 'ah is perfectly 
known and thus completed as an actual civil law, 54 it would have no need for insisting 
on the mechanism of consent in the making of laws, let alone call the Majlis the highest 
52 Hammad II. 
53 Cf. also Gaess' interview with US-based Hamas leader Abu Marzook, p 126. 
54 Kramer, `Democracy', p38. 
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legislative authority. Similarly, if the IM held either that schooling in Islamic law or the 
de facto possession of power were sufficient legitimisation for wielding authority - 
leading either to cleritocracy or autocracy - there would be no need to insist on consent 
to render authority legitimate. 
The most significant difference between the IM and Locke is their differing visions of 
political community. Where Locke advocates political community primarily to 
vouchsafe individual rights and implement a divinely inspired order, the IM views the 
divinely inspired political community, and in particular the process of creating that 
community, as essential to both protecting individual rights and individuals learning to 
apprehend the purpose of life (see also Chapter 7). 55 Hence the notion that one cannot 
be a whole Muslim unless one lives in an Islamic state. " Hence also the notion that the 
leaders in an Islamic state are educators, and as such should be pious and rule by 
example. Though Locke implicitly acknowledges this aspect of creating political 
community by stating that without it people remain largely ignorant of divine law 
(§11.124: 9-11), he does not place the same emphasis on the political community's 
potential for transforming people. 
Seeing the state as educator, the IM has a clear notion of the `curriculum' the state 
should be teaching. This raises the question of the extent to which the IM would leave 
people free to decide for themselves, and at what point it envisages the state interfering 
when people `abuse' their freedom? 
55 Cf. Hammad I. 
56 Cf. Women's Kutlah 2. 
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Conceptions of Freedom 
To probe the IM's conception of freedom it is helpful to employ Isaiah Berlin's 
distinction between `negative freedom' (freedom from) and `positive freedom' (freedom 
to). 57 In its negative form, freedom is protection from interference by others. In its 
positive form, it is primarily concerned with protecting one's higher nature from the 
corrupting influence of one's `unredeemed' or lower nature. Negative liberty is 
generally associated with liberalism, positive liberty with authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism because, as Berlin observes, it is ends-orientated, encouraging 
interference if a person employs freedom to further the `wrong' ends, on the grounds 
that the embracing of `wrong' ends stems from unfreedom 58 Moreover, because of its 
teleological nature, Berlin notes, positive freedom has a tendency to emphasise 
communal over individual needs. 59 
Though Locke is generally regarded as one of the founders of the liberal tradition, " and 
can thus be expected to champion a negative concept of freedom, he also displays a 
positive conception, " asserting that freedom is not "[a] Liberty for every Man to do 
what he lists" (§II. 57: 22), and that "the end and use of our liberty" is to learn to choose 
the "greater good" by way of our reason 62. "Without understanding", Locke asserts, 
"liberty ... would signify nothing" 
63 For liberty does not operate in a moral vacuum: 
57 Isaiah Berlin, `Two Concepts of Liberty' in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, pp 118-172. 
58 Berlin, pp131-134. 
59 Berlin, pp145-154. 
60 Cl. Tully, pp70-71. 
61 Cf. Berlin, p147; Tully, pp70-71. 
62 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 11.21: 35,48; quoted in Tully, p70. 
63 Locke, Essay, §69, p361; quoted in Riley, p80. 
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Morality ... cannot 
but determine the choice in any one that will but consider ... The 
rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established, as the 
enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against 
whatever pleasure or pain this life can show, when the eternal state is considered .. 
64 
A true law, Locke maintains, betraying his teleological bend, should direct the 
individual "to his proper interest" (§57: 10-12). A Commonwealth, moreover, should 
only be created for the purpose of "comfortable, safe, and peaceable living amongst one 
another, in a secure enjoyment of their Properties... " (§II. 95: 7)65 - not for establishing a 
property-free commune, for instance. 
However, Locke never implies that people should, for their own good, be forced to be 
free, as other contractarians like Rousseau did. 66 Nor does he deny people an area of 
liberty in which they are answerable only to themselves and to God, giving humanity "a 
great latitude" wherein "we have our liberty"' - "[w]hat doth not lie under the 
obligation of any law is ... 
indifferent" 68 Restraint should only be imposed when harm 
is done to others. Then, and only then, for the sake of the "preservation of the whole", 
is it allowable to "[cut] off those Parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they 
threaten the sound and healthy" (§II. 171: 21-23) 69 
64 Ibid., p364; quoted in Riley, p81. 
65 Indebted to Riley, p72. 
66 Rousseau: "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so .. 
he will be forced to be 
free" (Social Contract, Ch. 1.7, p195). 
67 H. R. Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke, 1: 393,395; quoted in Simmons, p53(n96). 
68 Locke, First Tract, p124; quoted in Simmons, p53(n95). 
69 Cf. Locke's "first and fundamental natural Law": "the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will 
consist with the publick good) of every person in it" (§II. 134: 5-8). See also §11.6: 7-10. 
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Despite the difference in attitude towards the formative role of the community, the IM's 
conception of freedom closely resembles Locke's. It has a similarly ends-oriented 
approach to freedom, suggesting that its (God-given) purpose is to learn about right and 
wrong and to choose to submit to God - equivalent to Locke's choice of `good' in the 
context of the `rewards and punishments of another life'. Yassin maintains: 
Freedom means that the human being should be left to do what he wishes to. But [he] 
should know that his behaviour will be followed by reward (Ihawäb) or punishment 
(`igäb) .. from God, and 
from society. ... 
Freedom is thus circumscribed by the law of 
reward and punishment 70 
The IM too holds that law should direct people to their `proper interest', the divine 
order; that a state should serve the sole purpose of furthering God's design for humanity 
- to establish a free, just and equitable society. 
Mirroring Locke, it advocates restraint from forcing people to be free, on the basis of 
such ayät as 2: 256, "Let there be no compulsion in religion", and the belief that, unless 
harm is done to others, the welfare of an individual's soul is a matter between that 
individual and God. " The IM agrees with Ghannouchi that 
Where coercion has taken place responsibility is absent and morality in fact has been 
72 violated. ... the moral requires 
freedom of the agent... 
70 Yassin 11. Others putting moral limits on use of liberty, mostly regarding actions harming society (such as 
excessive wealth acquisition and preaching atheism; see also Chapter 8): Abu Shannab I&IV, Dukhan, 
Hammad I, Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Ashraf, , `Narr'; Bahr, Musa II, Na`ami. 
71 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab I&II&III, Dukhan, Hamad I, `Muhammad', Hamas Supporters Gaza, 
`Ashraf, `Nasr'; `Iman', Islamist Women; Bahr, Musa II; 'Yusuf. 
72 Ghannouchi, Right, pp38-40; Yassin I, Abu Shannab I&III, Hammad I, Muslih, `Muhammad', `Ibrahim', 
Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Iyad', `Ashraf', 'Nasr', Communiques 22; `Iman', Board Members al-Shabbat, 
Islamist Women; Bahr, Musa II; `Yusuf. . Leftist Marwa Qassim (I) confirmed that coercion was not the IM's 
way. Cf. also Khalid al-Hrub, Hamas [Arabic], pp233-234,257-258. 
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Accordingly, it champions a sphere of personal autonomy over which the state has no 
jurisdiction, " on the grounds that, in Turabi's words, there is a distinction between 
"religious and juridical obligations", where only the latter are "enforceable through 
formal, objective sanctions" since the former are "subjective or private and outside of 
the domain of law as applied by governments". 74 Only when the individual's private 
actions harm others, does the IM advocate restraint. " This argument is based on the 
Islamic distinction between divine injunctions regarding 'ibadat (pertaining to worship) 
and mu amalat (pertaining to social relations), the former immutable, the latter 
changeable according to context (within the bounds of Islam). 76 Since worship has a 
predominantly private meaning, social relations a largely public one, this distinction can 
be loosely described as a private-public dichotomy (even though prayer has a heavy 
communal emphasis in Islam). 
Although establishing that the IM champions a sphere of personal autonomy, 
comparison between its and Locke's conceptions of freedom fails to clarify the extent to 
which the IM's positive understanding of freedom and the role of the state differ 
qualitatively from Locke's and how these effect the sphere of personal autonomy. The 
answer may lie in the fact that the IM, unlike Locke, establishes an intrinsic connection 
between freedom and state, beyond the extrinsic effect of establishing a power and civil 
law which can impose justice and vouchsafe freedom. I will therefore juxtapose the 
IM's position with that of one of the most famous Western exponents of such a linkage, 
73 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab I&II&III, Dukhan, Hammad I, 'Muhammad', `Ibrahim', Hamas Supporters 
Gaza, `Ashraf, `Nasr'; `Iman', Islamist Women; Bahr, Musa II; `Yusuf. 
74 Turabi, 245; Dukhan, Shamma`, Haniyyah I, Hammad, Intifada Cell III, Hamas Supporters Gaza; Bahr, 
Musa II, Na'ami. 
75 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab I&IV, Dukhan, Hammad I, Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Nasr'; Bahr, Musa II; 
Taha, Abu Dhughri. 
76 Shamma', Hammad I, Intifada Cell III, Harnas Supporters Gaza; Musa II, Na'ami. 
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Georg Hegel. As Hegel is a critic of contractarianism, " this will simultaneously 
highlight any anti-contractarian strands in the IM's thinking. 
6.3 FREEDOM AND STATE: HEGEL AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 
For Hegel, true freedom is unattainable outside the framework of the (rationally 
constructed) state. " Like Locke and the IM, Hegel distinguishes, without formulating it 
so, between `fallen' and `redeemed' human nature, between freedom as "arbitrariness", 
to do "what we please" (§15), and freedom as "self-determining universality" (§21), to 
"recognize [the rational] as law and follow it as the substance of our own being"79 and 
so end our state of alienation. The former, Hegel argues, is not true freedom, for it is the 
expression of a will "wholly determined by natural impulses" (§ 15), a mere obeying of 
`capricious' desires, not reason. The latter is the "absolutely free will, ... right, ethical 
life" (§ 15) because it is "self-consciousness which apprehends itself through thinking as 
essentially human, and thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false" (§21). To 
attain "absolutely free will" one must not only be self-determined, even rationally self- 
determined, but rationally self-determined according to universal reason 80 The 
individual must learn to think objectively and universally, for only in the universal lies 
the individual's true essence, only in the union between "the good with the subjective 
will" can the "Ethical Life" be born (§141). 
77 Cf. David Boucher & Paul Kelly, `The social contract and its critics' in Boucher & Kelly (eds), The 
Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, p23. 
78 The following analysis is indebted to Richard Schacht, `Hegel on Freedom' in Alasdair Maclntyre (ed), 
Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, pp289-328; Riley (Chapter 6); Peter Singer, Hegel. References in text 
to Hegel, Philosophy of Right. 
79 Hegel, Reason in History, p53; quoted in Schacht, p303. 
ß0 And not swayed by the subjective rationality of others (such as advertising companies who manipulate 
while leaving the impression of free choice). See Singer, pp26-27. 
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For individuals to come into "possession of their own essence or their own inner 
universality" (§153), they need an ordered community. As long as individuals decide, 
however rationally, on the basis of "their own ends alone" (§260), their wills remain 
subjective and fail to become universal. In Schacht's words, 
The individual can escape the condition of non-self-determined particularity only if he 
can find an objective basis for the determination of his actions that is not subject to the 
influence of his particular ... 
inclinations. Such [a] ... 
basis 
... cannot 
be determined 
subjectively, on one's own ... 
[O]nly one thing [has] this character: the ethical order, 
with its objectively existing laws and institutions. 81 
This "ethical order" is nothing less than that state which is the "actuality of the ethical 
Idea" (§257,155), "the divine Idea as it exists on earth". 82 Only in such a state can 
individuals find "objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life", and fulfill their 
destiny, "the living of a universal life" (§258,156), because they have attained "concrete 
freedom" (§260). In such a state alone can 
personal individuality ... 
know and will the universal ... recogniz[ing] 
it as their own 
substantive mind; [... ] and individuals ... do not live as private persons 
for their own 
ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal ... and their 
activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end (§260). 
Like Hegel, the IM links freedom to finding one's true essence, purified from `the 
contingent and the false'. This essence is contained in God's universal laws. With 
Qutb, it says: 
81 Schacht, p325. 
82 Hegel, Reason; quoted in Schacht, p302. 
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He Who has created the universe ... 
has also proscribed a Shari'ah for [man's] 
voluntary actions. If man follows this law, then his life is in harmony with his own 
nature. [... ] the Shari'ah which God has given to man ... 
is also a universal law, as it is 
related to the general law of the universe and is harmonious with it. [... ] Only [through 
obedience to the Shari`ah] does man's personality, internal and external, become 
integrated. 83 
Qutb's integration parallels Hegel's end to alienation and is likewise only found in 
submission to the `ethical order' of the Shari ah, which creates the state which is God's 
will actualised on earth. Only then will there be harmony between the particular and the 
universal, for, since the Shari ah is "operative within man himself and in the rest of the 
universe", 84 submission to it is harmonising actual human nature with ordained human 
nature and transforming particular wills into universal wills, balancing out individual 
and communal needs. 85 Hence the IM's insistence on an Islamic state and the 
implementation of Islamic law - not just to actualise and enforce natural law but to 
come into possession of one's own `inner universality'. " 
If, in Hegel's, or the IM's view, freedom is to rationally, voluntarily, and self- 
consciously will the universal will (the Shari'ah), is there any room for personal 
autonomy? Given that a universal will is posited, what implications does this have for 
those who either do not grasp the universal, or claim the existence of a different type of 
universal will? Such queries have led many to categorise Hegel as totalitarian. Karl 
Popper saw Hegel as pivotal to the development of totalitarianism while Ernst Cassirer 
83 Qutb, Milestones, pp 164-165. This view underpinned statements expressed in e. g. Yassin II, Abu 
Shannab I&IV; Bahr, Musa I&II. 
84 Ibid., p171. Cf. Abu Shannab I&IV, Bahr. 
85 Cf. Abu Shannab I, Hammad I; Bahr. 
86 Cf. Mawdudi's argument that only after Muhammad had established a state which people could see and 
experience, did they en masse understand that in his message lay "the salvation of mankind" (Process, pp67- 
68). 
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declared that in Hegel is "the clearest and most ruthless program of fascism that has ever 
been propounded by any political or philosophic writer". " What is Hegel's response, 
and what can this reveal about the IM's theory? 
Individual versus Community 
Despite his insistence on the universal, Hegel is equally unambiguous about the 
importance of safeguarding the individual's rights. 88 In Hegel's view, a state is the 
"actuality of the ethical Idea" only when the subjective is protected: 
[T]he universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full 
... development. It is only when 
both these moments subsist in their strength that the 
state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized (§260A). 89 
Hegel's argument operates at several levels. On one, he insists that the universal 
contains the particular and is in harmony with it. Schacht explains this, saying: 
In the properly organized state, ... 
[the laws and institutions] are nothing other than 
laws of reason itself ...; and as such they are not something alien 
to the individual's 
own nature at all. ... they embody objectively the very rational structure 
in terms of 
which the individual's essential rational nature is to be conceived 90 
87 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies; quoted in Singer, p41. Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the 
State, p267; quoted in Riley, p261(n89). 
88 Cf. Schacht, pp312-327; Singer, pp41-44. 
89 Cf. Singer, p43. 
90 Schacht, pp325-326. 
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On a second level, Hegel draws a clear distinction between the private and the public, 
arguing that the former is outside the domain of law (and thus the state), unless it has a 
bearing on the latter: 
Morality and moral commands concern the will on its most private, subjective, and 
particular side, and so cannot be a matter for positive legislation (§213). 
Similarly, Hegel asserts that 
since the content of a man's faith depends on his private ideas, the state cannot 
interfere with it (§270). 
At a third level, Hegel renders meaningless the notion that one can force others to be 
rational or free. To be free one must, in Hegel's view, self-consciously and rationally 
will and identify with the universal. Without consciousness of the universal, the 
decision to adopt it is not self-conscious. Without understanding, it is not rational. 
Without identification, it remains alien to one's consciousness and one fails to come 
into possession of one's essence. If people recognise the universal, they will accept it 
voluntarily because it reverberates in their essence. But if people are forced to adopt the 
universal, without recognising it, there is no consciousness of, nor identification with, 
the universal, and the result will be neither freedom nor an end to alienation. Thus, 
however much Hegel condemns any form of self-determination not rooted in the 
universal, he refrains from Rousseauean statements that people must be forced to be 
free. He may conclude, on the basis of his analysis, that someone is unfree. But, 
beyond putting forth the reasons for his conclusion, Hegel is powerless to free that 
person in the sense in which he has defined freedom. 
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With regard to the individual, the IM resembles Hegel in insisting that the Shari 'ah 
provides a framework in which the rights and duties of the individual (the subjective) 
and the community (the universal) are in perfect balance on the grounds that it embodies 
God's harmonious designs. " It argues with Turabi that the Shari ah is the perfect 
"arbiter between social order and individual freedom"; 92 with Mawdudi, that in an 
Islamic system 
The relations between the individual and the society have been regulated in such a 
manner that neither the personality of the individual suffers any diminution, ... nor is 
the individual allowed to exceed his bounds to such an extent as to become harmful to 
the community ... 
93 
Like Hegel, the IM distinguishes between public and private, and champions a sphere of 
personal autonomy. Regarding the freedom of atheists in an Islamic state, for instance, a 
large faction argues that, as long as atheists do not actively undermine the Islamic nature 
of the state they are free to disbelieve (see Chapter 8). 
Similarly, like Hegel, it renders coerced liberation meaningless. It too insists on 
freedom being dependent on self-conscious understanding of and identification with 
truth (the universal). This position transpires in the IM's belief that "the moral requires 
freedom of the agent", 94 and that the creation of an Islamic state is only possible when 
the people voluntarily choose i0' It is underpinned by the Qur'änic injunction that 
91 See footnote 83. 
92 Turabi, pp245-247. 
93 Mawdudi, Theory, pp33 
94 See footnote 72. 
95 Hrub: 234-245 (quoting Yassin, Zahhar and Rantisi), Abu Shannab II, Dukhan, Haniyyah I, Hammad I, 
Muslih, Intifada Cell III, `Narr'; Badawil; Masri, Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf , Leader Kutlah-Azhar. Cf. al-Banna's 
conviction that Islam could only have "supervision over all matters of life, ... as 
long as the nation wants to be 
(continued... ) 
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"there be no compulsion in religion" and the reluctance displayed by IM members to 
judge whether someone is a `true' Muslim or not. 96 It is expressed in the notion that a 
perfect society will come about, not through legislation but through the voluntary and 
enthusiastic internalisation of the morality that informs the laws 97 Hence the emphasis 
on a period of preparation before the implementation of the hudud, so that cutting off 
hands is no longer necessary because people have absorbed the principles. " 
Neither Hegel nor the IM can meaningfully force people to be free. But though this 
position discourages individual coercion, it does not necessarily stop either from 
according the unenlightened second rank citizenship, and forcing them to live in a state 
which is ethical by the standards of the enlightened elite. To clarify Hegel's and the 
IM's respective positions on this point, one must analyse the role accorded to consent in 
the establishment of the state. 
Virtuous State through Vanguard or Consent? 
In Hegel's view, the virtuous state precedes the creation of a virtuous community. For it 
is the ethical state and the power of the actualised universal will which will gradually 
teach citizens to will the universal. Hegel has a bleak view of people's capacity to 
"know best what is in their best interest", observing that 
95 ( continued) 
truly Muslim" (Min Khutab Hasan al-Banna, p11 quoted in Husaini, p63; emphasis mine). 
96 Abu Shannab III, Shamma', Hamad 1, Intifada Cell II&III, one member of Hamas Supporters Gaza, 
`Iyad', `Nasr'; Abu Dhughri, Taha. Full discussion in Chapter 8. 
97 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab I, Zahhar II, Hamad I; Bahr. See also Mithaq §20-21. Cf. Qutb, Justice, pp69- 
85. 
98 Shamma`, Hammad II. 
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To know what one wills, and still more to know what the absolute will, Reason, wills, 
is the fruit of profound apprehension and insight, precisely the things which are not 
popular (§301). 
In the IM's view, though it shares some of Hegel's doubts about ordinary people's 
capacity for knowledge, the virtuous community precedes the creation of the virtuous 
state. 99 This position is expressed in the IM's emphasis on education, on living by 
example and in its emphasis on consensus-building as the precondition for the 
establishment of an Islamic state (see Chapter 7) - the latter highlighting the importance 
the notions of consent and contract are accorded. It is here that Hegel and the IM most 
significantly diverge (as do the IM and Mawdudi, who closely follows Hegel's view of 
the masses and of the necessity of a virtuous state in creating a virtuous community). "' 
For Hegel the notion of contract debases the divine nature of the state by rooting the 
state in the arbitrary consent of individual wills which are unlikely to be as yet 
universalised. The "union of individuals in the state" is then based on "capriciously 
given ... consent" (and self-interest), not the universal will 
(§258). 10' While Hegel 
agrees that the state can only come into existence through willing, by more than one 
person and thus involving consent, his rejection of the contract notion seems to indicate 
that he favours the consent of the enlightened few over that of the unenlightened many, 
giving rise to some form of philosophers' rule. 102 For Hegel, the rule of the few seems 
99 This position underlies statements made by Abu Shannab 1, Shamma`, Hammad II, Hamas Supporters 
Gaza; Bahr, Badawil. 
100 Cf. "[I]t has been established by experience that the great mass of the common people are incapable of 
perceiving their own true interests. ... 
[Man] is [usually] swayed by emotions and desires to such an extent that 
rarely, if ever, can he judge important matters with the impartiality and objectivity of scientific reason" 
(Mawdudi, Theory, pp2l-22). For Mawdudi's views on necessity of state, see footnote 86. 
10! Cf. Hegel's criticism that contractarianism has "transferred the characteristics of private property 
[meaning self-interested deals] into a sphere of a ... higher nature. " (§75). 
102 Cf. Riley: "Though the idea of the universal class does not involve the actual rule of philosophy or 
philosophers, it does involve the predominance of knowledge" (p196). Hegel indeed suggests a form of rule 
(continued... ) 
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to be justified by his belief that their enlightened wisdom is beneficial to the masses. 
Hegel's faith in the power of universal reason -a power that will make "dispassionate, 
upright, and polite demeanour ... customary 
[in civil servants]" (§296) - prevents him 
from suggesting further counterbalances, or setting more store by contract theories, 
causing critics like Popper to call him totalitarian. 103 
The IM, despite a belief in something akin to universal will, a positive attitude towards 
freedom and a didactic state vision, does not embrace Hegel's anti-contractarian 
position but insists on the mechanism of consent as the basis for legitimising legislation 
and power. At times, the IM displays a Hegelian-like faith in the power of Islam to 
create ideal people. "' Such faith can both fuel one's ambition to create an ideal world 
and blind one to the need for political checks and balances. As with Hegel, the presence 
of this faith appears to cause critics to denounce the IM as totalitarian. However, the IM 
seems presently sufficiently aware of the potential for corruption not to lose itself in 
utopian dreams, but circumscribe rulers with a contract. 
6.4 CONCLUSION: LOCKE, HEGEL AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 
Though the IM's moral framework approaches that of Hegel, its political framework 
remains close to Locke's. It differs from Locke primarily by positing the virtuous state 
as essential to attaining true freedom and explicitly according a formative role to the 
state. Accordingly, it is likely to be more prone than Locke to subordinating individual 
102 (... continued) 
in which a "universal class,... the class of civil servants" which has "the universal as the end of its essential 
activity" (§303) is in power, even though it is appointed by an executive monarch and must heed the advice of 
an elected "Estates" which represents the private (i. e. particular) concerns of the citizens (§§275-320). 
103 See footnote 87. 
104 See footnote 24. 
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rights to communal needs. Yet, unlike Hegel, the IM upholds its contractarian stance by 
insisting on consensual agreement as the moral basis of legislation and power. All three 
employ both negative and positive conceptions of freedom. The IM is more detailed in 
its teleological prescriptions than Locke, and to a lesser extent Hegel, but as it still 
insists on rendering revealed laws acceptable to consensual agreement, this is mostly a 
difference in degree, not kind. Moreover, despite its prescriptive attitude, the IM has, 
like Hegel, rendered the Rousseauean notion of forcing people to be free meaningless 
within its own conceptual framework. That, combined with its distinction between 
private and public, and its exclusion of the former from the legal realm, should at least 
in theory guarantee against both totalitarianism and authoritarianism. 
Given that Locke, regardless of his adoption of a positive conception to freedom, is 
regarded as one of the fathers of liberalism, it is not unthinkable that the type of 
Islamism the IM advocates could produce a liberal form of government. The IM's 
emphasis on state and community, however, coupled to its insistence on social justice as 
a condition for the fulfilment of universal freedom, may equally lead it closer either to 
those Hegel-inspired paternalistic ideologies that have characterised some of Western 
Europe's 20`h century socialist governments, or to the more totalitarian Hegel-inspired 
ideologies that have characterised the erstwhile Soviet Bloc. Much depends on the type 
of leadership the IM's leaders will give, and on the evolution of the intellectual climate 
in which they operate. Needless to say, neither continued occupation, nor the 
development of an oppressive police state would provide a fruitful climate for the 
strengthening of a more liberal strand - although it might inspire one by bringing home 
the costs of oppression. 
Given the above, the IM's thinking is not as alien to Western theories as some of the 
essentialists and modernists portray. The counterfoils chosen might not be considered 
properly reflective of modern Western political theory, as neither is secular in the sense 
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of excluding God from the political arena (a position I term philosophical secularism) - 
though both frown on clergy participating in politics (a position I call institutional 
secularism). The above juxtapositions are indeed relatively straightforward because 
Locke and Hegel predate the divine-political dichotomy established by philosophical 
secularism. 105 Locke's central concept of political obligation would collapse without the 
rewards and punishments of the Afterlife. "' 
The gulf separating Locke, Hegel and the IM from modern secularist theories is not as 
wide as one would expect. Despite their non-secularism, Locke's and Hegel's are still 
profoundly influential. Modern Western thinkers are often defined in relation to 
them. 107 Leaving Hegel aside and focussing on contractarianism only, one must 
distinguish, with Boucher and Kelly, between moral, civil and constitutional 
contractarianism. 108 Locke and the IM fall within the second category, which employ 
the contract notion to explain moral, legal and political obligations in society and state. 
A number of modern contractarians fall similarly within this category1°9 and though they 
have abandoned the relationship between natural law and God, their approach is still 
similar to Locke's in postulating the existence of an elusive, yet objective, moral order. 
As such, there is still a high level of philosophical commensurability between these 
modern Western theories and Locke's and the IM's. 
105 Cf. Locke: "the taking away of God ... dissolves all" (A Letter Concerning Toleration in The Works of Locke, 6: 47; quoted in Riley, p73; see also Tully, p78). Cf. Hegel: God is "the unrestricted principle and cause 
on which everything hangs" (§270). 
106 Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, p119; quoted in Riley, p73 (see also Riley's comments). 
107 Cf. Boucher & Kelly's typification of Nozick in relation to Locke, p5. 
108 Ibid., pp2-13. The closest modern corollary of constitutional contractarianism, widespread in medieval 
times, is constitutionalism, though civil contractarians, including the IM, echo some of its positions. 
109 E. g. John Rawls, Robert Nozick (Ibid., pp4-10). 
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Moral contractarianism, conversely, assumes that moral rules are subjective, and thus to 
be arrived at, not through a search for an `objective truth' but through contractual 
bargaining between the various parties concerned. 1' At a philosophical level, moral 
contractarianism is incompatible with Islamist thinking as the latter asserts the existence 
of an objective set of moral rules. Yet, even this difference should not be 
overemphasised. Though the IM regards rules concerning faith as fixed, it argues, like 
Locke, that rules concerning human relations, which comprise the bulk of morality, are 
consensually adjustable, according to the needs and interests of era and location. "' The 
traditional judicial principle of ijmä'by which jurists reached legal consensus, and 
which the IM has adopted as the basis for political decision-making (Chapter 7) is 
essentially a bargaining process, the limits to which are equally determined by the 
consensus between the different contemporary interpretations pertaining to revelation. 
Let me conclude with a word on the envisaged role of religion in politics. Intriguingly, 
the IM's political theory does not significantly diverge from either Locke or Hegel on 
the issue of separating `church' and state. Though it posits religion and politics as 
inseparable, it distinguishes between private and public and refrains from demanding 
that politicians be religious functionaries (see Chapter 7). Confusion arises from 
misunderstandings concerning the IM's insistence that religion and politics are 
indivisible. Sunni Islam does not have an institution similar to that of the Catholic 
Church. No qualification is needed to officiate at religious services, nor does any 
institution have a monopoly on teaching the knowledge required to make 
pronouncements on Islamic law. The administration of `awgäf (religious endowments) 
provides some form of hierarchical structure but it does not have the authority to 
pronounce on religious issues. 
110 E. g. John Harsanyi, John Mackie, David Gauthier (Ibid., p3). 
111 See footnotes 49&76. 
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When the IM insists that religion and politics are indivisible, it does not advocate a 
cleritocracy. Instead, it argues that politics be conducted within the realm of morality 
and religious purpose, while religion should be practised with a view to affecting 
political and social conduct. Here, it echoes Hegel who argued that neither should 
religion "be looked upon as commanding downright indifference to earthly interests" 
nor should politics be viewed as "wholly a matter of caprice and indifference ... of 
passion and lawless force". Separating the two will prevent the ethical state from 
emerging because "all higher forms of intellectual life" will remain outside the realm of 
politics, thus precluding the development of "determinate thought" which "knows" that 
which religion holds as "given". To insist that religion and politics be inseparable is 
thus not unlike Hegel's call "to exalt the interest and business of state into the 
fundamental and serious aim in life" (§270). 
6.5 PRAXIS ANALYSIS 
Having explored the IM's theoretical approach to solving the tensions between consent 
and divine law, and negative freedom (personal autonomy) and positive freedom 
(teleological formation), I will attempt to deduce to what extent the theoretical 
constructs are practised, and, if not, whether non-implementation is willed, or 
circumstantial. 
6.5.1 CONSENT VERSUS DIVINE LAW 
That the notion of consent is central to the IM's praxis can be gleaned from the 
importance it accords elections. Hamas (before 1988 the Muslim Brotherhood), al- 
Kutlah al-Islamiyya and Hizb al-Khalas all actively participate in municipal and 
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institutional elections, regularly winning significant numbers or even a majority of seats, 
as in the Engineers' Union in Gaza (presently headed by Abu Shannab) and the 
Chamber of Commerce in Ramallah. "Z At a student level, the Kutlah al-Islamiyya has 
participated in Student Council elections, and cooperated with other movements in 
coalition councils, by and large playing by the rules of the electoral game. Islamist 
electoral participation, and the fact that non-Islamists, most notably Christians, have 
repeatedly voted for the IM, 13 seems to indicate a certain level of commitment to the 
democratic-electoral process - as does the couching of criticisms of the PNA and the 
Peace Process in democratic terms. ' 14 
Sceptics argue that the IM's commitment to elections is pragmatic only and will vanish 
when it has gained control, "' implying that current praxis says nothing about Islamist 
ideals. Though the IM's largely faithful observance of electoral rules somewhat 
weakens this argument, nothing conclusive can be gained from studying Islamist 
participation in municipal and institutional elections. If, however, it can be shown that 
the IM has voluntarily adopted elections for internal leadership selection, and that these 
elections are not meaningless show-cases, a stronger case can be made for the argument 
that consent is central to the IM's understanding of political authority. In this vein, it is 
significant that Hanf and Sabella's survey of political attitudes found that 59% of 
Islamists supported `democratic' solutions outright, while "a great majority favour the 
separation of powers and freedom of the press". "' 
112 For discussion of why Hamas did not participate in 1996 national elections, see Chapter 7.4. 
113 Cf. Ramallah's largely Christian Chamber of Commerce. 
114 Cf. Intifada Cell 1, `Ashraf, Special Communique (10.11.1988), Communique 49 (27.10.1989); 
Na`ami; Masri. 
115 Cf. modernists (Chapter 2); Freh Abu Middin (Minister of Justice); Top MOPIC Official. 
116 Hanf & Sabella, pp121-126. That 41% chose `undemocratic' positions is somewhat misleading, as all 
`undemocratic' options revolved around a dominant party model. Among ordinary Islamists, the fear of multi- 
partyism and its supposedly divisive effects is still strong (though less so among leaders; see p241). 
(continued... ) 
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All institutions affiliated with the IM operate internal elections. Hamas is constituted of 
regional shCrä councils whose members are voted for regularly (apparently annually) by 
the region's established members. "' Each of the regional councils elects representatives 
to the central Sh i Council, which then elects the Executive Committee from its 
members. "8 Some of the younger Hamas leaders, such as Ismail Haniyyah, Yahya 
Musa (now with Khalas) and Khalid al-Hindi, first rose to prominence in al-Kutlah al- 
Islamiyyah and the IUG's Student Council (SC). Others, such as Ghazi Hammad, chief 
editor of al-Risalah, became prominent during the Intifada, both through their activities 
and through elections among the Islamists in prison. "' 
Hamas leaders and members alike proved reluctant to reveal much about the internal 
elections. It took three meetings before the members of the Intifada Cell admitted they 
had participated in annual elections. Yassin refused to answer further questions after he 
had divulged that Hamas has internal shCxä councils, while Abu Shannab only revealed 
the electoral system in our fourth meeting, and asked me not to specify any dates or 
details. Reasons for this reluctance seem twofold. On one level, nobody wished to 
116 (... continued) 
Consequently, the answers, rather than indicating support for `democracy' conceived as government held 
accountable through elections, reveal the level of support for a `multi-party democracy' and say little about 
support for accountability. That Islamists do insist on accountability, is clear from the 79% support for 
`accountable government' as opposed to "[a] government which strikes deals and decides what is best for the 
population, irrespective of the position of the elected council". 
117 Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab I&IV, Shamma`, Haniyyah I, Hammad II, `Muhammad', Intifada Cell III, 
`Ashraf ; Musa II, Na`ami. During the Intifada (when the membership expanded rapidly), new recruits were 
not entitled to vote until they had passed certain exams (in Brotherhood terms, they had to have reached the 
level of nagib, captain) and had displayed their commitment in action, to curb infiltration by collaborators (cf. 
`Muhammad', Intifada Cell III, `Ashraf). 
118 Yassin I, Abu Shannab IV, Haniyyah I, Hammad H. `Elections' during the 1970s when the IM was still 
small, amounted to nominations by the leadership which then needed ratification by the membership (Abu 
Shannab IV). 
1 19 In prison, all those who had elected to be `quartered' with Hamas's prison section (each party had its 
own section and each new arrival had to choose between quarters; cf. Abu Shannab I) seem to have been 
entitled to vote, regardless of their membership status (suspected collaborators excluded). Cf. Hammad II, 
`Ashraf; Abu Dhughri. Abu Shannab I and `Khalid' II indicated that leaders in prison were chosen according 
to how prominent they had been `outside', and how much respect they were accorded by the inmates, rather 
than elections. This may reflect different practices in different prisons. 
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reveal information they had not parted with when interrogated by the Israelis. "' On 
another, it was feared that the more that is known about Hamas's internal elections, the 
easier it would be for foreign intelligence services - in particular the Israelis and 
Americans - to infiltrate their ranks and so influence the vote, and uncover their leaders' 
identity. 12' The following is based on what little I have been able to elicit. 
Three elections seem to have taken place before the Intifada. 122 During the Intifada most 
elections appear to have taken place in prisons. 123 After the Intifada there seem to have 
been annual elections. 124 In the pre-Intifada elections, one third of the central Sh lirä 
Council members and the Executive Committee would typically be replaced with newly 
elected members. Significantly, Yassin was once not elected to the leading position. 121 
A further indication of the genuine nature of these elections are examples from the 
Intifada of young men being elected over the heads of others, more senior in reputation. 
In one case, Ghazi Hammad was elected by the Hamas prison inmates to head their 
prison majlis while only in his twenties. In Hammad's words, 
there are some leaders who are not accepted by the people because of their mentality, 
their style and behaviour - how they deal with problems, how they respect different 
opinions. ... so some famous 
leaders were excluded. '26 
120 Abu Shannab IV. 
121 Intifada Cell I. 
122 Abu Shannab IV. 
123 Abu Shannab IV, Hammad II, `Ashraf ; Abu Dhughri. 
124 Intifada Cell I&III. `Muhammad' recalled only one election in 1994 before he left the IM. 
125 Abu Shannab IV. 
126 Hamad II. 
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Another illustration is the rapid rise of `Emad `Aql, one of Hamas's military wing's 
most famous Intifada leaders, to a leadership position at a young age. According to the 
Intifada Cell, his achievements as a resistance fighter and his capacity for organisation 
propelled him forward. 12' 
Some members acknowledged the electoral process has been flawed - for the reason 
that Hamas has had to operate clandestinely and cope with regular imprisonment of its 
members, both under the Israelis and the PNA. The need for secrecy has tended to 
override the candidates' need for transparency to make themselves and their `platforms' 
known to their `electorate', thus discouraging accountability, and encouraging 
leadership nominations, with its potential for nepotism (although only `Muhammad' 
complained of that). A number of Khalas members quoted the lack of openness as 
being the prime reason for creating/joining Khalas with its official permit to operate and 
conduct elections. 128 
`Muhammad', the former cadre leader who has since left the IM disillusioned, 
complained that in Hamas elections (he insisted on calling it the Brotherhood) those 
members entitled to vote were instructed how to vote: 
... 
from [the leaders'] instructions it was clear who they wanted to win. For example, 
three persons were to be elected for one cantonat. Then they said: "We prefer it if they 
are over 40" - with only 5 or 6 answering to that description. I believe anybody has the 
right to use their right to vote in the way they want. 
127 Intifada Cell III. Also `Khalid' III. I have been unable to verify whether `Aql was indeed elected, or 
appointed by the leadership. `Khalid' (IV) insisted that `Aql could only have assumed leadership with consent 
from the rank and file. 
128 Musa 1, Badawil, Na`ami. `Ex'-Hamas member `Ashraf admired this quality in Khalas. 
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The fact that he still had a choice of five seems to weaken his accusation. "' In other 
locations, moreover, people under 40 appear to have been elected, while no other 
interviewees corroborated his views. It is thus unclear how representative this 
complaint is. 
The situation in Hizb al-Khalas is more straightforward because of its official status. 
Like Hamas, it is made up of regional councils, whose members are voted for bi- 
annually by the region's party members (amounting to roughly 5000 for the whole of 
Gaza in 1998). Each of the regional shä councils then elects representatives to the 
party's 250-strong General Assembly who, in turn, elect the Majlis (51 members) out of 
which the Political Bureau is chosen (14 members). 130 Since its creation in 1996, the 
party has held three elections, the latest of which took place in the beginning of 1999. 
Because in each one a number of representatives seem to have been replaced with 
others, elections appear to be a genuine expression of the contractual relationship 
between leaders and members. 
The charities affiliated to the IM also run internal elections - circumstances allowing. 
This is significant, as the law under which they are registered does not stipulate how 
Boards are to be selected. 13' According to its current Director, Ibrahim Yazuri, the 
Mujamma' Islami has 
an executive Board that gets elected every four years. This Board takes care of the 
management of the Mujamma' according to the aims and objectives written down in the 
by-laws 
... [T]hose who are documented members of the Mujamma' are entitled to elect 
the Executive Board. 
129 Intifada Cell III specified they had a choice of four. 
130 Musa II, Badawil, Hamdan. 
131 See Chapter 7, footnote 107. 
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But no elections have been held since 1987. During the Intifada, Yazuri explained, 
holding elections was impossible (besides the fact that people's attentions were 
otherwise engaged) while the post-Oslo years, with their string of harassments, 
imprisonments and closures by the PNA, have been equally difficult. In September 
1997, the charity's management office was closed by the PNA, 132 and has remained 
closed, on and off, until the time of writing, severely hampering its effectiveness in 
administering elections. People with Islamist connections constantly run the risk of 
imprisonment, generally without charge. Since elected Board members may be 
imprisoned at any moment, elections are deemed ineffective. Yazuri nevertheless 
remained hopeful: 
we are reorganising the Mujamma' and we will run elections when the situation is more 
favourable. 
Some 20 other Islamist institutions were likewise shut down by the PNA in September 
1997, and were only allowed to operate at a reduced level. The Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat 
was one of these, although it seems that they have been able to continue organising 
some form of internal elections for their seven-strong Board. 133 The fact that they are 
women reduces the risk of imprisonment, thus rendering elections more meaningful. 
The same kind of problems are encountered by the IUG's male Kutlah leadership. In 
theory, the entire membership elects the Kutlah's Shtlä Council (20 members) which 
then elects an administrative council (7 members). The Shurä Council then appoints an 
electoral committee which, in consultation with the Kutlah's regional councils, 
nominates candidates for the Student Council elections, a selection which must be 
132 In response to Israeli and US pressure to dismantle Hamas's `terrorist' infrastructure (PCHR Press 
Release, `PNA Closure', 28.09.1997). 
133 Board Members al-Shabbat. 
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ratified by the administrative council. "' In practice, elections for the male Kutlah are 
often replaced by an informal canvassing by the outgoing council, since harassment by 
the PNA often makes formal elections impossible. "' The Kutlah's central office for the 
whole of Gaza, recently established to introduce more transparency than had been 
possible under occupation, had been closed down by the PNA. 136 The Kutlah 
leadership, moreover, regularly spend spells in prison - as for instance after the 
assassination of Hamas leader Muhya Sharif in Ramallah in April 1998. Because many 
members are unwilling to risk publicising their membership for fear of imprisonment, 
the administration of elections is also hindered. 13' Mirroring the difference between al- 
Mujamma` and al-Jam'iyyah al-Shabbat, the female Kutlah appear to be better able to 
organise formal elections, as its leaders run less risk of imprisonment. "' 
Political Culture: Servant Leadership 
Critics might argue that the Kutlah's and the charities' leadership prefers to by-pass 
elections because they do not believe in them, and that the present predicament is 
merely a handy excuse for not holding proper elections. "' The inclusive, transparent 
134 Masri. Confirmed by Taha, Abu Dhughri, `Yusu? (Haniyyah and Musa confirmed this for the 1980s). 
135 Masri (SC-1996) says there were informal elections, while Abu Dhughri (SC-1997) and Taha (SC- 
1998) stated the outgoing Council nominated people or asked people to nominate themselves, after canvassing 
general opinion. Abu Dhughri emphasised asking students to nominate themselves was necessary because 
Kutlah students had been "educated not to ask for these things" (see `Political Culture'). 
136 Masri, Taha. 
137 Masri, Abu Dhughri, Taha. 
138 Women's Kutlah 1, Women's Kutlah 2. 
139 The Islamists' predicament is not unique. Non-Islamist charities have likewise been forced by the 
continuous crisis situation to forego elections. The Red Crescent Society, for instance, whose director, Haydar 
Abd al-Shafi, is passionately pro-democracy, has not held elections since its building was burnt down by a 
mob in the wake of its 1979 elections. The Palestinian Blood Bank in Gaza has likewise only recently held its 
first elections since before the Intifada. 
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and egalitarian political culture I observed in the Kutlah-run male Student Council (SC) 
of the Islamic University appears to contradict this view. The elected Council members 
seem to be trusted by Kutlah members. At the same time, they do not insist on status 
and seem to encourage debate and questioning. When I interviewed the SC's President, 
other SC members and ordinary students present felt free to occasionally interrupt, add 
or even contradict. A similar atmosphere of egalitarian camaraderie and mutual trust 
prevailed during my three interviews with the Intifada Cell and my meeting with Hamas 
Supporters Gaza, despite the fact that in each case there was, in hierarchical terms, a 
senior member present. Illustrative of responsibilities being shared out is the way 
ordinary Kutlah members stepped in when almost the entire SC was imprisoned in April 
1998. 
A poster on the walls of the Student Council Office depicted äyah 33: 72: "We did 
indeed offer the Trust (ämänah) to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains but 
they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it; he was indeed 
unjust and foolish". This verse, explained one Kutlah student, served as a reminder that 
"a position is not something to be proud of, but a burden; leadership is like a trust". 140 
Viewing leadership as a trust and a burden - conceptually resembling what Robert 
Greenleaf termed `servant leadership' 141- means a position of leadership must be 
constantly re-earned by acting in the interests of the community and on the basis of 
justice and equality -a clear expression of the contractual nature of the IM's leadership 
culture. Islamist charities self-consciously illustrate it in ensuring their financial 
transparency, through rigid institutional checks and the constant ideological reinforcing 
140 Kutlah Members. 
141 Robert Greenleaf, Servant Leadership. 
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of the duty to be honest. 14' It is symbolised by the non-opulence of the IM leadership. "' 
It is illustrated by a leader of Hamas prisoners distributing by lot four new coats among 
a batch provided by the guards to ensure non-favouritism. 144 IM members illustrate it in 
their insistence on leaders earning their trust, 14' and in their critical stance when 
appointed, or self-appointed, would-be leaders have not earned it. '46 The absence of 
internal political assassinations within Hamas similarly demonstrates it. 147 
Compare this praxis with the patronage culture of Fatah in which family connection and 
status are deemed important, "' and where followers are often courted by the provision 
of hard-to-obtain benefits. 14' Based on my observations of Fatah's student wing, al- 
Shabibah15° (confirmed by popular perception), Fatah leaders seem more status-oriented 
142 Muslih, 'Ibrahim'. 
143 The reception room of Yassin's home is austere, Dukhan's house in Nuseirat Camp is frugal, as is 
Hamas's unofficial office next to Beach camp. Zahhar's clinic is likewise humble. 
144 'Khalid' II. 
145 Cf. Intifada Cell Camp III: "A leader becomes a leader in Hamas when he is trusted by the people AND 
the leaders, AND because of his skills and activities - all three of these are needed. " 
146 Hamas Supporters Gaza: "Sometimes [Islamic leaders] have put a person in a position of power without 
elections because he is an expert (äWm) but this is not clear in the eyes of the people because he is not famous. 
If the leaders choose such a person [while the people do not trust him], this is not OK, now. " Intifada Cell 111, 
on whether unpopularity of two Islamist break-away parties, established by dissident Hamas leaders (see 
p263), was caused by loss of trust by membership or by dispute between break-away leaders and Hamas 
establishment: "If the base loses trust in a leader, they don't wait for the leadership to say that is right. " 
147 E. g. Raji Sourani (PCHR and former PFLP activist) to Turid Smith-Polfus (Norwegian researcher), 
`Khalid' III, `Umar' (Shabibah sympathiser), Hrub: 236(nl 1) (Yassin). Popular rumour, interestingly, 
confirms this - unlike popular rumour concerning Fatah which has it that a number of Fatah leaders have been 
assassinated by fellow Fatah members, 'bringing Beirut to Gaza' ('Umar'), e. g. Asad Saftawi (source: 
'Khalid' IV; Usher, Palestine, p18), Muhammad Abu Shanaab (source: "Umar'), Maher Khail (source: 
"Umar'). Ali al-Jarbawi confirms these rumours ('The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel 
Accord', Muslim World LXXXIV(1-2), p147). 
148 E. g. advancement of relatives of Arafat's circle of friends without necessary qualifications at Ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation (Top MOPIC Official; Former MOPIC Employee). 
149 E. g. experience of political discrimination in receiving benefits from aivgäf (Intifada Cell I); the 
financial and social benefits available to members of Fatah football clubs (Jensen, p210). 
150 Observations based on interview with Gaza Strip Shabibah President in Shabibah Central Office (with 
others present), interviews with the Shabibah's IUG leadership, and observation of 1998 elections at al-Azhar 
(continued... ) 
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than their Kutlah counterparts while members appear to be more in awe of their 
leadership. When the IUG's Shabibah President came to the cafeteria table where I was 
interviewing other members of the IUG's Shabibah leadership, his peers, they displayed 
a subservient attitude. When I interviewed al-Azhar's Shabibah leaders, hierarchy 
influenced who said what. A non-partisan lecturer at al-Azhar University (and IUG 
alumnus) observed that the effectiveness of the Azhar Shabibah leadership was at times 
undermined by disputes over who should be accorded more status. He also noted that 
Al-Azhar's Shabibah-run SC was more partisan than the IUG Student Council, blatantly 
favouring those loyal to it. 15' 
A number of leading Fatah politicians have built `palaces' (by Gazan standards) and 
drive expensive American cars - allegedly with international donor money earmarked 
for rebuilding Palestine. "' While many of Fatah's local leaders are undoubtedly frugal 
and selfless, they are overshadowed in the public eye by Fatah's more opulent leaders. 
The IM's contrasting frugality is particularly striking as relatively large charitable 
donations from both Gazans and Muslims abroad pass through its hands - indicating 
that the difference between the IM and Fatah is more than circumstantial, as its critics 
would have it, but rather ideological. Where the IM has an ideology which glorifies 
discipline and curbs individual excesses, Fatah's only clear ideology seems to be the 
ideology of power. Those within Fatah who are incorruptible, tend to be so because of 
their personal values - not because of their movement's ideology. Not all IM leaders 
practise their movement's ideology. But it is noteworthy how many appear to have 
150 (. continued) 
University. 
151 'Yahya'. 
152 Reports by the Palestinian Legislative Council's Monitoring Committee and the General Control Office 
"exposed corruption and abuse of funds in several ministries" (Jerusalem Times, 07.08.1998) in an attempt to 
verify "allegations of embezzlement and the squandering of hundreds of millions of dollars of public funds" 
(Jerusalem Times, 19.06.98). 
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internalised it, and the extent to which ordinary people trust the IM's integrity in 
charitable matters. '53 
Related Theoretical Stances 
I will end this section by briefly listing examples of IM stances illustrating how it values 
contract versus divine law. One example is the position taken by a faction within the IM 
to honour current cooperation with the Palestinian Left as a contract for pluralism 
should an Islamic state be ushered in - despite a tradition in Islam which calls for the 
death penalty for apostasy (under which category Marxists and communists raised as 
Muslims would fall; see Chapter 8). In another example, a few IM leaders expressed 
willingness to accept a democratically elected Christian as Head of an Islamic state in 
the event of its being the popular will - despite their conviction that this post should, for 
the sake of Islam, be occupied by a Muslim (Chapter 8). 
Take also the IM position on obtaining the people's consent before a principle can 
legitimately become a law, or an institution can legitimately become a seat of power 
(Chapter 7). Similarly illustrative is that the IM generally values the fact a 
representative has been elected over whether s/he is sufficiently expert in Islamic law, 
breaking with an influential tradition which held that legislators should be legal and 
religious experts (Chapter 7). Thus, though suggesting that the Shw-ä Council appoint 
committees of unelected experts to suggest solutions, the IM insists that the final 
decision remains in the hands of those who have been elected. "' 
153 This is reflected in the trust accorded Islamist charities by international aid/donor organisations (cf. 
Pharmaciens sans Frontieres, Save the Children, Mennonite Central Committee) and the relatively high 
number of Hamas members among UNRWA's accountants (Patrick Barbieri, UNRWA official). Cf. also 
Hamas accountant in (anonymous) non-Islamist youth organisation. 
154 Yassin II, Abu Shannab III, Zahhar III, Shamma`, Haniyyah I; Bahr, Hamdan; Masri. 
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However, when one of the IM's core values, such as justice, is at stake, the IM is equally 
determined to put it before any contract, including contracts between them and their 
colleagues within the IM. It appears that Hijaz al-Burbar was dismissed from the 
Brotherhood around 1980 when his hot-headed actions (including leading a mob to the 
leftist Red Crescent Society which was eventually burned down in the event) led him 
into conflict with the movement's values. "' In a similar vein, Abu Shannab suggested 
that, when the time was right, all Palestinian Intifada movements should be open to an 
investigation of their members' actions, so that both victims and perpetrators of 
atrocities committed could be openly acknowledged and appropriate retribution 
administered, so as to draw a line under the deep intra-Palestinian wounds of the past. 
The IM thus seems to honour its theory that as long as God's law is not actually 
contradicted, contract is of paramount importance to legitimise that law on earth. 
Contract is equally paramount in its understanding of leadership within the IM. Trust is 
considered pivotal in the relationship between leaders and led, and leadership is viewed 
as a responsibility rather than a prize. The most practical expression of this is that all of 
the IM's institutions elect their leaders, and that leaders who have lost the trust of the 
led are dis-elected. Where elections have not taken place, or were less than transparent, 
the reason was generally that the circumstances prevented them from taking place, or 
being transparent. That this reading is correct is suggested by Islamist women (who are 
less encumbered by oppression, as they are less often imprisoned) have generally held 
elections regularly. The argument that the IM exploits the situation as an excuse not to 
implement elections is thus problematic - although one cannot conclusively predict 
whether the IM will honour its theoretical commitment to elections when the situation is 
less oppressive. 
155 Chapters 5&7. 
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6.5.2 POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE FREEDOM 
A positive attitude towards freedom is characterised by prescriptive interference, a 
negative one by restraint. To gain insight into whether the Islamic state the IM 
advocates is likely to refrain from interfering in its citizens' private lives, and, if so, 
under what conditions, I will examine the IM's present praxis concerning a sample of 
moral issues with a significant private component. 
Atheism is deemed not only sinful but harmful, as it is thought to destroy the moral 
fabric of an Islamic society by undermining God's authority. "' Yet, a majority of the 
IM members I interviewed, insisted that as long as they do not actively proselytise, 
atheists are free to disbelieve in God. 157 Most of the interviewees defended the latter's 
right to participate in politics, and promote political and economic theories rooted in 
communism, on the grounds that, however sinful their beliefs, they had the right to 
political participation as long as they stayed within the law. A distinction was made 
between sin and illegality, between private belief and public action, thus creating a 
personal sphere of autonomy within which unbelief was tolerated. 
In the same vein, though the IM unequivocally condemns drinking alcohol, some argued 
that, as long as it is drunk in private, it is a matter between God and the drinker, and thus 
allowable - even if forbidden by the Qur'än. Only when done in public, and thus 
156 This observation is based on the views expressed by cf. Abu Shannab III, Hammad I, `Narr'; Bahr, 
Musa II. All others interviewed on this topic seemed to concur with these views. 
1 57 Abu Shannab III, Hammad I, Intifada Cell 111 (5 from 6 members), Hamas member 1 of Hamas 
Supporters Gaza, `Narr'; Musa II; Taha, Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf. By inference (see Chapter 8): Yassin I&11, 
Shamma`, Haniyyah I. Those against this view: `lyad'; Leader Kutlah-Azhar. Those arguing communism 
would fade before an Islamic state arises: Dukhan, Khalas activist in Hamas Supporters Gaza. For full 
discussion, see Chapter 8. 
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inflicting potential harm on the general population (by setting a bad example or, worse, 
through drunken destruction) is it deemed punishable. "' 
A similar reasoning informs the IM's position towards the hYäb. Were it merely a 
private matter, or were it considered harmless to go bare-headed in public, it would have 
loomed less large in Islamist discourse. However, since bare-headedness is deemed to 
have a corrupting influence on society - it is generally equated with Western 
licentiousness (as seen primarily on television, in soaps and advertisements, rather than 
in reality) - not wearing the /jab has become a particularly hotly contested issue. "' 
This has been exacerbated by its having become a public statement of identity, as a 
Muslim, and largely also as someone resisting Westernisation. Not wearing it is 
considered a denial of faith, 16O but also a public betrayal of one's people's struggle for 
independence from the West's global hegemony. 
Significantly, the IM distinguishes sharply between its members and society at large. 
Where it expects its members to don the hfjäb without question - with the important 
exception of Khalas, which, Musa insisted, is open to un-Ijijäbed women16' - it merely 
preaches the hijäb to the rest of society, refraining, on the whole, from imposing it (see 
also Chapter 5). 162 The distinction lies in the consent expressed by joining a movement. 
Because the general populace has not given its consent, IM charities, for instance, do not 
158 `Muhammad', Bahr (on right of Christians to drink alcohol at home), Khalas Communique 12.09.1997 
(on right of Christians to drink alcohol full stop). As this issue came up unsolicited, I don't know what stance 
others in the IM would take, though I suspect that such views are widespread. 
159 Cf. Abu Shannab IV, Yassin II; `Khalid' I. 
160 Some argue that the hYa3 is not obligatory in Islam, cf. Mernissi. 
161 Musa I. 
162 Condemnations ofhYäb coercion: Yassin II, Abu Shannab IV, Shamma', Zahhar III, `Muhammad', 
Intifada Cell II, `Ahmad'. 
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demand of their `customers' or even, apparently, their staff that they wear the hyäb. '63 
On the basis of this attitude, one would expect that if an Islamic state were to become 
reality, the IM would certainly advocate the bijäb, but only agree to enforcing it if the 
Majlis had legislated it, and so legitimised it by (indirect) popular consent. Whether the 
IM would actually champion legislation on this matter depends on whether the view that 
wearing the hijalb is a societal issue would prevail over that which argues that donning 
the hab is a religious obligation, and thus a non-legal issue. ' 
The same kind of reasoning lies behind the dress code and the gender segregation at the 
IUG. Because enrolment involves consent, student subjection to the university's rules is 
not coercion. 165 There are some who wish to extend this type of prescriptiveness to 
society at large. Zahhar, in this vein, wishes to make it illegal for boys and girls to mix 
on the beach or in the dunes behind it because he believes it to corrupt their morals. '66 
However, he insisted that such a rule could only be legitimately imposed if legislated by 
the elected Majlis. Thus, though such a move would extend the government's power 
well into the private sphere (Zahhar would probably counter that these private decisions 
to mingle can have a very public outcome if they result in children born out of wedlock), 
this power is still circumscribed by popular consent. Furthermore, it seems that 
Zahhar's legislative zeal concerning such moral, and relatively private, issues is not 
shared to the same extent by others in the IM leadership. 167 
Zahhar's defence of government intrusion into the private sphere is informed by his 
understanding of harm: it is on the basis that moral laxity and unregulated parenthood is 
163 Cf. Muslih, `Ibrahim'. 
164 See p193. 
165 Abu Shannab IV. 
166 Zahhar 111. one member of Intifada Cell suggested similar laws. 
167 Though I discussed the same general gender issues with other IM leaders, none suggested such laws. 
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harmful to society that he proposes sexual segregation for youths. Personal freedom is 
curbed to protect the community from harm - not to protect the individual from 
him/herself. The above examples regarding atheism and alcohol corroborate that the IM 
indeed respects a sphere of personal autonomy in which the individual is tolerated to be 
as sinful as he/she chooses to be. The IM thus seems to practise a Lockean approach to 
freedom and harm. 
What is regarded as harmful, however, is highly context-dependent, and as such can 
change when circumstances change (in particular when Gaza's extreme circumstances 
become more normal). If one is wasteful with food in times of abundance, no great 
harm is done to anyone within that society (leaving aside the more subtle fact that it may 
cause moral harm by encouraging wastefulness). If, on the other hand, one is wasteful 
in times of famine, one causes immediate harm to others. Moral laxity, likewise, is less 
acceptable when a community needs to be united against, and wholly focussed on, an 
enemy. The IM has evolved in an extreme situation of oppression, occupation and fear 
of national annihilation. Harm, in such circumstances, takes on a more radical meaning. 
Because circumstances have not allowed the formation of a proper national platform for 
discussion on what constitutes harm, different visions of harm have at times resulted in 
intra-Palestinian clashes. This, however, does not imply that this will be the pattern for 
a future state. 
Zahhar's views, though not shared by all, are indicative of an approach to politics that is 
prescriptive and encouraged by the relative wealth in revealed detail (compared to, for 
example, Christianity) of what is permissible in Islam. "' However, there is a giant 
philosophical leap between being prescriptive and being authoritarian or totalitarian. A 
168 Cf. the detailed guidelines in Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. 
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prescriptive attitude has not prevented the IM from being (relatively) tolerant towards 
private alcohol consumption, limited atheism and not wearing the hijab. 
Two further illustrations of the IM's respect for self-determination are attitudes towards 
early marriage and self-nomination for a position of leadership. In Gaza, a large number 
of girls are married without their consent before they are 17 - often before they are 
physically or psychologically mature enough to endure marriage. "' Though some 
women's rights activists blame such Islamicly inspired movements as the IM for 
perpetuating a view which sees women solely as producers of men, the IM has in fact 
openly condemned both forced early marriage and early marriage per se, claiming that 
Islam gives women the right to say `no' and advising women to be mature before they 
marry - even though it simultaneously advises girls to listen to the advice of their 
parents. 17' A gauge of the depth of its concern is the fact that both the female Kutlah 
and the Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat have staged talks and debates for women, some in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Health, discussing their rights and warning them of the 
dangers of early marriage. "' The Kutlah has also distributed a booklet on the issue. "Z 
In this case the IM champions the right of women to self-determination - though it also 
insists that women be sufficiently mature before they are allowed to choose to marry. 
Secondly, there is a tradition in Islam which regards self-nomination as suspicious. This 
is rooted in the Prophet saying that "we do not assign the affairs of our government to 
169 Cf. Shadia Sarraj-Matar (Gaza Mental Health Project - Women's Empowerment Project), Eman 
Radwan (Women's Affairs Center). According to the Women's Affairs Center study Early Marriage in the 
Palestinian Community, in 41.8% of the marriages they sampled in the Gaza Strip the brides were between 12 
and 17 years of age. Of these, 60.5% thought they were too young for marriage, 76.6% would not have 
consented to their marriage had they known they could have refused, 90.7% were not aware of the age by 
which the law allows marriage, while 89.7% were not informed of their rights by the mä'dhim (the person 
representing the Shari ah court which registers marriages). 
170 Abu Shannab IV, Zahhar III, Hammad II, `Iyad', `Nasr'; Women's Kutlah 1, Women's Kutlah 2. 
171 Board Members al-Shabbat, Women's Kutlah 1, Women's Kutlah 2. 
172 Women's Kutlah 2. 
BETWEEN CONTRACT AND DIVINE LAW 224 
any one who aspires for it or is greedy in respect of it" because "we consider the seeker 
after a post (of trust and responsibility) as the most untrustworthy". ' 73 Among Islamist 
theorists, both Mawdudi and Turabi build on these ahäds? h to argue that election 
campaigns are destructive as they aid those with "relative wealth or access to the 
communications media""' and encourage cheating and lying -a view which echoes that 
of Western elite theorists, "' and is increasingly relevant with regard to US Presidential 
elections. 1' 
However, the majority of Hamas leaders I interviewed considered this tradition 
impractical in modem society where sheer numbers prevent people from noticing the 
true leaders. "' Instead, they argued that it is a duty upon the potential leader to stand 
forward for election lest others, less able or noble, take the lead - pointing to the 
example of Prophet Joseph promoting himself to Pharaoh as treasurer, and highlighting 
another Hadith in which Muhammad welcomed self-nomination. Here again, the IM 
champions self-determination, carefully balancing the notion that leadership is a burden 
with the notion that leadership qualities incur a duty on the carrier. 
'73 Ahädnh as quoted in Mawdudi, Principles, p47. 
174 Turabi, p248; Mawdudi, Theory, pp20-22,36-37. 
175 Cf. Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto (for synopsis and discussion, cf. Plamenatz, pp52- 
83). 
176 Cf. Ben Macintyre, `High stakes leave poorer presidential hopefuls out of the game - The dollar has 
become the primary battleground in the race to the White House', The Times 27.10.1999. 
177 Yassin II, Abu Shannab III, Zahhar II (initially criticised self-nomination, then justified it with the same 
Qur'änic example Yassin used), Muslih, `Iyad'; `Iman', Board Members al-Shabbat; Bahr, Badawil; Masri, 
Abu Dhughri, Taha, `Yusuf. Only `Ibrahim' insisted on disallowing self-nomination, while `Nasr' remained 
vague, as long as candidates were vetted by leadership (others not mentioned were not asked this specific 
question). Abu Dhughri believed that the issue would cease to be relevant in an Islamic state as nobody would 
dare take upon themselves the burden of leadership, unless nominated. Taha, somewhat contradictorily, also 
suggested that a specific body have the power to vet candidates, as did 'Nasr'. 
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In practice, leaders in Hamas, "' Hizb al-Khalas and the male Kutlah19 are both 
nominated (by leaders and led alike) and nominate themselves. The Hizb al-Khalas 
leadership particularly welcomed self-nomination because of its belief in open 
competition. "' In the Mujamma`, candidates for the Board must be nominated by other 
members, "' in the Jam'iyyah al-Shabbat the General Assembly nominates candidates 
(who are then free to refuse or accept nomination). "' The women's Kutlah asks all its 
active members to elect their nine preferred candidates and subsequently amalgamates 
these lists. During the Intifada, when this proved impossible, it asked those who 
thought themselves capable to step forward. 18' If, however, there is strong evidence that 
a nominee is unsuitable, the outgoing council has the right to veto her. 
In short, though the IM takes a relatively prescriptive approach to politics, it does seem 
to honour a sphere of personal autonomy. Even if actions privately undertaken are 
Karam (religiously prohibited), they are condoned as long as no harm is done to others. 
Direct interference in this personal sphere is circumscribed by a consensual agreement 
by the legislative (on behalf of the people) that a particular action is harmful to the 
community. This means that even if religious scholars have decreed something as 
haräm (leaving aside the possibility of different interpretations of what constitutes 
h, aram), it would theoretically remain legally permissible in the IM's Islamic state until 
the elected legislative has legislated on it. Outside of the bounds of harm and (legally 
implemented) baram, the IM seems to encourage self-determination. 
178 Cf. discussion regarding how Hamas leaders became leaders with Intifada Cell (III). I have not been 
able to verify this statement. 
179 Masri, Abu Dhughri, Taha, `Yusuf . Musa III on 1980s. 
180 Badawil. I have not been able to verify this statement. 
181 Shamma'. Muslih, however, said that members could also nominate themselves. 
182 Board Members al-Shabbat. 
183 Women's Kutlah 1. 
CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL PROCESS: 
BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND DISSENT 
In the previous chapter, I have shown how the IM roots political authority in both divine 
and consensual right, rendering rule legitimate only when it respects both God's 
boundaries and the popular will. The political process the IM envisages is similarly 
dually circumscribed. I will focus on the process of decision-making, and the role 
accorded to dissent. The IM's understanding of decision-making is rooted in the 
classical Islamic concepts of shrirä (consultation) and ßmä (consensus). I will first 
detail the IM's interpretation of these and how this affects its understanding of the 
nature of communal decision-making, in terms of the possibility of multiple `right' 
outcomes, the role of dissent, and the qualifications needed to participate in decision- 
making. I will then turn to the specific case of `constitutional' (as opposed to 
`operational')' decisions preceding the creation of an Islamic state, with a particular 
view to the IM's attitude towards ideological others, and conclude with an analysis of 
the tension between the IM's ideal of consensus and the practicality of majority voting. 
As before, I will contrast Islamism with both Western discussions of decision-making 
and, where applicable, its own praxis. Western `dialectical partners' have been selected 
to either indicate the existence of similar constructs in Western thinking, or to further 
illuminate Islamist positions through a perspectival shift. 
I J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, pp250-251. 
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7.1 SHÜRA AND IJMA` 
Shzmä (consultation), one of the three key principles underpinning an Islamic state, 
alongside justice and equality, ' is seen as the practical embodiment of the contractual 
nature of political authority, since it consecrates the viceregal status all citizens are 
deemed to possess by compelling leaders to heed their opinions 3 In interviews, shlrä 
was often used to mean freedom, particularly freedom of speech, because it enshrines 
the right to be heard, regardless how `wrong' or heterodox one's argument. ' In Yahya 
Musa's words: 
Shurä is a high ideal ... 
The main issue here is to avoid a dictatorship, or an 
authoritarian regime, which would prevent the public from expressing its views. Shiirä 
gives the whole of society the right to express its opinions, to participate [in decision- 
making]. It imposes upon the ruler the duty to seek, and to respect, the opinions of 
society. s 
Sh drä thus circumscribes how leaders are to make decisions while maintaining the 
contractarian nature of their position. 
2 Abu Shannab I&II&III, Hamas Supporters Gaza, Intifada Cell 1. Others (Hammad 1; Bahr, Musa II; Abu 
Dhughri) used either `democracy' or `freedom of expression' to translate this principle into `Western' jargon 
(Abu Shannab I&II, Hammad I&Il, Hamas Supporters Gaza and Intifada Cell II specifically equated these 
terms, with the provision that shiir be within Islamic principles). For scholarly discussion of the principles of 
the Islamic state, see El-Awa, p85ff. 
3 For discussion of viceregency argument, see Chapter 6. 
4 Cf. Abu Shannab IV, Intifada Cell I; Badawil, Musa II; Taha. Those using `freedom (of expression)' as a 
substitute for shinrä in the triplet shürä, justice, equality also implicitly equated shirä with freedom (Bahr, 
Musa 11; Abu Dhughri). 
5 Musa II. 
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Islamic Origins of Shürä 
The IM's insistence on consultation is rooted in the Qur'an which commands the 
Prophet to consult His companions (3: 159) and praises those "who [conduct] their 
affairs by mutual Consultation" (42: 38). ' Though some scholars have argued that the 
Qur'änic call to consultation is non-obligatory or that its outcome is non-binding on the 
ruler, the IM follows the view that shvrä is both obligatory and binding! In this, they 
distance themselves from such groups as Khan Yunis's al-Qur'an wa'1-Sunnah, 8 who 
insist that the Head of an Islamic state will be sufficiently wise to consult of his own 
volition, and too wise to be bound by the opinions of a Sh&ä Council possessing less 
wisdom than him. 
To underline their understanding of sh 5r ,a number of 
interviewees invoked the 
Sunnah. 9 The Prophet, it is pointed out, had no need to consult as he had access to 
divine wisdom. Yet, he did so at the Battles of Uhud and Badr and, significantly, 
accepted decisions "contrary to his own opinion". 10 Following Shamma', 
.. the Prophet was ordered by God to consult with others. 
The intention of this order 
was not for the Prophet to learn from the opinions of those around him - it was meant 
to teach those around him that they should consult. After all, the Prophet was receiving 
6 Cf. Abu Shannab, The Islamic Approach and the Subject of Democracy, p5. 
7 Cf. Yassin II (though Yassin also expressed the view that the Head of State can sometimes make 
independent decisions; see Chapter 6), Abu Shannab I&III, Shamma`, `Iyad'; Musa II; Taha, Abu Dhughri. 
For an overview of debate, see El-Awa, pp86-97. 
8 Which Schiff and Ya'ari mistakenly group under the IM (pp226-227). 
9 Abu Shannab III, Shamma', Hammad II, Muslih, `Iyad', `Ahmad'; `Iman'; Musa II. 
10 Shamma`. Also Abu Shannab III, `Ahmad'. 
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revelations from God so he did not really need to consult others. But the Prophet was 
teaching them that leadership comes through consultation. " 
The importance of shlrä is similarly believed to be derived from the fact that the 
successions of each of the first four Caliphs, known as the Rightly-Guided and thus an 
authoritative source of inspiration for Muslims, were decided (or at least ratified) by 
wider consultation, and that on issues of great importance, the first Caliphs, particularly 
`Umar Ibn al-Khattab, tended to consult beyond those constituting their everyday 
government. 12 
Scope of Shürä and the Issue of Borrowing from non-Islamic Systems 
Contrary to claims by Kramer and others who argue that because the Shari ah is "not 
legislated but revealed ... 
in the eyes of the fundamentalists it has already achieved 
perfection", " the IM regards legislation as an unfinished project, in need of constant re- 
interpretation as circumstances evolve. Its attitude towards the Shari äh is like Locke's 
to natural law: a divine law, partially known to humanity in the form of general 
principles through revelation and reason, to be transformed into a legal system through 
the mechanism of consent. 14 
Shrn-ä itself, the IM argues, has been revealed as a general principle, not as a specific 
political system. Why otherwise would each of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs have 
implemented the sh tirä command so differently? Consequently, the systems these 
11 Shamma`. 
12 Abu Shannab III. Regarding successions, Shamma`, Muslih; Musa II. 
13 Kramer, `Democracy', p38. 
14 See pp174-177. 
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Caliphs developed must be seen as illustrations of the principle; they are not to be 
copied literally. With Musa, 
Throughout these examples, there wasn't a specific system, of which we could say: this 
is the system Muslims follow. Because there were different systems, this leaves 
Muslims a wide range of possibilities for choosing what most suits their circumstances. 
[... ] Islam didn't indulge in details but drew a general picture ... 
Society and life evolve 
... Whatever is beneficial 
for you today, would not be beneficial for you tomorrow. So 
the human being should be allowed to be creative to choose what suits best. 15 
Shirä is the IM's proscribed method of decision-making. But it is also an ideal the 
realisation of which is dependent on the type of institutional mechanisms adopted, 
which, in turn, are chosen through sh rnrä. The scope of the IM's initial sh ik thus 
includes not only legislative and policy decisions, but also constitutional decisions about 
the kind of system to be adopted. 
The IM's advocacy of an Islamic state is one rooted in principles and values rather than 
in a dogmatic adherence to institutional specifics. Consequently, it is free to borrow 
from any political system, Islamic or not. In Abu Shannab's words, one can "select 
whichever system is better for one's life as long as one is applying and practising 'shurä 
democracy' in principle". " Thus, returning to Musa, 
How to achieve shurä in reality is left to the group that will rule the country. If we 
decide that democracy achieves the merits of shiir at this time, then we'll adopt 
democracy. If we find that there is some new methodology that better respects shürä 
and public opinion, then we will follow that ... we 
don't really care about [what this 
Is Musa II. Cf. also Abu Shannab III, Shamma`, Muslih. 
16 Abu Shannab III. 
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entity is called], what we care about is how to achieve the main ideals: justice, equality 
and respecting public opinion and the public interest... 17 
IM leaders welcome the adoption of Western political constructs, be they liberal or 
communist, on the grounds that Islam called Muslims to seek wisdom wherever it is 
found. " However, they warn against wholesale adoption of, say, democracy, as it 
carries within it flawed, un-Islamic components. One such is the notion of absolute 
popular sovereignty. This, Abu Shannab argues, 
Islam perceives ... as a usurpation of the sovereignty of the 
law (shay ä) descending 
from God. For, in unlimited freedom, there is a way out of the Islamic binding rules 
which God legislated to organise morals, life and relations between people. 19 
If the popular will is sovereign, morality becomes subservient to it and loses its status as 
an `objective' value system (however contested) to which one can appeal. Given that 
many are insufficiently mature to make the right decisions, or, in Hegelian terms, know 
the universal will, a morality theoretically rooted in the popular will is deemed 
problematic. The IM does not acknowledge that the actual form Islamic morality takes, 
despite its rootedness in revelation, is in fact heavily dependent on the consensus of 
contemporary interpretations, and thus already indirectly related to the popular will 
(Chapter 6.3). 
Secondly, in an almost Gramscian critique of Western-style democracy, the IM observes 
that, though 
17 Musa II. Cf, also Muslih. For scholarly perspective: EI-Awa, p36. 
18 Yassin 11, Abu Shannab I&IV&V, Dukhan, Zahhar 11, Hammad II, `Iyad'; Bahr, Musa I&II&IV, Na`ami, 
Khalas Conference Paper 3; Abu Dhughri. 
19 Cf. Abu Shannab, Democracy, p5. 
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in theory, the vote of big landowners, the elite, media moguls, ... is equal to the vote of 
the unemployed and the cheap labourers who represent the majority ..., 
in reality this 
majority follows the direction of the former who use their influence to form public 
opinion and distort the facts for the public. 20 
Musa illustrated this, saying 
Take the Congress of the United States of America. Not every person can become a 
Senator, only those with money in the range of $250 million. The regular man from the 
street cannot reach that level, .. 
[and without it he will not have] access to the media or 
the different power centres. So it becomes the democracy of the strong and the rich, 
not the democracy of everyone. 21 
This discrepancy between theory and practice is, according to the IM, partly caused by 
Western democracy having elevated the notion of the popular will above God's 
sovereignty. Following Musa again, 
Under such circumstances, morals become abstract ... and everyone can 
decide what a 
moral standard is. ... 
Whatever is deemed necessary by a group of people, ... they can 
pronounce it moral. ... So 
[they] can rule over society in wicked ways 22 
The result, Musa contended, is that values are created "according to cost and ... benefit", 
subjectively, without respect for `objective' moral values such as justice. " Without the 
20 Ibid, p3. Also Musa II. Cf. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp5-23,210-276. 
21 Musa H. Cf. Abu Shannab: "the electoral process is thus controlled by the strong, rather than the people" 
(Ibid., p4). 
22 Musa II. 
23 Musa 1. 
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restraint of God's boundaries, elites will rapidly become ruthless. Hence the distortion 
of democratic ideals in the West. 24 
Criticism of Western-style democracy, however, does not amount to a dismissal of the 
notions of the popular will and regular elections. For, as Abu Shannab insists, 
al-Khalrjah [Head of State] in the Islamic system represents the nation, not God. The 
community does not choose al-Khalah except to be their representative [nä'ib]; so he 
does not derive his authority except from representing the community which has ... the 
right to watch him and forbid him from getting beyond the borders of his brief. 
Islam, the IM contends, commands contractarian rule. At present, the Western 
parliamentary system with its recourse to elections is recognised as the best realisation 
thereof. In Musa's words, 
the modern method ... of parliamentary representation and 
different committees does 
not exist in Islamic history. This [method] ... can actually achieve a 
better way of 
shürä. 25 
The IM warns against the adoption of philosophical perspectives which contradict the 
Islamic notion of God's sovereignty. But it readily absorbs those elements of the 
Western democratic system which it believes conform to Islam. It even goes one step 
further, insisting these elements are simply modem manifestations of principles already 
posited by early Islam. Thus Abu Shannab argues 
24 This argument is rooted in the faith the IM has in the power of Islam to transform people, and limit their 
excesses. See also Chapter 6. 
25 Musa II. 
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Islamists don't find it embarrassing to accept democratic facts such as those 
guaranteeing the right to establish political parties and own public presses, to oppose 
and select rulers and representatives (nawaä) through the ballot and respect the results 
thereof, or such facts as the acceptance ... of the concept of rotation of authority, and 
the right to criticise and correct and oppose - because these meanings are included in 
Islam and the IM calls for more than these rights when the concept of shura is applied 
as the basis for the political system. 26 
Partly to justify its advocacy of mechanisms developed in the West, partly to prove that 
Islam had already established the principles underlying these mechanisms, the IM tends 
to depict early Islamic history in a way which merges Western and Islamic traditions. 
The Prophet consulting his Companions is presented as an imperative to consult the 
entire citizenry. Abu Shannab thus calls the decision of the Prophet at Badr "the 
people's selection" despite the fact that the record only mentions the opinions of 
(subsequent Caliphs) Abu Bakr and `Umar. The council of six `Umar appointed to 
choose a new Caliph is interpreted as a precursor of an elected legislative, despite its 
being an appointed council and including representatives of only one of `Umar's various 
constituencies. 27 Similarly, `Umar's dismissing a governor because his subjects had 
complained about him, despite the former deeming the latter "good and honest", is taken 
as illustrating the principle that only popular consent as expressed through elections can 
legitimise political authority - even though `Umar had appointed and dismissed the 
governor without elections. 9 
26 Abu Shannab, Democracy, p7. 
27 Abu Shannab III (cf. also `Iman'). The six appointed were Meccans from the Quraish tribe who had 
accompanied the Prophet on his flight from Mecca to Medina; the council did not include any Medinans or 
later converts (cf. Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, p70). Accordingly, Mujamma' 
Managing Director Muslih saw `Umar's succession as inspiring Islamists like Mawdudi to call for elite rule. 
He posited Abu Bakr's succession, decided in conclave by all leaders, as inspiring the notion of national 
elections. 
28 Abu Shannab (III) on the dismissal of Sa`ad Ibn Waqqas. 
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Ijmä` and Ijtihäd 
The classical concept of ijmä (consensus) underlies the IM's understanding of the 
nature of decision-making. 29 In line with its teleological approach to freedom (Chapter 
6.3), the IM believes in independent standards of right and wrong, rendering some 
decisions more right than others. Consensus is seen as one means of testing the 
rightness of a decision (where right is measured against what is known of God's 
principles), since the Prophet stated that "My community [ummah] shall never agree on 
an error". " In combination with Utihäd, a carefully circumscribed method of 
jurisprudential interpretation of Qur'än and Sunnah with the aid of such tools as 
analogical deduction (giyas) and considerations of public interest (ma. laljah mursalah), 
it was classically believed that the conclusions thus reached were objectively right 
because both the rules of ijtihäd and the fact that all agreed gave some guarantee that 
personal preferences and partial perspectives had been neutralised. Moreover, since 
any residue of doubt was believed to result in disagreement, agreement was regarded as 
testifying to the truth of the decision. " However, since human interpretation is 
considered to be fallible, resulting in multiple interpretations concerning speculative 
(, -anni), as opposed to definitive (qal 1), revelations, scholars have tended to agree that 
Unis is almost impossible to achieve in practice. Consequently, it was never formally 
institutionalised. 32 
The IM's application of the notion of ijmä to the workings and institutions of 
government has been inspired by such modern Islamic scholars as Muhammad Iqbal 
who at the start of this century questioned why ijmä had "rarely assumed the form of a 
29 Cf. Yassin II, Abu Shannab IV; Board Members al-Shabbat; Masri, Abu Dhughri. 
30 This and similar ali dRh quoted in Mohammad Karnali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, pp178-180. 
31 Karnali, pp180-182. 
32 Cf. Karnali, ppl67-172,182-185,190-192. 
BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND DISSENT 236 
permanent institution", and argued that transferring the notion of ijtihäd "from 
individual representatives of [legal] schools [as has been the practice for most of Islam's 
history] to a Muslim legislative assembly ... 
is the only possible form ijmä can take in 
modern times". 33 
Through the centuries, scholars have debated whether the above Had th stipulates 
unanimity or merely majority rule, and whether the decision-making `ummah' should 
encompass the entire citizenry, or only the mujtahidun (those entitled to practise ijtihäd, 
and thus likely to be the most knowledgeable). The IM follows the interpretation al- 
Shafi` i (d. 820) gave to the above Hadith that "the people at large cannot agree on an 
error" - not just the mujtahidun34 - and thus seeks to include, through consultations and 
referenda, the people at large in the legislative process 35 
However, some in the IM doubt the level of wisdom one can expect in ordinary people. 
Echoing Mawdudi's conclusion that "the great mass of the common people are 
incapable of perceiving their own true interests" unless they are taught the "true Islamic 
mentality", 36 members of Women's Kutlah 1 summarised the dilemma, arguing: 
President SC: Normal people cannot just be given the right to decide because 
they may look at the surface only. 
Kutlah Member: Therefore, there must be certain regulations, like not serving 
just your own desires [... ] We cannot ignore people, but we 
also cannot give them the absolute right to choose. 
33 Muhammad Iqbal, Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, ppl73,174. Some 
interviewees mentioned they had studied Iqbal; the Mithaq also quotes Iqbal. 
34 Shafi`i, Risalah (trans. Khadduri), p285; quoted in Karnali, p181. 
35 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Shamma`. Abu Shannab pointed to Turabi who advocates an "intensive procedure 
of hearings, research, and deliberations" with "anyone who knows anything well enough to relate it to God", 
whether "a chemist, an engineer, an economist, or a jurist" (p245). See also footnote 87. 
36 Mawdudi, Theory, pp2I-22; Process, pp35-36. 
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A Hamas supporter similarly observed: 
democracy says that people should govern themselves by themselves or by electing 
others. This is right. But suppose that these people are bad? They would elect bad 
people like them. So this contradicts with Islam. 37 
Besides these students, a few leaders expressed concerns about the low level of 
independent thinking in (some) ordinary party supporters, but largely blamed the 
occupation and the Intifada for this. 38 Though such attitudes have led modernists and 
essentialists to conclude that Islamists tend towards authoritarianism, similar 
reservations about popular opinion have been made by prominent liberals, such as John 
Stuart Mill. 39 Failure to adequately address this issue facilitates the manipulation of 
votes by authoritarian demagogues. 
The IM's solution is not to propose a cleritocracy, as some modernists maintain, 
demanding that Majlis candidates be mujtahidun, or that their candidacy be vetted by a 
Council of Mujtahidun (resembling the Iranian Council of Guardians), " but to propose a 
partnership between experts and representatives, " in which the latter, have the final 
37 `Ashraf (member during Intifada). 
38 Abu Shannab V and Musa IV on the IM, Hammad II in general. 
39 Mill suggested giving multiple votes to those who had enjoyed higher education until the whole 
population was sufficiently educated (Considerations on Representative Government, pp336-341). Cf. also 
elite theory criticisms, e. g. J. S. Schumpeter's observation that "the typical citizen drops down to a lower level 
of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues ... 
in a way which he would readily 
recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again" (Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, p262). 
40 Yassin II, Abu Shannab III. `Narr' and Taha did propose a body which monitored candidates. Given the 
support for self-nomination (Chapter 6, footnote 176), though, the majority of interviewees appeared to 
support Yassin and Abu Shannab. Iqbal similarly advocated a modem assembly containing laymen besides 
mujtahidun (Ahmad Hasan, `Modem Trends in Ijma", Islamic Studies XII(2), p135). 
41 Cf. Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab II&III, Zahhar III, Haniyyah I, `Ibrahim', Intifada Cell I, `lyad'; Board 
Members al-Shabbat; Bahr, Hamdan; Masri. 
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word because they alone have a popular mandate! ' First, despite queries about the 
electorate's lack of wisdom, the IM expects the electorate to return, in their own interest, 
candidates with some practical expertise and a working knowledge of Islamic law, and 
sees the representativeness of the Majlfs as some guarantee that a sufficient level of 
scientific and practical expertise covering all areas of life and state will be present. 43 
The IM describes the legislative process as ijtihäd, 44 thus implying the rigour of ijtihäd 
be applied to legislative decision-making (even though the representatives need not be 
niujtahidun). But it seems to simultaneously rely on the neutralising effect of 
representativeness in ironing out personal and factional interests, and so render the final 
decisions optimally `objective'. 
By not insisting on mujtahid status, the IM mirrors early Muslim practice in which 
leaders were generally not formally schooled in religion and jurisprudence as 
Conversely, it also echoes the insights of Western political theorists such as Giovanni 
Sartori who observed that the "question of rationality in voting behavior" is redundant 
because 
If, in fact, elections decide about who will decide, the implication is that the burden of 
rationality does not rest ... on electorates: 
It is shifted on to their representatives ... 
46 
42 Cf. Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab II&III, Zahhar III. 
43 Yassin II, Abu Shannab III, Dukhan (did not insist on elections, only on inclusion of wide variety of 
experts and leaders), Haniyyah I, `Ibrahim', Hamas Supporters Gaza, Intifada Cell 111, `Iyad'; Board Members 
al-Shabbat; Bahr (I did not discuss this with other Khalas members; judging by their Majlfs' composition, they 
do not insist on a State Majlis being mujtahidun); Masri, Abu Dhughri, Women's Kutlah 1. Some suggested 
Majlis candidates need PhDs (Intifada Cell), others a good level of expertise (Dukhan, `Ibrahim', 'Iyad'; 
Board Members al-Shabbat; Women's Kutlah 1). All insisted, or implied, that candidates have working 
knowledge of the Shari ah and other laws (cf. Abu Shannab, Abu Dhughri). Traditionally, "those who guide 
the community" were expected to have religious erudition (tafaqquh); Kamali, pp372-374. See also El-Awa, 
pp7l-74. 
44 Cf. Yassin H. 
45 Cf. El-Awa, pp72-74. 
46 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p110. 
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Second, where further expertise is needed, the IM entitles the Majlis to appoint advisory 
expert committees, the Head of State to appoint a limited number of unelected experts to 
his government 47 To keep legislative power within the Maju s, Abu Shannab and 
Zahhar suggested that experts merely advance a number of sound alternatives, on which 
the representatives subsequently vote 48 This proposition again echoes Sartori's 
argument that, given the technological and economic advances of the modern world, 
states need planning, " and thus high expertise and "autonomy of decision". On both 
counts politicians generally fail: they are not chosen on grounds of expertise ("the 
democratic system neither presupposes nor requires competency"), and they are under 
pressure of "sectorial and short-term demands". Enter the experts, and with them a 
democratic deficiency: 
the more we lean on the demos, the less we are likely to achieve rational planning; ... 
the more we lean on the expert, the less democratic we are ... 
50 
This deficiency can be minimised, Sartori suggests, if one distinguishes between 
"democracy in input" ("how much the voice of the people counts") and "democracy in 
output" ("how much the people benefit"), and between means and ends. As long as 
"democracy in input" can ensure that "democracy in output" remains democratic, and as 
long as the "government of experts" refrains from determining the electorate's ends and 
limits itself to concern over means, the democratic process is reasonably safeguarded - 
though tensions will continue to exist. " The IM's emphasis on the precedence of 
election over expertise resembles Sartori's conclusion that `democracy in output' be 
47 Cf. Yassin I&II, Abu Shannab II&III, Zahhar III, Haniyyah 1, 'Ibrahim', `Iyad'; Bahr; Masri. 
48 Abu Shannab III, Zahhar III. 
49 Cf. also `Iyad'; Hamdan; Masri. 
50 Sartori, p427. 
51 Sartori, pp426-433. 
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subject to `democracy in input'. Though differing from Sartori on the appropriateness 
of proposing ends, 52 the IM subordinates the definition of communal ends (personal 
ends are left to the individual) to consensual approval (see Chapter 7.2), thus ensuring 
the safeguarding of `democracy in input'. 
Finally, the IM envisages that the process of creating, and subsequently living in, an 
Islamic state will raise the level of wisdom in the general populace (a Hegelian notion). 
Witnessing leaders meticulously obeying the rules they set and acting for the communal 
good rather than self- or clan-promotion (see the discussion of the IM's notion of 
`servant leadership' in Chapter 6), observing jurists and experts wrestling with issues of 
equality and justice, and being properly educated in morality, not only through an 
improved educational system but also through a media which no longer narrowly serves 
the interests of the elite, people are expected to grow in Islamic awareness. 53 
One Version of Truth or Many? 
The IM's insistence on truth and divine will suggests that it only allows for one view of 
right, disallowing dissent - thus fuelling the modernist conclusion that the IM is 
authoritarian. There is a tradition in Islam which is wary of the divisive effects of 
discord. 54 But, for all its prescriptiveness, the IM still allows for multiple interpretations 
of `truth'. 
52 See Chapters 6.2-3 and 7.2. There is an interesting parallel to be explored between the IM and Western 
contemporary philosophers Charles Taylor (Sources of the Sei and Alisdair Maclntyre (After Virtue) who 
both, and for different reasons, conclude that one of the primary reasons for the moral confusion of the modern 
West is the loss of ends-oriented values. 
53 Cf. Abu Shannab I, Zahhar II, Hammad I&II; Bahr. Implied by Yassin II, Abu Shannab, Democracy; 
Musa II, Badawil; Women's Kutlah 2. 
54 Cf. Ghazali warning against the "tyranny exerted by the subjects against each other" (see p168). 
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Musa recognised that an Islamic state can be created in multiple ways. Abu Shannab 
admired classical jurist Imam Malik for chastising the rulers of his day for wishing to 
prevent others from interpreting his interpretations differently. Zahhar pointed to the 
existence of fundamental differences between the four main schools of Islamic law, and 
disagreed with Abu Shannab on whether zakah (legally obligatory alms) would be 
sufficient taxation in an Islamic state. And an Intifada Cell member indicated awareness 
of the possibility of multiple `right' interpretations when telling my interpreter: "Don't 
say we are wrong - that is your point of view; this is ours". 
" The IM also insists on 
having a plurality of candidates for Head of State, 56 demarcating it from movements 
with a more literalist approach to the Islamic canon such as al-Salafiyyun who claim 
that, in an Islamic state, just as truth is one, one obvious candidate for "Caliph' 'will 
appear who will stand out from all others in wisdoms' 
A public illustration is a 1991 Hamas statement saying that 
difference of opinion and a variety of political interpretations and positions is natural 
and a healthy phenomenon which all nations have, since "having different opinions 
does not necessarily ruin good relationships" [Arab saying]. 58 
Though I did not discuss this issue with all interviewees, most of those asked favoured a 
multi-party system in an Islamic state (with the proviso that the parties would not 
55 Musa II, Abu Shannab II, Zahhar II, Intifada Cell Il. Others indicating acceptance of `multiple truths' 
and dissent: cf. Hammad II, Shamma`, Muslih, 'Muhammad', `Ashraf; Masri, `Yusuf. `Multiple truths', as 
long as within Islamic framework: Dukhan; Bahr. Some of Hamas Supporters Gaza and the Intifada Cell were 
uncomfortable with the idea of 'multiple truths'. 
56 Abu Shannab (III) criticised Sudan and other Arab countries for presenting the people with one choice 
only. 
57 Al-Qur'an wa'l-Sunnah. 
58 `Appeal to the righteous and wise in our beloved nation' (06.11.1991) quoted in Hrub, p237. Similar 
expressions of respect for plurality of views in Hrub, pp233-238; Khalas Conference Papers 1 &2&3; Khalas 
Political Programme, pp4,24. 
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undermine the consensually agreed Islamic basis of the state). " The few who did not, 
argued that Islam is one, while unbelief is multivocal 6° Underlying their position, 
however, seemed to be fear of the divisive nature of multi-partyism, as particularistic 
party loyalty could conflict with commitment to `truth' or the universal 6' 
Consequently, while support for multi-partyism is an indication of a pluralistic attitude 
towards `truth', opposition thereto cannot be automatically taken as proof of a dogmatic 
approach to the unicity of `truth' (though it often is). 
Abu Shannab justified the view that multiple acceptable interpretations of truth coexist 
by pointing to ayäh 8: 67 which revealed that the decision the Prophet had taken in shrlrä 
at the battle of Badr had been wrong. This, he argued, was God's way of teaching 
humanity to value shwkä over rightness: 
God 
... 
left it, because this is a lesson ofshurä. It was not God's will but ... the 
people's choice. 62 
Thus it is implied that God values the process of decision-making over getting it right as 
the former teaches people more about right and wrong than the imposition of a divine 
decision. 63 
The IM is here building on the classical notion that ßmä holds within it a deep respect 
for the dissenting voice as the potential repository of truth -a notion which has meant, 
according to some at least, that minority opinions among leaders and ülamä' were 
59 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Hammad 1, Intifada Cell III; Bahr, Musa II, Na'ami. 
60 `Narr'. Implied also by one of Hamas Supporters Gaza. 
61 Zahhar II. 
62 Abu Shannab 111. Cf. Karnali, pp381-382. 
63 This corresponds with the IM's Hegelian position that rational freedom cannot be forced (Chapter 6). 
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respected in early Islam 64 This is a logical outcome of the classical conviction that 
ijtihäd involves speculation and thus the possibility of error. " Failure to reach jmä is 
deemed a possible indication that the `truth' proposed by the majority may prove a 
fallacy. Though such a position undermines faith in the veracity of majority rule (see 
Chapter 7.3), it also throws up a strong defence of the minority view, and can inspire 
acceptance of the principle to agree to disagree. " This approach is sustained by iyät 
such as 29: 69, which speaks of God guiding "those who strive" in "Our paths", rather 
than `path'. 67 The IM thus strikes what is, at times, an uneasy balance between striving 
for unanimity and accepting that dissent is essential to arriving at truth - echoing J. S. 
Mill's defence of the freedom of opinion. 68 
7.2 CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 
The IM deems consultation particularly important in the creation of an Islamic 
constitution, in order to create a consensus on rules and ends. In this, it echoes Lively's 
critique of contemporary theories of pluralistic society 69 There is, Lively contends, an 
inherent tension in the role of representative government. It should "both represent the 
divisions within society and resolve those differences", be both impartial and champion 
partisan demands. Without the notion of consensus, this is impossible. Reviewing two 
popular pluralistic models of the state as neutral `arbiter' and the state as neutral `arena' 
64 Cf. Hasan, pp264-266; Karnali, pp171-172; Kerr, pp66-102. 
65 Karnali, p367; Hasan, pp264-266,269. 
66 Cf. Khalas Conference Paper 2 calling all parties to "[agree] on what is agreeable and excus[e] each 
other for what we differ on" concerning Palestine's future. 
67 Cf. Karnali, p373. This view is implicit in e. g. Abu Shannab's and Hammad's discourse. 
68 See Chapter 8.2.4. 
69 Jack Lively, `Pluralism and Consensus' in Pierre Birnbaum, etc. (eds), Democracy, Consensus and 
Social Contract, pp 185-202. 
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(where the government is one among many constituent groups, differentiated only by the 
fact its self-interest is to be seen to resolve conflicts), Lively argues that, while neither 
mentions the need for consensus, both would fail without it - the former because for 
arbitration to be seen as neutral, it must operate within a set of principles acceptable to 
all, the latter because the `arena' will only be considered neutral if the initial distribution 
of resources and access is acceptable to all. 
Lively's argument is a reproach of a dominant strand of pluralist thinking which has 
elevated the necessary conflict between group interests and the general interest to an 
indispensable guarantor against authoritarianism, while ignoring the need for a basic 
consensus to counterbalance these centrifugal forces. 7° This strand of pluralism is so 
focussed on the need to protect groups and individuals from the Leviathan of a monist 
state by diffusing power that it sacrifices the ideal of consensus. The IM's emphasis on 
community-wide consensus-building is similarly a critique of those who regard pursuing 
factional interests as the essence of politics. " Consultation, it argues, will foster 
community-wide tawäfuq (harmony) by both including and heeding the whole 
community, thus promoting a sense of ownership towards the state project. 
Yet, as hinted at in the discussion of the IM's teleological view of freedom and the state 
(Chapter 6.2-3), there is a potential tension between the IM's prescriptive understanding 
of right and the notion of an open-ended consultation. I have already alluded to the fact 
that the IM recognises that interpretations of `truth' can be multiple, and that its 
advocacy of an Islamic state is rooted in principles rather than a dogmatic positing of 
institutional specifics. 
70 Lively, pp187-190. 
71 Zahhar II, Hammad I; Bahr, Khalas Conference Paper 1; Women's Kutlah 2. See also Hrub quoting 
Muhammad Nazzal (West Bank Hamas leader): "we do not prefer divisions and factionalism... But in the end 
we respect the interpretations of others... " (p236). 
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Value Consensus versus Procedural Consensus 
To fully understand the IM's approach, it is useful to employ Sartori's distinction 
between value consensus (concerning the basic values and goals of a community), 
procedural consensus (concerning the procedures by which decisions are taken) and 
policy consensus. 72 The first two concern `constitutional decisions', the third 
`operational decisions'. At a procedural level, the IM is willing to consult. Numerous 
interviewees underlined Islam's flexibility, insisting that the constitutional make-up of 
the Islamic state is open to discussion, as long as it is based on Islamic principles! ' It is 
less willing at a value level, in line with its prescriptive attitude to truth. It confidently 
posits its value system as right, and presumes that it will prevail while others, such as 
the communists', will fade. 74 
Though this attitude seems to corroborate the modernist-essentialist claim that Islamists 
are anti-pluralistic, it in fact refutes it. For a democracy to function, Sartori notes, 
procedural consensus is a "necessary condition". Without it there would be continuous 
conflict. Value consensus, conversely, is only a "facilitating condition". The IM 
similarly insists on consultation at a procedural level, knowing that a willing acceptance 
of procedural rules (which necessarily involves some level of value consensus regarding 
the ends of the state) enables multiple value systems to live side by side. By the same 
token, it refuses to compromise on values, in the knowledge that value consensus is non- 
essential. 
72 Sartori, pp90-92. 
73 Cf. Abu Shannab II&III&IV, Haniyyah I, Hammad I, Muslih; Bahr, Musa II; Women's Kutlah 1, 
Women's Kutlah 2. While others (cf. Yassin I&II, Zahhar II&III, Shamma`; Taha, Abu Dhughri) gave the 
impression that the Islamic system was more or less fixed, the fact they simultaneously held that each people 
and era were free to adapt the Islamic system to their situation, indicates that they too focussed on principles 
rather than institutional specifics. 
74 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Dukhan, Hammad 1, two of Hamas Supporters Gaza. 
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Corroborating this reading, the IM indeed displays a willingness to cohabit with 
different value systems, and compromise on procedures. 75 Illustrating this, all those 
asked maintained that, though personally advocating an Islamic state, they would abide 
by a majority decision regarding the form Palestine's statehood would take - even if this 
meant accepting a secular democratic state. 76 Kutlah leader `Arafa al-Masri expressed 
this, saying 
If a majority voted for a secular state, the minority should respect the majority opinion, 
and would not continue to work towards an Islamic state. 
Similarly, unequivocal abhorrence was expressed at the notion of establishing an Islamic 
state in Palestine by force. " In line with its Hegelian attitude to freedom, the IM holds 
coerced consensus to be meaningless. 
Certainty concerning one's values enables one to be more tolerant towards other- 
thinkers. In this vein, Hammad argued in al-Risalah, 
75 In this, the IM closely follows the original Egyptian Brethren's insistence that Islamic rule would only 
work "as long as the nation wants to be truly Muslim" (see Chapter 6, footnote 95). 
76 Abu Shannab III, Dukhan, Haniyyah I, Hammad I, Muslih, Intifada Cell, `Nasr'; Bahr, Badawil; Masri, 
Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf, Leader Kutlah-Azhar. Others were not asked this question. See also Hrub quoting 
Yassin, Zahhar and Rantisi saying that "Harnas would respect the opinion of the Palestinian street [regarding 
the nature of a future state], even if it was the opposite of its own wish" (pp234-235). 
77 Abu Shannab III, Haniyyah 1, Hammad I, Intifada Cell III; Bahr, Badawil, Na'ami; Masri, Abu Dhughri, 
`Yusuf. Others were not asked this question. Similar view expressed in Hijazi's interview with Zahhar, 
`Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct', Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV(3), p83-84. 
Regarding the coup which brought the Sudanese Islamists to power, those asked to comment (Abu Shannab 
III, Na`ami, Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf) condemned it, some qualifying their condemnation, arguing that all 
Sudanese governments have ruled on the back of military power and that there was no other way to establish 
an Islamic state there. Only Haniyyah justified the coup on the grounds that it was bloodless, and in harmony 
with the wishes of the people. 
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God gave a mind to both Muslims and unbelievers, and to everyone of them part of 
wrong and right. The unbeliever can thus speak truth, and it should be accepted, not 
rejected because he is an unbeliever. 8 
If one is clear about one's goals, one is in a stronger position to adopt eclectically from 
others and judge how their systems promote or undermine one's goals. One is also 
buffeted by the belief that one's ideas will prove the stronger, thus facilitating the 
decision to embark on an open-ended consultation. However, this is only so if one is 
not fearful of others and their `corrupting' influence - in which case the projected 
`certainty' is really a barrier against debate, a camouflage for uncertainty about whether 
one's values would stand up against criticism. 
Even if the modernist texts are only partially right, the IM of the 1980s appears to have 
been less tolerant than today's IM. Musa II acknowledged that the Islamists then felt 
they had the right, more than others ..., to express themselves 
because they were the 
ones with... righteousness. To be self-critical ..., 
both the Islamic and the secular 
mentality were backward. Both had a mentality that depended on the logic of power, 
not debate - the logic of reaction, conflict and tit-for-tat 
79 
Whether this mentality was caused mainly by being under occupation (see Chapter 4), or 
also by fear of corruption by others, and a less robust attitude towards its own value 
system, is difficult to conclude. However, circumstances have begun to change on both 
counts. The lawlessness and humiliation of occupation have been replaced with a more 
lawful Palestinian Authority. Fear of the ideological other has diminished following 
78 A1-Risalah 06.04.1998, p5. Cf. also Abu Shannab III&IV, Hammad 11, `Iyad'; Khalas Conference Paper 
3. Zahhar 11 implied a similar stance. 
79 Cf. also Hammad II, `Muhammad'. Abu Shannab I implied this too. 
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prison encounters between leftists and Islamists during the Intifada, 80 and the subsequent 
leftist-Islamist alliance against Fatah and the Peace Process. The IM also appears to be 
more secure in itself, and its position in society. The prison encounter with the Left did 
not corrupt the IM's value system but deepened it - as meeting an ideological other 
often does through the contrast it offers. Abu Shannab's reading of ffyah 8: 67 (p241) is 
illustrative of this more self-confident attitude, as is Hammad's readiness to learn from 
communists. 
Open-Ended Consultation versus Ends-Oriented Consultation 
Attitudes towards the consultation process betray the IM's ideological confidence. It is 
willing to accept compromise on procedural matters, but it simultaneously expects 
people to be eventually swayed by its arguments for freedom, justice and equality - 
particularly once procedures are accepted which reflect their values. " This approach is 
informed by the IM's conviction that the consultative process itself is educational - 
mirroring the gradual revelation of the Qur'an which established an Islamic state 
through incremental, voluntary internalisation of Islamic values 82 Hammad illustrated 
this with the example of alcohol in the Qur'an, observing its prohibition was not 
introduced overnight but gradually explained over years to ensure people understood 
why they should abstain from alcohol. " 
80 Abu Shannab I, Hammad II, Intifada Cell 11, 'Nasr'; Abu Dhughri. PFLP affiliates Yunis al-Jarro` I, 
`Adli Yazuri , `Ziad' & `Husam' also mentioned this. See also Chapter 8.2.5. 
81 Cf. Hammad II. Abu Shannab III, Haniyyah I; Bahr, Musa II, Badawil implied this too. 
82 This reading owes much to Mawdudi, Process, pp3,17-19,31-36,40-47 (Qutb, Milestones, pp42-52 
reiterates Mawdudi's argument) - the difference being that Mawdudi is more concerned than the IM seems to 
be that a process which includes non-Islamic (e. g. nationalist) elements will fatally jeopardise the Islamic end 
result as he believes that "the nature of a state is wholly determined by the nature of the circumstances which 
underlie its birth and formation". 
83 Hammad I. 
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An Islamic state cannot arise out of imposed institutions. It can only result from a 
society which has voluntarily internalised Islamic values, so that zakah is given out of 
moral conviction rather than legal duty, and even thieves (following the example of 
society's leaders) wish to give themselves up in order to receive the punishment they 
themselves believe they deserve. " Consequently, the modern Islamic state must evolve 
slowly, in harmony (tawäfuq) with and with the consent and full understanding of 
society. In Hammad's words: 
I think that Islamic law should not be imposed in one moment - there are thousands of 
issues which need an answer before we can implement them. ... So I think at this point, 
the IM should not ask to implement Islamic law but first of all prepare society ... 
85 
Hence the IM's emphases on education86 and on extensive constitutional consultations 
preceding the establishment of an Islamic state. 87 And hence also the tension between 
divine right and consultation. If consultation is truly consultative, its outcome is 
undetermined. But if it is to educate people to discover and will, in Hegelian terms, the 
universal within themselves (Chapter 6.3), 88 predetermination enters. 
Here it is instructive to turn to Dankwart Rustow's theory of democratisation. On the 
basis of empirical case studies, Rustow expects that the tactical adoption of a 
84 Implied by Yassin II, Abu Shannab I, Dukhan, Zahhar II, Haniyyah 11, two of Hamas Supporters Gaza; 
Bahr. One of the reasons frequently given for why members joined the IM was the observation that its 
members practise what they preach. 
85 Hammad II. 
86 Cf. Yassin II, Abu Shannab 1. Of the 22 Communiques from the Intifada's first year featured in Mishal, 8 
emphasise the importance of education. 
87 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Hammad II; Na`ami. Cf. also calls for an ongoing consultation with all the different 
factions on the future of Palestine in Khalas Conference Papers 1&2. 
88 Cf. similarly J. S. Mill's argument that "Among the foremost benefits of free government is that 
education of the intelligence and of the sentiments, which is carried down to the very lowest ranks of the 
people when they are called to take a part in acts which directly affect the great interests of their country " 
(Representative Government, p327). 
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democratic-type pact by all parties, on the basis that it is the most lucrative way forward 
for all concerned, will eventually lead to the internalisation of democratic rules by the 
majority of citizens. " Rustow does not demand that, at the outset, any of the players are 
`democratic' by conviction, only that the situation is thus that the breaking of the 
democratic rules will adversely affect the guilty party. Applying Sartori's 
characterisation of consensus levels to this approach, it seems that Rustow expects that 
by contractual acceptance of democratic-type procedures, a form of consensus on 
democratic values will gradually evolve. For this to happen, the initial rules must be 
consensually determined and agreed upon by all parties so that policy and distributive 
decisions can be taken without resulting in civil war. 
The IM's approach is similar. It too expects that, once procedural consensus has been 
reached, the community will gradually come to value consensus, particularly if the 
procedures are sufficiently Islamic/Islamist to be producing justice and social equality? ' 
Like Rustow who presupposes that the end result will be a consensus on democratic 
values, it presupposes that participation in the shw-ä process will result in a consensus 
on Islamist values. And like Rustow, it bases this supposition on the belief that its 
values promote justice, equality and freedom. Seen from this perspective, the IM's 
certitude that its values will prevail is as much or as little sinister (depending on one's 
view), as Rustow's and indeed many of the West's democratisation agencies. 
89 Dankwart Rustow, `Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics 2-3, 
pp337-63. Discussed in Waterbury, p35. 
90 Cf. view that communism will fade once Islamicly-based freedom, justice and equality are established 
(see footnote 71). This resembles Mawdudi's argument for the Islamic state (Process). 
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7.3 UNANIMITY AND MAJORITY RULE 
The IM's process of decision-making is modelled on the fjmä `(consensus) ideal of the 
first Muslim community. However, it is sufficiently pragmatic to realise that unanimity 
is an ineffective, and potentially costly, method of decision-making as each participant 
will have an effective veto and can thus extract unacceptable concessions. 
Consequently, the IM considers a majority sufficient on the understanding that 
unanimity remains the ideal. 91 
Following this revised ijmä `model, the nearer to unanimity, the more likely a decision is 
to reflect `truth' 92 The IM therefore generally insists on a weighted majority of around 
two-thirds regarding constitutional or legislative decisions. If a proposal wins 51%, 
Zahhar suggested it be referred back to a committee of experts and representatives 
whose task is to forge a compromise proposal which will carry a larger majority - and 
93 so increase the probability that the decision is right. 
This attitude closely mirrors conclusions reached by Buchanan and Tullock. Starting 
from the premise that individuals have different interests and try to further these by 
means of political activity, Buchanan and Tullock explore the cost-efficiency of 
different majority rule decision-making procedures in a large society 94 Simple majority 
rule, they find, results in the largest number of people requiring to accept, and pay for, 
91 Cf. Yassin 11, Zahhar III, Shamma', Hammad II, Muslih, `Ibrahim'; `Iman', Board Members al-Shabbat; 
Masri, Taha, Abu Dhughri. Abu Shannab II&III, Dukhan, Haniyyah I, Intifada Cell III, `Nasr', Badawil, 
`Yusuf, Women's Kutlah 1, Leader Kutlah-Azhar implied it. The other interviewees did not discuss this 
issue. 
92 Abu Shannab IV: "a group decision is better than an individual decision - even if the individual is right. 
This encourages democratic behaviour". This follows Muhammad `Abduh's argument that "the majority is 
normally less exposed to misjudgment than the individual" (quoted in El-Awa, p97). 
93 Zahhar III. 
94 Cf. Buchanan & Tullock, pp97-116,131-145. For a synopsis see Norman Barry, Modern Political 
Theory, pp288-289. 
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public action they themselves had opposed, teaching individuals they will lose out 
unless they self-centeredly maximise their interests at others's expense. Under 
unanimity, conversely, one has high bargaining costs, pushed up by minority coalitions 
in exchange for agreeing to any third-party proposal, and the process is lengthy. 
According to Buchanan and Tullock's calculations, a weighted majority is the optimal 
median. However, like the IM, they insist that, though practicality demands majority 
rule, consensus should remain the ideal: 
These [majority] variants [on the unanimity rule] will be rationally chosen, not because 
they will produce "better" collective decisions (they will not), but rather because, on 
balance, the sheer weight of the costs involved in reaching decisions unanimously 
dictates some departure from the "ideal" rule. ... [M]any scholars seem to have 
overlooked the central place that the unanimity rule must occupy in any normative 
theory of democratic government. We have witnessed an inversion whereby ... 
majority rule has been elevated to the status which the unanimity rule should occupy. 
At best, majority rule should be viewed as one among many practical expedients made 
necessary by the costs of securing widespread agreement... when ... 
interests diverge. 5 
Despite the philosophical distance between the notion of consensus as a means to 
arriving at truth and the logic of cost-efficiency, both arguments arrive at the same 
conclusion - indicating that, despite philosophical differences, Western and Islamist 
theorists are not as far apart in terms of practical solutions as modernist-essentialist 
scholars have generally inferred. 
At an operational level, the IM appears to be more willing to lower its ideal of 
unanimity, being content with a mere simple majority (see `Praxis Analysis'). Reasons 
for this are, firstly, that operational decisions must generally be made at a faster rate than 
95 Buchanan, p96. 
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constitutional decisions. Secondly, their subject matter does not directly concern God's 
law, nor are they binding on generations to come as they concern such temporal matters 
as the allocation of resources. Thirdly, the body most regularly involved in operational 
decisions, the government, is envisaged to be operating in a spirit of tawäfuq (harmony). 
Tawäfuq is closely linked with value consensus. If a high level of consensus exists 
regarding core values, particularly regarding the ends of government, generally a higher 
level of trust results, leading to a greater willingness to accept compromises because one 
feels a sense of ownership towards the collective project, and trusts one's `detractor' to 
have the same ends in mind. Within a government, one is more likely to find a higher 
level of tawäfuq than in the Majlis or the state at large - even though the IM's proposed 
consultative process is intended to raise the general level of tawäfuq through consensus- 
building on procedures and communal ends. 
A further reason for this difference in attitude towards constitutional and operational 
decision-making is the fact, expounded by Buchanan and Tullock, that constitutional 
and operational decisions are generally qualitatively different. Contrary to popular and 
academic opinion, Buchanan and Tullock argue, political bargaining is not necessarily a 
zero-sum game (meaning that one side of an agreement loses by the same amount as the 
winners win). Though operational decisions about, for example, goods distribution tend 
to be zero-sum decisions - money can only be allocated once - constitutional decisions 
tend to be non-zero-sum decisions as all those party to the contract may gain from it. A 
thief, they argue, is likely to support laws protecting property, despite the risk of 
imprisonment, because they also protect his property. Because of this qualitative 
difference, operational and constitutional decision-making should be approached 
differently. Since constitutional decisions both need and are likely to achieve the 
highest level of consensus to be effective, and because they occur relatively 
infrequently, unanimity or a weighted majority is an obvious choice. Operational 
decisions, conversely, occur too frequently to justify the cost of a weighted majority; 
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moreover, their zero-sum status renders such a majority unlikely. Buchanan and 
Tullock thus conclude, mirroring the IM: 
there is no necessary inconsistency implied in the adoption of, say, simple majority rule 
for the making of certain everyday decisions for the group with respect to those 
activities that have been explicitly collectivised, and the insistence on unanimity of 
consensus on changes in the fundamental organizational rules. 96 
7.4 PRAXIS ANALYSIS 
In the following I will analyse IM praxis regarding consensus-building, majority rule, 
dissent and tolerance of others. But first, I will briefly review the composition of the 
IM's leadership, with a view to establishing how the IM values expertise in relation to 
representativeness, and answering the modernist charge that the IM champions a 
cleritocracy. Significantly, none of Hamas's top leadership have had a clerical training 
- though all appear to have a solid grounding in Islam and Islamic law. Yassin is a 
school teacher, Abu Shannab an engineer, Rantisi and Zahhar medical doctors, Yazuri a 
pharmacist, Maqadmah a dentist. Though some, like Yassin, are called `shaykh', this 
title merely expresses respect. Hizb al-Khalas is likewise largely made up of 
professionals while al-Kutlah's leadership includes students from many different 
disciplines. 97 
That the IM greatly respects expertise, is obvious from the reverence both leaders and 
led displayed towards the learned. In discussing intricate issues of Islamic law, Abu 
Shannab referred to the opinions of scholars like Qaradawi and Ghannouchi, 
96 Buchanan, pp250-251. 
97 1 have not investigated the composition of the Boards of the various charities. 
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emphasising that, as a non-expert, his own opinion was worth little. " Most ordinary 
members refrained from expressing opinions on intricate issues concerning the Islamic 
state, if they felt insufficiently knowledgeable on the matter, instead urging me to turn to 
the ulamä'. 99 Yet, the fact that so few ülamä' are actually represented in the top 
echelons of Hamas or Hizb al-Khalas, despite the existence of close relations, appears to 
corroborate my reading that the IM does not champion a cleritocracy - although it is 
possible that the absence of ülamä' is not reflective of the IM's values but of the latter's 
unwillingness to be publicly associated with the IM. '°° 
7.4.1 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
All IM institutions researched claim to take operational decisions by majority rule, while 
aiming at consensus as the ideal. 1°' Members of the seven-strong Board of the 
Jam`iyyah al-Shabbat, for instance, operate what amounts to a consensus-oriented 
weighted majority rule, in which the minority, after arguing its case and failing to 
98 Abu Shannab III (e. g. when justifying his position that communists be included in the body politic of an 
Islamic state he said: "If I talk to Muslims as I am talking to you, they might not believe me ... because I'm not 
a scholar. ... But when you refer to Mr Qaradawi, 
he is a symbol of scholarship, and can convince them 
directly"). Cf. also Hammad I. 
99 Cf. Intifada Cell I, Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Ashraf ; Women's Kutlah 1, Women's Kutlah 2. Others 
like `Nasr' had studied Islamic thinking to a far greater extent, and consequently did not need to defer to the 
experts. 
100 Some younger ordinary members often referred the more intricate questions to `the experts'. Though 
this may have been partly an abdication of the responsibility to acquire knowledge, they may equally have 
been wary of expressing a `wrong' opinion which I would subsequently erroneously construe as representative 
of the IM, or they may simply not have been used to a researcher expressing interest in their opinion. As they 
expressed their opinions on matters about which they felt knowledgeable confidently, this attitude can also be 
construed as simple modesty, rooted in an awareness of their limitations. 
101 Hamas Shi7rä Council (Yassin II, Abu Shannab IV); Mujamma' Board (Shamma`, Muslih); Board of 
one of Mujamma"s Women Centres ('Iman'); Islamist Charity Board in Khan Yunis ('Ibrahim'); Board at- 
Jam'iyyah al-Shabbat (Board Members al-Shabbat); IUG's Men's Student Council (Masri), IUG's Women's 
Student Council (Women's Kutlah 1). 1 did not obtain verbal confirmation of this practice regarding Khalas. 
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convince the others, accepts the majority opinion on the basis of tawäfuq (harmony). "' 
The men's Kutlah-led Student Council at the IUG appears to operate a simple majority 
rule, in which a decision needs the consent of only four out of seven. 103 Yet, they too 
aim at working on the basis of tawäfuq. '°4 Illustrative of this is, in the words of the 1997 
President, the "brotherly" consultation between the outgoing SC, the Kutlah's regional 
representatives and other active Kutlah members to decide on the Kutlah's SC 
candidates in lieu of internal elections (rendered impossible by the political situation). '°5 
Though the possibility of dissent is acknowledged, it is expected that differences of 
opinion can be discussed in an atmosphere of harmony. 
The basis on which most decisions are made, appears in all institutions to be rational 
reasoning on the principle of ma$lahah mursalah (considerations of public interest). "' 
Revelation was only so far important as it set the boundaries (the "red line", as some 
called it) within which decisions could be taken. Qur'an and Sunnah appear to be 
consulted only when it is unclear whether a decision falls within these boundaries. 
Instances of constitutional-type decision-making in an opposition movement like the IM 
occur only infrequently. Besides foundational discussions concerning rules and by-laws 
when a charity is founded (which are circumscribed by law and tradition, and thus not 
102 Board Members al-Shabbat. The example they gave was of 5 versus 2. Abu Shannab IV, Shamma`; 
`Iman'; Abu Dhughri, Women's Kutlah I also directly implied the principle of tmväfuq. 
103 Masri, referring to al-Kutlah's 7-strong Administrative Council rather than the 9-strong Student 
Council. 
104 Masri. 
ios Abu Dhughri. 
106 Abu Shannab IV (Hamas), Shamma' (Mujamma`), `Iman' (Mujamma`'s Women Centre), Musa II 
(Khalas), Masri (Men's Kutlah), Women's Kutlah I (Women's Kutlah). 
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wholly paradigmatic of the IM), 107 examples of decisions which could be said to be of 
constitutional quality are the decision by the Brotherhood to create Hamas in 1987/1988, 
the decision to allow for the creation of a separate political party which would recognise 
the Oslo framework (under protest) in order to gain official legal status, and the decision 
not to participate in the first national Palestinian elections of 1996. Though the decision 
to form Hamas seems to have been the outcome of a (somewhat forced) dialogue 
between ordinary, younger members unwilling to any longer refrain from resistance 
activities and the leadership, which could be construed as a form of consultation, the 
circumstances in which it was taken were too chaotic and unique for it to be 
paradigmatic for the IM's general behaviour. 108 
More representative was the extensive consultation upon which Hamas embarked 
around 1993 on how to respond to the Oslo Agreement and the subsequent arrival of a 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in Palestine. " This ultimately produced the 
decisions regarding Hizb al-Khalas and the Palestinian elections. "' `Muhammad', a 
former cadre leader, described the process, saying 
[T]he Ikhwan spread questionnaires about which political line to take, and how to deal 
with the PNA ... 
They asked many leaders - in Germany, Jordan, Bahrain, in prison in 
Israel. And they received many suggestions. One of them was to become a political 
107 The Mujamma`, for instance, is registered under Ottoman law. However, this law does not specify, for 
instance, how a charity's Board is to be selected. The fact that Islamist charities have chosen the mechanism 
of elections is thus a reflection of Islamist values. 
108 References to existence of internal debate e. g. Abu-Amr, `Haman', p11; Ahmad, p18; Barghouti, 
`Islamists', p133. 
109 Reference to this consultative process is made in Rashad, p42; Milton-Edwards, pp163-166; Usher, 
pp72-73,77; Menachem Klein, `Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations', Terrorism and 
Political Violence 8(2), p122. In 1991, a similarly extensive consultation ("like a questionnaire") seems to 
have been held to decide whether "to focus on building more popular support, on building more charities, or 
on engaging in more military action" ('Muhammad'). 
1)0 A third element to the consultation was the issue of whether to continue military operations against 
Israel or to accept some form of cease-fire. Cf. Usher, pp75-77. 
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organisation, another to change the name of Hamas but continue operating in the same 
way. A whole group suggested to work in a political organisation, and maintain the 
military force separately. The result was: we'll make a political organisation - like 
Khalas - to deal with the PNA and maintain the military arm. 
Abu Shannab, in prison at the time, confirmed he and his fellow Hamas prisoners had 
been consulted on these issues. "' The Chairman of Hizb al-Khalas, Ahmad Bahr, 
likewise corroborated that a consultative process had taken place to decide whether to 
establish a political party, and that, though some were against it, a majority within 
Hamas supported it. Hammad, `Iyad', the Intifada Cell, `Ashraf and `Nasr' all 
described an internal consultation regarding the creation of Hizb al-Khalas (as well as 
the issue of the elections), and confirmed that the Hamas Shrn-ä Council decided to 
support the idea. "' Apart from Hammad, they themselves had not been consulted - at 
the time they were teenage activists and did not expect to be - but they, like other 
students I talked with, were fully abreast of the pros and cons, indicating they identified 
with the process. 
Though it has been impossible to ascertain exactly how extensive this consultation was, 
it included not just the central Shtlrä Council, but also the various minor sht7rä councils, 
both regional and in the prisons. The fact that so many ordinary members knew about it, 
and knew individual leaders' standpoints, ' 13 also seems to suggest that local leaders 
discussed the issues informally with their `constituencies'. It thus seems that, within its 
own organisation, Hamas practises what it preaches regarding the need to include a wide 
1" Abu Shannab I. 
112 Hammad II, Intifada Cell 1. Only Haniyyah I insisted that the creation of Khalas was not a decision of 
the movement, but of individuals within Hamas. Yet, he too conceded that a consultation had taken place 
regarding the creation of a political party. Cf. also Gaess' interview with Abu Marzook who took Haniyyah's 
line (p122). 
113 Intifada Cell I quoted the names of two prominent members who were against. This was likewise 
common knowledge among lUG students who had been active during the Intifada (cf. `Ashraf; Various Pro- 
Hamas Students). 
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section of the `population' in the consultative process regarding `constitutional' issues - 
while the executive role is reserved for the elected leaders. It is unclear, beyond the fact 
that the central Shrn"ä Council had the final say, whether the local councils had 
mandated their representatives with their vote, or whether the representatives expressed 
their own preference after having listened to the local council's advice; from the 
description of the Intifada Cell, the latter appears to have been the case. 
7.4.2 DISSENT 
Though there are numerous instances of publicly acknowledged dissenting factions 
within the IM, 14 I will focus on a controversy which arose amidst the general debate 
regarding Hamas's attitude towards the Oslo Agreement, around the question whether to 
participate in the first national elections in 1996 for the newly-created Palestinian 
Legislative Council. Many Islamists considered participation to imply recognition of 
the Oslo Agreement, as the elections took place within its framework. Deeming the 
Agreement an unjust, and unworkable, basis for peace, they refused to lend it 
legitimacy. Non-participation, however, meant losing the opportunity to influence the 
creation of a Palestinian state from the inside. 
Already in November 1993, Yassin stated from his prison that 
Islamists are divided between those supporting participation [in elections] and those 
opposing it. 
114 Cf. debate regarding resistance versus education in early 1980s which resulted in the creation of Islamic 
Jihad; debate on the creation of Hamas; debate on the creation of Khalas. 
BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND DISSENT 260 
His own position was that 
I consider it better to participate than to abstain, providing that the [autonomy] council 
be empowered with legislative privileges. ' 15 
Hamas's-representative in Jordan, Ibrahim Ghosheh, represented the rejectionist camp, 
stating in January 1994 that Hamas would not participate in "any elections associated 
with autonomy". "' Much of the money earmarked for Hamas's armed wing, the 
Qassam Brigades, appears to have come through Hamas's office in Jordan. "' 
Consequently, the Amman leadership had a considerable amount of influence over the 
Gazan leadership concerning issues of peace and armed resistance. This regularly seems 
to have led to tensions - as when Ghosheh and Nazzal tried to wreck the agreement 
wrought by a reconciliation committee made up of high-ranking Hamas and Fatah 
leaders, after the November 1994 bloodshed in which 13 Hamas activists died at the 
hands of the PNA. 18 In contrast to the Gazan leaders, the Amman leadership, for lack 
of a local base, appears to have almost free of contractual obligations towards members. 
Resultantly, its policies were informed almost solely by geo-strategical concerns, 
heavily influenced by the interests of the Jordanian Brotherhood, and `anti-Israeli' 
regimes such as the Syrian and the Iranian. Little consideration seems to have been 
given to the impact of these policies on the IM's members inside Palestine. 
Initially, some younger Gazan leaders, notably Ismail Haniyyah and Khalid al-Hindi, 
decided to dissent from the Ghosheh line (which was ultimately endorsed by majority 
115 Al-Wasat, 01.11.1993, quoted in Usher, p73. Rashad also quotes an article in al-Hayat (01.11.1993) 
stating the same position, based on a letter from Yassin to Hamas supporters, smuggled out of prison (p41). 
116 AI-Nahar, 10.01.1994, quoted in Usher, p73. 
117 Klein, pp124-125. Klein implies, probably rightly so, that ultimate control of the Brigades was in the 
hands of the Amman leadership. 
118 Klein, p132(n45/46). Hammad II, Musa I and `Muhammad' confirmed the existence of these tensions. 
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decision), "' and publicly declared their intention to stand for election. Eventually 
Haniyyah and Hindi withdrew. In Haniyyah's words, 
There was an ijtihäd that I might stand for election.... But when I saw that that would 
endanger the unity of the Islamic movement, and also endangered what Hamas had 
publicised, I preferred to withdraw, and both I and Khalid al-Hindi were happy with 
this withdrawal. 120 
Haniyyah insists it was voluntary. However, pressure may have been applied. JUG 
students recalled a leaflet being distributed, attacking Haniyyah and Hindi for standing 
forelection. 12' Some thought this leaflet was the work of the Israelis, others said it was 
signed by Hamas members, but not the leadership. It is possible the Jordanian 
leadership had a hand in it. James Zogby, one of the international observers present at 
the elections, wrote of the Hamas leadership, despite initially deciding "to support the 
elections and run for the [Legislative] Council", being "eventually forced by their 
outside leadership to withdraw their candidates" -a reading of events which appears to 
be corroborated by Klein and Sayigh. '22 
Interestingly from the point of view of consensus-building, the compromise reached 
between the two sides was that, though Hamas candidates were asked to withdraw, 
Hamas members were left free to vote according to conscience. Disclaiming 
1 19 Haniyyah I. Cf. Zahhar's statement at the conclusion of the PNA-Hamas dialogue in Cairo, 18- 
20.12.1995: "The stand taken by Harnas on elections has not changed. Hamas will not take part in the 
elections. " (`Harnas refuses to join electoral process', Jerusalem Times, 29.12.1995, p2). Others specifically 
referring to this debate: `Muhammad', `Ahmad', `Ashraf . 
120 Haniyyah 1. `Ashraf: "[Haniyyah and Hindi] retreated because they knew that if they stood for election 
they would split the movement. They thought of this carefully and preferred not to stand for the sake of the 
movement. " 
121 `Ashraf, `Ahmad', `Khalid' IV, Various Pro-Hamas Students. 
122 James Zogby, `Observing the Palestinian elections', Jerusalem Times, 02.02.1996, p5; Klein, p129; 
Sayigh, pp652-653. 
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responsibility for a leaflet, distributed throughout the West Bank on December 25,1995, 
calling on voters to boycott the elections, Zahhar stated publicly: 
It is the opinion of the movement that no individual is to be coerced into anything. We 
will leave it to each and every individual to express themselves as they see fit. '23 
The truth of this statement was born out by the fact that both international and 
Palestinian observers noted the high turnout of Hamas supporters during the elections. 
Zogby recorded a "90% turnout in some of the Hamas-dominated areas of Gaza". "' 
Quds Press stated that Hamas "played a larger role than expected [... ] urg[ing] its 
members to vote for those candidates whom Hamas preferred. " Indeed, according to 
Quds Press, the election planners found Hamas supporters "standing and leading the 
lines of voters. " 125 
This particular example of dissent during consultation is instructive in numerous ways. 
First, the final decision went against Yassin's stated views, who, though in prison at the 
time, was still the much revered spiritual leader of the movement. His will is thus not 
necessarily law, corroborating my conclusion that Hamas sees the Head of State as 
bound by the outcome of consultations (Chapter 6). Second, Yassin's, Haniyyah's and 
Hindi's stances testify to the existence of a pluralistic climate where both sides felt 
sufficiently free to express their opinions. Third, Hamas was willing to appear divided 
in public, thereby undergirding my conclusion that the IM acknowledges there may be 
more than one right answer, and undermining the essentialist claim that Islamists cannot 
123 `Harnas refuses to join electoral process', Jerusalem Times, 29.12.1995, p2. 
124 Zogby, p5. 
125 `Hamas - an active factor in the elections', quoted from Quds Press in Jerusalem' Times, 26.01.1996, 
p3. Interestingly, rather than hailing this participation as support for democracy, Quds Press blames Hamas 
for "interven[ing] in the elections", creating "a great deal of confusion" and quotes a "source close to Fatah" 
as saying that "Hamas played a very deceptive game" by first boycotting the elections, then encouraging 
participation. 
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be but anti-pluralistic because their predecessors, the medieval jurists, condemned fitnah 
(civil strife, and thus, by implication, dissent). "' Even the eventual compromise 
reached, allowing Hamas voters to vote according to conscience while demanding that 
Harnas leaders withdraw their candidacies, was a clear sign from the leadership that it 
recognised that its position was right only insofar as it had been agreed upon by majority 
vote. Other courses of action might equally be morally right. 
Fourth, Haniyyah's and Hindi's withdrawal illustrates their commitment, not only to the 
consensual unity of the movement (tawäfuq), but also to the institution of majority rule. 
Rather than creating a break-away party, they accepted the majority's decision. Fifth, 
despite Haniyyah initially opposing the winning side, he is still among the ten most 
influential Hamas leaders and sits on the prestigious PNA-Hamas liaison committee, 
together with Abu Shannab and Zahhar. 12' Though critics might argue that this 
prominence might have been the price exacted for agreeing to withdraw, it is equally 
possible that his present prominence indicates that Hamas is not afraid of internal 
dissent. 
There are other instances in which dissenters, or dissenting factions, were either not 
tolerated or decided to split from the IM. I have already alluded to the split between the 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (footnote 114), and the ousting of Hijaz Burbar at the 
time of the Red Crescent incident (Chapter 5). Other instances are the breaking away of 
two IM leaders in the mid-1990s to create alternative Islamic parties, "' and the severing 
of ties with erstwhile IM leader, Imad Faluji, who since has become the Minister of 
Information in Arafat's government. In the first case, the split was a result of two 
126 Cf. Sadowski's explanation of the classical Orientalist (essentialist) argument (p 16). The notion that 
Muslim society is monolithic still underlies neo-Orientalist explanations. 
127 Cf. `Start of Mediations between the PA and Hamas to Stop the Campaign of Mutual Accusations', 
Sativt a! -Jami äh, 21.12.1998, p1. 
128 Hizb al-Ittihad al-Islami (Khadr Mahjis) and Hizb al-Nasar al-Islami (Mahmud Abu Dan). 
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irreconcilable positions, the one advocating violent resistance, the other commending 
Islamisation of society and the forbearance of violent resistance until the time was right. 
If the two factions had remained together, those advocating restraint would have 
suffered from the inevitable Israeli repercussions which violent resistance evoke, and 
have been hindered in their own cause of action. The resulting split can thus not be 
taken as a typical example of intolerance of dissent since tolerance of this particular 
dissenting view would have led to the curtailment of the movement as a whole. 
In the second case, the friction seems to have been caused by Burbar's unauthorised 
participation in unacceptable violence against fellow Palestinians. "' Because the 
friction appears to have been precipitated by his adhering to a different set of 
behavioural rules, which undermined the IM's political credibility, his case is likewise 
not paradigmatic of the IM's attitude towards ideological dissent. The break-away cases 
similarly seem to say little about ideological intolerance. Since none of the rank and file 
interviewed appeared to know what these parties stood for, except that it was rumoured 
that they received funding from the PNA to set up rival parties and so undermine the 
IM, it seems that theirs was a split based on a mixture of incompatibility of personalities 
and ambition. One noticeable ideological difference is the latter's apparent acceptance 
of the Oslo Agreement's political framework. Yet, the fact that relations between 
Hamas and Hizb al-Khalas, created by ex-Hamas leaders on a similar ideological 
position, are cordial seems to indicate that the lack of cordiality between Hamas and 
these break-aways is not ideologically motivated. "' 
129 There also appear to have been some moral problems. 
130 A1-Risalah, which is edited in the same building in which Khalas has its headquarters, and is generally 
seen as the mouthpiece of Khalas, often defends Hamas in its pages. Abu Shannab publicly lauded Khalas as 
an example of `shimä democracy' (Democracy, p8) and confirmed the links between it, al-Risalah and Hamas 
in Gaess' interview with him (Middle East Policy VI(1), pi 16-117). Yassin attended a Khalas political rally 
('Daoud'). I often saw Haniyyah (Hamas) and Musa (Khalas) talking together at the IUG. 
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I have not been able to establish exactly why Hamas severed its ties with Faluji, once a 
prominent Hamas leader and chief editor of the IM's now defunct newspaper, al-Watan. 
The Jerusalem Times reported that Faluji was expelled "for exceeding certain limits, 
including a statement that Hamas would participate in the elections". "' Judging by 
Haniyyah's explanation, the severing was the culmination of a sustained set of 
disagreements. Faluji's refusal to stand down as candidate in the 1996 elections, 
besides his implicating Hamas, was the final straw. 132 Faluji was appointed ombudsman 
by Arafat, even before the elections, "' and became Information Minister at the 
formation of the Cabinet after. He thus must have been in close contact with Arafat 
prior to the split. Possibly, the split was engineered, so Arafat could include a Hamas 
member in his Cabinet without unduly angering the Israelis, or provoked by Faluji, so he 
could take up his Ministerial post (for which he probably had to stand for election). 
Consequently, one can deduce few conclusions from this incident regarding the IM's 
attitude towards dissent. 
Finally, it must be underlined that there have been no recorded incidents in which 
leaders of the IM have resorted to political assassination (see Chapter 6). Nor have I 
discovered incidents of forceful coercion within the IM - apart from the hardly serious 
complaint against one particular leader having a forceful personality, capable of 
silencing weaker ones. 1 ' 
This does not, of course, mean that suppression of dissent does not exist. Taking Steven 
Lukes' three-dimensional view of power, the emphasis in the IM's political culture on 
respect for and trust in elders could well suppress dissent before it is formed - whether 
131 Jerusalem Times, 15.12.1995, p2. 
132 Haniyyah I. 
133 Jerusalem Times, loc. cif. 
134 1 will keep these sources anonymous. 
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by controlling what is permissible to discuss, or by encouraging unquestioning belief 
that what the elders say is in everyone's best interest. 13' However, the open debates I 
witnessed in my target groups, the criticisms voiced against leaders (even if never 
uttered to the people in question) and the existence of a plurality of views (including on 
such `taboos' as the right of Israel to exist), 136 suggest the IM's political culture to be 
relatively open. Where dissent is circumscribed, it is by religious taboos - although, in 
the absence of a central religious authority in Sunni Islam, even such taboos can be 
challenged if one can make a rational case for one's heterodoxy. 
7.4.3 TOLERANCE TOWARDS IDEOLOGICAL OTHERS 
To shed light on the IM's attitude towards political/ideological others I will analyse two 
specific instances. One is the case of the IUG where the IM enjoys a relative amount of 
hegemony, particularly at the student level where the Kutlah has dominated the Student 
Council since the IUG's beginning. Because it is a near-hegemonic situation, "' it 
provides a model for the IM's behaviour if it were to come to near-hegemonic power in 
Palestine overnight. Though obviously the IUG is but one particular situation, and thus 
not an adequate sample for generalisation (though this study's covering the past 20 years 
somewhat neutralises the influence of particular personalities on the sample), it is also 
the IM's flagship, as it is the only university in which the IM has had continuous and 
135 Steven Lukes, Power: a Radical View. 
136 Some (e. g. Yassin, Abu Shannab; see Gaess' interview with latter) argued that Israel has the right to 
exist for the duration of an indefinite cease-fire if it granted the Palestinians the pre-1967 Palestinian areas. 
Abu Shannab (I) suggested that such a cease-fire might be transformed by a future generation into a 
permanent peace if relationships between the two peoples and living conditions among the Palestinians had 
improved. Dukhan even went so far as to accept to live with the Israelis in one democratic state, if there was 
true equality. Though cynics may dismiss these arguments as insincere, they are in ideological opposition to 
the original IM argument that all of Palestine is Islamic ivagf (religious endowment), and thus belongs 
eternally to the (Palestinian) Muslims. As such, they are significant and an expression of plurality. 
137 This is made worse by the system sported by the IUG (and al-Azhar) which grants control of the SC to 
the party with the most votes, rather than allocating seats according to the percentage of votes won. 
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significant influence, and this is recognised by others. What happens there, will be 
considered by other Palestinians as reflective of the IM as a whole. One can thus 
assume that what happens at the IUG is closely monitored by the IM leadership, and to 
some extent condoned (although the Kutlah leadership has considerable autonomy from 
Hamas). Consequently, what happens at the IUG can be considered relatively reflective 
of the IM's, or at least Hamas's, political culture. 
But first, I will discuss the IM's attitude towards the Palestinian Model Parliament - 
Women and Legislation (MP), a project involving charities concerned with women's 
issues aiming to formulate legislation to further women's rights. As the MP has strong 
affiliations with the Left, the relationship is an interesting illustration of how the IM 
interacts with ideological others. Among those interviewed, there were two trends. One 
is illustrated by Zahhar's dismissal of the MP as a "foreign body in our culture", 
sponsored by Western funds, "looking for the destruction of Islam", organised by a 
group of women who "had had a bad experience in married life". 138 Zahhar supported 
the handing out of inflammatory leaflets condemning the MP as anti-Islamic - though 
the leaflets' authors seem to have been from the Islamic establishment, not the IM - and 
appeared uninterested in dialogue on the grounds that the MP is a `foreign body'. '39 
The other trend, though disagreeing with the MP's line of argument, was open to 
dialogue. Hammad, for instance, addressed one of the MP's sessions, and wrote 
thoughtful articles in the media. 140 Commenting on the inflammatory leaflets, Hammad 
said: 
138 Zahhar III. 
139 I did not meet any others from this camp. But as there seems to be considerable support among 
conservative Muslims in general for the inflammatory leaflets and sermons denouncing the MP, it is unlikely 
that Zahhar is the only Hamas member holding this attitude. 
140 Others in this camp: Abu Shannab IV, Shamma'; Badawil, Musa I, Harridan; Women's Kutlah 1. 
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if someone says anything against Islam, ... 
I should not accuse him using sharp words. 
[... ] I believe this battle between the Islamists and the MP should not take this shape.... 
[T]he first mistake of the MP is that ... they 
didn't begin with preparing the people, 
[gradually persuading them to adopt their views]. [... ] [T]he mistake of the Islamists is 
that they started to accuse the MP of receiving orders from the West, that they are 
enemies, aiming to spread prostitution and adultery. I don't believe this. [... ] [B]oth 
sides should understand each other, [without shouting at each other]. I went to the MP, 
stayed about two hours, and discussed all the issues with them. I found that they 
misunderstood many facts of Islam. 141 
Though the MP would probably retort that Hammad similarly misunderstands many 
facts about women's issues, Hammad not only preached dialogue but practised it. In 
contrast to Zahhar's attitude, Hammad's approach portrays a deep confidence in his own 
value system, which allows him to interact with ideological others, without fear. 
Though he clearly hoped to persuade the MP of his point of view (mirroring the MP's 
hope to convert the IM), he appeared likewise willing to listen. Further illustrating this, 
Khalas's Women's Committee, headed by Yusra Hamdan, agreed to study Fatima 
Mernissi's The Veil and the Male Elite, a critique of the notion that the hijib is ordained 
by the Qur'än, and discuss it with members of the MP. 142 
Thus, though a section of the IM still displays the pre-Intifada prejudice against the Left 
regarding women's issues (in Zahhar's case, this prejudice is considerably less regarding 
other issues), another section is open to dialogue and tolerates other-thinkers. Since the 
latter includes some of the younger leaders, and appears to be larger (if my small sample 
141 Hammad It. 
142 Hamdan, Marwa Qassim I (director of Gazan branch of MP). 
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of nine versus one is anything to go by}, '43 it is likely that this second approach is, or 
will become, the predominant one. 
Case Study of the Islamic University 
The following is based on eye witness accounts of alumni and staff who were at the IUG 
during the 1980s, and of students and staff who were at the IUG during the time of my 
fieldwork (1997-1998). Time restraints and the difficulty of finding suitably 
knowledgeable alumni without having access to the IUG's archives, have meant that the 
number of alumni eye witnesses is limited. I have supplemented their accounts with 
observations of the IUG's history as chronicled in Western discourse. 
IUG students can be divided into three categories: Kutlah members, opposition party 
members, and those who vote for the Kutlah in SC elections but are insufficiently 
supportive of the IM to become Kutlah members. Though student support for the 
Kutlah usually amounts to 70-80% during elections, active Kutlah membership is much 
lower. 144 'Yahya', an alumnus, recounted that, being a religious person, he joined the 
Kutlah's election campaign in his first year, but later withdrew because he felt himself 
drawn into a "vortex, where more commitment is demanded than I want to give". From 
then on he avoided all parties. This testimony indicates that it was possible to be non- 
aligned -a reading which is corroborated by testimonies of students who were at the 
IUG during the 1990s and similarly remained non-aligned 14' That there is a 
143 1 have not been able to discuss the MP with others. 
laa Hard facts are difficult to come by - but, from observation, at least one third (if not more) of the 
students appear to be unaffiliated (cf. also `Khalid' IV). 
145 Cf. 'Mahmud' & brother, `Khalid' III, `Hisham'. 
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constituency of non-aligned Kutlah voters, enhances the contractarian nature of the 
Kutlah's power since it must annually woo the non-aligned with proper conduct. 
Despite the opposition blocs being less in number, they seem to have been as active as 
the Kutlah. `Yahya' recalled that canvassing during election time was chaotic with all 
parties clamouring for one's attention - indicating that the opposition was allowed to 
operate. Election tensions sometimes erupted into violence. "' But this seems to have 
been largely the result of the violence of occupation and the lack of proper 
communication - resulting in an ideological intolerance that has since loosened up. 
147 
When I observed the elections of December 1997, all parties were free to organise 
rallies and distribute pamphlets. Each party was given an area to display posters and 
organise parties, commensurate with the percentage it had received in the previous 
election. Significantly, the Kutlah's allocation was less than deserved on the basis of 
previous percentages while Fatah received more. 
At present, opposition parties seem to be able to express their views freely. "' Each 
party has its own section on the public notice boards, and can obtain permission to 
organise an event. All seem to be able to organise their internal affairs without 
interference. There appears to be regular contact between the various leaderships and 
the Kutlah-led SC, the latter stressing that it represents the whole university, not just the 
Kutlah. General Assemblies are held regularly, opposition members appear to be able to 
address them (see p278ff) - though, at times, they stay away in a bid to invalidate the 
146, Yahya' described the 1985-86 elections as an "Intifada inside the university". See p273 for context. 
147 See also Chapter 4. 
148 Following based on interviews with (ex)-SC-members Masri, Taha, Abu Dhughri, `Yusuf ; then 
Shabibah leader Sami Shahin; Various Pro-Hamas Students; non-aligned, Islamicly inclined alumni `Khalid', 
`Mahmud'; pro-Fatah `Hisham'; Various Non-aligned Students. 
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Assembly (as a minimum quota is needed). 149 Besides the annual SC elections, each 
department organises annual elections for its own educational club. According to a 
number of interviewees, those elected are often non-aligned, Fatah, Islamic Jihad or 
PFLP supporters. 'so 
In the 1980s, two PFLP alumni claim, opposition activists were regularly prevented by 
the Administration (which was only partly controlled by the IM) and the SC from 
staging demonstrations. They recounted how they were prohibited from taking leaflets 
exhorting students to resistance activities onto the IUG's campus: 
We were not afraid of Israeli soldiers, bringing pamphlets from the West Bank; but we 
were afraid of the doormen - it felt like drugs smuggling. [... ] This was always the 
problem: when we wanted to do something against the Israelis, [the administration and 
the SC] prevented us. Their argument was: Israel will close the university [when you 
demonstrate] - so, you are collaborators [if you demonstrate] because you clearly want 
ls to close the university [by acting against the Israelis]. ' 
Islamists confirmed that such resistance activities were opposed. 152 Yet, this opposition 
was as much based on the fundamental disagreement regarding resistance between the 
PLO and the IM, as it was a struggle for hegemony. As detailed in Chapter 4, the IM 
did not believe the time for resistance was right and saw education as a better 
149 'Khalid' IV. 
150 Abu Dhughri, `Khalid' III, Various Pro-Hamas Students, Various Non-Aligned Students. The fact that 
Shabibah leader Shahin was so upset about not winning his club election (see further) indicates, despite his 
blaming the Kutlah, that he had expected to win, thus suggesting it is perfectly possible to win without being a 
Kutlah supporter. 
151 `Ziad' & `Husam'. 
152 Abu Sibah (then Kutlah leader, now Dean of Student Affairs). 
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preparation for the eventual battle for liberation. "' Activities that could lead to 
suspension of education, were condemned. Arguably, the Islamists manipulated this 
logic to curb their rivals' activities. But that their logic was not just Machiavellian, and 
rooted in genuine conviction, can be gleaned from the fact that non-Islamist staff 
similarly argued for curbing resistance activities on campus; 154 that the IM had always 
emphasised education; and that the memory of the Brotherhood's near-extinction under 
Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s was still sufficiently fresh to justify the IM's fear of 
extinction following premature resistance. '55 
Despite opposition by Islamists, non-aligned staff and Board members to resistance- 
related activities on campus, the PLO factions did succeed in demonstrating, and by all 
accounts quite regularly. On one occasion, despite Islamist refusal to commemorate 
Land Day with a demonstration, PLO supporters managed to organise one, leading, 
according to a PFLP student leader at the time, to the Israeli army surrounding the IUG, 
arresting PLO supporters and closing the IUG. 156 The fact that Zakariyyah Thalmas, the 
IUG's 1980s Fatah student leader, could complain that the Kutlah imitated events 
initiated by Fatah (such as commemorating Land Day), suggests likewise that Fatah was 
able to be active. " As there are also records of non-resistance-related activities by the 
opposition - the 1983 strike by pro-PLO students and staff against the IUG's 
Administration being but one158 - it seems the opposition had a fair amount of leeway, 
153 Even during the Intifada, Hamas kept urging teachers to teach and students to study, if need be privately 
(cf. frequency of these calls in communiques; see footnote 86). Nairab (secularist, former Dean), `Ziad' & 
`Husam' (PFLP) confirmed this was the IM's attitude during the 1980s. 
154 Nairab, Abu `Ali (then Dean of Student Affairs). 
155 Cf. Milton-Edwards, pp46-55. 
156 `Adli Yazuri. 
157 Thalmas. 
158 See Chapter 4. 
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even at a time when the alleged `thuggish' behaviour of the IM against opposition was 
at its height. 
This leads me to `everyday violence' as a means of suppressing opposition and 
divergent lifestyles. Western discourse, mirroring the local PFLP's narrative, is full of 
accusations of everyday violence. Milton-Edwards chronicles the case of one PFLP 
activist who was prevented from standing for the SC (by the Administration, not the 
IM), and harassed and attacked with nitric acid (allegedly by the Kutlah) until he made 
an appearance in the mosque. 15' Two former PFLP activists I interviewed likewise told 
of an incident in which a PFLP student leader was chased across campus and barely 
escaped being knifed, "' while another PFLP leader described his own severe beating. '6' 
A former student leader of the women's PFLP, Marwa Qassim, similarly recounted how 
a fellow activist lost a finger during a demonstration for the right to go bare-headed 
when the lUG's doormen forcefully closed the gate on her hands. 162 
It is questionable how representative these attacks are of 1980s student life. It is 
certainly untrue that they were unique to the IM. Most incidents occurred in the context 
of particular periods of tension in which all parties indulged in violence. Both the latter 
instances mentioned above happened against the background of the 1985-1986 clashes 
between the PFLP and the IM, triggered by the mass release of PFLP activists from 
Israeli prisons. 16' They were a series of attacks and counter-attacks. For each case 
blamed on the IM by the PFLP, the IM blames the PFLP for a similar atrocity. The acid 
attack on Milton-Edwards' `Bassam' can be `matched' by the acid attack on Zakariyyah 
159 Milton-Edwards, pp 113-114. 
160, Ziad' & `Husam' on Hasa (Hasu) `Aleyan (later killed by bomb). 
161 'Adli Yazuri. 
162 Qassim II. 
163 Cf. Jarro' I (PFLP); Schiff & Ya'ari, p225. 
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Sanwar, 164 the near-knifing of the PFLP activist by the near-fatal knifing of an Islamist 
activist during the 1983 tensions, 165 the crushing of the female PFLP activist's fingers by 
the knife wound female Islamist Yusra Hamdan received on her face at the hands of 
PFLP activists. 166 
Despite their prominence in Western discourse, the number of serious incidents seems 
to be limited. The two (male) former PFLP activists could only recount one incident in 
which nitric acid was (successfully) used against a PFLP activist while Islamists always 
refer to Sanwar when discussing acid. Likewise, the case of Yusra Hamdan is famous 
for its unicity. Moreover, and despite the fighting, close friendships existed across party 
lines. Thalmas was close to some of the Islamist leaders, particularly Yahya Sanwar, 
then senior Kutlah leader, whose family came from the same pre-1948 village as 
Thalmas's. Said Thalmas, "[Sanwar is] my personal friend - till now. I have a very 
good relationship with him and his family". "' Another example is that of a PFLP 
leader's close friendship with Abu Sibah, currently Dean of Student Affairs and one of 
the Kutlah's student leaders during the early 1980s. 168 
Since the Intifada, violence has abated. The violence of the 1980s thus appears to have 
been more reflective of the occupation, than of Gaza's political culture (however heavy- 
handed this still can be). It seems to have been exacerbated by Israeli stirring with the 
help of collaborators. 169 It was intensified by the deep divisions between the IM and the 
PLO concerning the issue of resistance and the place of Islam in society. But the 
164 Cf. Haniyyah 11. 
165 Haniyyah II. Abu Sibah refers to a similar incident. 
166 Haniyyah II, Qassim It. 
1 67 Thalmas. 
168 `Muhammad' (relative of PFLP leader). 
169 Cf. Abu Shannab I, Jarro' I (PFLP). See Chapters 4-5. 
BETWEEN CONSENSUS AND DISSENT 275 
fighting appears to have been about control of the university, rather than ideas. Where 
ideas were attacked, as in the case of the PFLP activists refusing to wear the hijäb, the 
ideological clash had become violent because it was played out in the context of an 
overall struggle for control. 
That the Kutlah's general approach is persuasion through reasoning rather than violent 
intimidation can be gleaned from various testimonies. `Yahya' maintained that, though 
Kutlah members used his religiosity to put mental pressure on him to join them, they 
never used force. `Khalid' corroborated this for the 1990s. 10 As already mentioned in 
Chapter 5, Qassim, the female PFLP student activist quoted above, insisted that using 
violence to impose views was "not typically Hamas" - despite her friend having lost a 
finger in clashes. "' 
According to `Yahya', if one talked positively about Darwin in class, the Kutlah would 
deal with you, not by silencing you, but by publishing a leaflet, or bringing a book that 
would contradict your argument. 1' At present, according to both Islamists and non- 
Islamists, any political or ideological view can be expressed in the classroom. "' Some 
recounted heated discussions between Islamists and leftists in classrooms. Michael 
Jensen (the anthropologist discussed in Chapter 2) confirmed that in 1998 one student in 
his class regularly expressed Marxist-inspired views without being ostracised. 14 
Importantly, the IUG library contains a sizeable collection of Western books on 
philosophy, politics, sociology, anthropology. 
170 `Khalid' IV. 
171 Qassim I. 
172 This contrasts sharply with Milton-Edwards' account of PFLP activist `Bassam', leading one to wonder 
whether the troubles of `Bassam' were more to do with his activism than his views. 
173 Students at Student Affairs, `Khalid' 111, Various Non-Aligned Students (including a self-professed 
agnostic). 
174 Jensen. 
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Some of Hamas's Gazan critics argue that the Kutlah's (and the IUG's in general) 
present respect for opposition parties is not reflective of its deepest views but enforced 
by the presence of the PNA. This argument is somewhat flawed in that there are myriad 
ways of harassing the opposition and preventing it from expressing itself without 
ostensibly breaking the law. Moreover, given the fact that the SC's members are 
regularly imprisoned for being Hamas supporters, they do not have much to lose in 
incurring the PNA's wrath. Yet, even if this argument is taken at face value, it must be 
noted that the Kutlah still wins a three-quarter majority, five years after Arafat returned 
to Gaza - despite its leaders, members and infrastructure experiencing regular 
harassment from Arafat's security forces, and the enormous pressure on the IUG's 
Shabibah to gain more votes. During these past years, the Kutlah could arguably not 
have engaged in the same kind of violent intimidation that PLO supporters accused it of 
during the 1980s (Chapter 4). The fact that the Kutlah has maintained its massive 
electoral lead despite that - the factual veracity of which lead was confirmed for the 
1997 elections by my own independent exit poll conducted as part of my survey' 75 
does seem to indicate that it inspires genuine confidence among its electorate. 
Shabibah-Kutlah Relations 1997-1998 
To gain further insight into the Kutlah's attitude towards opposition, I asked the lUG's 
Shabibah leadership of 1997-1998 for their view of the Kutlah-led SC, a view which I 
subsequently corroborated with the SC and other students. They complained 
vociferously about the limitations put on their political activities by the SC but, upon 
verification, on almost all counts their complaints seem to have been exaggerated or 
175 Of the 636 respondents (intercepted as they left the voting building), 81.9% stated they had voted for 
the Kutlah. 
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misleading. "' Particularly intriguing is that their portrayal of the Kutlah is exactly as 
one would expect the Kutlah to be from a modernist perspective, and that only upon 
corroboration does one discover the distortion in their claims. 
First, the Shabibah claimed they had not been allowed to display political posters or 
distribute political leaflets. However, both the SC and non-partisan interviewees 
confirmed that the Shabibah had distributed political material which was highly critical 
of Hamas. Following the assassination of Hamas leader Muhya Sharif in April 1998, 
for example, the SC had not prevented the Shabibah from distributing leaflets blaming 
Hamas for the assassination. On another occasion, the Shabibah had distributed a 
newspaper (Falastinuna) with "very bad leaflets" inside it, accusing imprisoned Hamas 
leader Musa Abu Marzuk of stealing. "' Two non-aligned students, sympathetic to, yet 
critical of the Islamists, told me independently that they had seen a poster explaining 
Fatah's view on Sharifs death on the public notice board reserved for Fatah 
publications. "' 
Second, the Shabibah leaders declared that the Kutlah had allowed them only one day to 
put up election posters during the December 1997 student elections, by which time the 
latter had allegedly taken up most of the Shabibah space for election posters. Again, 
both the SC and independent observers claim that Fatah had been allocated one side of 
the main road leading through the university, the other side of the road having been 
reserved for the Kutlah. 1' Like the other parties, they had had three days to put up their 
posters. But, according to Kutlah leaders, they did not make use of that opportunity 
176 The Shabibah's point of view was expressed to me by Sami Shahin, senior member of the IUG's 
Shabibah Administrative Council. 
177 Abu Dhughri. Confirmed by `Khalid' III. 
178 `Khalid' III; Non-Aligned IUG Student. 
179 Abu Dhughri, Various Non-Aligned Students. 
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because of disorganisation. 18° A non-partisan lecturer at al-Azhar university and IUG 
alumni confirmed that it is not unusual for the Shabibah leadership to waste the time 
allocated for putting up posters in internal leadership squabbles. "' According to my 
own observation, all parties standing for election in 1997 were free to distribute election 
statements, put up election posters and organise election parties. 
Third, the Shabibah leaders complained that they were never allowed to use the large, 
covered `tent' (a permanent, open metal structure on campus) and were instead relegated 
to the, equally spacious, cafeteria. According to the SC, the `tent' is only used on 
occasions concerning the majority of students, warranting the university coming to a 
standstill (noise made in the `tent' penetrates most class-rooms). On all other occasions 
the cafeteria is used. Students, both Islamist and non-Islamist, confirmed that many 
smaller events organised by the Kutlah were held in the cafeteria and that, on occasion, 
the smaller political parties had organised university-wide events in the 'tent'. 182 
Fourth, the Shabibah leaders stated that, though they felt able to criticise the Student 
Council in the General Assembly, 
when I say something they do not like, they shout `Allahu Akbar' and laugh. 
In one incident, Shahin was attacked during a General Assembly meeting in December 
1997 for arguing that the elections for the faculty educational clubs had been rigged. 
According to the victim, 
ISO Abu Dhughri. 
181 `Yahya': "Sometimes Fatah people lack the skills as to how to [strategically] manipulate the [time and] 
place... they waste time on who is the leader, who will give the speech, etc. Others, like Hamas, do not waste 
time. " 
182 `Khalid' III&IV, `Hisham', Various Non-Aligned Students. 
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They know I will win, so they create some obstacles to make me fail. I tried to prove 
this. My department has 13 students of which I have 9 on my side. When they read out 
the results, they said: there are 18 students, 8 voted for me, 10 for the other. I have the 
papers to prove I was right. After I said this, they got very angry and tried to fight. 
The 1997 SC President commented, saying: 
lt is right that people fought with him, not because of the students' club, but because he 
was rude to the public. ... 
He was impolite to the people ... Those who attacked were 
[from different political backgrounds], not just Kutlah Islamiyyah. [... ] If you look at 
the university's records, you will find that most of the people who won the elections 
[for the educational clubs] were not from the Kutlah. They are certainly not Islamic 
and maybe they are Shabibah or PFLP. 183 
Non-partisan students confirmed that many of those elected in the elections for the 
educational clubs were indeed non-Islamists, "' though I have been unable to corroborate 
this with records from the IUG's archives. As to this particular accusation of election 
rigging, it may be true, though I have not been able to verify it. Whatever the truth, 
however, the issue is whether such an incident is representative of IUG practice - as 
Shahin seemed to imply. Judging by the presence of non-aligned staff in the various 
colleges, and significant numbers of non-Kutlah representatives in the clubs, as well as 
the fact that Shahin was seriously upset he had not been elected (indicating that he had 
expected to be), it is unlikely that this practice is widespread. 
The shouting and fighting during the General Assembly is more worrying from a shi rä 
point of view as it prevents true consultation. Student culture in Gaza tends towards the 
183 Abu Dhughri. 
184 See footnote 150. 
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heavy-handed, regardless of political affiliation - as exemplified by the fact that Shahin 
commented himself that "there was some good fighting with chairs" (throwing doubt on 
his own democratic credentials). The 1998 election campaign at al-Azhar, which is 
dominated by the Shabibah, was marred by an incident in which an excited Shabibah 
procession, led by the Vice President of the Gaza-wide Shabibah (not a student at al- 
Azhar), burst into the Hamas corner, tore down a wooden wall with posters, and 
trampled triumphantly on it. 185 This violent disposition is partly a result of the rough 
environment the refugee camps provide, partly of 50 years of occupation, with both 
Egyptian and Israeli rule having been more heavy-handed in Gaza than Jordanian and 
Israeli rule in the West Bank, and having prevented serious "institutionalized political 
forms of participation" from developing. "' However, in contrast to the Azhar elections, 
the 1997 IUG elections I witnessed appear to have been without disturbances on 
campus. 
Though I have been unable to attend a General Assembly, my observations of everyday 
student behaviour lead me to believe that there is a fair amount of freedom of expression 
- which these occasional scuffles do not seem to squash. 
When I interviewed the 
Shabibah leaders in the IUG cafeteria, they showed no reserve in loudly expressing their 
criticisms of the Kutlah-led SC - even in front of an IUG alumnus they did not know 
(and who, in fact, sympathised with the Kutlah). Those at tables around us could easily 
have eavesdropped. Similarly, I had frank conversations with an agnostic, anti-Islamist 
student on the university lawn, within earshot of passers-by, including two lecturers 
185 Though the Dean of Students later denied this incident happened, I have photographs to prove it did. A 
Shabibah acquaintance who witnessed it too, commented: "Those Hamas posters should all be burned! ". 
When I asked: "What about human rights? ", he retorted: "They are not humans! ". I also witnessed a female 
Shabibah leader orchestrating an attack on four Islamist girls silently protesting during the elections with 
placards; the placards were torn and trampled on, the Islamist girls became agitated but did not respond 
violently. 
M See also Sara Roy, Gaza, p25. 
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known to be IM leaders. 187 To contextualise this, the Kutlah leader from al-Azhar was 
extremely furtive when interviewed at al-Azhar, while a Kutlah leader from the College 
of Education, just released from prison where he had been imprisoned because of his 
party winning the Student Council elections, refused to be interviewed at his own 
College, instead taking me to the IUG. 
In short, despite operating in an increasingly oppressive environment, "' despite the 
violent legacy of occupation and the occasional outbursts of violence, despite even the 
allegations of its political foes, 189 the Kutlah-led SC appears to be increasingly 
comfortable with opposition. 
187 Haniyyah and Musa were talking less than ten metres away. 
188 Cf. recent ban on holding public meetings and marches without prior permission from head of police 
(PCHR Press Release, 27.03.2000). 
189 Complaining about the dominant party comes naturally to the minority parties. In the same vein, the 
oppositional Kutlah at al-Azhar vociferously criticised the Shabibah-led Azhar SC - probably, although I have 
not corroborated this, with a similar amount of distortion. 
CHAPTER 8 
BODY POLITIC: 
BETWEEN INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION - 
CHRISTIANS AND COMMUNISTS 
The following chapter will focus on the IM's understanding of the ideal body politic and 
deal with questions of political inclusion and exclusion. Given that the IM stipulates 
that an ideal state's law be Islamic, and that it presupposes a basic knowledge of Islamic 
law in its legislators, what implications does this have for non-Muslims? I will 
concentrate on the political position of Christians' and communists within a Palestinian 
context. 
8.1 CHRISTIANS IN THE ISLAMIC STATE 
Around 40,000 Christians live under Palestinian Authority rule, and another 130,000 
under Israeli jurisdiction, of which 10,000 in Jerusalem? In the Gaza Strip, some 2000- 
1 Though in Qur'änic terms Jews have the same status as Christians as `People of the Book', I did not 
discuss the position of Jews as this issue is presently clouded by the Jewish occupation of Palestinian land. In 
principle, what applies to Christians applies equally to Jews. Many interviewees used inclusive terms such as 
`non-Muslims' or `minorities' when answering (cf. Abu Shannab 11, Shamma`; Bahr; Taha); some added, of 
their own volition, the category `Jews' to that of `Christians', indicating willingness to welcome Jewish 
citizens to a future Islamic state (Haniyyah I, Hammad I; Musa II; Masri). 
2 Though the ultimate aim of the IM appears to be a united Islamic ummah, all my interviewees 
automatically limited their focus to Palestine, when discussing a possible future Islamic State. In this respect, 
it is noteworthy how often the Palestinian flag (generally with an Islamic inscription on the white middle 
section) features in Hamas leaflets, stickers and campaign banners. 
3 Yossi Klein Halevi, "Squeezed Out", Jerusalem Report, 10.07.1997, p14. 
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3000 Christians make up only 0.3% of Gaza's total population. ' A more comprehensive 
study of IM praxis towards Christians would have included the West Bank, as 
interactions there are more frequent. Of the respondents to my IUG and Azhar surveys, 
83.2% and 65.4% respectively said they had no "close Christian friends". ' In Gaza, the 
status of Christians in an Islamic state is thus not necessarily a topical issue. But since 
Christians have been influential in both intellectual and leftist political circles, and 
Muslim-Christian tensions in Israel and the West Bank have caught the headlines in 
recent years, most Gazan Islamists I interviewed seemed to have given the issue serious 
thought. 
The IM's attitude towards Christians is little debated in Western discourse. When it is, 
the assumption is usually that the IM will follow the historical example of the dhimmi 
model, in which Christians were protected but excluded from the body politic. Daphne 
Tsimhoni thus asserts 
the majority of Christians have no illusions about their treatment in a Muslim 
fundamentalist state ... In such a state, they would assume their traditional, marginal, 
and inferior position as dhimmis ... 
6 
Islamists, she contends, identify Palestinian Christians with the so-called Christian 
West, and vent their anger at Western meddling in Middle Eastern affairs on them. She 
reports threatening slogans written on Christian churches, singling out the sinister "After 
4 These figures are based on interviews with Christian leaders. The percentage of those declaring 
themselves Christians in my LUG survey was similarly 0.3%. 
5 For the IUG, the figures were 85.3% for Hamas supporters, 76.1 % for Fatah supporters. For al-Azhar, 
69.8% and 64.2% respectively. The figures for those responding they had "many close Christian friends" were 
1.5% and 6.0% for the lUG, 2.3% and 6.3% for al-Azhar. Those saying they had "a few", were 11.2% and 
13.4% for the lUG, 23.3% and 25.3% for al-Azhar. 
6 Daphne Tsimhoni, `Palestinian Christians and the Peace Process: The Dilemma of a Minority' in Ilan 
Peleg (ed), The Middle East Peace: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, p146. 
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Saturday comes Sunday" - meaning that after the Jews have been dealt with, Christians 
will be next. ' Yet she fails to investigate whether this slogan was authorised by Hamas 
or indeed reflective of its stance towards Christians! Litvak similarly unquestioningly 
portrays incidents in which (alleged) Hamas supporters harassed Christians as reflective 
of the IM's general attitude, referring, in essentialist fashion, to attacks by Egyptian 
radical Islamists on Egyptian Christians to underline the typicality of Hamas's attacks - 
ignoring that the IM has little affinity with these groups. 9 
While Nüsse devotes a chapter to Hamas's attitude to Christians, she assumes, without 
adequate exploration, that Hamas follows the traditional dhimmfmodel. She dismisses 
passages from Hamas publications which claim that Hamas is a movement of "all 
Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike", as motivated by the need for unity in the 
face of the Israeli enemy: 
The classical Islamic view of protected religious minorities is incompatible with the 
Western idea of pluralism and equality of individual citizens in a nation-state. 
Christians and Jews are in fact different citizens than their Muslim fellow-men.... 
[separated] from the body politic ... 
10 
At question, however, is not the compatibility of Hamas's views with Western ideas, nor 
the classical Islamic view, or even the views of earlier Islamists such as Mawdudi and 
Qutb, but the exact substance of the IM's stance towards Christians in an Islamic state. 
7 Tsimhoni, p147. Similarly Cubert, p178(n29). 
8 Anti-Christian actions happen. The question is whether the IM is behind them, or justifies them. 
9 Litvak, p18. 
10 Nüsse, pp101-103. 
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I interviewed 36 Islamists regarding this matter. Thirteen advocated exclusion of 
Christians from the Islamic body politic, " twenty-three argued for inclusion. " I will 
discuss each argument in turn. 
8.1.1 TREND A: CHRISTIANS AS A SEGREGATED MINORITY 
The first group viewed Christians as subjects of the Islamic state but with the status of a 
separate minority community - in the tradition of the ahl al-dhimmah (protected people) 
model developed within the early Islamic polity to incorporate Christian communities 
under its rule. " Because it is the traditional model, it is possible that in some instances, 
particularly concerning younger members whose other ideas were less traditional, this 
was a gut response, concealing that the issue had not been sufficiently pondered by the 
interviewee. It is noteworthy that a full 34.9% of Fatah-supporting respondents to my 
Azhar survey also stated that Christians could not be Members of Parliament (against 
48% who thought they could). '4 
11 Yassin, Dukhan, 'Ibrahim', Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Ahmad'; Taha, Women's Kutlah 1, Leader 
Kutlah-Azhar. 
12 Abu Shannab II, Zahhar 1, Shammä , Haniyyah I, Hammad I, Intifada 
Cell 111, `lyad' (specified number 
of representatives be proportional to size of Christian minority ), `Narr'; one Board Member al-Shabbat; Bahr, 
Musa I&II, Na`ami; Masri, `Yusuf , Women's Kutlah 2. Three referred this issue to Shari ah experts: `Ashrar 
; one Board Member al-Shabbat; Abu Dhughri. Judging by Abu Dhughri's stance on communists (if they 
respect the system, they can participate), he would, if the scholars approve, support this group. 
13 For different interpretations of the dhimmimodel, see Watt, pp192-249; El-Awa, ppl7-19; Y. Courbage 
& P. Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam, pp2,6-7; Ye'or, The Dhimmi, pp43-77; Ghannouchi, Right, 
pp43,92-93,105-107. 
14 The figures for Azhar's Harnas supporters were 58.1% and 30.2% respectively. Unfortunately, this 
question was not included in my IUG survey. If the opinions of Leader Kutlah-Azhar are representative, al- 
Azhar's Kutlah is more traditional than the IUG's Kutlah which explains these results' discrepancy with the 
results of my oral interviews (see also p294). 
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Yassin, for instance, argued: 
In Islam, the system that is applicable is Islamic law. Christians do not believe in such 
a law, nor do they believe in Islam in its totality. So, how could someone who doesn't 
believe in Islam apply Islam to life? But, Christians should have their opinions 
respected, and they should be listened to in things that pertain to their personal matters 
and their ... 
belief. 15 
In this view, Christians are subject to the general laws when dealing with the state or 
Muslim citizens, but entitled to their own personal status laws when dealing with each 
other. Following a semi-contractual logic, in return for consenting to being subject to 
the general law, Christians will have their rights and well-being protected by the state. 
This contract is strengthened by the Prophet's command to protect dhimm. rs, 'b and, must 
be backed up by some form of representative body which can broker between the 
Christian community and the state. 
Three forms of brokerage were suggested. Echoing Mawdudi, Yassin and two others 
advocated creating a separate ShC Council for Christians which could communicate 
their concerns to the Head of State. " Four interviewees suggested Christians be 
represented in the main Majlis, though without legislative powers) Following Taha: 
1s Yassin It. 
16 "He who hurts a Dhimmi is my opponent. And he who is my opponent here will be my opponent in the 
hereafter" (quoted in Ghannouchi, Right, p63). 
17 Yassin II, two of Hamas Supporters Gaza. `Ahmad' advocated this solution, then refuted it for the next 
suggestion. Mawdudi argued for a "separate representative Assembly for all non-Muslim groups" (Rights, 
pp24-27; Principles, pp48-51). See also Ridwan al-Sayyid, `Islamists and Christians in the Arab World', pp6- 
7; Wadi Haddad, `Ahl al-dhimma in an Islamic State', Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 7(2), pp 177-178. 
18 `Ibrahim', `Ahmad'; Taha, Leader Kutlah-Azhar. Dukhan (see further) may adhere to this view, he 
would not specify. This view echoes another of Mawdudi's suggestions (though seemingly less preferred) that, 
as long as dhimrn s acknowledge the Islamic nature of the law, they could participate in Parliament because it 
was "considerably different from the Shura in its traditional sense" (Rights, pp24-27). 
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Non-Muslims have the right to be represented in Parliament where they can express 
their opinions which is what the Prophet made clear when stating that non-Muslims 
have a choice of Islam, jizyah [tax levied on non-Muslims as "commutation for military 
service"]'9 or war. ... 
The Christian minority needs to be protected under the Islamic 
Khiläfah. 
Taha's reference to the Prophet's offer of Islam, jizyah or war, and his use of the word 
`Khiläfah', instead of the less traditional `dawlah Islamiyyah' (Islamic state) often used 
by Taha's student peers, underlines this argument's rootedness in traditional narrative. 
A further six interviewees argued that Christians need no special representation because 
Islam's righteousness and a Muslim's sacred duty to protect dhinwTs is sufficient? ' 
Dukhan thus explained that 
The combination of an Islamic Parliament (ahl al-hall wa'l- aqd) and Islamic Shari ah 
will be sufficient guarantee that all members of society will be preserved.... If Muslims 
are held responsible [by God] for not paving a road for a mule [reference to an incident 
with Caliph `Umar], how much more so will they be held accountable with regard to 
partners in humanity? 
This third sub-group remained vague about whether Christians could participate in the 
general elections for an all-Muslim council (as a minimal mechanism of accountability). 
19 Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur'an, p447(n1281-1282). Contrary to what some scholars contend, jizyah does 
not appear to have been primarily conceived as a humiliating punishment for non-conversion (Ye'or, pp53-54; 
Nüsse, p101) but as an extension of the pre-Islamic tribal custom in which weak communities paid strong 
tribes to protect them (Ali, loc. sit; Watt, p246; Mawdudi, Rights, pp18-20). Significantly, the majority of 
Christians in the Levant remained unconverted for two centuries after the Islamic conquest while some 
Christians occupied important governmental posts (Courbage, pp10-12,20-25; Haddad, `Ahl', ppl75-176). 
Equally important, contemporary Islamist theoreticians do not portray jrzyah as a symbol of humiliation 
(Qaradawi, Ghayr al-muslimin j al-mujtama `al-lslamr, quoted in Yvonne Haddad, `Islamist Depictions of 
Christianity', Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 7(1), p85), while some suggest abolishing it because it is 
outdated (Ghannouchi, Right, pp105-107). 
20 Dukhan, one of Hamas Supporters Gaza; Women's Kutlah I (who granted that Christian participation in 
Majlis is acceptable ifSharfah experts justified it). 
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They were clear, however, that Christians could not participate in Islamic legislation, 
because, as one women's Kutlah leader put it, "they will serve their own interests and 
this would create a weak point in the fort of Islam"? ' 
Fear of Christians undermining Islamic law through misunderstanding seems to inform 
all three sub-sets of this group ZZ Current relations between Gaza's Christian leaders and 
Hamas appear to be good. But two factors readily sow distrust among Islamists 
regarding the Christian community's potential loyalty towards an Islamic state. First, 
with the Qur'än repeatedly warning Muslims to not "listen to" (3: 100), "take into your 
intimacy" (3: 118) or "take ... as 
friends and protectors" (5: 54) Christians and Jews, 
because not only "will the Jews or the Christians [never) be satisfied with thee unless 
thou follow their form of religion" (2: 120) but "most of them are perverted 
transgressors" (3: 110), 23 there is ample ammunition against according Christians full 
citizenship. Qutb, for instance, used some of these verses to argue against Muslims 
learning about philosophy, theology or sociology from Christians and Jews, as the 
latter's "good intentions" cannot be trusted 24 Second, many Islamists believe the 
(Christian) West to be actively striving to eradicate Islam (one of the reasons why more 
radical Islamists elsewhere decry pluralism as a Western concept aimed at weakening 
the Islamic ummah through division)25 As local Christians share the West's 
predominant religion, they are readily associated with the latter's presumed offensive - 
21 Women's Kutlah 1. 
22 Cf. Dukhan (only mildly so), 'Ibrahim', Hamas Supporters Gaza; Women's Kutlah 1. 
23 flyät 3: 118,2: 120 quoted in Hamas's Mithaq, 5: 54 quoted in Hamas Communique 31 - in all three cases 
referring to "the imperialist powers" of the allegedly Christian West, or Jewish Israel (see `Praxis Analysis'). 
Ayah 3: 100 is quoted in Qutb, Milestones, p212. 
24 Qutb, Milestones, pp202-217. 
25 Cf. Haddad, 'Christianity', pp87-89. 
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particularly as there is a long history of Arab Christians enjoying special privileges from 
Western powers. 26 
Since Christians must be kept out of legislating, they have no guaranteed means to hold 
their rulers accountable or influence the laws to which they owe obedience. If their 
advice to the government goes unheeded, they have no recourse to electoral 
mechanisms, only to a judiciary which is not accountable to them. They are thus wholly 
at the mercy of the Islamic government and its sense of obligation towards them. The 
contract between Islamic rulers and Christian subjects is thus in effect solely between 
the rulers and God. Because of its faith in the persuasive powers of Islam, and the 
Afterlife, this group believes Islam to be a sufficient guarantee - particularly, as they 
pointedly observed, as history suggests that Muslim rulers have generally treated non- 
Muslims better than, for example, their Christian counterparts. 27 
Though the first two sub-groups incorporate a more or less Western understanding of 
the principle of representation, and all three invoke a rights-based argument, asserting 
that Islam guarantees Christians basic rights, " these solutions have remained primarily 
rooted in classical Islamic models. Unlike other instances, such as the classical 
command to consult, which has been creatively recast as a command to hold rulers 
accountable through state-wide elections (Chapter 7), the command to protect dhimmis 
has not been re-interpreted beyond granting that Christians deserve some form of 
representation - despite the fact that there are äyät which could support a more inclusive 
26 Cf. Capitulations under the Ottomans which made France the protector of Christian minorities in the 
Levant, resulting in Muslim-Christian tensions. Cf. Courbage, p74. 
27 Cf. Dukhan, Hamas Supporters Gaza; Women's Kutlah 1. Cf. also Mithaq, §31; Filastin al-Muslima, 
September 1990, p11 (quoted in Nüsse, p101). Though there are examples of discrimination and persecution, 
examples of tolerance and respect for human rights outweigh these, particularly when compared to 
contemporary societies in Europe. However, political rights, such as participation in government (of which 
there are many examples; Courbage, pp24-25) were never granted by right. 
28 Cf. Yassin II, Dukhan, `Ibrahim', Hamas Supporters Gaza; Taha, Women's Kutlah 1, Leader Kutlah- 
Azhar. 
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approach, such as that adopted by the IM's second trend 29 In this respect, it is 
interesting, and potentially a sign of changes to come, that Hamas's Mithaq, which was 
heavily influenced by an older, more traditional leadership, including Dukhan, 
nevertheless quotes one of the äyät used by more `liberal' Islamists to argue for religious 
and political pluralism: 30 
To each among you [Jews, Christians and Muslims] have We prescribed a Law and an 
Open Way. If God had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His 
Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The 
goal of you all is to God; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which 
you dispute (5: 51). 
8.1.2 TREND B: CHRISTIANS AS MEMBERS OF THE BODY POLITIC 
The second group (which included most of the leaders)" views Christians as an integral 
part of the body politic, with the same rights and duties as Muslims, bar two: a Christian 
cannot become Head of State32 and Christians are entitled, if they so wish, to their own 
personal status law (allowing them, for instance, to drink alcoho133 and deal with 
adultery in a different way than the Sharl ah stipulates). This position is supported by a 
religious, a contractual and a rights-based argument. 
29 Ayah 24: 55, "Allah has promised those of you who believe and do good works to make them masters in 
the land... " (Penguin translation), on which the theory of viceregency is built, could readily incorporate 
(believing) Christians, particularly in the light of verses 2: 62,3: 113 and the H adith "No one is superior to 
another except in point of faith and piety. All men are descended from Adam" (quoted in Mawdudi, Theory, 
p30). 
30 Cf. Haddad, `Christianity', p76. 
31 See footnote 12. 
32 Though I did not discuss this, it is likely that this group agrees with Ghannouchi that non-Muslims be 
excluded from the post of head of the Army (Right, p78). Cf. Hamas Supporters Gaza. 
33 Cf. Khalas Communique 12.09.1997. 
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Contractually speaking, since Christians are citizens of the Islamic state, subject to its 
policies and overall legal system, they have the right to participate in legislation, policy- 
making and holding rulers accountable. Abu Shannab argues, for example, that 
Christians should have their share ... within the main 
Majlfs. There is no restriction on 
this because as far as they are representing the people, they are part of the Majlis 3a 
The key words in this passage are "representing the people" rather than "representing 
the Christians". Christian participation in the higher levels of decision-making is here 
legitimised by the principle of representation - if `people' (note, not just Christians) 
elect them, they obtain the right to exercise viceregal power on behalf of their 
constituency (Chapter 6). Says Ahmad Bahr: 
How can a Christian be chosen, and then we don't respect his opinion? That doesn't 
make sense. ... 
We are not enslaving people, we want them to be free. That is Islam. 35 
Consequently, a Christian representative or Minister is a representative or a Minister 
first, a Christian only in faith. In principle, Muslims can vote for Christians if they 
believe the latter are better qualified, and Christians can vote for Muslims. 36 
A number of interviewees backed up their position with a rights-based argument, 
arguing that because all citizens are humans they should have equal rights to voting and 
representation. 37 Both this and the contractual argument can be supported by the 
34 Cf. also Shamma`, Haniyyah, Hammad, Intifada Cell, `lyad', 'Nasr'; Board Member al-Shabbat; Bahr, 
Musa, Nä ami; Women's Kutlah 2. 
35 Bahr. Cf also Haniyyah, Musa, Hammad, Na`ami, Masri. 
36 Muslih, `Yusuf, , `Nasr' specifically made this point. 
37 Cf. Shamma`, Hammad, Intifada Cell, `Narr'. 
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`viceregal' äyah (24: 55). "Those of you who believe and do good works" can be 
interpreted to mean all who perform these actions, regardless of their religion. The term 
`believe' can even be stretched to mean those who believe in God's principles of 
freedom, equality and justice (see Chapter 8.2). At the same time, both the rights-based 
and contractual argument are `modem' in nature. And, most significantly, they have 
come to override the dhimmiprinciple. 
However, the fact that Islam underpins the Islamic state means that Christians are 
distinguished from the rest of the body politic in two ways. I have already alluded to the 
fact that Christians have the right to exemption from those personal status clauses of the 
Sharlah which contradict their own religious beliefs. The second differentiation is that 
a Christian cannot become Head of State. In any state, the Head of State is both Chief 
Executive and the highest embodiment of the state. As the state is an Islamic state, there 
is thus an argument for him being Muslim as he needs to both embody Islam, and 
defend the religious interests of the majority of citizens. Beyond this, Christians are 
entitled to occupy any other political office, as long as they respect the Islamic 
framework of the state. 38 
While the religious argument limits Christian citizenship, it has paradoxically also 
encouraged Islamists to embrace the notion of Christian membership of the (Muslim) 
body politic. For, as Musa observes, 
a Christian or a Jewish person [as opposed to an atheist] can participate in such an 
[Islamic] system, because they are believers in God. 39 
38 Haniyyah and Bahr stated this explicitly, Musa hinted at it, the others implied it. 
39 Musa II. 
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It is thus the religious kinship between Christians and Muslims which has enabled the 
transition from viewing Christians as dhimmis to seeing them as (near-equal) citizens. 
This clearly has implications for communists (see Chapter 8.2). 
Notably, two interviewees placed the contractual above the religious argument, stating 
that if the majority of the body politic elects a Christian as Head of State, they would 
accept it as the will of the people and trust he would be able to both embody the Islamic 
principles of the state and defend the majority's Islamic interests. 0 Whether these two 
represent a growing trend within the IM, is impossible to say without further research. It 
is significant, however, that the contractual argument which in itself has been rooted by 
the IM in Islamic sources, has come to override the religious argument in their minds. 
As with the previous one, the views of this group are rooted in historical precedent and 
revelation. But, rather than using these examples to prove that Islam is a sufficient 
guarantor for the protection of Christians in an Islamic state, this group used them to 
highlight precedents for Christians in high office 4' Though none mentioned it 
explicitly, this group's position seems to be inspired by a `modern' reading of the 
Medina Constitution as epitomised by Ghannouchi, who argues that 
40 Shamma' ("Yes, of course - it is majority rule"); Na`ami ("if the people accept this, I think that [the non- 
Muslim] is entitled to be President"). Others may reason likewise. I did not have time to draw all interviewees 
out on this point. Hammad I, Hamas Supporters Gaza, Intifada Cell, `Narr', Board Members al-Shabbat 
specifically prohibited this. 
41 Haniyyah ('Umar's appointment of Christians as governors and Ministers), Na'ami ('Abbasid 
appointments), Hammad ('Abbasid appointments), Shamma` (exemplary history of Muslim treatment of 
Christians). Masri pointed to Christians in the government of present-day Sudan. Importantly, this group 
contradicts the argument popularised by Mawdudi that in the early days of Islam there was an "utter absence 
of even a single instance" of a dhimmi being made a member of Parliament, Governor, Judge or even being 
"allowed to participate in the election of the Caliphs", and that consequently, "were it right to give them a 
share in the Government, we fail to understand how the Prophet of God (pbuh) could have done injustice to 
them in the first instance" (Principles, pp49-50). 
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this document [the Medina Constitution] stipulated the religious freedom of non- 
Muslims as party of the body politic of the nation, as citizens and nationals [emphasis 
mine]. 42 
Where the first group expounds a position close to earlier Islamist theorists such as 
Mawdudi and Qutb, 43 the latter champions a position not unlike later theorists such as 
Ghannouchi and Fahmi Huwaydi, who argue that all people, regardless of religion, are 
viceregents of God and should thus be accorded full citizenship (bar the right to become 
Head of State). " Age may partially explain this predilection. Age may also explain 
why the second group is more inclined to employ a mixture of traditional and modem 
concepts. The two elder Hamas leaders I interviewed, Yassin and Dukhan, both belong 
to the first group while all the middle-aged and younger leaders belong to the second. 
The student generation does not wholly fit this explanation. Against Taha, Women's 
Kutlah 1, Leader Kutlah-Azhar, the three interviewees of Hamas Supporters Gaza and 
`Ahmad' in the first group, Masri, `Yusuf, Women's Kutlah 2, the six members of the 
Intifada Cell, `Nasr' and possibly Abu Dhughri (see footnote 2) belonged to the second. 
What is clear is that more student interviewees supported the second group. Beyond 
this, differences in opinion may be influenced by personal experience, learning and 
personality. 
8.1.3 POINTS OF COMPARISON WITH WESTERN CONSTRUCTS 
The position espoused by both IM trends, that Christians are entitled to their own 
personal status law, but not to occupying the position of Head of State, is not as 
42 Ghannouchi, Right, p43. 
43 Qutb did not detail the political position of Christians in an Islamic state, but his overall approach to 
Christians places him close to Mawdudi. See al-Sayyid, `Islamists', pp7-8; Haddad, `Christianity', pp82-83. 
44 Ghannouchi, Right, pp43,75-85; for Huwaydi's views, epitomised by the title of his book Muwälinzm lä 
dhimiyyim (Citizens not dhimmis), see Haddad, `Christianity', pp85-86; Haddad, `Ahl', pp178. 
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incompatible with a Western understanding of human rights, as Western conclusions 
that Islamism views non-Muslims as second-rate citizens would suggest. Though the 
principles of equality before the laves and "one law for all citizens", 46 championed so 
avidly by the West, stand perpendicular to the Islamist notion of multiple laws, the 
Islamist notion may well prove better at safeguarding the right of a religious, cultural or 
ethnic minority47to preserve its customs. In this vein, Ghassan Salame observed that 
Those putting shari'a into practice have a reply which it would be wrong to reject 
immediately, 
... an 
islamic regime ruled by the shari'a easily admits the principle of 
plural legislations, particularly in the matter of personal status (covering a field wider 
than in other legal traditions), to the advantage of non-Muslims. We are, of course, 
faced here with a direct attack on the modern national principle of one law for all 
citizens. But for many minorities, it seems more acceptable to deny that principle than 
to relinquish the right to their own law. 8 
The IM's position resembles the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples which grants separate legal rights on the basis of ethnic identity. With the 
increase in, and awareness of, cultural and ethnic diversity in the West, Western 
countries have also begun to adopt a more pluralistic legal approach to minorities. In 
New Zealand, specific clauses apply to those belonging to the indigenous people, the 
Maoris, regarding fishing rights and land tenure so as to preserve ancient Maori customs 
45 Cf. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "All are equal before the law" (Article 
7). 
46 Salam6, `Introduction' in Salam6, p6; based on principle expressed in French Revolutionary Constitution 
of August 1795 that "the law is equal for all" (Article 3, quoted in Sartori, p343). 
47 Constantin Dabbagh (Director Near East Council of Churches, Gaza) and Musa Saba (Director YMCA, 
Gaza) rejected this term because it stigmatises and prohibits full assimilation. They rejected sectarian 
differentiation. See footnote 51. 
48 Salam6, pp5-6. 
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and Maori welfare 49 In Britain, various acts have been passed to exempt members of 
religious minorities from generally applicable laws on the basis of a difference in belief. 
In this vein, Jews were exempted from a ban on opening shops on Sundays in the Shops 
Act 1950, s47, while Sikhs have been exempted from wearing motor-cycle helmets in 
the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976, sl, on the grounds 
that devout Sikh practice is to wear a turban in public places - overruling the argument 
that religious freedom be curtailed when public safety (and the National Health Service) 
is concerned. " 
If a minority demands its own personal status law, the IM's position can hardly be 
faulted from a human rights perspective. However, the minority may not desire special 
legal status. Constantine Dabbagh, for instance, director of Gaza's Near East Council of 
Churches (NECC), observed: 
if you have a special privilege then you have special duties also. [... ] [As to whether we 
would be safe in a future Islamic state], it depends to some extent on us [the 
Christians]. 
... 
If we believe in our citizenship ... as part and parcel of this society, then 
we have to behave in accordance with the law of this society. We cannot have a special 
law for us. ... If we want to 
have a special law, we have to get out ... 
I am against that. 
If we talk about democracy, then the rule of the majority should apply. ... If they are a 
great majority (99%), they have to rule and we have to accept the rule of the law. s' 
49 Cf. John Luxton, Maori Affairs in New Zealand - Maori Policy; Douglas Graham, Treaty Negotiations 
in New Zealand - The Treaty of Waitangi; Athanasia 
Akermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in 
International Lmv, p 153. 
so Sebastian Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs, pp276-277,283-284. 
51 Also Saba; George Awwad (priest at Gaza's principal Orthodox Church). Cf. Turabi's remark that "the 
public law of Islam is one related rationally to justice ... and even a non-Muslim may appreciate its wisdom 
and fairness. Christians in particular ... should not mind 
[its] application ... as 
long as it does not interfere with 
their religion. It is a moral [law] based on values which are common and more akin to Christian values than 
any secular law" (p250). 
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The second trend appears to honour this position. The first group would have more 
difficulty in accepting it, since it diminishes the difference between Christians and 
Muslims and creates a pressure to include Christians in the legislative process on the 
contractual grounds that those subject to the law must have a say in it, thus introducing 
an un-Islamic element into legislation. This raises a problem. For, if minorities have 
the right to choose assimilation or segregation, does not the majority have a right to stay 
segregated (if this is indeed the majority will) - specifically if assimilation could mean 
`un-Islamic' changes to the law? At present, the small Christian minority is unlikely to 
affect legal decisions. But if it grew, it could do so by allying itself to dissident Muslim 
factions, or flexing its muscle in those areas where a high proportion of Christians live. 
This latter case is qualitatively not much different from that of, for instance, certain 
European cities in which communities of Turkish and North-African `guest workers' 
have become a sizeable minority, or even a local majority (the main difference being 
that Palestinian Christians are of course indigenous). " As European states have no 
official differentiation in law, the cultural views of these large minorities have begun to 
influence elections, and thus, indirectly, legislation - enhancing tensions with 
autochthonous citizens. Whether the introduction of a differentiated system of law 
would alleviate cultural and religious tensions, remains to be seen, particularly as it 
could undermine efforts at combatting racism and ghettoisation 53 A more detailed 
study of Islamist theories and practical examples of legal differentiation might provide 
fresh insights. Introducing a sub-set of differentiated legal codes within an overarching 
legal framework might also be one way of guaranteeing national and minority rights 
52 Cf. per 31.12.1997,6.3% (133,193) of the population of 2,120,837 of West Berlin (Germany) was of 
Turkish origin (Statistiches Landesamt, Eimvohnerregister). 
53 Elgin KUrsat-Ahlers argues for instance for an equal-rights strategy as "Germans have tended to interpret 
multi-culturalism as a model to facilitate the preservation of their own German culture and shield it from 
contact with (or contamination by) migrant cultures" while "xenophobic violence" was rising in the early 
1990s ('The Turkish Minority in German Society' in David Horrocks & Eva Kolinsky (eds), Turkish Culture 
in German Society Today, p115). 
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within, for instance, the Council of Europe which, by the late 1990s, still had no explicit 
clause stipulating the rights of national minorities, let alone minorities resulting from 
immigration policies. " 
Exclusion of citizens from the office of Head of State on religious grounds stands 
likewise perpendicular to the principle expressed most eloquently in the French 
Declaration of Rights of 1789: 
All citizens being equal..., they are equally entitled to all the emoluments and positions 
of public office in accord with their capabilities and under the sole distinction of their 
virtue and intelligence. 55 
Yet, even in the wording of this Declaration lies a bridge to the IM's theory of 
citizenship. For, if it is accepted that the principle of equal access to public office is an 
equality of opportunity based on capability, not a right to access regardless of capability, 
the criterion that the Head of an Islamic state be a Muslim takes on a different hue. It 
could, after all, be argued that only a Muslim is capable of being the embodiment of an 
Islamic state, if only because the Head of State is generally regarded as the state's chief 
representative, which, since the very existence of an Islamic state presupposes a 
majority has consented to its creation, should logically be a Muslims' The argument 
that only a Muslim can defend the political interests of the Muslim majority is more 
dubious, particularly if the view is taken, following Turabi, that religious obligations are 
outside the realm of the state, and that because the Shari `ah is "related rationally to 
54 Beyond a reference to discrimination on grounds of national origin or "association with a national 
minority" in article 14 prohibiting discrimination; Akermark, ppl97-246. 
ss Article 6, quoted in Sartori, p342. It is reiterated by contemporary theorists like Robert Dahl (cf. 
`Procedural Democracy'). 
56 Though opposition to the status quo is mounting, at present the case of Britain is similar as, for historical 
reasons, the Head of State (the Queen) is also the head of the state's established church, the Church of 
England, and must by law be a Protestant. 
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At an institutional level, many partnerships exist. Directors of Christian charities 
confirmed they enjoyed good relations with charities associated with Hamas 58 Certain 
projects associated with the IM, for instance some related to the IUG, received goods or 
services from the NECC, while both the NECC's and the YMCA's premises have been 
used by people affiliated with the IM 59 During the Intifada, the Christian-run Ahli 
Hospital treated many Hamas members 6° Conversely, Hamas is said to have defended 
the interests of Christians against the Israelis, " while its charities have a reputation of 
even-handedness, regardless of religious background bZ At the IUG, the Dean of 
Students, a former Kutlah leader, told me he was just deciding whether to expel "a 
student who had mistreated Christians". 63 At Christian occasions, IM leaders are among 
the invited while Christian dignitaries are similarly invited to IM events 64 Hizb al- 
Khalas welcomes Christians as members as long as they subscribe to the party's aims. 65 
I have come across a number of friendships between individuals. Saba, YMCA director, 
knows some Hamas leaders well. Singling out one, Saba commented: 
58 Dabbagh (NECC), Saba (YMCA), Awwad (Orthodox Church). 
59 During the Intifada, the YMCA hosted meetings between Hamas and other political parties (Saba), while 
the NECC provided rooms for the IUG (Dabbagh). 
60 Maher Ayyad (Christian doctor). 
61 Saba ("Hamas tends to treat the Christians better than they would treat Muslims. ... This is positive 
discrimination. I don't like it.... Nationality is for all the people. "); Awwad. 
62 Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres. Dabbagh confirmed this was the public perception; he had not personally 
tested its veracity. Awwad did not know of financial help given by IM-affiliated charities to Christians 
(according to him, Christians are too independent-minded to ask for money); yet he believed IM-affiliated 
charities gave moral support to Christians in need. 
63 Abu Sibah. 
64 Dabbagh, Awwad. Abu Sibah specified that e. g. Awwad was invited at every public lUG function. 
65 Musa I. 
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there was nothing to fear. Both Dabbagh and Saba emphasised the Christians' own 
responsibility for being treated well, condemning demands for a sectarian-based special 
status and calling on Christians to work for the national good. Dabbagh cited the 
Christians as provoking a specific bout of Christian-Muslim tensions in Beit Sahur 
(West Bank) during 1998 by ostentatiously displaying crosses on every house. 
Ordinary Christians, however, were not unanimously positive, some fearing 
discrimination from a Hamas-led government. Though it is possible that the leaders I 
interviewed put up a positive front for fear of jeopardising relations with the Muslim 
majority - as two young men in Jerusalem, where Muslim-Christian relations are tenser 
than in Gaza, suggested to a reporter's - the discrepancy between these views appears to 
stem rather from the fact that many ordinary Christians have no working or friendly 
relationship with Hamas members, and, consequently, are subject to rumours and Israeli 
disinformation (see further). 72 Since Christians are more likely to be affiliated to the 
Palestinian Left, their perception of Hamas will be coloured by the Left's violent 
encounters with the Islamists during the 1980s which had little to do with Christianity. 
Significantly, I did not hear of any Muslim-Christian incidents in Gaza, nor was offered 
any concrete proof of such by ordinary Christians who feared Hamas rule. 
In publications, the IM treats Christians with respect and as fellow citizens. A Hamas 
text entitled "The movement's policies towards Palestine's Christians", stated: 
1. Considers Palestine's Christians an integral part of the Palestinian people, the 
Arab nation and its civil identity. 
71 "Our leaders are liars: They tell the newspapers that everything is OK. But when Christians go to the 
market, they're afraid to wear their crosses" (Halevi quoting two shopkeepers; "Squeezed Out", p 19). 
72 Ordinary Christians Gaza. 
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2. Considers Christians as having the same civil rights and the same duties as 
those of other Palestinians [... ] 
6. Re-states the importance of their [Christian] participation in the political life 
and the resistance of the Palestinian people during the occupation and after 
liberation; and works towards attracting them to work in national 
establishments. 
7. Works towards starting firm relationships with their political and religious 
leadership to win their support in public and national situations and to consult 
their leaders in the country's general affairs. [... ]73 
Similarly, Hamas condemned an attack by Israeli settlers on an Orthodox Church and its 
clergy, lamenting it particularly because "this took place during Christian feasts"! ' 
Such statements are partly motivated by the wish to challenge Israel on every front? 5 
But the above reference to the Christian feasts indicates that Hamas is sufficiently 
interested in its Christian fellow citizens to find out when their feasts are. 
The IM is similarly keen to respect and protect Christian rights pertaining to their 
religion. In a statement calling for the absolute prohibition of alcohol in Palestine, the 
authors underlined 
the particularity of the Christians among the children of the Palestinian people to whom 
Islam made permissible what their religion permits them to do. 6 
73 August 1988, quoted in Khalid al-Hrub, `Christians in the Occupied Territories', al-Hayat, 03.07.1993 
(quoted in Hrub, p 153). 
74 Communique 13.04.1990, quoted in Hrub, p154. Cf. also joint statement of Hamas, Khalas, Jihad, PFLP, 
DFLP, Arab Liberation Front on 21.08.1997 (Khalas Collection). 
75 The next sentence indeed reads: "Hamas, while it condemns such aggression against Christians among 
our Palestinian people, reminds the world that the state of Israeli occupation is a racist state which is hostile to 
religious beliefs. " 
76 Khalas Communique 12.09.1997, signed `The Convention of Scholars in Palestine to Fight Against 
Liquor'. 
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On another occasion, the leadership, realising that a planned strike would coincide with 
Christmas Day, immediately cancelled it. " Though planning the strike on Christmas 
Day seems to reveal ignorance of the Christian calendar, it must be remembered that the 
majority of Palestinian Christians are Orthodox (particularly so in Gaza) and thus 
celebrate Christmas later, and that the majority of Christian feast days, like their Islamic 
counterparts, are determined by the moon, rather than having a fixed date. 
However, and somewhat confusingly, the IM also liberally quotes iyät which are highly 
critical of Christians. If read literally and out of context, it is easy to misinterpret these 
as expressions of anti-Christian sentiment. But a closer reading reveals that these verses 
are quoted only in the context of diatribes against Western meddling in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict - called either `imperialism' or, tellingly, `Crusadism'. Article 13 of the 
Mithaq, for instance, quotes "Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee 
unless thou follow their form of religion" (2: 120), after denouncing international peace 
conferences as "nothing but a form of enforcing the rule of the unbelievers in the lands 
of Muslims". Article 22 cites "Do not take into your intimacy those outside your ranks 
[of believers]: they will not fail to corrupt you" (3: 118), to underline the pernicious role 
of "the imperialist powers in the Capitalist West and Communist East' 'in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. 78 In each case, the quotations are intended to underline the 
`unbelieving', infidel nature of the foreign policy of the West and Israel. Read carefully, 
they do not imply that Christians as such are infidels. Article 22 underlines this by 
calling the `imperialist' powers "the unbelievers' powers". 
In the same vein, the Mithaq's claim that "peace and harmony [between Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism] is possible only under Islam" and that "[f]ollowers of other 
77 Communique 67 (03.12.1990), quoted in Hrub, p154. 
78 Cf. also Communique 31, quoting äyah 5: 54 after condemning the Balfour declaration as a Christian- 
Jewish scheme against Palestine. 
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religions should stop fighting Islam in ruling this area, because when they rule, there 
will only be murdering, punishing, and banishing... " (§31), is clearly directed towards 
the `Crusading' states and the `Zionist entity', not the local Christians. 
Vindicating this explanation is the difference between the tone of Hamas's above 
statements and the äyät quoted in addressing local Christians. A 1988 leaflet thus 
stated: 
[Hamas] asserts that it is the movement of all the Palestinian masses, Muslims and 
Christians without distinction, as it follows strictly the way of the Qur'an, which states: 
"And thou wilt find the nearest of them in affection to those who believe [to be] those 
who say: Lo! We are Christians.... " [5: 85]79 
Such contradictory usage of Y_yät may have confused the Hamas rank and file, as well as 
the general population. In both instances the Qur'än refers to `Christians'. Yet, while in 
the Western case Hamas means the term to denote `infidel' behaviour, in the Palestinian 
case it simply means `Christians'. This may explain why some of those Christians who 
have no business or social touches with Hamas believe the latter to be anti-Christian, 
and why some of the less educated Muslims, Hamas supporters or not, daub anti- 
Christian slogans on churches and Christian-owned houses. 8° In this, it does not help 
that Palestinian Christians both share the religious heritage of and have historically 
enjoyed a privileged relationship with, the West, which is held responsible for much of 
the suffering in Palestine. 
79 Communique 49. 
80 Cf. Ordinary Christians Gaza; Ordinary Christians Jerusalem; slogans on churches mentioned in 
Tsimhoni; slogan on East Jerusalem Christian house reading "? slam is the solution". 
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Finally, it must be emphasised that the IM is not the only potential perpetrator of 
Muslim-Christian incidents. Some Muslim establishment members (specifically the 
waqj) appear to have condoned irregularities in Jerusalem, " while uneducated, poor 
Muslims seem to have been involved in incidents in East Jerusalem (for socio-economic 
rather than religious reasons). " Furthermore, there is the Israeli policy of sowing 
division. Numerous Christians told me they were singled out and treated better at 
checkpoints in front of their Muslim fellow-citizens (yet out of sight of Muslims, they 
received equally humiliating treatment). " In one incident, the Israeli authorities were 
linked to a forged `llamas' leaflet, commanding the daughters of a Christian family to 
wear the hijäb - something the llamas leadership is against. 
84 In another incident, 
Hamas called on people 
"[t]o warn against the "planted" leaflets in the name of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, Hamas, such as the leaflet attacking the heroic inhabitants of Beit Sahur [a 
village near Bethlehem with a majority of Christians]. Hamas movement asserts that 
this cheap method is far-removed from the way which is familiar to our masses. 85 
Given the high stakes for which Israel is playing, and the potential for misunderstanding 
between the religious communities, it is rather remarkable that Christian-Muslim 
relations are as good as they are. 
81 Involving seizure of Christian property to expand mosque (Halevi, "Squeezed Out", pI9). 
82 Incidents in the Beit Hanina area recounted by a Christian inhabitant. 
83 Ordinary Christians Gaza; Ordinary Christians Jerusalem. Dabbagh confirmed that Israeli authorities 
often treat Christians differently from Muslims, to sow division. 
84 Ibrahim Shahadah I (GCRL). 
85 Communique 49. Of the 22 Communiques from the Intifada's first year featured in Mishal, 7 warn 
against counterfeit leaflets made by the Israelis. 
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8.2 COMMUNISTS IN THE ISLAMIC STATE 
Another `test case' for the IM's ideal of political equality to ideological others is its 
attitude towards communists. Western discourse says little beyond accusing the IM, for 
instance in the context of the IUG, of dealing "severely" with "[l]eftists, liberals or 
progressives expressing a view that was in any respect contrary to that of the Mujama 
[Brotherhood]", 86 and declaring that, if in power, Hamas would not tolerate "political 
parties whose frame of reference is not Islam". 87 Similarly, Hamas's involvement in 
killing collaborators during the Intifada and its alleged orchestration of the hi/ b 
campaign are sometimes posited as a preview of its attitudes in an Islamic state. 88 As 
there is no detailed analysis of Hamas's political discourse and praxis regarding leftists, 
conclusions remain highly emotive. 
Economically and politically, communism is a rival ideology to Islamism. At a religious 
level, communism is, in theory, the negation of Islam. Consequently, the IM's overall 
response is deeply influenced by Islamic traditions regarding unbelief and apostasy 
(concerning communists raised as Muslims). However, a number of Palestinian 
communists are still practising MuslimsS9 (or Christians). Moreover, both communism 
and Islamism fight for justice and equality. At present, the IM is in alliance with the 
Left (principally the PFLP and DFLP) against what it perceives as the injustices of the 
PNA and the Peace Process. It is thus inevitable that there will be tensions between 
86 Milton-Edwards, p 111. 
87 Abu-Amr, 'Hamas', p 18. 
88 Usher, pp68-69. Usher seems to refer to the kind of sentiments expressed to me by Abu Middin (Justice 
Minister), Top MOPIC Official, Gazan Businessman. 
89 Cf. PFLP prisoners regularly attended the five daily prayers and Friday prayers organised by Hamas 
prisoners ('Khalid' IV); a leftist Fatah member, formerly belonging to the Communist Party, reluctantly 
missed prayer at al-Azhar University on my behalf. 
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dogma and pragmatic considerations, and, resultantly, inconsistencies in stances taken 
- particularly as the IM's attitudes seem to be in the process of transition. 
Due to time restraint, the sample of interviewees on which I have drawn (19) is 
significantly smaller than that of the previous section (35) but is sufficiently 
representative in containing a random cross-section of leaders and members (six Hamas 
leaders, four Kutlah leaders, nine members/supporters) and covering an amply broad 
spectrum. A glaring omission is that the sample includes no women. References to the 
IM refer therefore exclusively to male views. 
8.2.1 UNBELIEVERS AND APOSTATES IN QUR'AN AND SUNNAH 
The Qur'än leaves no doubt that hell-fire awaits unrepentant unbelievers (kuffär), 9° and 
that for believers to befriend God's enemies is to stray "from the Straight Path" (60: 1). 91 
A few verses go further, ordering that unbelievers be fought "until there is no more 
tumult or oppression and there prevail ... 
faith in God... everywhere" (8: 39), and that 
"those who wage war against God and His apostle, and strive with might and main for 
mischief throughout the land" be executed, crucified, mutilated or exiled (5: 36). As for 
apostasy (riddah), besides the existence of a Hadith stating unequivocally that 
"Whosoever changes his religion, slay him", 92 there are a number of instances in which 
apostates were killed on the authority of the Prophet or his successors. 
90 Cf. 2: 39; 3: 4,10,56,116; 5: 11,36,39,40,44,89; 8: 36. 
91 Cf. 3: 28,118; 5: 60,83; 8: 39; 60: 2,9. 
92 Quoted in S. A. Rahman, Punishment of Apostasy in Islam, p59. 
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Besides a school which, taking the above Hadith literally, advocates execution for 
simply embracing unbelief (kufr), 93 another school questions whether unbelief is 
punishable, if unaccompanied by acts of sedition 94 This latter approach is based on the 
view that the äyät stipulating unbelievers be fought or executed, and the executions 
recorded in the Sunnah, all concern unbelievers who had simultaneously either actively 
waged war against God and His believers or had committed other punishable crimes, 
such as murder 95 
Such a reading is bolstered by äyät differentiating between unbelievers who "fight you 
for [your] Faith" and those who do not, admonishing believers to deal "kindly and 
justly" with the latter (60: 8-9)96 - as well as by the Qur'änic injunction that "there be no 
compulsion in religion" (2: 256). It is similarly rooted in the conviction that it is better 
to leave both judgement and punishment to God, since fallible humans cannot 
conclusively judge the extent of apostasy. This conviction is underpinned by al. dt? h 
warning that "the reproach of kufr is equivalent to murder" and that "[i]f a Muslim 
charges a fellow Muslim with kufr [unbelief], he is himself a käfir [unbeliever], if the 
accusation should prove untrue" 97 
93 Cf. Shafi'i of the four founders of schools of law (see Rahman, p22). In modem times, Muhammad 
Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State, ppl71-174; Asaf Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Lativ, pl54. 
94 Cf. Malik, Ibn Hanbal, Abu Hanifah of the school of law founders (see Rahman, p21). In modern times, 
Rahman; Mohammad Karnali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, pp186-187,250; Muhammad El-Awa, 
Punishment in Islamic Law, pp49-68. 
95 The apostates of the `Ukal and `Urayna tribes whom the Prophet had executed, had mutilated and killed 
fellow herdsmen and stolen their camels (cf. El-Awa, Punishment, pp51-52; Mohammad `Ali, The Religion of 
Islam, p595). The so-called Riddah wars of Abu Bakr revolved around maintaining the tribal alliances and the 
payment of taxes agreed to under the Prophet, and so upholding Islam's worldly authority after the death of its 
Prophet, rather than unbelief per se (cf. Rahman, pp63-64; Karnali, Freedom, p93; Kennedy, pp50-57). 
96 Cf also 8: 61. 
97 Quoted under entry `käfir' in Encyclopaedia of Islam IV(1975), p407. 
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8.2.2 TREND A: EXCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS FROM THE BODY 
POLITIC 
Three of the four groups among my sample of interviewees excluded communists from 
the body politic. Though each of these consisted of two interviewees only, the fact that 
two interviewees independently identified a similar position, and that two of these 
groups included at least one leader while the third is rooted in a well-documented 
Islamic tradition, suggests that these are identifiable positions, supported by sufficiently 
significant sections of the IM to be categorised as separate trends. In this vein, 30.2% of 
Hamas-supporting respondents to my Azhar survey stated agnostics and non-mosque- 
going Muslims could not be Members of Parliament (against 62.8% who said they 
could). " 
The first of these argues that, though communists are free to disbelieve, even to express 
their beliefs as individuals, they should not be allowed to systematically undermine the 
basis of the Islamic state by organising themselves in parties and participating in 
legislation. Following Bahr, 
it doesn't make sense in an Islamic State to have a communist party ... We will not 
prevent people from expressing their points of views, they are free to express what they 
believe. But there should not be a systematic weakening of the state from within.... 
When I say there's no compulsion in Islam, I mean we do not impose Islam on people. 
An Islamic system allows Christians and Jews to practise their beliefs but that doesn't 
mean they can drink alcohol, for example, in front of Muslims, because... this negates 
Islam. They can do it privately. In the same vein, a communist cannot go out and 
propagate disbelief and impose it on Muslim society. 
98 The figures for Fatah supporters were 16.3% and 79.2%. Again, with the Harnas sample, it must be taken 
into account that al-Azhar's Kutlah appears to be more traditional than the lUG's Kutlah. 
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Musa justified this position, saying: 
It's every human being's right to participate in ... 
legislation 
... 
But when we're talking 
about an Islamic State, the general movement of the society should be towards a 
believing life. It's not logical that someone who says that there is no God, should be 
part of making the laws ... 
[if] he became a legislator, he would be provoking people to 
disbelieve in God. ... 
I am not denying such a person has a personal right to believe 
whatever he wants to believe, to practise whatever he wants to practise. ... But when it 
comes to issues of general policy and society's general direction that's where we 
should make distinctions of who's who in society. 99 
Though this group limits communists' freedom of expression, it does not limit their 
freedom of belief, or advocate that communists be killed for their unbelief - or, if they 
were raised as Muslims, their apostasy (if indeed they have adopted atheism). To 
support its argument for limitation, it does not invoke the Qur'an or the Hadith, but the 
harm principle: unbelief harms society by undermining the belief in God's punishments 
and rewards, upon which the whole fabric of political obligation, legal authority and 
social morality is believed to rest - resembling Locke who similarly held that without 
belief in God, the Afterlife and Judgement Day, there would be no incentive to heed 
promises made, thus spelling the end of the social contract. Locke, however, goes 
further by suggesting atheists not be tolerated for the good of society, as they were 
unlikely to make good citizens. 'oo 
The second group takes Locke's solution one step further, calling, with the scholars of 
the first tradition described in Chapter 8.2.1, for the execution of apostates - provided 
an official court has verified their apostasy and given them the opportunity to retract 
99 Musa II. Though I did not discuss communists with him, Yassin's reasoning regarding Christians 
suggests he falls into this category. 
100 Riley quoting Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature and Letter Concerning Toleration, p73. 
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their beliefs. "' Communists of Christian origin, meanwhile, are free to practise 
communism, since, as `Iyad' paradoxically pointed out, to them applies the äyah `let 
there be no compulsion in religion'. Taking a literal interpretation of the apostasy 
Hadith, this group argues that apostasy is humanly verifiable and must be fought and 
punished. 1°2 No differentiation is made between communists waging war on Muslims, 
and those who do not. Nor is the execution of apostates justified by recourse to the 
harm principle, only the Had th and the Qur'an are invoked. Paradoxically, though, 
`Iyad' conceded, despite his rigidity in condemning unbelief, that on account of its 
current cooperation with the Palestinian Left, Hamas could not possibly execute its 
erstwhile allies once an Islamic state was achieved and should accept a compromise 
(echoing the fourth group; see Chapter 8.2.3) . In the same vein, 
he acknowledged that 
Muslims can learn from communist ideas and solutions. "' 
The third group ducks the issue altogether, insisting that there will be no communists in 
an Islamic state because Islam will have removed all grounds for communism, such as 
inequality and injustice. 104 Unable to appreciate that a communist might disbelieve on 
principle, it declares those who would continue to believe in communism in a just and 
egalitarian state, clinically insane. In Dukhan's words, 
Under Islam, there will be no justification to believe in communism. Communism 
promises humanity food and drink; Islam will provide for all humanity's needs, 
material and spiritual. While communism sees the human being as an animal merely 
seeking drink and food, Islam regards the human being as a being with both material 
and spiritual needs. It is the duty of an Islamic state to supply a person with all his 
101 `Iyad'; Leader Kutlah-Azhar. 
102 `Iyad': "God ordered us to fight kuffar and munäfigin (hypocrites)". 
103 ' Iyad'. 
104 Dukhan, Khalas member of Hamas Supporters Gaza. 
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needs. There is thus no need to transgress against the Islamic state - if someone [like a 
communist] does, doesn't this tell you that he is psychologically sick? The state will 
treat his illness, ask God for healing - and after that there will be no communists. 
This group's views seem to be influenced by the conviction that communism was 
introduced to Muslims by Europe to undermine the Muslim faith from within. 105 As 
such, it regards it as alien and destructive to the Arab and Islamic `nature'. One has to 
wonder what this group's reaction would be if communism did not disappear in an 
Islamic state - and whether Dukhan's (good-humoured) proposal of curing them of their 
`illness' could become a Soviet-like practice of locking up dissidents in psychiatric 
hospitals. 
8.2.3 TREND B: COMMUNISTS AS MEMBERS OF THE BODY 
POLITIC 
Thirteen interviewees supported the view that communists have the right to be 
represented, stand for election and participate in legislation, and be voted for. 1°6 Apart 
from barring communists from the office of Head of State on the grounds that they 
cannot be expected to have the best interests of Islam at heart, they grant the latter the 
viceregal rights bestowed by God on all those "who believe and do good works" (äyah 
24: 55). 
105 Cf. Dukhan. 
106 Abu Shannab III, Shamma` (by inference; see footnote 112), Hammad I, Intifada Cell II&I1I (5 out of 6 
members), one member of Hamas Supporters Gaza, `Narr'; Abu Dhughri, Taha, `Yusuf'. Though I did not 
discuss this issue with Haniyyah, his logic concerning Christians suggests he would belong to this group. 
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Three arguments were advanced to justify this position. The first argument is rooted in 
the Hadith: 
"A government may subsist with impiety, but it cannot last with oppression and 
tyranny. " 107 
This Hadith was developed by medieval jurists such as Ibn Taymiyyah to mean 
God supports the just state even if it be non-believing but does not support the unjust 
state even if it be Muslim. 108 
Ibn Qayim al-Jawziyyah similarly argued 
when the signs of justice appear ... then that 
is what is intended by the Shari'ah and the 
Din [religion] of Allah. [... ] Any way by which justice and equity are secured is part of 
the Din and not contradictory to it. 
109 
Ghannouchi developed this theme in modem times, insisting 
A just government, even if not Islamic, is considered very close to the Islamic one, 
because justice is the most important feature of an Islamic government, and it has been 
said that justice is the law of Allah. ' 10 
107 Quoted in Kerr, p122(n44). The following argument is based on Ghannouchi's interpretation. Though 
none of my interviewees explicitly used this argument, it was inferred by Abu Shannab 111; Abu Dhughri, 
Taha. 
108 Kerr, p122 (n44). 
109 Ibn Qayim, Al-Turuq al-Hukmiyahfi al-Siyasat al-Shari iyah, Cairo Edition (1953), pp14-16; quoted in 
EI-Awa, System, pp79-80. 
110 Ghannouchi, `Participation', p59 (Ghannouchi bases this argument on Ibn Qayim, Ibn `Agil and Ibn 
Khaldun). `Abduh and Rida also championed this view (Kerr, p122 (n44)). 
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If justice is more important than piety, and if communists are indeed working towards 
justice or freedom and equality, there is no justification for excluding the latter from the 
body politic. 
Secondly, to harmonise this group's position with the apostasy IIad th and the numerous 
Qur'änic injunctions against cooperation and friendship with kuffär, and those decreeing 
war or execution, the distinction between plain unbelief and unbelief coupled with 
sedition against the state was invoked. As long as communists do not fight the 
believers, their beliefs are not illegal and punishable. In the words of one Hamas 
supporter, 
[to support communism] is forbidden in the sense that it is a sin - but it is not 
punishable by law, for the Qur'än says "there is no compulsion in religion". " 
Shamma' even refrained from calling `deviant opinions' sinful: 
It is possible that ... certain 
individuals ... 
have deviant opinions [in the Majlis], which 
do not follow the mainstream. This is not a danger to the community, but a 
phenomenon ... throughout 
history. There were people like that even at the time of the 
Prophet. t 12 
The third type of justification used is the IM's current alliance with the Palestinian Left 
against what it perceives to be the injustices of the Peace Process and the corrupt, 
`Nasr'. Though only `Narr' articulated it, this view informs the position of the whole trend, as without 
it, cooperation with communists cannot be squared with Islamic rule. 
112 Shamma' commenting on whether someone like Egyptian Professor Nasr Abu Zaid, declared apostate 
by some Egyptian Islamists for proposing to use Literary Theory methods on the Qur'an, could be elected to 
the Majlis of an Islamic state. His reasoning here, in conjunction with his justifying women and Christians 
becoming Heads of an Islamic state if this was the will of the electorate, suggests Shamma' would not object 
to communists being elected to the Majlis (as Shamma` was one of the first to be interviewed, before this 
question had crystallised, I did not ask him about communists). 
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authoritarian ways of the PNA. Once one accepts that cooperation with just unbelievers 
is in God's and the ummah's interests, argued Abu Shannab, 
it is unfair that at the end of the path [when we have achieved an Islamic state], we tell 
them:... we succeeded, now you must stop operating.... [I]f you accept working 
together from the beginning, then pluralism should be the principle. 13 
This argument illustrates this trend's commitment to contractarian logic over and above 
issues of piety. 
Most of those adhering to the majority view demand, following contractarian logic, that 
communists, whether organised in a party or not, ' 14 respect the Islamic framework of the 
state (as this was the consensus of the majority to which all citizens are bound) - thus 
balancing the right to freedom of expression against the right of the community to be 
protected against harm. Like the first exclusionist group, this trend - with the exception 
of two who insisted that it is up to the individual elector to square voting for a 
communist with his/her conscience1' - feared that active proselytisation for atheism 
will "put the society into chaos". ' 16 Despite this fear, it is prepared to grant communists 
the right to participate in legislation. Though the persistence of this fear betrays a 
fundamental tension in this trend's position - which might push some into the first 
113 Abu Shannab III. Cf. Ghannouchi's argument that, if Muslims are unable to establish an Islamic state 
"Muslims have no option but to participate politically in establishing and administering non-Islamic 
governments in order to serve the interests of the ummah (community) and prevent evils [... ] The best option .. is [thus] to enter into alliances with secular democratic groups" (Participation, pp59,61,57,60). 
114 Besides Abu Dhughri who did not specify whether a communist party was allowable, and Hammad who 
granted it was, but preferred there not to be one for fear of it causing tensions in society, all members of this 
trend stipulated communist parties were allowable in an Islamic state - given they did not undermine Islam 
(i. e. limited themselves to economics and politics). 
115 `Yusuf, , `Nasr'. 
116 Abu Shannab III, Hammad I 
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exclusionist group if communists grew rapidly in numbers - the concession to allow 
participation indicates the influence of the representation principle on the IM's thinking. 
Some in this group - significantly, none of the leaders - insisted, despite championing 
communist participation in legislation, that apostates be executed. "' This contradiction 
appears to be the result of a tension between a rationally informed pragmatism and a 
rigidly interpreted dogma, and a by-product of the transitional phase in the IM's 
thinking regarding communists. When discussing dogma, the said members 
unequivocally argued that execution was divinely ordained. When, however, discussing 
the Islamicity of PFLP members (and thus the potential for their execution), they argued 
that these were not kuffar but merely lacked "Islamic consciousness". Illustrating the 
tension between their dogma and the reality of friendships or kinship with PFLP 
members, they said: 
You can't say whether people are Muslim or non-Muslim. This is a big issue that we 
don't want to discuss [because it is beyond us]. The only distinction we can make is 
between people who fear God and those who don't: those who don't might do 
something bad because they are not afraid of God observing them. 118 
Importantly, they emphasised: 
You cannot say this man is a käfir because his thought is different from Islam. 119 
Given their reluctance to declare fellow Palestinians kuffär, and their ready approval of 
the notion that communists are part of the Islamic body politic, these members could 
117 Intifada Cell II&III. 
118 Intifada Cell II. 
119 Intifada Cell III. 
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well embrace the more `liberal' interpretation of Islamic sources detailed in Chapter 
8.2.1, which denounces executions on purely religious grounds - if they were properly 
instructed of its existence, and, equally importantly, its being solidly grounded in 
Islamicfiqh (jurisdiction). 12' As long as the notion is morally acceptable to some IM 
members, that a court can put someone to death for plain heresy, some IM leaders might 
be tempted to exploit it for political ends. 
Finally, like the others, this group believes that communism will whither. "' The issue is 
whether, as sceptics would argue, it is this conviction that underlies the IM's 
conciliatory attitude, rather than a principled adherence to pluralism and the Qur'änic 
injunction that "there be no compulsion in religion". It is impossible to answer this 
question conclusively, as much depends on the kind of leadership the IM's leaders will 
give and on the development of leftist-Islamist relations. 
Whatever the depth of the IM's commitment to pluralism, it must be set in the context 
of numerous Palestinian movements dishonouring their professed commitment to 
pluralism (in which they are of course not unique). The prominence of political 
violence and polarisation in recent Palestinian history, particularly under occupation, has 
not offered many examples of non-violent acceptance of political defeat. But 
developments away from this are the beginnings of a rule of law"' and increased 
personal contact between leftists and Islamists, following a rapprochement initiated in 
Israeli prisons, and consolidated in the Left-Islamist alliance against the Peace Process 
(see `Praxis Analysis'). 
120 This again highlights the challenge for the Hamas leadership to educate its members. 
121 Cf. Abu Shannab III, Hammad I. 
122 For details, see Chapter 4, footnote 97. 
BETWEEN INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION 319 
The fact that the majority of interviewees advocated inclusion of the communists in an 
Islamic state, indicates that they have clearly contemplated the eventuality of a sustained 
presence of communists in an Islamic state. 
Within this context, the very development of a series of arguments positively justifying, 
rather than merely condoning, cooperation is an indication that this group's commitment 
to pluralism is more than Machiavellian. During the 1980s, the official party line was 
that communism was evil. The subsequent rapprochement could have been 
ideologically supported by toning down references to communism's supposed evil, 
emphasising the temporality of the alliance, and justifying it on pragmatic and strategic 
grounds. Instead, this inclusionist group has embraced arguments which justify long- 
term cooperation and inclusion in the (Islamic) body politic, on both religious and 
strategic grounds - despite the possibility of alienating its more conservative supporters. 
The depth of this commitment to rapprochement is indicated by the fact that Hammad, 
for instance, wrote in Khalas's official mouthpiece, al-RIsalah, that "[t]he unbeliever 
can ... speak truth, and it should 
be accepted, not rejected because he is an unbeliever" 123 
- thereby countering all those who literally interpret the §, yät and ahädl? h concerning 
unbelief and apostasy. 
8.2.4 THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, J. S. MILL AND THE HARM 
PRINCIPLE 
The difference between the inclusionist and exclusionist trends is largely informed by 
their respective understandings of the harm they believe communists to represent (which 
in turn is related to each trend's faith in the strength of Islam). To clarify the different 
123 Al-Risalah 06.04.1998, p5. 
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positions, I will employ J. S. Mill's detailed explanation of the harm principle, which 
states that 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. ... He cannot 
rightfully be compelled ... 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of 
others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating 
with him ..., 
but not for compelling him ... 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign. '24 
Though beliefs are personal, expression of beliefs affects other people, and is thus 
subject to the harm principle, particularly when the opinion expressed incites to harm - 
as when one states that corn-dealers are "starvers of the poor" to "an excited crowd 
assembled before the house of a corn-dealer". '" Thus, 
Whenever ... there 
is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in 
that of morality or law. ' 26 
However, the curbing of freedom of expression can itself be harmful. The silenced 
opinion may turn out to be true or it may "contain a portion of the truth". Since the 
"prevailing opinion ... 
is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of 
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied". 
127 
Moreover, "received opinion", however true, will become a mere "prejudice, with little 
124 Mill, On Liberty, p14. 
125 Mill, p62. 
126 Mill, p91. 
127 Mill, pp59,52. 
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comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds", unless it is "vigorously and earnestly 
contested". Without debate, "the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of 
being lost, ... and deprived of its vital effect on the [person's] character". Only by 
"explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents" is "a mere formal profession" of 
dogma transformed into an "intelligent and living apprehension of the truth", which is 
capable of influencing a person's conduct. 128 The harm done by the expression of an 
opinion must thus be weighed against the harm done by preventing that expression. "' 
The inclusionist trend's position is close to Mill's. Communists have the right to vote, 
stand for election, and express their opinions concerning economics, politics and 
morality. "' They are banned from becoming Head of State and attacking the Islamic 
basis of the state, God or the central pillars of faith - on the grounds that these actions 
would harm the community by undermining the religious basis of the political, moral 
and legal framework of the society. In this, the inclusionist trend differs from Mill who 
justifies debate on all issues, both sacred and profane13' - although, because Mill fails to 
distinguish "incitement to act" from "advocacy and debate about the merit of action", "' 
his argument could theoretically be stretched to prohibit debate on issues pertaining to 
state security. This difference between Mill and the IM seems to stem largely from the 
fact that the IM posits more beliefs as certain than Mill does (which is in turn related to 
the greater detail contained in Qur'an and Sunnah than in the Bible). However, as 
Mill's defence of theological debate revolves solely around moral issues and the fact 
128 Mill, p59. See also Mill, pp26,28,50-57. 
129 I am here not interested in the ambiguities of the harm principle, such as that its definition is dependent 
on one's moral outlook (cf. John Gray, Mill on Liberty, pp48-49). 
130 Abu Shannab III, Hammad I, one member of Hamas Supporters Gaza, Intifada Cell 111, `Narr'. Taha 
and Abu Dhughri implied it. 
131 Mill, p16. Cf. "If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity, they should themselves be 
just to infidelity.... [A] large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not 
only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith" (p58). 
132 Gray, p106. 
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that the New Testament's morality is incomplete, and as he refrains from justifying 
debate on the veracity of God's existence or faith per se, the inclusionist trend's position 
is not far removed from Mill's. 
Beyond these issues concerning God, debate is welcomed on the same grounds as Mill 
welcomes debate: to advance truth and ensure that half-truths are challenged. Or as 
Hammad put it in al-Risalah, because "the unbeliever can say the truth", 
every human being, whatever their [ideological] affiliation, should open their mind [to 
other-thinkers] so that they can reach the truth. For, to be open-minded, away from 
subjectivity, is the sound way to prove the truth and discover the untruth. 133 
Several interviewees highlighted that Muslims did not have a monopoly on truth and 
much could be learned from non-Muslims, including communists. 134 This, after all, is 
the philosophical basis for ijmä `which recognises the fallibility of the human mind and 
the possibility that truth lies in the dissenting voice (Chapter 7). To argue this with 
regard to communists, this trend separates the individual acts and statements of a 
communist from that his/her overall belief system, and judges them according to their 
specific content, not their origin. Such an attitude shows not only pragmatism, but 
confidence in the robustness of Islam. 
The exclusionist trends operate beyond Millian logic. Though the first of these could 
theoretically allow debate on economic and political issues that do not pertain to 
legislation or the Islamic foundation of the state, it in fact curbs debate with communists 
altogether - thus departing from Mill's principle that debate is necessary for truth to be 
33 Al-Risalah 06.04.1998, p5. 
134 Abu Shannab III&IV, Hammad II, Zahhar 11 (with reservations), Intifada Cell II&III, `lyad'. Cf. also 
openness of some IM leaders towards the (leftist) Model Parliament- Women and Legislation (Chapter 7.4.3) 
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arrived at and dogma to stay alive. Musa justified this stance by arguing that Western 
democracies would also not tolerate someone "legislat[ing] something against the core 
of democracy". "' In a similar manner, neither Musa nor Bahr showed any interest in or 
openness to learning from communism - on the grounds that atheism is indivisible, 
rendering communist ideas or actions, however good, `contaminated' with their atheistic 
foundations. This position seems to betray a lack of faith in the strength of Islamism to 
absorb communist ideas and criticisms. 
Though at one level this exclusionist trend's position could still be described as Millian, 
in the sense that the curbing of freedom is justified by the harm principle, and that it 
welcomes not only debate within an Islamic framework, but also debate with the 
West, "' it has at the same time departed from Millian principles by inflating the harm 
principle, without "definite" proof of "risk of damage", and limiting debate on the 
dubious supposition that unbelief is indivisible -a position which the inclusionist trend 
condemns. This goes beyond Mill's intended use of the harm principle, to 
discriminating against a person's views on the basis of his/her beliefs, rather than on the 
basis of the content of the particular statement at hand. 
The second exclusionist trend differs from the first only by degree, by ending the life of 
(ex-Muslim and atheist) communists, instead of silencing them for life (to which the 
first exclusionist trend's views amount). Though this position is justified through 
reference to Qur'an and Sunnah, it is equally, though probably subconsciously, inspired 
by fear of the harm apostasy can do to Islam. Yet, though the argument has a harm 
element, it goes, like the first exclusionist trend's, beyond Mill by discriminating on the 
basis of a person's beliefs, rather than the statement or action they are actually engaged 
in. A `hopeful' sign, from a pluralistic perspective, is that neither of the two adherents 
135 Musa H. 
136 Bahr, Musa I. 
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to this group are in high positions of leadership, and that both come from the more 
conservative southern end of the Gaza Strip. "' As such, it is possible that exposure to a 
more `inclusionist' religious approach to unbelievers will affect their position. One of 
the two, `Iyad', indeed conceded that in the actual case of cooperation with the Left, 
Hamas could not resort to killing its allies, and that Islamism could learn from 
communism. 
The third exclusionist trend stands somewhat apart, ignoring the issue altogether. 
However, if communism fails to disappear in their Islamic state, there is a real 
possibility that, despite their present `tolerance', they would veer towards the second 
rather than the first of the exclusionist trends. 
8.2.5 PRAXIS ANALYSIS 
In the absence of an Islamic state, current praxis can reveal little about the IM's attitude 
towards the constitutional position of communists. But pointers to the depth of the IM's 
commitment to pluralism can be found in the extent of present cooperation and 
friendship, and in the way the IM treated the Palestinian Left during the lawless climate 
of the Intifada. 
Concerning the present, a loose political alliance between leftist PLO factions and 
Hamas has lasted, on and off, since 1991, when Fatah brought the PLO into negotiations 
with Israel138 - mirroring the cooperation between communists and Brothers which 
137 `Iyad' is an ordinary member, Leader Kutlah-Azhar is the leader of a small branch of al-Kutlah at al- 
Azhar University. For security's sake, I will not disclose their precise domiciles. 
138 Cubert sets the formation of a "loose coalition, shortly after the 1991 Madrid conference" (p86). 
Rashad mentions a Hamas communiqu6 stating so on October 24,1991 (p30n118). Usher sets Hamas's 
(continued... ) 
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existed during the 1950s, before the Brothers were suppressed by Nasser., 
39 The PFLP 
praised "the positive nature of dealing with the Islamic forces" at its Fifth National 
Congress in 1993,140 while a coalition of PFLP, DFLP and Hamas supporters won a 
historic victory over Fatah at the Bir Zeit University student elections 14' After the 
expulsion of the 415 alleged Hamas activists to Marj al-Zuhur (Lebanon) in late 1992, 
the PFLP was one of those providing supplies for the expellees. 142 During the latter half 
of the 1990s, leftist Human Rights Centres such as the PFLP-dominated Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights provided legal defence for the continuous stream of Hamas 
leaders passing through PNA prisons. 143 PFLP and DFLP representatives are invited to 
Hamas functions and vice versa. 144 The existence of an alliance does not, however, 
prevent the movements from opposing each other. In 1992, the PFLP and DFLP joined 
Fatah against Hamas candidates in elections for Bir Zeit University's Student Council 
while Hamas shunned an alliance with the leftists in the 1993 elections for the 
Engineers' Union in Gaza. 145 In 1994, a PFLP leader observed that a "strategic alliance 
remains problematic because of our differences ... over democracy and social matters", 
138 (... continued) 
"formal enlistment in the Palestinian Forces Alliance" in January 1994, observing negotiations had 
been 
underway since Oslo (Palestine, p27). Barghouti ('Islamist Movements in Historical Palestine' 
in Sidahmed & 
Ehteshami, p168) and Klein (pl 19) set the start of the alliance after the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles in 1993. 
139 In 1954-55, Brothers and communists jointly lead protests against Nasser, the Brothers also lending 
electoral support to the communists in the Teachers Union (Milton-Edwards, pp49-52). Communist-Islamist 
cooperation is of course not new, or ideologically impossible; cf. C. van Dijk, "Communist Muslims' in the 
Dutch East Indies' in C. van Dijk & A. H. de Groot (eds), State and Islam. Cf. also interaction in Egypt 
(Ramadan, p173). 
140 PFLP, `Al-Taqrir al-Siyasi: al-Juz' al-Thalith', Al-Hadaf, No. 1150,13.06.1993, pp23-38; quoted in 
Cubert, p86. 
141 Usher, Palestine, p27. 
142 Ahmad, p67. 
143 Raji Sourani, Director PCHR. Cf. Press Releases criticising the PNA concerning its refusal to release 
Hamas leaders Rantisi and Ahmad Nimr Hamdan (26.08.1999), the torture of senior Khalas member Sami 
Naufal (25.08.1999), and the case of `Hamas Detainees on Hunger Strike' (14.10.1997). 
144 Cf. Hammad H. 
145 Cf. Cubert, pp167-168; Usher, Palestine, p27. 
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but added "there are responsible and rational factors in Hamas and, when our interests 
converge, we will work with them". 146 
At an institutional level, there is some exploratory cooperation, most intriguingly 
between women's groups (which have traditionally been ideologically diametrically 
opposed). 14' Though both sides seem to enter such cooperation in the hope of 
converting the other to their point of view, 148 the cooperation suggests the beginnings of 
the end of the demonising that characterised the relationship during the 1980s. Besides 
this, Islamist charities are said to treat clients even-handedly, regardless of political 
affiliation. 149 Western charities dealing with the IM corroborate this, 
'S° indicating that, 
in charity, the IM does not discriminate. 
At an individual level, I have come across a number of friendships. One PFLP leader is 
befriended with Abu Sibah, Dean of Student Affairs at the IUG and a former Kutlah 
leader. "' `Muhammad', the former Hamas cadre leader, has close friends among the 
PFLP, as do some of the members of the Intifada Cell (one of whom used to be a PFLP 
activist himself). The rapprochement of IM and PFLP leaders in Israeli prisons has been 
particularly important in neutralising the mutual negative images which had been 
reinforced by the need for secrecy under occupation (and thus the lack of opportunity to 
146 Interview with Ghazi Abu Jiab ("politically identified with the [PFLP] in Gaza"), Middle East Report 
24(6). 
147 Cf. between the leftist Model Parliament and Khalas's Women's Committee. 
148 Cf. Board Members al-Shabbat; Sarraj-Matar, Director Gaza Community Mental Health Programme - 
Women's Empowerment Project; Qassim, Director Model Parliament - Women and Legislation. 
149 Muslih, `Ibrahim'; `Khalid' I. 
150 Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres, Save the Children, Mennonite Central Committee. 
151 `Muhammad' (relative of PFLP leader). 
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I have already discussed the increasingly conciliatory attitude of some IM leaders. As 
for the Left, `Umar Sha'ban, communist candidate for the PLC, acknowledged that 
Hamas had, in its own way, "worked for our country"157 -a shift from earlier 
accusations that Harnas was anti-nationalistic. A PFLP-affiliated lecturer at Nablus's al- 
Najah University, once acting President of the IUG, observed likewise that the Islamists 
have become "more elastic in their mentality" and readier to debate. 158 Leftist 
interviewees generally dismissed the notion expressed by some government officials159 
that Hamas in power would execute those who opposed it. A leftist Azhar lecturer 
affirmed that "from what they say, they are within democratic practice"160 Sha'ban held 
that "they will control me in a certain way, but they won't kill mes 16' The former PFLP 
student activists were less optimistic, maintaining that despite the improvement in 
relations Hamas would try to "squash" the PFLP (in the same way as they believed it 
had tried to do during the 1980s), and that Hamas would "destroy the principles of 
democracy". 162 However, since their description of the 1980s clashes was highly 
partisan and without much self-criticism, their opinion must be regarded as possibly 
more biassed than that of the other leftist leaders I interviewed. Jarro', finally, was 
pessimistic about the future of pluralism in Palestine per se - not because of Hamas but 
because of "Arab culture": 
See Sudan, the Ba'this in Syria and Iraq, or the leftists who ruined Yemen - there is 
fundamentalism in all factions. 
157 `Umar Sha'ban. 
158 Yusuf'Abd al-Haq. 
159 Top MOPIC Official. Abu Middin (Minister of Justice) did not go as far, though argued that Hamas 
would never leave power once in power. 
160 'Daoud'. 
161 Sha`ban. 
162 `Ziad' & `Husam', Yazuri. 
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However, and despite believing that the "religious individual" advocates "shürä" (a 
negative thing in Jarro"s book), and only supports democracy "to get power", Jarro' 
commented: 
Our trip is long. Hopefully we will be able to change their mentality. I myself, I was a 
[dogmatic] Marxist, I changed into a pragmatic realist. [If I can change, they can. ] 
There are common denominators with Hamas. '63 
One accusation often heard is that Hamas instituted a reign of terror during the Intifada, 
killing those whose lifestyles were deemed un-Islamic, using the collaborator issue as 
pretext. 164 Taken together with allegations that Hamas persecuted leftists during the 
1980s, 161 the accusations infer that if Hamas came to power, it would massacre 
communists, secularists and Westernised Palestinians (even though, inconsistently, it is 
not accused of killing political opponents during the Intifada). 166 
First, the context. To achieve their purpose of undermining the Palestinian resistance to 
occupation, the Israeli secret services ordered collaborators to infiltrate political 
movements, supply inside information, exacerbate tensions between the movements, 
and undermine the general morale of society. "' To political movements, collaborators 
posed a considerable threat to the safety of their members, the success of their 
operations and to society at large. They believed collaborators to be involved in 
163 Jarro' 11. 
164 This claim is less prominent in Western discourse (cf. Usher, `Haman', pp68-69), more so in local elite 
discourse (Top MOPIC Official; Fatah PLC Member, Gazan Businessman; to lesser degree Shahadah 1, 
Director of Gaza Centre for Rights and Law). 
165 Cf. Milton-Edwards on PFLP leaders `Bassam' and Rabah Muhanna, pp113-116. 
166 The Top MOPIC Official envisaged that Hamas would turn Palestine into a second Algeria, referring to 
the prolonged spate of killings in the struggle between Islamists and government there. 
167 This paragraph based primarily on Be'er & Saleh (B'Tselem), Collaborators in the Occupied 
Territories. 
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peddling drugs and alcohol, and encouraging prostitution and adultery. All movements 
sought to punish collaborators suspected of moral laxity. "' Each type of collaboration - 
Hamas differentiated between security, ideological, political, economic and `morality' 
collaborators - invited a specific form of punishment. 
"' According to the prominent 
Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem, Hamas did not kill those belonging to the 
categories of ideological, political or economic collaborator. 170 
In a study of Nusseirat Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip, B'Tselem found that most of 
the 15 cases of collaborator punishment in which Hamas was involved were related to 
"intelligence cooperation with security forces". This is in sharp contrast to the 
punishments meted out by Fatah and the PFLP, 100 in total during the same period, 
roughly half of which concerned "social, moral and criminal issues". Of the total of 31 
killings only 9 were attributed to Hamas. "' Though these conclusions apply to 
Nusseirat Camp only, they suggest, particularly in conjunction with the fact that more 
interest seems to have been shown in this issue in leftist and Fatah than in Hamas 
publications, "' that Hamas was not as, or at least not more, keen on killing those 
suspected of `morality' collaboration than the other political movements. 
Much has been made of the fact that in the last years of the Intifada, Hamas was 
responsible for the bulk of collaborator-killings, and that the number of `morality' 
168 Be'er, pp39-42,89-99. 
169 Be'er, pp173-176,123-138. 
170 Be'er, pI75. 'Khalid' (I1) recounted how, following the accidental death (during punishment) of a 
suspected economic collaborator from Shaja'iyyah, Gaza City, Hamas issued a communique apologising to the 
family, and offering blood money, as is the Islamic custom. 
171 Be'er, pp145-147. Time frame: December 1987 (beginning of Intifada) to end September 1993. 
172 Cf. the PFLP's publication in the 1980s of "Let the Methods of the Enemy's Security Services be 
Exposed" (Be'er, pp41-42), subsequently used by Harnas to instruct its members, and the fact that of the 81 
"major circulars issued in the first four years of the Intifada by Hamas, only nine made reference to the issue 
of collaborators", compared to the constant references to collaborators in the PLO's circulars of the same 
years (B e'er, pp176,164-165). 
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killings increased. "' The Director of the Gaza Centre for Rights and Law claimed, for 
example, on the basis of those last years, that Hamas was responsible for 95% of all 
executions during the entire Intifada. 14 Between April 1992 and the end of 1993, 
Hamas's al-Qassam squads did, according to B'Tselem, kill more than 150 suspected 
collaborators, while the killings by other movements, notably Fatah and the PFLP, fell 
sharply (having already killed a similar number between the beginning of the Intifada 
and the end of 1989 when Hamas killed relatively few, and some having been involved 
in collaborator killings since the 1970s, thus making Hamas's killings far from 
unique). "' 
By 1992, and even more so 1993, after the expulsion of 415 suspected Islamist leaders 
to Lebanon, most of Hamas's senior leaders were exiled or in prison, leaving the already 
young leadership of the Qassam squads without their restraining control. According to 
B'Tselem, there was a marked increase in the number of collaborator punishments 
when, following the arrest in May 1989 of a number of erstwhile Brotherhood activists 
who, during the 1980s, had generally refrained from killing, the young militants of the 
al-Qassam squads stepped into the void. "' Any restraining influence those of the older 
political leadership could wield who had not been arrested by then, was further eroded 
when the majority of these were imprisoned or exiled in turn. It is thus not surprising 
that the most ruthless killing occurred in 1993, after the exile of the 415. On this issue, 
Abu Shannab observed: 
173 Cf. Shahadah I, Fatah PLC Member, Gazan Businessman; Usher, `Haman', pp68-69. 
174 Shahadah I. 
175 Between December 1987-December 1989, some 170 suspects were killed by "groups identified with 
the PLO or by individuals whose affiliation was unclear" (Be'er, p 163). In contrast, between December 
1987-May 1989, Hamas is charged with killing 10 suspects (Be'er, p176). In the early 1970s, and early 1980s, 
the PFLP killed dozens of suspected collaborators, "many of them apparently mistakenly" (Be'er, p160). 
Sayigh remarks of the 1967-1970 guerilla war from Gaza's refugee camps (in which the PFLP was prominent) 
that "the campaign against informers was getting dangerously out of hand" (p210). 
176 The 1980s activists were the Majad and Palestinian Mujahidin (Be'er, p176). 
an 
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there was a common agreement between the top leaders of all the different parties not to 
kill collaborators. But the young people, who were taking the active part, could not 
stick to this strategy - whether because of their enthusiasm or because of their short 
vision. Fatah, at the beginning [of the Intifada], experienced this when the leadership of 
Fatah asked its members not to kill. [We experienced it] also. 177 
Despite the fact that leaders such as Yassin have continued to justify the killing of 
collaborators1' and B'Tselem and others have consequently concluded that the Hamas 
leadership was unequivocally behind the procedure, 1' a significant number of leaders 
within the movement were against the killings. Abu Shannab condemned the 
executions, on the grounds that they could not be based on a proper juridical process and 
that the experience of the 1936 uprising had taught the Palestinians that "killing 
collaborators was something against the Intifada itself '. "0 Haniyyah and Musa were 
unequivocal in their condemnation while Bahr expressed great reserve. 18' As a result of 
the stance of leaders such as Abu Shannab and Haniyyah, collaborator killings in the 
prisons where they were confined, did not occur. ' 12 Moreover, Abu Shannab suggested 
that, once a non-partisan political and judicial system was in place in Palestine, the 
different political movements submit themselves to a national investigation, in a bid to 
lay the ghosts of the Intifada to rest through attribution and retribution. "' 
177 Abu Shannab IV. 
178 Yassin III. 
179 Be'er, pp176-180. Shahadah I&II, Fatah PLC Member and Gazan Businessman implied the same. 
180 Abu Shannab I&IV. 
181 Haniyyah II, Musa III, Bahr. I did not discuss this issue with other leaders. 
182 I have not been able to corroborate Abu Shannab's and Haniyyah's testimonies. Abu Shannab (IV) 
recounted one incident in which the suspect accidentally died after interrogation because of an undetected 
fever, after which he sent word to the family of the deceased, apologising for the death, offering blood money, 
and clearing the suspect's name of collaboration outside of prison. 
183 Abu Shannab IV. 
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As for the accusation that Hamas persecuted leftist leaders, the discussion in Chapters 4 
and 7 showed that there was a continuing power struggle between the IM and the PFLP, 
in which both sides committed atrocities. In the prominent case of PFLP leader Rabah 
Muhanna, moreover, it appears that the person responsible for instigating the beatings 
later turned out to have been a collaborator, responsible for betraying Hamas leader 
`Emad `Aql, and presently serving a prison sentence on suspicion of collaboration! 84 
While non-collaborating IM activists no doubt participated in the beatings, they did so in 
a climate of violence and disinformation, little communication between the parties, 
plenty of disinformation, and a collaborator as commander. That, and the fact that, then 
and since, no systematic killing has been initiated against political opponents, while 
subsequent collaborator killings appear to have been both condemned by much of the 
leadership, and targeted primarily against security collaborators, renders the notion that 
the IM intends to systematically kill communists in future somewhat speculative - 
particularly in the light of the above testimonies of leftist leaders, and the present state of 
cooperation between the IM and leftist movements. 
184 Jarro' I (PFLP), Yazuri (PFLP), Zakariyyah Thalmas (Fatah). 
PART IV 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to explore the political theory of the Islamic Movement (IM) in the 
Gaza Strip. It sought to understand the nature of governance, the political process and 
the body politic in the Islamic state the IM advocates, in the belief that insights into the 
IM's utopian political constructs will not only suggest how it might act in a future 
Palestinian state - be this secular democratic, Islamic democratic or authoritarian - but 
also throw light on the kind of issues Islamism is generally concerned with, however 
diverse its manifestations. 
Existing scholarship has not sought to probe in depth the IM's political ideals - the 
absence of sophisticated political tracts in the IM and the IM's (assumed) propensity to 
violence having led scholars to believe the IM's theory to be too rudimentary or 
Machiavellian to be worth studying. Where theory is discussed, it is generally with 
regard to `international' issues, such as the Peace Process, the IM's attitude towards 
Jewry or nationalism. Little has been said about the IM's `domestic' political theory, 
beyond observations, rooted in Western discourse's preoccupation with the IM's role in 
political violence, that the IM is anti-democratic and anti-pluralistic. Only a few articles 
with a more sociological focus hint that the IM might have democratic-like, pluralistic 
and non-violent aspects. 
The methodological approach used (derived from an analysis of the correlation between 
findings, method and perspective in a sample of Western scholarship on Islamism) is 
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rooted in a perspective which acknowledges the possibility of multiple, in particular non- 
secular, paths to the ideals enshrined in Western democracy. It seeks to incorporate the 
voice of both Islamists and their critics, test commitment to expressed ideals against 
praxis, and juxtapose Islamist theory with comparable Western constructs to create a 
hermeneutical dialectic while refraining from treating the latter as normative. With this 
methodology, I found that the IM has a coherent political theory, internally contradictory 
at times, internally disputed at others, but a discernible body of thought nevertheless. 
The marked similarity between the responses of the forty-eight Islamist leaders and 
members I interviewed bore this out, as did, in areas where current praxis can reveal 
something about utopian theory, the consistency between the IM's theory and praxis. 
Given the assumption in existing Western scholarship that the IM readily resorts to 
violence, and the implications this has for the credibility of democratic-like statements, I 
deconstructed four violent episodes which have been central in shaping Western 
conclusions, detailing two in this thesis. In the case of the 1983 clashes at the Islamic 
University in Gaza, accounts were found to omit important contextual details which 
showed that Islamists indulged in violence neither more nor less than non-Islamists, that 
this violence was highly contextual, triggered by a climate of occupation, resistance, 
infiltration and the absence of a legitimately enforced rule of law, and that its outbreak 
could be traced to a breakdown in communication and a belief, on both sides, that they 
were under threat from the other. In the case of the so-called `bj/ g campaign' of 1988- 
1989, portrayals were seen to inflate the IM's involvement, following ill-informed 
rumours and ideological conjecture by the IM's critics that Hamas must have been 
responsible on account of its religiosity, and its assumed `reactionary' stance on women 
(an assumption which can be shown to be problematic) - where, in fact, Hamas seems to 
have only been responsible, along with others, in helping to create a climate in which 
bare-headedness came to be seen as offensive, triggering a wave of incidents in which 
unaffiliated young boys targeted bare-headed women. 
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Both accounts were found to be coloured by a hegemonising pro-PLO narrative, intent 
on dichotomosing between the PLO and the IM, and depicting the latter as more anti- 
nationalistic and ruthless than it is. Taking this distortion into account, and given that 
the ideational and structural context has changed since the 1980s to a more pluralistic, 
less lawless environment, that IM leaders have expressed regret for the various clashes, 
and that the IM seems not to have been responsible for a hijab campaign and, moreover, 
condemns it, these episodes cannot be said to be reflective of the IM's current political 
culture, or prove that it is inherently violent. 
The IM's political theory, as expressed by my interviewees, is dually contractarian, 
where the contract is between both ruler and ruled, and the ruler and God. Because the 
IM believes that each human being is God's viceregent on earth, it holds that all are 
essentially free and equal, and that, consequently, no one can legitimately wield power 
over another unless the latter has voluntarily consented to this. As God's viceregent, no 
ruler's authority is legitimate unless s/he rules within the boundaries set by God. All are 
thus equal before the law. IM institutional praxis bears out these ideals, political power 
being dependent on personal integrity and members' trust, as expressed in regular 
elections (circumstances allowing). To institutionalise the contractarian nature of 
leadership, the IM proposes a separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary 
powers, the first two, in the form of a Head of State and a legislative assembly (Majlis 
al-Shrma), elected directly and regularly by the people. The MajIfs is the highest 
legislative authority and has the right to impeach the Head of State if the latter reneges 
on either his contract with the people, or his contract with God, as defined in constitution 
and law by the Majlis. 
Existing scholarship has generally portrayed the IM's commitment to the notion of a 
social contract as expressed in elections as Machiavellian, insisting that it seeks to 
implement an authoritarian nomo- or cleritocracy. However, a comparison with John 
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Locke's contractarianism, which also roots political authority in the potentially 
conflicting sources of divine and consensual right, reveals that, like Locke, the IM relies 
on the consensual mechanism to transform divine law, known largely in terms of general 
principles, into a detailed civil law suited to the needs of the community and the era 
while maintaining each member's liberty. Without consensus, divine law has no earthly 
sovereignty. Without divine law, consensus has no moral framework. 
To ensure the law stays true to God's purpose and draws on available expertise, the IM 
envisages the elected legislature to appoint committees of experts. Significantly, in the 
light of charges that the IM proposes a cleritocracy, and of a tradition in Islam which 
holds that legal decisions are the exclusive realm of religio-legal experts (mujtahidun), 
the IM does not demand that Majlis Members be mujtahidun, only that they have a 
working knowledge of the Shari ah and other legal systems. The professional 
background of the IM's current leaders - teachers, medical professionals and engineers - 
seems to bear out this principle. Equally significant, the IM insists that final legislative 
authority remains with the Majlis, not the experts, as the latter lack the popular mandate 
to legislate. In this, it echoes Giovanni Sartori who resolved the democratic deficit 
introduced by the increasing reliance of modern states on unelected experts by 
suggesting that "democracy in output" (decisions which experts have helped shape) 
remains subject to "democracy in input" (the voice of the people as embodied in the 
representatives). 
Underlining both its contractarian commitment, and its rootedness in Islamic tradition, 
the IM imposes the duty to consult (commanded by the Qur'än and exemplified in the 
Sunnah) on the elected representatives in an Islamic state. After consultation, using, for 
instance, referenda on important issues, constitutional and legal decisions should be 
decided by a weighted majority vote, with unanimity the ideal. Everyday policy 
decisions could be decided with a simple majority, as long as they are taken in an 
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atmosphere of tawäfuq (harmony). IM institutional praxis regarding the equivalent of 
`constitutional' decisions at an institutional level and everyday policy issues follows 
these principles. The IM's advocacy of weighted majority rule mirrors that of Western 
theorists Buchanan and Tullock who arrive at this conclusion through calculating the 
optimal cost-effectiveness ratio for decision-making varying from simple majority voting 
to unanimity. Buchanan and Tullock similarly insist on maintaining unanimity as the 
normative ideal, critiquing Western political theory for adopting the majority principle in 
its place. The IM's emphasis on tawäfuq parallels Jack Lively's critique of Western 
pluralist theories for elevating the necessary conflict between group interests and the 
general good to an indispensable guarantor against authoritarianism, while ignoring the 
need for a basic consensus to counterbalance these centrifugal forces. 
Extensive consultation is deemed particularly important in the creation of the 
constitution. The constitution, the IM believes, should reflect the principles God has 
revealed through Islam. But, it insists, such a constitution cannot be imposed. It must be 
resonant with people's beliefs and wholeheartedly embraced. This attitude is rooted in 
an approach to freedom which closely resembles that of Georg Hegel who similarly 
posited that to be free one must voluntarily and self-consciously will what he called `the 
universal will'. Only then is one in harmony with one's divine purpose. Yet, because 
one must will the universal both voluntarily and self-consciously, it is impossible to 
force someone to be free. 
Criticism of Hegel as an authoritarian or totalitarian for advancing a highly prescriptive 
notion of freedom, parallels Western criticism of the IM. Like Hegel, the IM leaves no 
doubt as to what it believes the end of freedom to be. Yet, however prescriptive, both 
Hegel and the IM render the notion of forcing people to be free meaningless in the way 
they define freedom. Both define a personal sphere of autonomy over which the state 
has no authority and which includes religious choices (though there is some ambiguity 
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among a minority of those interviewed about whether this includes the choice to leave 
Islam). Both also insist that a state which fails to safeguard the rights and needs of the 
individual is not legitimate. 
Like Hegel, the IM sees the establishment and development of its Islamic state as an 
educational process in which people are taught to understand and will the 
divine/universal will and so become free. This introduces a tension in the consultative 
process to precede the state. If this is to arrive at a prescribed end-result, is it free? Here 
the IM diverges from Hegel who criticises the contract notion on the grounds that the 
general populace is not sufficiently enlightened, so justifying the rule of an enlightened 
few. Though the IM partially shares Hegel's doubts about the general populace's 
capability to know what is best, it insists that both political authority and the constitution 
lose their legitimacy unless consented to. The sincerity of this belief is demonstrated by 
the extensive consultations the IM embarked upon to decide its policy towards the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and by the fact that it is concerned to gain popular 
acceptance, through education, of the penal stipulations revealed in the Qur'än (al- 
hudrld) before they can be implemented as law. 
It is also born out by the IM's insistence that, though God's principles are univocal, there 
is no one Islamic system. Each of the first four Caliphs, it observes, devised different 
political systems. In addition, following the classical Islamic notion of ijmä `(consensus) 
which holds that truth may reside in the dissenting voice, it acknowledges that more than 
one answer may be (morally) right. In praxis, this is exemplified by the existence of 
multiple views and vigorous debates on constitutional and policy issues, and the 
championing, by some at least, of multi-partyism. Moreover, following the Islamic 
injunction to seek wisdom wherever it is found, the IM is willing to accommodate any 
political system, whether Western or communist in origin, as long as it actualises God's 
principles, chief of which are freedom, justice and equality. 
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Employing Sartori's distinction between value and procedural consensus, the IM appears 
willing to consult and compromise on procedural issues, but not on values. Though this 
attitude seems to corroborate the claim that the IM is anti-pluralistic, it in fact refutes it. 
As Sartori observed, while procedural consensus is essential for a democratic system to 
function, value consensus is merely preferential. The IM similarly welcomes 
consultation regarding procedural issues, aware that procedural consensus is essential for 
the Islamic system to function, but refuses to compromise on values, knowing that 
different value systems can coexist under procedural consensus. 
A majority of IM members interviewed thus welcome Christians and communists as 
members of an Islamic state (though not as Heads of State), as long as they operate 
within the constitution to which the majority of citizens agreed. Present cooperation 
with Christian and leftist institutions, the latter facilitated by the prison encounters 
between Islamists and leftists during the Intifada and the decade-long Islamist-Leftist 
alliance against the present Peace Process, suggests that the IM is serious about 
coexistence with other value systems. A majority similarly emphasise it will abide by 
the outcome of a popular constitutional vote, whether or not this resulted in an Islamic 
state. These attitudes are partly informed by a commitment to contractarianism, partly by 
the belief that the IM's proposed system, based on the righteousness of Islam, is the most 
persuasive. In this it resembles Dankwart Rustow, who argued that pragmatic 
acceptance of democratic procedures by non-democrats will eventually produce genuine 
democrats. 
Too strong a faith in the power of Islam to transform people could blind the IM to the 
need for institutional checks and balances. Some members declared an inordinate 
amount of trust in Islamicly-inspired leaders, insisting that their Islamic faith would keep 
them from error and corruption. However, the majority of those interviewed appear too 
aware of the corrupting influence of power to do away with institutional checks. 
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Illustrative of this attitude is the elaborate system employed by Islamist charities to 
ensure financial integrity, and the holding of regular internal elections. 
Finally, the IM's political theory is a creative fusion of classical Islamic and Western 
principles and traditions, following the example of contemporary Islamist theorists such 
as Rashid al-Ghannouchi (and, on occasion, breaking with earlier Islamist theorists such 
as Abul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb). The reinterpretation of the Sunnah as 
advocating a Western form of electoral contractarianism is an illustration, as is the way 
the IM's attitude towards Christians and communists has developed. 
Though a minority of those interviewed maintain classical attitudes - depicting 
Christians as protected but segregated non-Muslim communities (dhimmk), and 
communists (of Muslim origin) as apostates, to be excluded from the body politic or 
executed -a majority argue, following a rights-based argument, that both should be 
members of the body politic on the grounds that, being subject to the law, they should 
have the right to be represented in the legislature. Accordingly, they should be entitled 
to vote, stand for election and be appointed Ministers. A small minority argue that, if the 
people will it, a Christian could be Head of an Islamic state. The majority, though, insist 
that that post be reserved for a Muslim, employing a competency argument which holds 
that only a Muslim can adequately represent the interests of the Muslim majority. 
Christians would, if they desire so, be entitled to have their own personal status law. 
Though incommensurate with the Western principle of one law for all, and potentially 
dangerous by stigmatising the minority as a segregated, and possibly marginal, group (a 
concern shared by some of Gaza's Christian leaders who advocate full integration and, 
by implication, submission to the Shari'ah), this approach, resembling the Universal 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is both more sensitive to the need of 
minorities to protect their heritage, and is beginning to be reflected in the praxis of 
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Western countries whose populations are becoming increasingly (aware of their being) 
multi-cultural. As such, the IM's stance is worth studying in more detail to ascertain 
whether the Islamist approach holds pointers for future Western multicultural solutions. 
Implications and Further Research - Islamism in Palestine 
At a practical level, the conclusion that the IM has a sophisticated and principled 
understanding of politics suggests it is a political player worthy of inclusion into the 
political process. Particularly in the light of the democratic (secular or otherwise) 
aspirations of the Palestinians, and of Western professed support for the creation of a 
transparent and accountable political system in Palestine, the IM's declared commitment 
to freedom of speech, justice and equality, its theory of contractual leadership and its 
increasing commitment to safeguarding religious freedom, dissent and pluralism in the 
search for truth, are important contributions. Though the movement has only really 
begun to embrace pluralism since the experience of sharing prison with ideological 
others during the Intifada, this type of thinking seems to have resonated with both 
leadership and members, and resulted in a more cooperative and tolerant attitude than 
some of the PLO supporters I interviewed, including a Minister of the PNA, give it credit 
for. 
Lingering prejudices among PLO supporters, rooted both in the clashes of the 1980s and 
in secularist prejudice, might inspire the PLO and the PNA to continue demonising the 
IM, particularly Hamas, and exclude it from the political process - through closures of 
its institutions and imprisonment of its members as is current practice - and so stifle 
pluralistic developments, within both the IM and society in general. Conversely, the 
more the IM is engaged with politically, the more sophisticated and pluralistic its 
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political theory is likely to become - given the developments in theory since its prison 
encounter and subsequent cooperation with ideological others. 
The situation is exacerbated by already existing hegemonic tendencies within the PNA 
and by the pressure exerted on it by the Israeli and US governments to eradicate the IM's 
structure on the grounds that that would stop Hamas's political violence against Israel. 
Israeli policy-makers are tempted, more than Westerners, to overlay their understanding 
of Hamas, not only with secular prejudices based on their own experience with Israeli 
religious parties, but also with an (understandable) excessive focus on Hamas's 
`military' branch's involvement in terrorist acts - thereby losing sight of Hamas's 
political wing's sophistication and the possibility of negotiating a non-violent settlement 
(particularly as political leaders have over the past years begun to distance themselves 
from the `military' solution). 
It is further aggravated by the fact that many Western donor countries involved in the 
Peace Process seem to harbour similar prejudices against Hamas, in the belief that only a 
commitment to secular democracy is acceptable to a modern state. This research has 
demonstrated that non-secular alternatives of the sort which advocate freedom, 
transparency and accountability, should be acknowledged as valid, and given the liberty 
to influence the political debate. 
Many areas of the IM's theory and praxis remain under-researched. My research into the 
IM's praxis at the Islamic University in Gaza (IUG) has indicated how little detailed 
research has been done to date, and how much could be learned about the IM's political 
attitudes with regard to pluralism and democratic praxis in this, to the IM, near- 
hegemonic environment. A more thorough study of the lUG's history, from its origins 
till the present, embracing Committee, Board, staff and student politics, charting the 
IM's and other groups' influence and their interaction at each of these levels, would yield 
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insights into the IM's political values and culture. A similar study of interaction at the 
universities of Najah and Bir Zeit would provide insights into the IM's behaviour in 
opposition to or in coalition with ideological and political others, and so complement the 
data from Gaza's near-hegemonic situation. 
My analysis of the IM's contractual theory and its attitude towards the ideological others 
of Christians and communists tangentially touched upon its attitude towards freedom, the 
private-public and religious-political dichotomies and the limiting of freedom by means 
of the harm principle. More research is needed to arrive at a more comprehensive 
understanding of the IM's position, probing further both the IM's conceptual framework 
and its actual attitude in specific instances. Research into the extent to which the IM 
distinguishes between subjectivity and objectivity will further clarify its approach to 
`truth' and freedom of belief. My research into the IM's attitudes towards Christians and 
communists in Gaza could be duplicated in those areas of the West Bank where the 
highest concentrations of Christians and communists exist, indicating whether my 
conclusions are valid for all Palestine. 
In the chapter on the `hyäb campaign' I briefly alluded to the discrepancy between 
Western discourse's view of the IM's attitudes regarding women's issues, and the IM's 
actual, less than `reactionary' views. As leftist Palestinian women's movements 
themselves acknowledge, the IM can be more effective in changing popular attitudes 
towards women's issues than they themselves are, as it can draw on the legitimacy its 
Islamicity accords it in the eyes of a largely religious population. Moreover, conclusions 
that the IM is `reactionary' do not correspond with the reality of large numbers of 
women becoming IM members, and claiming that the IM has enabled them to become 
better educated or claim their place in professional life. Blank condemnations of the IM 
as `reactionary' are thus not only non-factual, they also prevent an atmosphere of 
dialogue from developing and thus ultimately harm Palestinian women. A thorough 
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study of the IM's thinking regarding women, moving beyond assumptions that 
religiously-inspired movements are necessarily `reactionary', would vital in helping to 
create such an atmosphere. 
Implications and Further Research - General 
The above research has vindicated my thesis that democratic-like, pluralistic and non- 
violent expressions of Islamism exist, even where existing research denied they did. In 
doing so, it has tentatively demonstrated the validity of my argument that perspective and 
method prevented previous scholars from perceiving these expressions - my discovering 
a coherent and sophisticated political theory in the IM seems after all to have been the 
direct result of my having self-consciously problematised my perspectival and 
methodological positions. Problematising the secular prejudice, and its assumption of 
violence and intolerance in religio-political movements, and adopting a pluralist 
methodology which seeks to incorporate both the Islamist voice and that of its critics, 
both violent and non-violent, anti-pluralistic and pluralistic, and anti-democratic and 
democratic instances of Islamist behaviour, seems to have enabled me to re-evaluate 
available evidence concerning the IM's involvement in violence, and take the IM's 
political theory seriously. My use of Western political theory to create a hermeneutical 
dialectic with Islamist thinking, while refraining from positing the former as normative, 
has prevented me from succumbing to the pluralist temptation to lose definitional depth, 
and helped me maintain a value hierarchy to evaluate the relative significance and 
internal logic of the different data. The adoption of a Ricoeurian approach to praxis as 
text and the juxtaposition of praxis and rhetoric also provided a vital critical moment. 
Given the discrepancy between my conclusions and those of most existing Western texts 
on Islamism in general, this research also suggests, along with other pluralist texts, that 
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similar democratic-like, pluralistic and non-violent instances of Islamism exist where 
current research has failed to locate them. Besides demonstrating the need for a more 
self-consciously critical methodological approach, this thesis thus highlights the 
necessity for Western scholars to problematise the applicability of Western `norms', in 
particular the `secular prejudice', and to move beyond a fascination with Islamist 
involvement in political violence, through re-evaluation of existing data and inclusion of 
the Islamist perspective, to an in-depth study of the various manifestations of Islamist 
political theory. This is important for improving Western understanding of Islamism. 
But it may also enhance the West's understanding of itself, and generate new insights 
into persistent problems facing Western political theory, such as how to reconcile 
multiculturalism with an agreed overall moral framework, or how to create a servant 
leadership culture to counter corruption and self-aggrandisement. 
It is important to differentiate, where possible, between the different manifestations of 
Islamism, distinguishing, for example, those who readily engage in political violence, 
from those who do not, and those who approach the Islamic sources literally, without 
much regard for changing circumstances, from those who display a level of pragmatic 
responsiveness to the exigencies of the moment. Each of these will have different sets of 
political constructs and different value hierarchies. Conflating them into a monolithic 
whole will obscure theoretical differences. Yet it is equally important to not categorise a 
manifestation before it has been thoroughly studied. Hamas had been categorised as 
violent; yet it does possess a sophisticated non-violent political theory and praxis. 
Finally, I have not been able to satisfactorily resolve the tension between universalism 
and relativism. Though on the one hand I set out to problematise the assumption that 
Western political science and its values are the universal norm, and have succeeded to 
the extent of problematising the secular prejudice, on the other the bottom line of my 
argument that the IM's theory is an `acceptable' alternative to secular democracy is 
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rooted in the contention that much of its theory resembles those elements of Western 
democratic theories which I (tentatively) hold to be universally desirable. Had the IM 
been less `democratic-like' and more prone to violence, I might have found it more 
difficult to accept its non-secularism. In fact, my reluctance to acknowledge violence as 
a morally acceptable political tool is in itself a universalisation of my value system - 
even though the IM showed a somewhat similar reluctance, justifying their recourse to 
violence with reference to the extremity of their circumstances. 
Whether or not I succeeded in achieving methodological `objectivity', my approach has 
enabled me to learn from the IM's critique of Western democratic theory and practice, 
and appreciate the depth of the IM's political theory. The conclusion that there is a high 
level of similarity between the two political theories does of course not invalidate the 
fact that I was initially willing to problematise my understanding of what constitute 
universally acceptable values. In fact, the discovery of similarity when one is ready to 
find either difference or similarity, seems to vindicate the notion that there is a set of 
universal values, even if we may never know it in M. Perhaps the fact that I had 
temporarily suspended my assumptions about difference and similarity, and about the 
universal validity of some `Western' values, was sufficient to see Islamism and my 
Western background in a more `objective' light. Perhaps, too, it was sufficient to 
acknowledge the potential cultural specificity of those values I refused to suspend, such 
as the moral unacceptability of political violence. In either case, the above underlines 
the importance of problematising both one's perspectival and methodological positions, 
and one's assumptions about Islamism and the universality of Western values. 
APPENDIX A 
Survey of Student Views at the Islamic University 
Gaza, December 1997 
Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
University of Durham, Great Britain 
This questionnaire must be anonymous. Please do not put your name on it. 
Please answer this questionnaire on your own. We want to know what you think. 
Please tick one square per question. If you do not wish to answer a question, leave 
it blank. 
I Which party did you vote for (or if you didn't vote yet, have you decided to vote for)? 
Q al-Kutlah al-Islamiyyah Q Shabibah Q al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (Isl. Jihad) 
Q Lijan al-`Aural al-Taqaddumi (PFLP) Q Lijan al-'Amal al-Tatawwa`i (DFLP) 
2 Did you vote this way because of the party or the candidate? Q party Q candidate 
3a If party, why? Q party's performance Q national party's perf. Q religious reasons 
Q political reasons 
3b If candidate? Q candidate's religiosity QI agree with their views Q from good family 
Q candidate's integrity Q candidate's patriotism Q candidate a friend 
4 Which of the following national factions do you trust most? 
Q Hamas Q Fatah Q Islamic Jihad Q PFLP Q Fida 
Q PPP Q DFLP Q Islamic Independents 
Q Nationalist Independents QOther Q None 
5 What does `secularism' mean to you? 
Q non-religious state Q Western concept Q modernity Q end of religion 
Q individual freedom Q immoral state 
6 What does `modernity' mean to you? 
Q end of religion Q less poverty/illness Q loss of indigenous culture Q progress 
Q better education Q western standards 
7 What does `democracy' mean to you? 
Q elections Q rule of the people Q pluralism Q majority rule 
Q immorality Q indiv. freedom Q secularism Q modernity Q Islamic 
consultation 
8 Do you believe in democracy? Qa lot Qa bit Q not at all 
If so, why? Q it's western Q democracy is true Islam Q democracy works best 
If not, why? Q it's not Islamic Q democracy doesn't exist Q Palestinians are not 
democratic 
9 Do you think modernity is good for Palestine? Q very Qa little Q not at all 
APPENDIX 350 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
What kind of state do you hope to see in Palestine? Q secular Q Islamic Q mix 
Why? Q rel. conviction Q pol. conviction Q Islamic=indigenous Q fear of religious politics 
Q fear of immoral politics Q secular=Western 
Which countries in the world would you say have Islamic systems (tick as many as you like)? 
Q Saudi Arabia Q Palestine Q Iran Q Sudan Q Malaysia Q None 
What do you believe is the most important characteristic of a future Palestinian state? 
Q democratic Q no poverty Q just Q pious Q protects human rights 
What do you believe is the most important issue confronting Palestine now? 
Q democracy Q human rights Q security Q economy Q peace Q Islamisation 
What do you think is the most important role of political opposition? 
Q criticize government Q protect pluralism Q protect freedoms Q protect unity 
"Palestine has a free press" Q true Q false 
"The National Authority can be criticized without fear" Q true Q false 
"Political disunity must sometimes be resolved through violence" Q true Q false 
How do you evaluate the performance of democracy in: 
Palestine Q very good Q good Q bad Q very bad 
Israel Q very good Q good Q bad Q very bad 
Britain Q very good Q good Q bad Q very bad 
If Hamas were in power, would there be more democracy? Q more Q similar Q less 
If Hamas were in power, would there be less corruption? Q more Q similar Q less 
If Hamas were in power, would human rights be protected? Q more Q similar Q less 
How much influence should religion have over politics? Qa lot Qa little Q none 
"Access to public office should depend on integrity, regardless of religion"Q true Q false 
"Laws should reflect today's needs rather than early Islamic tradition" Q true Q false 
"The Legislative Council, not religious scholars, should determine the law"Q true Q false 
"Laws must never contradict the Qur'an (e. g. stoning adulterers to death)" Q true Q false 
"Schools should teach Q all children Islam Q all children about all religions 
Q Islam to Muslim children, Christianity to Christian children 
Did you ever vote for a female political candidate? Q yes Q no 
If yes, why? Q she was best qualified Q women's input improves government 
Q men cannot represent women's needs 
If no, why? Q none were qualified Q women are not made to lead 
Q men can represent women's needs 
Should women have equal opportunities in the professional sector? Q yes Q no 
If no, why? Q women should take care of the family Q women are not capable enough 
Q women should not have social contact outside of their family Q other 
Do you believe Israel has the right to exist? Q yes Q no Q depends 
If Palestinians are given an independent state on roughly the pre-1967 borders, with Jerusalem 
as a shared capital, does Israel have the right to exist? Q yes Q no Q depends 
If no, do Israelis have the right to live in a future Palestinian state? Q yes Q no 
Do you support suicide bombings? Q yes Q no Q depends 
If yes, why? Q calling attention to Palestinian rights Q religious conviction Q revenge 
Q only means of expressing anger Q only means to achieve state 
If no, why? Q they cause sanctions from Israel Q religious conviction 
Q does not achieve anything positive Q they kill innocent civilians 
How old are you? Q 17-18 Q 19-20 Q 21-22 Q 23-24 Q over 25 
In what faculty do you study? Q science faculty Q arts faculty 
Where do you live? Q Gaza City Q other city Q village Q refugee camp Q other 
Your family's financial situation is: Q good Q fair Q difficult Q poor 
If your family's situation is difficult or poor, is this since: 
Q before intifada Q intifada Q autonomy in Gaza Q last year's suicide bombings 
Have you lost family members at the hands of Israelis? Q yes Q no 
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34 Have family members lived in: Q the Gulf Q the West Q former Soviet Union? 
35 How many family members have studied at university? Q most Qa few Q only me 
36 Do you want to study in: Qa Western country Q an Islamic country 
37 Are you a member of a social or sport club? Q none Q one Q two Q more 
38 Who or what most influenced your views on the political situation in Palestine? 
Q newspapers Q pamphlets Q radio Q TV Q family Q friends 
Q religious people Q political organization Q youth organization Q PNA 
39 What is your religion? Q Islam Q Christianity Q agnostic Q other 
40 What does your religion mean to you? Q identity Q integrity Q security Q family inheritance 
Q personal faith QI don't think about it 
41 Do you consider yourself religious? Q yes Q no Q don't know 
42 Do you worry whether others consider you religious? Qa lot Qa little Q not at all 
43 Does your faith in God have any influence on: 
your character? Qa lot Qa little Q not at all 
your choice of career? Qa lot Qa little Q not at all 
(The rest of the questions concerns Muslims only) 
44 How often do you pray the early morning prayer? Q always Q often Q rarely Q never 
Why? Q Religious conviction Q peer pressure Q cultural statement Q political statement 
45 Do you ever omit prayers because of other business? Q often Q rarely Q never 
46 Should women wear the hab? Q always Q only outside the home Q never 
Why? Q Religious conviction Q peer pressure Q cultural statement Q political statement 
Q to protect women from men's looks Q to facilitate the pursuit of a career 
47 Is your family religious? Q all of them Q some of them Q none of them 
48 Does your family wear the hab? Q all of them Q some of them Q none of them 
49 Does your family accept your choice of religious life? Q yes Q no 
50 Do you have close Christian friends? Q many Qa few Q none 
Thank You! 
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Survey of Student Views at al-Azhar University 
Gaza, March 1998 
Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
University of Durham, Great Britain 
This questionnaire must be anonymous. Please do not put your name on it. 
Please answer the questions on your own. We want to know what you think. 
Please tick () ONE square per question, otherwise the answer will be invalidated. 
If you do not wish to answer a question, leave it blank. 
la Which party did you vote for? 
Q Shabibah Q Kutlah al-Islamiyyah 
Q Kutlah al-Nizal al-Islami (Islamic Jihad) Q None 
lb Why? Q party's performance Q national party's performance Q candidate's religiosity 
Q candidate's patriotism Q candidate's integrity Q religious reasons 
Q candidate is my friend Q other ........................ 2 Which of the following national factions do you trust most? 
Q Fatah Q Hamas Q Islamic Jihad 
Q PFLP Q DFLP Q Nationalist Independents 
Q Islamic Independents Q PPP Q Fida QOther Q None 
3 What does `secularism' mean to you? 
Q non-religious state Q Western concept Q individual freedom 
Q end of religion Q modernity Q immoral state Q other 
4a What does `modernity' mean to you? 
Q end of religion Q less poverty & illness Q loss of indigenous culture 
Q progress Q better education Q western standards Q other 
4b To what extent do you think modernity is good for Palestine? 0%------------------------------100% 
5 What does `democracy' mean to you? 
Q elections Q rule of the people Q majority rule 
Q secularism Q Islamic consultation Q pluralism 
Q modernity Q individual freedom Q immorality Q other 
6a To what extent do you believe in democracy? 0%------------------------------100% 
6b Why? Q democracy is: 
.. western 
Q 
. true Islam 
Q 
.. anti-Islam Q works best 
Q democracy doesn't exist Q Palestinians aren't democratic Q other ..................... 7a What kind of state do you hope to see in Palestine? Q secular Q Islamic Q mix Q other 
7b Why? Q rel. conviction Q pol. cony. Q Islamic=indigenous Q fear of religious politics 
Q fear of immoral politics Q secular=Western Q other 
8a Can women be members of parliament/majlis as-shura? Q yes Q no Q don't know 
8b What about Christians? Q yes Q no Q don't know 
8c And non-mosque-going Muslims, or agnostics? Q yes Q no Q don't know 
9 How should members of parliament/majlis as-shura be selected? 
Q free elections Q appointment Q don't know Q other:........... 10 Which countries in the world would you say have Islamic systems (tick as many as you like)? Q None Q Saudi Arabia Q Palestine Q Iran Q Sudan Q Malaysia 
11 What do you believe is the most important characteristic of a future Palestinian state? 
Q democratic Q no poverty Q just Q pious Q protects human rights 12 What do you believe is the most important issue confronting Palestine now? Q democracy Q human rights Q economy Q peace Q security Q Islamisation 
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13 What do you think is the most important role of political opposition? 
Q criticize government Q protect pluralism Q protect freedoms Q protect unity 
14a "The National Authority can be criticized without fear" Q true Q false 
14b "Political disunity must sometimes be resolved through violence" Q true Q false 
14c "Those who don't agree with the ulema are apostates" Q true Q false 
14d "Apostates should be removed from office" Q true Q false 
15a If Hamas were in power, would there be more democracy? Q more Q similar Q less 
15b Would there be less corruption? Q more Q similar Q less 
15c Would human rights be more protected? Q more Q similar Q less 
16 To what extent should religion have influence over politics? 0%-----------------------------100% 
17a "Access to public office should depend on integrity, regardless of religion" Q true Q false 
I7b "The Legislative Council, not religious scholars, should determine the law" Q true Q false 
17c "Laws must never contradict the Qur'an (e. g. stoning adulterers to death)" Q true Q false 
18 Schools should teach: Q all children Islam Q all children about all religions 
Q Islam to Muslim children, Christianity to Christian children Q other 
19 Did you ever vote for a female political candidate? Q yes Q no 
19b Why? Q she was the best qualified candidate Q no women were qualified enough 
Q men should represent women's needs Q women have right to pol. positions 
Q women's input improves government Q women are not made to lead 
Q the Prophet said women should not lead Q other ................................................. 
20a Should women have equal opportunities in the professional sector? Q yes Q no 
20b If no, why? Q their task is the family Q women are not capable Q Islam discourages it 
Q they shouldn't have social contact outside the family Q other ..................... 
21 Do you believe Israel has the right to exist? Q yes Q yes, conditionally Q no 
22a If an independent state is created inside the pre-1967 borders with Jerusalem as its shared 
capital, does Israel have the right to exist? Q yes Q yes, conditionally Q no 
22b If no, do Israelis have the right to live in a future Palestinian state? Q yes Q no 
23a Do you support self-martyrdom operations? Q yes Q yes, conditionally Q no 
23b If yes, why? Q to call attention to Palestinian rights Q religious conviction Q revenge 
Q only way to express anger Q only way to achieve state Q other 
23c If no, why? Q economic sanctions Q religious conviction Q nothing positive achieved 
Q innocent civilians are killed Q other 
24 In what faculty do you study? Q science faculty Q arts faculty 
25 Where do you live? Q Gaza City Q other city Q village Q refugee camp Q other 
26a Your family's financial situation is: Q good Q fair Q difficult Q poor 
26b This situation has been like this, since: Q before the intifada Q during the intifada 
Q autonomy in Gaza Q the 1997 closures 
27 Have close family members died at the hands of Israelis? Q yes Q no 
28 Have family members lived in the: Q Gulf Q West Q frmr Soviet Union Q other 
29 How many family members have studied at university? Q most Qa few Q only me 
30 Do you want to study in: Qa Western country Q an Islamic country Q other 
31 What is your religion? Q Islam Q Christianity Q agnostic Q other 
32 What does religion mean to you? Q identity Q integrity Q security Q family inheritance 
Q personal faith QI don't think about it Q other 
33a To what extent does your faith in God influence your character? 0%----------------------100% 
33b And on your choice of career? 0%----------------------100% 
34 Do you worry whether others consider you religious? Q much Qa little Q not at all 
(The rest of the questions concerns Muslims only) 
35 How often do you pray the early morning prayer? O always O often Q rarely Q never 
36 Do you ever omit prayers because of other business? D often Q rarely Q never 
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37a Should women wear the hab? Q always Q only outside the home Q never 
37b Why? Q Religious conviction Q peer pressure Q the hab is a misrepresentation of Islam 
Q political expression Q cultural expression Q to protect women from men's looks 
Q to facilitate pursuit of career Q men should control themselves Q other............ 
38 Is your family religious? Q all Q some of them Q none of them 
39 Does your family wear the hab? Q all Q some of them Q none of them 
40 Do you have close Christian friends? Q many Qa few Q none 
Thank You! 
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